Sea/Air development if Germany wins the 'Race to the Sea' 1914.

[Rule of cool]

Inspired by this thread https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/th...nt-holds-1940-consequences-for-the-raf.44388/

In WW1 the Sea war and associated air and coastal aspects were pretty stale, at best the Germans could 'assault their jailer, but remained in jail'.

What If the Germans 'won' the so-called Race to the Sea; hit the coast at Etaples-Le Tourque and the front line of trenches was established along the Canche river and stretched inland to about where the front lines were in our history?

What impact would this have on Naval, Air and Coastal forces development?

 

[Rule of cool]

Rather than let this die I'll add a few bits of info that might stimulate discussion.

This report on Belgian and French ports was compiled in October 1914 as the Siege of Antwerp ended and the Race to the Sea was in progress. The lines in purple were the ones that the Germans actually held.

• Antwerp: major port and shipbuilding facilities, Scheldt pass through (neutral?) Dutch waters, linked by inland canal to Bruges:
• Zebrugge: shallow approaches and drifting sand requiring dredging, undefended apart from sea mole requiring major defensive gun emplacement, canal big enough for small cruisers inland to Bruges, minimal repair facilities: in general not considered a desirable base
• Bruges: linked by canal to Antwerp, Zeebrugge and Ostend, no repair facilities: useful as safe harbour and supply station
• Ostend: defenceless without guns, linked by small canal to Bruges, some repair facilities including 2 small drydocks
• Dunkirk: shallow and navigational hazards on approach meant bad for Uboats but easily defended, good repair facilities: Good base for Torpedo boats
• Calais: Deep approaches mean uboats could dive as soon as leaving port, well equipped with repair facilities, very vulnerable to attack and would need major defensive gun emplacements: useable by uboats but overall worse than Dunkirk.
• Boulogne: approaches and defensibility similar to Calais but with added disadvantage that the supporting rail line ran along the coast and was vulnerable to naval gunfire leaving the port isolated, limited repair facilities: barely passable for Uboats and Torpedo boats
• Le Havre: navigation hazards so bad as to require French pilots, excellent defensive works with artillery, exceptional repair facilities, canal access from port to inland, Seine navigable deep inland for shelter against naval gunfire: very promising.
• Cherbourg: deep approaches, excellent defences, very well equipped repair facilities, very well placed for a commerce war against Britain: First class, more promising that Le Havre.

In the event the Germans stationed 1/4 of their u-boat fleet in the little Belgian ports and sank 1/4 of the total tonnage sank during the war. They also emplaced a huge number of coastal guns, making the coast a 'dead-zone' for the RN for much of the war. I found the attached diagram of German guns on the internet years ago, I don't know who owns it, and it shows the coverage of the German guns emplaced on the 50km of Belgian coast the Germans did occupy. I imagine such guns emplaced at Cap Griz Nez near Calaias would have a significant impact on the war.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth there's a similar thread in progress on alternatehistory.com. Here is a link to it.

WWI: Channel ports in German hands in 1914

All, Not being particular strong in WWI, had look up something in Liddel Hart’s ‘History of the First World War’. The channel ports were obviously of high importance to BEF. According to Hart, the British command neglected to guard against this although Churchill had been jumping up and down...

www.alternatehistory.com

Is that thread the inspiration for this thread?

 

[Rule of cool]

For what it's worth there's a similar thread in progress on alternatehistory.com. Here is a link to it.

WWI: Channel ports in German hands in 1914

All, Not being particular strong in WWI, had look up something in Liddel Hart’s ‘History of the First World War’. The channel ports were obviously of high importance to BEF. According to Hart, the British command neglected to guard against this although Churchill had been jumping up and down...

www.alternatehistory.com

Is that thread the inspiration for this thread?

I don't look at AH.com these days, but this is a topic that has interested me for a long time. My main thing is that the German navy achieved so little with the resources at its disposal.

 

[ArtosStark]

I imagine such guns emplaced at Cap Griz Nez near Calaias would have a significant impact on the war.

We aren’t going to have the discussion about “whether WW1 Coastal guns could shut down Dover or starve out London when those in WW2 didn’t” again, are we?

 

[Rule of cool]

We aren’t going to have the discussion about “whether WW1 Coastal guns could shut down Dover or starve out London when those in WW2 didn’t” again, are we?

I'd hope to not go down any particular rabbit hole as THE war winner. While I think Harassment and Interdiction fire into Dover port from railway guns when they become available would make life difficult I think the real value of coastal guns at Cap Griz Nez are the dozens of smaller guns that squeeze through-Channel merchant traffic into a very small shipping lane where German uboats can attack and mine them easily. The other great value is that these coastal guns means the RN has to fight to approach the German held coast, rather than approach at will to conduct missions.

I'd also point out that just as the Germans could conduct H&I against Dover and Folkestone the British could conduct H&I against Calais, likely in a similar timeframe.

The attachment below of from Admiral Bacon 'The Dover Patrol 1915 - 1917', note the huge number of uboat-laid minefields between Dunkirk and Calais. In a scenario where the Germans control not only this bit of coast but also all the way down to Bolougne (which has its own fair share of minefields) these minefields could be laid elsewhere, likely in the British side of the Channel outside the range of the German coastal guns.

 

[Hood]

Would make transit of aircraft to and from France more hazardous I guess in the sense that they would have to cross the Channel at a wider point with all the implications that has for limited navigational skills and engine reliability.

 

[Rule of cool]

Would make transit of aircraft to and from France more hazardous I guess in the sense that they would have to cross the Channel at a wider point with all the implications that has for limited navigational skills and engine reliability.

That's something I've not thought about before, but is a prime example of how the Germans holding this piece of real estate mkaes the British war effort that much harder. The Dover-Cap Griz Nez distance is the famous 21 miles and often you can see all the way across unaided. The distances from about Eastbourne to the coastal area near Abbeville is about 70 miles and the distance from the Ilse of Wight to Cherbourg peninsula is a touch closer at 65 miles.

I think that in the event the Germans did capture the French coast down to Etaples-Le Tourquet the British would set up their blockade line between the Ilse of Wight and Cherbourg peninsula, as opposed the the Dover Narrows in our history. This would be patrolled by the Channel Fleet, which wouldn't be able to be disbanded and sent to the Med in early 1915. This blackade line would be able to give assistance to aircraft ferrying across the Channel to France.

The attached map is from Admiral Bacon The Dover Patrol, it should the efforts the British put in to contain the 50km of Belgian coast the Germans did occupy, and that only got its first 3 'fleet' destroyers in early 1916. From mid 1916 (post Jutland) the number of 'fleet' destroyers went up to 13 then 23 until early 1917 when the 2 flotillas of fleet destroyers went back to the High Seas Fleet, leaving the number at 3. They also had 2 flotillas of coastal uboats, one 'attack' and one minelaying.

 

[Rule of cool]

I posted this in another thread, but its more at home here.

I've refreshed my knowledge on this and am reminded how the Germany artillery in 1914 was dominant compared to the French. This superiority is part of the reason the Germans were able to advance so far in the early weeks of the war, and why I think if they played their cards right they could win the 'Race to the Sea'.

Firstly, the Germans weren't backwards compared to the French. They introduced a modern 150mm medium field howitzer in 1902, 100mm field fun in 1904, modernised the 77mm field gun in 1904, modernised the 105mm light field howitzer in 1909, introduced the heavy 210mm field howitzer in 1910, a new 150mm medium field howitzer in 1913 and a new 100mm field gun in 1914. In contrast The French introduced the 75 in 1898, the Rimahilo 155mm howitzer (another innovative design) in 1907 and the 105mm heavy field gun in 1914.

Secondly there are the numbers.
In 1914 France had about 4,100 75s and 110 Rimahilo 155mm. The April 1914 Cadre law organised the French artillery, 110 Schneider 105mm heavy field guns were on order so 4 standard regiments each with 12 x 155mm howitzers (4 guns per battery) and 12 x 105mm that would be ready by 1915. A 5th non standard regiment was also to be stood up using 1878 120mm Le Bange guns taken from fortifications and put on motorised transport, 10 batteries of 6 guns. Longer term plans were to double this, a proposed follow-on order for 110 105mm heavy field guns, a proposed order for 110 medium field howitzers of an unspecified type and another 5 batteries of the old 120mm De Bange guns. This is a grand total of 280 heavy field guns by 1915 and 560 by 1917.

In 1914 the Germans had just over 5,000 77mm field guns, ~1280 105mm light field howitzers, 178 100mm heavy field guns, over 400 150mm medium field howitzers and over 200 210mm heavy field howitzers. That's a grand total 800 heavy field pieces in service in 1914 that France was attempting to counter with their 280 pieces by 1915 and 560 by 1917. The French had no answer to the almost 1300 light howitzers and Germany had more field guns than the French.

Thirdly, the devil is in the details.
The German 77mm field gun had less range and rate of fire than the French 75 and fired a lighter shell than the British 18pdr, but was lighter and therefore more mobile. This gun was good in the movement phase but found wanting in trench war compared to the French and British guns, however the German divisions had 18 105mm howitzers which were superior in trench warfare to the 75 and 18pdr. The French Rimhailo howitzer had a very high rate of fire, but it lacked range compared to the German 150mm howitzer and in any case was outnumbered 4 to 1. The French had 1000s gun pieces and millions of rounds of ammo in fortresses throughout the country, and these were pressed into services as soon as the lines stabilised, but without modern recoils systems these pieces had such a low rate of fire that a battery equated to a single modern gun.

 

[ArtosStark]

I've refreshed my knowledge on this and am reminded how the Germany artillery in 1914 was dominant compared to the French. This superiority is part of the reason the Germans were able to advance so far in the early weeks of the war, and why I think if they played their cards right they could win the 'Race to the Sea'.

I fail to see how a better heavy artillery park helps to win a maneuver race largely determined by logistical rail throughput and internal lines of transportation.

 

[Rule of cool]

I fail to see how a better heavy artillery park helps to win a maneuver race largely determined by logistical rail throughout and internal lines of transportation.

For context, this post was in response to an assertion that Germany was lucky to get as far as it did and if they tried to do anything else they would do worse. My assertion is that Germany's advances in 1914 weren't a fluke, they had artillery superiority among other things, and could have won the 'Race to the Sea' if different decisions were made.

As for outrunning the logistic support, that implies tactical success in battle exceeding expectations/capabilities, something artillery superiority helped with.

 

[ArtosStark]

for outrunning the logistic support, that implies tactical success in battle exceeding expectations/capabilities,

And/or unrealistic expectations. In the case of 1914 I would argue more of the latter. Certainly the Germans had expectations for their forces to go much farther than they actually did.

 

[Rule of cool]

And/or unrealistic expectations. In the case of 1914 I would argue more of the latter. Certainly the Germans had expectations for their forces to go much farther than they actually did.

I don't think they expected 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies to keep marching around Paris and on to the French-German border. I think, from scraps of information scattered all over the place, that they expected the 6th and 7th Armies to be replaced by the Italian 3rd Army on the French frontier. The 6th and 7th Army would deploy to the right wing positions, probably around Paris, and restart the advance. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies would redeploy to East Prussa to deal with the 3rd Russian field army expected to arrive at 6 weeks after mobilisation according to Plan 19G.

Of course the Italians didn't join the war and send their field Army, and the 5th French army didn't cooperate by getting cut off and encircled between August 20 and 24.

 

[ArtosStark]

I don't think they expected 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies to keep marching around Paris and on to the French-German border

In that we agree. Though how far that goes I don’t know. Both Schlieffen and Moltke were aiming at the destruction of the French Army, rather than directly for the capital, much less to loop around it all the way back to the border.

I think, from scraps of information scattered all over the place, that they expected the 6th and 7th Armies to be replaced by the Italian 3rd Army on the French frontier.

My understanding is that at least by 1912 Moltke and the German General Staff were skeptical of the Italians arriving and being useful to the German attack on France. AIUI this was a contributing factor to the decision to commit German reserve formations into the front line in large numbers. This decision was what allowed the Germans to match the French numbers and achieve local superiority on the Right.

The 6th and 7th Army would deploy to the right wing positions, probably around Paris, and restart the advance.

All of 1st and most of 2nd Army was already sharing a supply corridor (basically one major rail corridor). This was a contributing factor in why the Germans were stopped where they were. Putting two more armies on the same corridor doesn’t seem like it will improve the situation on the Right Flank.

 

[Rule of cool]

In that we agree. Though how far that goes I don’t know. Both Schlieffen and Moltke were aiming at the destruction of the French Army, rather than directly for the capital, much less to loop around it all the way back to the border.

Yes, but what does that mean in practice? Big, dotted lines on small maps seem to give the impression that the many German armies would push the French armies back onto the German frontier and destroy all 5 in once enormous encirclement. Maybe Schlieffen even believed this was the case, and with 300,000 more men than he had maybe it was his idea. Moltke in contrast only had an extra 135,000 men and had to deal with pesky details like trains, and the enemy.

I suspect Moltke hoped to actually achieve what might have happened on 20-24th August where the 5th French Army might have been cut off and encircled and/or all or part of the BEF shouldered aside from the French line. Once a large enemy force is removed making an advance is much easier and faster. I've read that he planned a rest day for September 6th but this was overtaken by events, while I think this was perhaps somewhat ad-hoc given what I've seen about phases, redeployment and the like I think Moltke expected to incorporate a halt, perhaps to reduce an encirclement.

My understanding is that at least by 1912 Moltke and the German General Staff were skeptical of the Italians arriving and being useful to the German attack on France. AIUI this was a contributing factor to the decision to commit German reserve formations into the front line in large numbers. This decision was what allowed the Germans to match the French numbers and achieve local superiority on the Right.

I wouldn't be surprised if that was the case, especially given how ready the Italians were to not join the war. However I've read that the Germans did reserve trains for the Italians until the 20th of August. As thing panned out I'm not too sure how needed the Italians were, I think that the Germans could have started transferring troops to the right from maybe August 24th without much danger and certainly between the Battle of the Trouée de Charmes that ended on 26 August and Battle of Grand Couronné that began on 4 September.

All of 1st and most of 2nd Army was already sharing a supply corridor (basically one major rail corridor). This was a contributing factor in why the Germans were stopped where they were. Putting two more armies on the same corridor doesn’t seem like it will improve the situation on the Right Flank.

Even if it was the plan to swap out 1st and 2nd Armies with 6th and 7th I doubt they'd be able to get the offensive moving again. Even the French Armies formed from Reserve units after the war started would be enough to start trench lines where the German stopped. What I think would happen is that if the Germans started moving them early enough, 2 weeks earlier than they did, the Germans would be in front in the 'Race to the Sea'. The 6th Army started transferring units on 15 September and they started in action on 25 September, if they started on 1 Sept the first units would have begun arriving on 10 Sept while the Marne was in play and certainly before the Aisne.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Ninja'ing myself by reposting Message 3 of this thread.

For what it's worth there's a similar thread in progress on alternatehistory.com. Here is a link to it.

WWI: Channel ports in German hands in 1914

All, Not being particular strong in WWI, had look up something in Liddel Hart’s ‘History of the First World War’. The channel ports were obviously of high importance to BEF. According to Hart, the British command neglected to guard against this although Churchill had been jumping up and down...

www.alternatehistory.com

Is that thread the inspiration for this thread?

According to Liddell Hart, Motlke had the opportunity to take the Channel Ports in August 1914 using the German forces that were in the Pas de Calais covering the right flank of the Schlieffen Offensive.

This is a quote from Page 60 of my copy of his History of the First World War, which formed part of Message 56 on Page 3 of the above Alternatehistory.com thread.

Flux and Stagnation. Unhappily for their calculations, on the Aisne was re-emphasised the preponderant power of defence over attack, primitive as were the trench lines compared with those of late years. Then followed, as the only alternative, the successive attempts of either side to overlap and envelop the other’s western flank, a phase known popularly, but inaccurately as the “race to the sea”. This common design brought out what was to be a new and dominating strategical feature – the lateral switching of reserves by railway from one part of the front to another. Before it could reach its logical and lateral conclusion, a new factor intervened. Antwerp, with the Belgian Field Army, was still a thorn in the German side, and Falkenhayn, who had succeeded Moltke on September 14th, determined to reduce it while a German cavalry force swept across the Belgian coast as an extension of the enveloping wing in France. One of the most amazing features and blunders, of the war on the German side is that while the Allied armies were in full retreat, Moltke had made no attempt to secure the Channel Ports, which lay at his mercy. The British had evacuated Calais, Boulogne and the whole coast as far as Harvre; even transferred their base to St Nazaire on the Bay of Biscay, a step which not only revealed the measure of their pessimism but delayed the arrival of the reinforcing 6th Division until the German front had hardened on the Aisne. And, during the Allied retreat, German Uhlans had roamed at will over the north-west of France, settled down in Amiens as if they were permanent lodgers, yet left the essential ports in tranquil isolation. The Supreme Command was so mesmerized by its Clausewitzian dogma – “We have only one means in war: the battle” – that it could see no purpose in securing the spoils before it had won the “decisive battle”. A month later the Germans were to sacrifice tens of thousands of their men in the abortive effort to gain what they could have secured initially without cost.

Although, when I first read the book, about 30 years ago, I thought he wrote that the Germans had a whole cavalry corps in the Pas de Calais for the duration of August 1914 to cover the right flank of the German Schlieffen Offensive.

Link to Message 56 on Page 3 of the Alternatehistory.com thread

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

From Message 86 on Page 5 of the same Alternatehistory.com thread.

According to Liddell Hart fear that the Belgians would make sorties from Antwerp (they did) and that the British would make outflanking attacks with troops landed at the Channel Ports (they didn't) resulted in Moltke sending troops intended for the Battle of the Marne to cover his right flank and to strengthen the force besieging Antwerp.

In late September the British did land the 7th Infantry Division and 3rd Cavalry Division at Ostende and Zeebrugge for an overland move to relieve Antwerp, but it was too late to do anything other than cover the escape of the Belgian Field Army down the Flanders coast. Had the German Army taken those ports in August as well as the Channel Ports the British landings would have been impossible and maybe the Belgian Field Army wouldn't have been able to escape.

Link to Message 86 on Page 5 of the Alternatehistory.com thread.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In that thread there was some discussion on whether the German Navy could have used the extensive network of inland waterways in the Pas de Calais, which connected to the equally extensive network of inland waterways in Belgium, that the Germans used IOTL.

I posted the following links to a website about the state of said inland waterways today in Message 99 on Page 5 of the thread.

This website shows the inland waterways network of northern France as it is now. It might not have been this extensive in 1914.

Northern France | Detailed Navigation Guides and Maps

Nord, Calais, Picardy region canals and rivers. Expert detailed cruising information. Ports, depths, heights, locks, VNF contacts, guides, maps, photos

www.french-waterways.com

These are the dimensions of the French canals now. They might have been different in 1914.

Navigation Information | Depths, Heights, and Widths

Information about canal and river depths, bridge air height clearances and waterway lock widths. Key maximum boat dimensions to travel the waterways.

www.french-waterways.com

 

[uk 75]

This is an interesting thread for me as WW1 is not my period.
I am not clear what unbuilt weapons systems are involved that would make a key difference.

 

[Rule of cool]

In that thread there was some discussion on whether the German Navy could have used the extensive network of inland waterways in the Pas de Calais, which connected to the equally extensive network of inland waterways in Belgium, that the Germans used IOTL.

I posted the following links to a website about the state of said inland waterways today in Message 99 on Page 5 of the thread.

This website shows the inland waterways network of northern France as it is now. It might not have been this extensive in 1914.

Northern France | Detailed Navigation Guides and Maps

Nord, Calais, Picardy region canals and rivers. Expert detailed cruising information. Ports, depths, heights, locks, VNF contacts, guides, maps, photos

www.french-waterways.com

These are the dimensions of the French canals now. They might have been different in 1914.

Navigation Information | Depths, Heights, and Widths

Information about canal and river depths, bridge air height clearances and waterway lock widths. Key maximum boat dimensions to travel the waterways.

www.french-waterways.com

The simple answer is yes, if the Germans held the French coast they'd use the canals. They built coastal uboats and boats in Antwerp and avoided neutral Dutch waters by sailing them through the canals to Bruce's, Zeebrugge and Ostend.

One thing to note, and the Germans noted this in October 1914, is the Bolougne is isolated. It isn't connected to the canal network and apparently the single rail line went along the coast so was vulnerable to Naval attack. Yet, assuming the line was along the Somme, Bolougne would be Strategically/operationally the most important port as it is furtherest West, furtherest from Britain and the RN and has the widest access to open water.

 

[Rule of cool]

This is an interesting thread for me as WW1 is not my period.
I am not clear what unbuilt weapons systems are involved that would make a key difference.

I think if Germany held so much coast, an opportunity would arise for them to develop weapons that could be used against Britain directly. Things like long-range artillery, perhaps monitors, coastal defence ships and blockade runners.

Of course, this being alternative history if you don't establish the premise the topic gets bogged down in the premise rather than the question.

 

[uk 75]

Hope I have helped move it along...

Are there any plans from German sources of such weapons?

The old battleship used to shell the Westeplatte in WW2 comes to mind as well as various railway guns.

 

[Rule of cool]

Hope I have helped move it along...

Are there any plans from German sources of such weapons?

The old battleship used to shell the Westeplatte in WW2 comes to mind as well as various railway guns.

In December 1914 von Schroer, Commander of MarineKorps Flandern, requested one of the Odin class coastal defence ships in the Baltic to be transferred to Flanders. This request was denied and the 2 oldest ships that were being used as coastal defence ships in the Baltic were paid off in early 1915. These ships carried 3 x 1 9.4" guns plus the usual assortment of 88s, as did the follow-on Siegfried class.

Such ships could operate under the umbrella of the coastal guns in France and shell targets in Britain.

 

[Rule of cool]

According to Liddell Hart, Motlke had the opportunity to take the Channel Ports in August 1914 using the German forces that were in the Pas de Calais covering the right flank of the Schlieffen Offensive.

The question is what troops could they use for this task? The Royal Maine Brigade landed in Ostend on August 27 following reports of German cavalry and withdrew on August 31 as the front lines moved south and the BEF would be supported for ports further south and west. The potential was there for the British to oppose a weak holding force, as you've said the forces masking Antwerp were insufficient to stop 3 breakout sorties and of course the fully engaged forces on the right wing were getting relatively weaker with each passing day.

I once read that the reason the 2 corps from 2nd and 3rd Army that were besieging Namur sent to the eastern front on 24 August was because Moltke asked 6th Army commander Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria to send troops east and he replied that it wasn't for Bavarians to defend Prussia. The Kaisar was in his HQ and backed him.

 

[Rule of cool]

Somewhat to my surprise the Germans wouldn't be able to bombard Kent with guns until 1917 when the 15" Langer Max in fixed mounting became available. The 11" Tirpitz battery and 12" Kaiser battery lacked the range to reach Kent even if emplaced right on the coast at Cap Griz Nez.

Railway guns won't cut the mustard either, they're limited in elevation and therefore range.

 

[Rule of cool]

In this scenario would it be possible to run the blockade?

In WW1 it was about 1000 miles from Germany to the open ocean via the northern route, which was heavily patrolled and increasingly mined. It was about 400 miles from Belgium through the Channel, but about 90 miles to the Dover narrows that was even from 1915 heavily patrolled and fully mined, then another 120 miles to the Cherbourg - Ilse of Wight narrow-ish section then another 180 miles to the open ocean. Obviously, these are too much for any realistic merchant ship to evade.

In this scenario it's about 150 miles from Boulogne to the Cherbourg - Ilse of Wight narrow-ish section then another 180 miles to the open ocean. A ship travelling at 20 knots could cover the 150 miles in 6 or 7 hours, and in a 12-hour night could cover maybe 250-300 miles and be almost in the open Atlantic. The Cherbourg - Ilse of Wight narrow-ish section is about 60 miles wide, so would take a lot more mines and patrolling than the Dover Narrows did. Are there ships around in 1915 that could make this run then go to the USA or elsewhere?