Russian Strategic Weapon Modernization Plans

[bobbymike]

If you were a Pentagon planner would not such a systems development alarm you also given the fact that the Russians are deploying an new Sineva derivative (capable of ten warheads), Bulava (ten warheads) and another new ICBM the RS-24?

Not at all: Gates would've been my boss, I'd have been too busy being alarmed about the implications of that ;D

One commentator remarked that the Russians are modernizing their forces faster than at any time since the end of the Cold War at a time when a new arms control treaty has just been signed lowering warhead count to their lowest levels since the 60's.

A defense planner should be able to ask why.

They're modernizing faster and faster compared to the end of the Cold War in part because they finally have the money to do it. A big portion of the RVSN is the road-mobile Topol, and they're beginning to reach their service life limits. Hence the RS-24. SATAN reaches the end of it's life soon, hence the new liquid-fueled missile being considered. Bulava is a ridiculously expensive failure, likely explaining the new Sineva derivative. Plus, the Sineva derivative and RS-24 were going to appear a lot quicker anyway, being that they weren't clean sheet of paper designs.

I'm kind of hoping this type of news spurs the US into developing a Peacekeeper + sized MMIII replacement first for prompt global strike and then for the future land based strategic deterrent mission.

 

[SOC]

Whatever replaces Minuteman we've already dropped the biggest ball, fumbling away an opportunity to solve multiple problems: the B-3 will be an air-breather.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Which of course everyone on this forum would know and is completely irrelevant to the my question of why such a system is needed.

Actually its not, but you seem like you want to throw a fit for the sake of doing so like half the people on these forums. This reminds me why I rarely post.

Proper analysis of the information in the article would cover the actual information in the article and not pure speculation.

What information, its a couple sentences? You only want analysis on that; well guess what that’s impossible to draw any conclusions from so why did you even ask the question? Any rational analysis at all will work by pulling in other information, a lot of it.

How do we know that the new missiles throw weight cannot already accommodate 15 future light weight boost glide systems.

Volume constraints make that unlikely unless this missile is going to be so big it needs new and very expensive silos.

Rather than just speculate if you look at the actual article it states the the warheads to be deployed on the new system will have stealth characteristics able to defeat future ABM systems.

And since nothing about a conventional RV can be stealthy, that already indicates it’s probably something much different, like boost glide. Guess I read the article after all hun? Of course you might have noticed, and this is amazingly, not in the article, Russia has already been claiming it has highly stealthy ABM defeating warheads… so why would they need a new missile for that? Maybe because stealth RVs don't work, and Russia has a long track record of highly political motivations to lie about its existing military capabilities, and often tells contradictory lies about the US ABM system? One day US ABM is the ultimate threat to Russia, the next day Russian super warheads are totally immune to all ABM weapons ect… Meanwhile the US says stealth on RVs doesn’t work, and is working on its own boost glide systems on which these forums already have extensive threads. Funny no?

New Start allows 700 strategic launchers (with 100 as spares) deploying a maximum of 1550 warheads. As important, this system will begin to deploy right at the time the treaty is to expire 2020. If you were a Pentagon planner would not such a systems development alarm you also given the fact that the Russians are deploying an new Sineva derivative (capable of ten warheads), Bulava (ten warheads) and another new ICBM the RS-24?

Russia has a GPD 1/10th that of the United States, no I can’t say I would be terribly worried about them starting a new nuclear arms race and bankrupting themselves again. Especially not with static silo based weapons. They have a clear need to replace existing missiles which are for the most part, very old, and not modernized in the comprehensive manner as was done to the US Minuteman force. Beyond that, anything you can think or dream on WHY is speculation. A high payload missile could be desired for a number of reasons, some far less hostile then others. The very fact that the US is likely to have some kind of boost or ascent phase ABM capability by the 2030s already makes a high warhead count missile a dumb option for countering ABM, which makes it in fact rather reasonable to speculate that they have no intention is actually loading the thing with that many warheads. You might recall that several different US ballistic missiles did not carry full warhead counts in service in ordered to provide more missile cross range and stay within treaty limits, and that the USSR loaded many of its ICBMs with varying warhead and yield counts. This would be nothing new.

A defense planner should be able to ask why.

And without speculating on the future situation, on possible payloads, sensors and countermeasures such a question is an impossible one. But you asked it anyway didn't you? What do you expect as an answer that isn't pure speculation? Someone with a secret tap on the Russian Defense Ministry phone lines to show up?

 

[bobbymike]

Sea Skimmer - See I actually like your second post better. I hardly think I threw a fit, do you? So in your second post if you take out the snark and sarcasm it contains some good information.

But my concern remains with the pace of Russian modernization coupled with the relative decline and current precarious state of the US Triad and nuclear enterprise. I see a fully modernized Russian nuclear force with huge warhead upload capability in the 2020 timeframe but at the same time another decade of US neglect of the nuclear deterrent mission and continued aging systems.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

Sea Skimmer - See I actually like your second post better. I hardly think I threw a fit, do you? So in your second post if you take out the snark and sarcasm it contains some good information.

Well, yeah that might be a an exaggeration; but frankly I have not found the reception at this place very warm at all. I’m not the nicest person myself either but even in the tiny amount of time I’ve spent here I’ve already seen a number of posters go nuts over pretty dumb stuff.

But my concern remains with the pace of Russian modernization coupled with the relative decline and current precarious state of the US Triad and nuclear enterprise. I see a fully modernized Russian nuclear force with huge warhead upload capability in the 2020 timeframe but at the same time another decade of US neglect of the nuclear deterrent mission and continued aging systems.

The Russians are certainly stepping up modernization, but that and the reduced state of US nuclear forces are directly related to the utter decay of Russia nuclear and strategic defensive systems from 1991 into the early 2000s. Russia also lost a great deal of its strategic depth, and already faces a vast superiority of NATO conventional firepower. We are at the point at which F-16 raids on Moscow could be reasonable. Its simply lost its place in the world, making a conflict that could escalate into a nuclear war dramatically less likely. I certainly see a need to upgrade US nuclear forces, but it is now fairly independent of whatever Russia feels like spending money on. I'd much rather see the brunt of the money spent on defensive systems and conventional weapons that might actually be useful. Certainly US conventional superiority is not at all in doubt. With the US continuing to produce Trident D-5 and finally allocating money for a new bomber project office; though not yet an actual plane, as well as working on new ICBM reentry vehicles and new launch systems for future attack submarines my only real concern lies in if the nuclear warheads will actually work. But I also grow more convinced by the day that the non full scale testing methods being used will work. Our first nukes worked without testing after all more then a half a century ago. But like I was saying, this issue is kind of independent of the specifics of Russian deployments. We do not need to match them missile project for missile project anymore.

 

[stew3]

The Russians are in the same position as to actually testing new warhead designs given the treaty limitations, so the difference between the Russian and American warheads is Russia is making new warheads evidently and the US is rebuilding old ones. I guess there is a difference between 'rebuild' and 'build' according to the above posts, but were not US warheads more advanced (higher yield for weight as in the W-76) to start with, and is their age relevant given the 'rebuild'? How long is a 'rebuilt' warhead viable? I honestly don't know, and that is not a rhetorical question.

 

[bobbymike]

Sea Skimmer - See I actually like your second post better. I hardly think I threw a fit, do you? So in your second post if you take out the snark and sarcasm it contains some good information.

Well, yeah that might be a an exaggeration; but frankly I have not found the reception at this place very warm at all. I’m not the nicest person myself either but even in the tiny amount of time I’ve spent here I’ve already seen a number of posters go nuts over pretty dumb stuff.

But my concern remains with the pace of Russian modernization coupled with the relative decline and current precarious state of the US Triad and nuclear enterprise. I see a fully modernized Russian nuclear force with huge warhead upload capability in the 2020 timeframe but at the same time another decade of US neglect of the nuclear deterrent mission and continued aging systems.

The Russians are certainly stepping up modernization, but that and the reduced state of US nuclear forces are directly related to the utter decay of Russia nuclear and strategic defensive systems from 1991 into the early 2000s. Russia also lost a great deal of its strategic depth, and already faces a vast superiority of NATO conventional firepower. We are at the point at which F-16 raids on Moscow could be reasonable. Its simply lost its place in the world, making a conflict that could escalate into a nuclear war dramatically less likely. I certainly see a need to upgrade US nuclear forces, but it is now fairly independent of whatever Russia feels like spending money on. I'd much rather see the brunt of the money spent on defensive systems and conventional weapons that might actually be useful. Certainly US conventional superiority is not at all in doubt. With the US continuing to produce Trident D-5 and finally allocating money for a new bomber project office; though not yet an actual plane, as well as working on new ICBM reentry vehicles and new launch systems for future attack submarines my only real concern lies in if the nuclear warheads will actually work. But I also grow more convinced by the day that the non full scale testing methods being used will work. Our first nukes worked without testing after all more then a half a century ago. But like I was saying, this issue is kind of independent of the specifics of Russian deployments. We do not need to match them missile project for missile project anymore.

Sea Skimmer - rereading my response to your post I do come off a little abrupt with what are valid points. I am not happy with US strategic planning especially with regard to the nuclear deterrent mission so my frustration was misguided in this case.

 

[bobbymike]

Russia Announces New Sub-Fired Ballistic Missile Tuesday, Aug. 9, 2011 Russia's Makeyev Design Bureau has verified the first trial of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile intended to trump the payload-to-range capacities of comparable systems wielded by the world's other nuclear weapons states, Russia Today reported on Tuesday (see GSN, May 25).
The new "Liner" missile is a heavily modified variant of the RSM-54 Sineva formally delivered to the navy in 2007. Russia has equipped its Delta 4 submarines with 16 of the Sineva systems.
The new weapon had its initial trial launch in May. It is designed to deliver independently targeted nuclear warheads of varying yields, and it includes sophisticated features for breaching present and planned antimissile systems, Russia Today reported.
The Liner would enable Russia's Delta 4 submarines to remain in use until 2030, according to the report.
The solid-fuel weapon can transport between six and 12 warheads with explosives yields of 150 kilotons or four higher-yield nuclear weapons, placing it on par with the U.S. Trident 2 D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile.
The Liner is strongly distinct from Russia's Bulava missile -- a three-stage, solid-fuel weapon slated for deployment on Borei-class submarines once testing is complete -- and the weapons should not be compared by their warhead capacities, specialists say. The Bulava can travel farther than 4,970 miles and carry 10 steerable, 150-kiloton warheads able to exceed the speed of sound, Russia Today reported (see GSN, July 1).
Safety risks posed by liquid-fuel missiles prompted Russia's navy to phase out their use, according to the news report. Solid-fuel missiles are also capable of gaining greater speed upon liftoff, potentially giving them an edge in evading enemy missile defenses (Russia Today, Aug. 9).
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Meanwhile in the US RFPs Slightly Delayed For Air Force's Four ICBM Sustainment Subsystems The Air Force has opted to delay its release of formal requests for proposals for a series of intercontinental ballistic missile sustainment contracts by several months, but the structure and requirements of the contracting process remain stable, according to a service official
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So forget modernization we are going to delay sustainment programs for our 40 year old ICBM,

 

[bobbymike]

Russia to Develop Heavy ICBM to Evade U.S. Missile Interceptors Dec. 16, 2011

Russia intends to design and manufacture a new heavy ICBM with the capacity to evade U.S. missile interceptors, RIA Novosti reported on Friday (see GSN, Sept. 6). Russian strategic missile forces head Lt. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said a determination had been made to build the liquid-fueled, silo-based ICBM to provide Russia with an "enhanced capability to breach a hypothetical U.S. missile defense system." The United States plans between now and 2020 to deploy increasingly advanced sea- and land-based missile interceptors around Europe as a proclaimed hedge against a potential ballistic missile attack from Iran. The Kremlin says it suspects that next-generation U.S. interceptors planned for Europe could have the ability to target its strategic nuclear forces. It has threatened to deploy Iskander missiles near NATO states and to take other steps if its concerns are not addressed.


Karakayev said Iran does not have the industrial capacity or the technical means to manufacture ballistic missiles that can reach Europe. Moscow intends for the new 100-ton ICBM to take the place of the R-36M Voyevoda missile. The new long-range missile is needed as the military's solid-fueled strategic weapons might be vulnerable to interception by U.S. antimissile systems, Karakayev said. The general said his command would conduct trial firings of 11 long-range ballistic missiles in 2012 (RIA Novosti, Dec. 16).


Separately, a Russian naval staff insider said there would be an additional trial this year of the submarine-launched Bulava ballistic missile, Interfax reported on Thursday (see GSN, Nov. 29). "The preliminary information available to us confirms that a Bulava salvo test launch will be carried out from the Yuri Dolgoruky missile-carrying submarine within the period from Dec. 25 to Dec. 29 this year," the anonymous source said, adding that a "launch date will be set by a state commission at the beginning of next week."
Russian officials had earlier intended to hold off on additional Bulava testing until the year was over. "But the defense industry has created all of the conditions needed to conduct a Bulava salvo launch. It concerns this missile itself, its carrier and ground-based infrastructure," the source said. In the upcoming test, two missiles would be fired from the Yuri Dolgoruky, with less than a second separating their launches, he said. "The possibility of putting the Bulava missile into service in the Russian navy will be considered if the test launch is successful," the naval insider said. The Bulava has performed successfully in three test firings in 2011 after a number of unsuccessful trials. The missile, designed to deliver as many as 10 separately targeted nuclear warheads a maximum of 5,000 miles, is intended to become a central component of Russia's nuclear deterrent (Interfax, Dec. 15).
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Despite the fact New Start takes the US and Russia to 1550 deployed strategic warheads Russia is building large 10 warhead capable missiles, why?


Also interesting that in the early 90's the proposed R-36M3 IKAR was to be a solid fueled replacement for the R-36M2 Voyevoda liquid fueled ICBM. Russia still has trouble with large solid fueled rockets or just much less technical risk and lower cost to go with what you know?

 

[SOC]

The new missile will replace the R-36M. There is no sinister plan to create 3,000 warheads. Consider that many of the Topols (SS-25s) are going to be retired in the coming years, and that the R-36M will need to be repalced. The RS-24 is the answer to part 1, its MIRV capability allowing fewer missiles to meet the same warhead number, the new ICBM to part 2.

 

[gaenar]

Separately, a Russian naval staff insider said there would be an additional trial this year of the submarine-launched Bulava ballistic missile, Interfax reported on Thursday (see GSN, Nov. 29). "The preliminary information available to us confirms that a Bulava salvo test launch will be carried out from the Yuri Dolgoruky missile-carrying submarine within the period from Dec. 25 to Dec. 29 this year," the anonymous source said, adding that a "launch date will be set by a state commission at the beginning of next week."

According to Izvestiya it seems it's done already. Bulava passed the last test for fire in salvoes

 

[Grey Havoc]

In other news: Russian nuclear submarine fire put out (BBC News)

From reports and commentary on HP&CA and elsewhere, looks like the Yekaterinburg is a constructive total loss.

 

[gaenar]

In other news: Russian nuclear submarine fire put out (BBC News)

From reports and commentary on HP&CA and elsewhere, looks like the Yekaterinburg is a constructive total loss.

Yeah, I hope it wouldn't be a Kursk tragedy once again ^(

 

[flanker]

Yeah, I hope it wouldn't be a Kursk tragedy once again ^(

lol woot? :

 

[gaenar]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/kursk

 

[bobbymike]

Bulava Enters Hasty Production

January 30, 2012: Russia has ordered mass production of the new Bulava SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile). The exact number of missiles was not disclosed but the order covered deliveries for the next eight years. The Bulava is only used in the new Borei SSBN (nuclear submarine carrying SLBMs). Each Borei carries 16 Bulavas and you need some spares for testing, maintenance, and such. Reloads are not an issue. So there will have to be about 18 Bulavas per Borei. There are currently two Boreis built and waiting for their Bulava missiles. Six more Boreis are to be built, indicating the need for over a hundred Bulavas before the end of the decade.

 

[stew3]

Why not reload SLBMs? If they are so survivable, why not get some to hide somewhere in the world to assure, after the first launch of all SLBMs on board the sub, that all the targets are covered, considering we will have lost a considerable portion of our forces after absorbing a first strike. That would considerably add to deterrence IMHO.

 

[gaenar]

I think after a first launch the will be no need to reload. Just think what if about 100 nuclear missiles reach the aim ^(

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/14/russia-submarine-nuclear-idUSL5E8DE7U920120214

Vlast reported that immediately after the fire the Yekaterinburg sailed to the navy's weapons store, an unusual trip for a damaged submarine supposedly carrying no weapons and casting doubt on assurances that it was not armed.

"K-84 was in dock with rockets and torpedoes on board," the magazine said, adding that apart from the nuclear weapons the submarine was carrying torpedoes and mines as well as its two nuclear reactors.

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2012/02/ekaterinburg.html

 

[bobbymike]

From Defensetalk.com:

Russia is due to create a new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2018, Strategic Missile Forces commander Sergei Karakayev said on Monday. “Construction of the missile is ongoing,” he said. “It is to be completed by 2018.”
The new missile is to replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan) missile.
So far all of Russia’s recent ICBM projects, both sea-launched (Bulava) and ground-based (Topol-M, Yars), have been solid fuel.

Karakayev said the new ICBM will have a launch mass of around 100 tons with a better payload-launch weight ratio than in a solid fuel missile. Such ICBMs can only be deployed in silos. Earlier, the Russian Defense Ministry said that if the United States went ahead with its missile-defense-in-Europe plans, Moscow would respond in kind by notably creating a new sophisticated ICBM.
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Question for the experts at SP:

1) 100 tons is less than half the weight of a R-36M2. With advanced liquid propellants - storable - could this missile even approach the R-36M2's throw weight?
2) In a comparible sized missile how much heavier on average would a solid fueled missile be than a liquid fueled one?

Thanks

 

[bobbymike]

Russia's new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile will have a 5-ton warhead, which is four times that of its predecessors, a former military commander said on Friday. "The new ICBM will have a payload four times bigger than that of the Yars missile,” said Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin (Ret.), advisor to the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (SMF) commander, who served as SMF chief of staff in 1991-93. “The 45-ton Yars has a payload of 1.2 tons. The new missile will be able to orbit a payload of 5 tons. ”The new missile will have a greater capability for missile defense penetration," he said. SMF chief Col. Gen. Sergei Karakayev said this past Monday that Russia will build a new ICBM by 2018. The new missile is to replace the R-36M2 Voyevoda (NATO reporting name SS-18 Satan) missile. So far all of Russia’s recent ICBM projects, both sea-launched (Bulava) and ground-based (Topol-M, Yars), have been solid fuel. Karakayev said the new ICBM will have a launch mass of around 100 tons with a better payload-launch weight ratio than in a solid fuel missile. Such ICBMs can only be deployed in silos.

The Russian Defense Ministry previously said that unless the United States abandons its plans to create a missile defense system in Europe, Russia will take counter measures, including building a new heavy liquid-propellant missile.

 

[bobbymike]

Encapsulates all Russian modernization, scary as the US continues to do basically no modernization of the Triad or weapons infrastructure.

http://www.nipp.org/Publication/Downloads/Downloads%202012/Schneider%20Russian%20strategic%20forces%20talkingpoints%20-.pdf

 

[RyanC]

I like this -- so in order to defeat ABM "that doesn't work", Russia is having to increase the payload of their ICBMs by a factor of four. That doesn't come cheap, whether in overall missile costs (bigger missiles = $$$) or mobility (bigger missiles = harder to move). ;D

 

[chuck4]

The massive payload suggests the Russians are building a missile that has great latitude in sending warheads into a variety of orbit instead of just into a ballistic trajectory to the target. If this is what they intend, it would mean the new missile can threaten any point on the globe from any direction, not just from the direction of the great circle route between launch site and target. This would make defence of large areas such as continental US or western Europe much more difficult. The incoming warhead could now come from any direction. From south, from south east, from south west, etc.

This makes it much more attractive to attempt to take out the missile at boost stage.

 

[bobbymike]

The paper talks about, apparently, new 'miniature' warheads, anyone have any idea?

 

[sferrin]

The massive payload suggests the Russians are building a missile that has great latitude in sending warheads into a variety of orbit instead of just into a ballistic trajectory to the target.

It suggests nothing of the sort. 5 tons is considerably less than the current R-36.

 

[chuck4]

Actually, the R-36 was designed to put warheads into orbit in precisely the manner I described, in what was called at the time fractional orbital bombardment system.


The capability was removed from SS-18 in the mid 1970s due to mutual blackmail between US and USSR, with the inducement of ABM treaty. It was outlawed under SALT II treaty.

 

[SOC]

FOBS was the R-36-O, also known as the SS-9 SCARP. The FOBS unit was based at Baikonur. I don't think I've heard of an R-36M/SS-18 FOBS.

 

[chuck4]

I misspoke. SS-18 is based on the SS-9, and possessed the energy and throw weight to loft multiple warheads into orbit in a FOBS role. But SS-18 was not so deployed, despite evident latent capability to be so deployed due to ABM and SALT II.

I think the reason for deploying new liquid fueled, silo launched missiles with exceptional throw weights to replace SS-18 could only be to preserve this latent capability. Otherwise replacing SS-18s with lighter solid fueled mobile missiles makes more sense.

FOBS poses a severe challenge to any wide area, terminal stage physical interception type of missile defense. For one, FOBS can come from any direction, necessitating much larger number defensive missiles deployed in every direction. Another thing is FOBS launch could be disguised as a satellite launch, and FOBS warheads can arrive at point of reentry without warning.

 

[SOC]

The new heavy ICBM is basically the answer to US missile defense. The large throw weight isn't going to be used up by warheads, it's going to carry both warheads and a whole mess of penetration aids. It will be markedly more survivable post-launch than the Topol-M or RS-24, as those are much smaller ICBMs with reduced throw weights.

Plus, it wouldn't surprise me if the big one was cheaper. No TEL costs, far fewer people to watch over the things, and you can probably use pre-existing R-36M silos. Add to that the fact that the Russian SLVs are mostly liquid fuel, and you can cross-feed certain improvements from one to the other.

Besides, SBIRS can differentiate between boosters. You aren't hiding a FOBS with a satellite launch cover story. Well, unless you actually use an SLV...but then you don't need the new ICBM for that.

 

[chuck4]

SS-18 were deployed with 10 MIRVs and 40 decoys. That didn't use up it full throw weight capacity. These was a scheme to deploy it with 20 or more MIRVs.

 

[sferrin]

SS-18 were deployed with 10 MIRVs and 40 decoys. That didn't use up it full throw weight capacity. These was a scheme to deploy it with 20 or more MIRVs.

Which doesn't change the fact that it was never a FOBS system.

 

[chuck4]

It was a quarter screw driver turn away from being an FOBS.

 

[sferrin]

It was a quarter screw driver turn away from being an FOBS.

Uh-huh. :

 

[RyanC]

Uh-huh. :

Considering that the civilian space launch version of the SS-18 is/was capable of putting 4,000 kg into LEO.... Yeah.

 

[sferrin]

Uh-huh. :

Considering that the civilian space launch version of the SS-18 is/was capable of putting 4,000 kg into LEO.... Yeah.

And the Titan II, Peacekeeper, and D-5 have/had decent throw weights as well. That by no means indicates they're "a quarter screwdirver turn" away from being a FOBS system. :

 

[RyanC]

And the Titan II, Peacekeeper, and D-5 have/had decent throw weights as well. That by no means indicates they're "a quarter screwdirver turn" away from being a FOBS system. :

It all depends on their guidance computer. Once the more modern fully digital guidance systems allowing for near instant retargeting via electrical connections, rather than swapping out physical tapes came along; that was a significant "quarter screwdriver turn" towards a FOBS system.

You still need a specialist re-entry vehicle with a de-orbit system, but that can be accomodated if it was designed to interface through the same attachments that the normal suborbital RVs use to connect to the missile bus.

 

[sferrin]

You still need a specialist re-entry vehicle with a de-orbit system, but that can be accomodated if it was designed to interface through the same attachments that the normal suborbital RVs use to connect to the missile bus.

And thus no, "quarter turn of a screwdriver".

 

[chuck4]

1. It take up to twice as much kenetic energy to send something into low earth orbit as it does to send the same thing into a intercontinental ballistic trajectory.

2. Becuase lower energy of ballistic trajectory, throw weight of a ballistic missile on intercontinental ballistic trajectory is typically much higher than the weight the same missile booster can put into low earth orbit. Some intermediate range Missiles can have impressive throw weights without the energy to put any payload at all into orbit.

3. To convert typical missile into satellite launcher usually requires very substantial alterations like adding a additional upper stage, and/or auxiliary boosters to handle the added weight during liftoff. A typical ballistic missile thus converted probably won't fit back into the same silo.

4. Unlike most solid fueled missiles the SS-18 can put a large payload into orbit without major modifications like adding an additional stage or putting on strapon boosters. It can in theory come straight out of its silo and send a satellite, or a FOBS bus, into orbit.


This is why SS-18 class missile has unusual potential for FOBS deployment, whether announced, or covert.

5. Tell me, when your favorite hawkish commentator say Iran is a quarter turn of screw driver away from nuclear weapons, do you think they meant some mullah has a literal screw driver in a slot, and is flexing his weists to make that quarter turn? Or do you take that to mean they are merely closer to it then is comfortable?