Was Type 985 do-able with 1960s technology given the range and discrimination required?
The yanks managed something that worked, albeit, they ended up dropping it later for what was systems of greater reliability. Not such a problem when you have Hawkeye, and TFX or later VFX comming down the line with their weapons system.
What does the shift from 985 to 988 and NIGS to SIGS do to the whole planning of the fleet?
Does this also reflect the ministerial decision to get the largest CV possible, which happens I seem to reccal around 1962, when the minister questions why they've put forward a 50,000ton design when larger could be accomodated. Then they open up more drydock options to remove restrictions on size, its only the Treasurey that dictates its displacement. Crucialy equating displacement with cost.....
Does NIGS die for more than cost reasons? Could it be that AEW and a "Class II fighter" where expected to match it for dealing with attacks? While being more flexible.
.
By '64 the Russians display some serious anti-ship missiles that render the likes of the SeaVixen and Seaslug of doubtful utility in defence. Did they have earlier warning of that, did SIS get wind of the Russian weapons and they realised the consequences for defence?
On the other hand FAA tactics with the Buccaneer did expose issues with how well defended the fleet would be against such concerted and organised attack by low level strike aircraft (as in not very well defended at all). But some admirals where adamant that the Russians would never use such methods.
How does this relate to the timelines for Argus AEW, and the Aspinal CW radar with a new AAM for OR.346?
Or indeed the revised AW406 requirement. That seems to have a set of requirements about low level interception, not just medium and high altitudes.
SIGS is lighter than SeaSlug and its associated systems, though thats as much a move from valves to transistors as anything. But along with 988 its certainly more achievable for a ship under 10,000tons.