RTX (Raytheon) fined $200m for 750 technical document leaks to China and Russia

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WatcherZero

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RTX has come forward and voluntarily admitted 750 violations of ITAR pertaining to leaks of military information between August 2017 and September 2023. This includes the VC-25 (Air Force One), F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II and the B-2 Spirit stealth, B-1B Lancer and the F/A-18, F-15 and F-16 fighters. This involved employees (company salesmen) travelling to Russia and China with technical documents on their laptops then logging in to local Wi-Fi, the laptops firewalls detected intrusion attempts and the company ignored it, another time the RTX employee was visiting Iran and logging in and a intrusion attempt was detected and laptop remotely locked by corporate. The company also exported parts, components, and technical date of Tomahawk LACM, RIM-162 ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile), RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile, SM-2 and the Paveway-1 LGB (Laser Guided Bomb) to Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sweden, Turkey, the U.A.E. and U.K. without seeking an export license.

Collins Aerospace (which was an independent company at the time, now an RTX subsidary) also imported thousands of Chinese manufactured components (PCB's and circuit boards) and used them in its products without notifying its customers including in 2021 and 2022 exporting technical data of the KC-390 and E-3 Sentry AWACS to Chinese companies employees to facilitate the acquisition of the components. Then in January 2023 the companies employees told the Chinese company classified details of the F-22 cockpit display housing so as to purchase aluminium display fittings from them.

theaviationist.com

RTX Fined $200M for Leak of F-22, F-35, B-2, E-3 And Other Aircraft's Data to Russia, Iran, China

The technical leaks happened with Russia and Iran, while commercial dealings in aerospace components took place with China. The U.S. Department of State
theaviationist.com theaviationist.com
 
"Treason doth never prosper, what's the reason?For if it prosper, none dare call it Treason."
 
Collins Aerospace imported them and passed them off to the DOD / Armed Force as being American made or otherwise of western make. And that's even before one considers what backdoors and such the Chinese were able to build into them.
 
Grey Havoc said:
Collins Aerospace imported them and passed them off to the DOD / Armed Force as being American made or otherwise of western make.
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Are you referring to this part?

...it exported technical data pertaining to an F-22 aluminum display housing component to two Chinese FPEs at the Collins’ facility in Shanghai. The “root cause” was the “misclassification” and “misinterpretation” of the defense articles. It identified “circuit cards” and thousands of “PWBs (Printed Wiring Boards)” that Rockwell Collins (before it became a part of RTX in 2018) and Collins purchased from “PRC entities.” For the procurement, it had to export controlled technical data.
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If so, then that's not a case of "passing them off...as American made".
 
GTX said:
If so, then that's not a case of "passing them off...as American made".
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They also bought parts and components directly from Chinese manufacturers, but with regard as to that Shanghai facility, they were legally prohibited from building anything for US Defense contracts there. Which means in order to get parts from there accepted by military supply chains in fulfillment of said contracts, they had to actively pass the parts off as having been made in authorised Collins facilities in the US or in other friendly countries, or else as having been procured from DOD approved foreign suppliers (usually from NATO countries or places like Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea). And even American company facilities in newer NATO members like Poland have had trouble in in the past getting approval from the Pentagon for inclusion in defense contracts.
 
Grey Havoc said:
They also bought parts and components directly from Chinese manufacturers, but with regard as to that Shanghai facility, they were legally prohibited from building anything for US Defense contracts there. Which means in order to get parts from there accepted by military supply chains in fulfillment of said contracts, they had to actively pass the parts off as having been made in authorised Collins facilities in the US or in other friendly countries, or else as having been procured from DOD approved foreign suppliers (usually from NATO countries or places like Japan, Taiwan, or South Korea). And even American company facilities in newer NATO members like Poland have had trouble in in the past getting approval from the Pentagon for inclusion in defense contracts.
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And if you read "The “root cause” was the “misclassification” and “misinterpretation” of the defense articles. " What does that tell you? That these parts were misclassified/misinterpretted. I wish I had a dollar for every time that has occurred.
 
GTX said:
"The “root cause” was the “misclassification” and “misinterpretation” of the defense articles. "
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That is their legalese position in the legal settlement with the State Department which was agreed to by both sides to allow them to get off with a light slap on the wrist and the State Department to sweep the entire mess under the carpet (or so they hoped, they may well be disappointed there).
 
Have you ever worked in a Defence company? Surely you have seen misinterpretation?
 
Can’t but help wonder what people outraged about the Raytheon indiscretion will respond to the little known Honeywell incident of 2009.
 

State Department Debars Former Honeywell International Employee for Export Violations​



Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
November 27, 2013


The State Department issued an order administratively debarring LeAnne Lesmeister, former compliance officer at Honeywell International, Inc. (Honeywell), from participating in any activities that are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)(22 C.F.R. parts 120-130) for violations of the Arms Export Controls Act (AECA)(22 U.S.C. § 2778) and the ITAR.
Honeywell voluntarily disclosed to the Department numerous ITAR violations carried out by Ms. Lesmeister, its senior export compliance officer in Clearwater, Florida, between 2008 and 2012. Ms. Lesmeister, who had worked in export compliance at Honeywell for twenty-seven years, used her position to circumvent Honeywell’s export compliance program in the fabrication of various export control documents that Ms. Lesmeister presented as Department of State authorizations. Relying on these falsified authorizations, Honeywell exported defense articles, including technical data, and provided defense services to various foreign persons without Department approval in violation of the AECA and ITAR.
The State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs performed an extensive compliance review of the disclosed violations. The results of that review indicated no direct harm to U.S. foreign policy or national security. The nature of the violations, however, prompted the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to formally charge Ms. Lesmeister with twenty-one violations of the AECA and ITAR in connection with her creation and use of Department authorizations, containing false statements or omitting and misrepresenting material facts for the purpose of exporting, retransferring, or furnishing defense articles, technical data, or defense services, and causing the unauthorized export of technical data and provision of defense services.
This administrative debarment is the result of the Department’s first institution of an administrative proceeding by referral of a charging letter before an Administrative Law Judge for consideration pursuant to ITAR § 128.4. The referral and debarment followed Ms. Lesmeister's failure to answer the formal charges.
Acknowledging the serious nature of the violations, Honeywell cooperated fully with the Department’s review and implemented remedial measures to resolve the conditions that allowed the misconduct of one employee, in a position of authority, to bring about significant export compliance violations.
This administrative proceeding highlights the range of potential penalties that may be imposed by the Department on entities or individuals for ITAR violations. Individuals, if found culpable, may not be shielded by their employers for their independent violations. Those persons tasked with an entity’s export responsibilities, should be vigilant in their compliance with all export control regulations.
Under the terms of the administrative debarment, Ms. Lesmeister will be prevented from participating directly or indirectly in any activities that are subject to ITAR for a period of three years and until an application for reinstatement is submitted and approved by the Department. The Department determined that civil penalties were not appropriate at this time.
The Administrative Debarment Order and related documents will be available for public inspection in the Public Reading Room of the Department of State and on the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls website at http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/debar_admin.html
For additional information, please contact the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Congressional and Public Affairs at PM-CPA@state.gov.
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So this basically happened due to the actions of a single corrupt Honeywell official?
 
In the past things like fire extinguisher brackets have been labelled ITAR, hope they've sorted that out.
 

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