Royal Navy decides to abandon carriers earlier- options?

'a fighty looking gray thing'
You realise how ridiculous that sounds?
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Ridiculous is certainly a word that has occurred to me a few times from your posts. Policies also frequently could be described thus.

Fact is, all they basically wanted was a ship. The RAN, a tier up and wanting (want however often being far from what achieved) an effective ship had to modify the weapons.

Dilandu sums it up well, perhaps try listening?

Suggesting Graf Spee would have gone after convoys is illiterate - the entire concept was vanish in the depths of the Ocean, pick off enough lone ships to tie up vast numbers of warships forcing them to escort (expensive in warships and is less effective for supply than a flow of ships, port efficiency for instance). Even with something of the capability of Tirpitz a direct assault on a convoy although feared, wasn’t pushed to happen.

Ref Sea Slug, I read Brown and the language is both precise and vague - based on experience of MoD with things that don’t work I strongly suspect Sea Slug didn’t. In ’82 it wasn’t even positioned or used in the anti-snooper role.

Overall, bin carriers earlier and the RN likely gets a much better surface fleet than sole T82, excess Leanders and T21s. Plus more SSNs as the infra to build 2 a year would likely have survived post R class priority.

'Fact is, all they basically wanted was a ship.'
"We need a ship to look good. Let's buy this ancient obsolete British frigate."
I admire your imaginative scenarioes.

'Suggesting Graf Spee would have gone after convoys is illiterate'
Well, it would have been extremely difficult, given the lack of convoys in 1939. Bismarck, Prinz Eugen, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau set out with the express intention of attacking convoys. Tirpitz was based in Norway with the express intention of going after the Arctic convoys.

'Ref Sea Slug, I read Brown and the language is both precise and vague - based on experience of MoD with things that don’t work I strongly suspect Sea Slug didn’t. In ’82 it wasn’t even positioned or used in the anti-snooper role.'
Sea Slug development began in the 1940s. Are you surprised it was regarded as obsolete in the 1980s?

Actually.
Admiral Scheer DID go after at least one convoy, which resulted in the lost of the AMC Rawalpindi.

As said, early in the war the convoy system had not been introduced. It did not take long for the convoy system to be established (certainly no dithering and pointless arguments as in WW1). As a result, Commerce Raiders, be they the 'Pocket Battleships', Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, Bismarck or later Tirpitz (remember convoy PQ.17?!) did at the very least attempt to attack convoys. The one big No, No, when attacking a convoy was the avoidance of a heavy escort. This was why some of the Revenge class Capital Ships were used for convoy work. They may not have had a good time in a fight with Bismarck or Tirpitz, but they did offer a level of 'fleet in being' protection to convoys in general.
Remember, the Battle of North Cape when Scharnhorst was sunk - The cruiser screen was enough to deter the pressing home of the initial attack if only due to mis-identification of the escorting vessels, and of course, Duke of York was then able to engage and we know the result.
Quite. And why were the attacks on convoys so ineffective in terms of outcome?
Because they were escorted by combatants, of which even a middling one could inflict mission or even fatal damage for a nominally superior attacker and even if the convoy escorts lost ships.

No longer commerce raiding. But expensive for the defending power and an inefficient use of shipping.
 
Which involved keeping a number of obsolete expensive dinosaurs, with all the man power and logistics to support them, to accompany the convoys 'just in case'.
It's arguable that it cost the RN far more than it cost the Kriegsmarine in trying to defend convoys against a remote threat.
 
Of course it did, convoy is insanely expensive for the defending power, who is claiming otherwise? Hence RN reluctance to do it in WW1. Classic Fleet in Being situation.

It is still interesting that the RN saw the Soviet threat in a prism of what it feared, rather than what they actually planned to do - and the Soviet’s had a much more focussed view of employing their naval resources against Allied sea power which had beaten the combined German and Japanese Fleets, against which the Soviet capability was small.
 
The worst part of the RN Leander upgrades is not adopting the RAN Ikara configuration that literally fitted the system in the space previously occupied by Limbo. I understand the reason the UK system was as bulky as it was , was to facilitate the carriage of nuclear payloads for the system and to provide precise aiming (as to why this was necessary for a guided delivery system I do not know). Use the RAN Ikara installation and either keep the 4.5" or have Ikara and Exocet with an additional Seacat, maybe even go Harpoon and a 76mm gun.

The need for 'deep' stowage for the WE.177A warheads was one reason, but the other was that the Australian magazine used on their Type 12 conversions did not meet RN standards for safety. It a booster rocket accidently ignited on any of the first row of missiles, the missile immediately behind would be right in the exhaust and would set off a chain reaction. The Type 82 (and CVA) magazines were perhaps the safest if not exactly space efficient. The Leander magazine of course was slightly more of a compromise. Maybe the RN should have taken the risk? Adding WE.177A to Ikara just added headaches.

Thankyou, you have just reminded me of something that another member found and posted somewhere some time ago, may have ben GTX, or AGRA appologies if I have miss remembered.
https://aso.gov.au/titles/sponsored-films/ikara-weapon-thrower/clip1/

The second half of the first clip shows the test of the Ikara Magazine arrangement in the event of the motor of a missile igniting in the magazine.
 
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