Indeed, it would have rightly terrified the Soviets if push ever came to shove. ;)
 
OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

If 10/64 Election had been narrowly won by the incumbent Party, they would have canx TSR.2 instantly (I give the quote elsewhere), then as Labour, to DC 12/64 to talk Alms and Arms. LBJ wanted bagpipers in SVA and offered a package of kit, fixed price, deferred payment, if UK retained EoS - he could manage UK reduction in NATO; he could manage UK abandonment of the SSBN; he needed (Oz+) UK in distant parts, so inc RN Strike Carriers. Wilson took LBJ's package as means of keeping all the above (until £ devaluation, 11/67). Tory Ministers could not abandon the Deterrent (sacred), nor Empire (ditto), so...must reduce UK-in-NATO.

No need for VTOL EoS so sayonara P.1154, HS681, welcome C-130K, a bunch of J79 Phantoms for NEAF/FEAF interim Canberra replacements; more F-4K for CVA-02 and CVA-03 (mixed fleet with Spey/RN shrugged as insignificant). AFVG (tentatively explored since mid-64) to be the Land/Sea Multi Role Combat A/c. No Harrier.

So: CDG "Non" again, 27/11/67; AFVG spreadeagled 29/6/67; EoS unaffordable 11/67, all as actual, Tories still there.
VTOL tarnished, so FRG about to dump ridiculous AVS and set up an F-104G replacement Study. That so easily might not have been F-16/F-18, Mirages for some, Tornado for 4.
 
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OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

If 10/64 Election had been narrowly won by the incumbent Party, they would have canx TSR.2 instantly (I give the quite elsewhere), then as Labour, to DC 12/64 to talk Alms and Arms. LBJ wanted bagpipers in SVA and offered a package of kit, fixed price, deferred payment, if UK retained EoS - he could manage UK reduction in NATO; he could manage UK abandonment of the SSBN; he needed (Oz+) UK in distant parts, so inc RN Strike Carriers. Wilson took LBJ's package as means of keeping all the above (until £ devaluation, 11/67). Tory Ministers could not abandon the Deterrent (sacred), nor Empire (ditto), so...must reduce UK-in-NATO.

No need for VTOL EoS so sayonara P.1154, HS681, welcome C-130K, a bunch of J79 Phantoms for NEAF/FEAF interim Canberra replacements; more F-4K for CVA-02 and CVA-03 (mixed fleet with Spey/RN shrugged as insignificant). AFVG (tentatively explored since mid-64) to be the Land/Sea Multi Role Combat A/c. No Harrier.

So: CDG "Non" again, 27/11/67; AFVG spreadeagled 29/6/67; EoS unaffordable 11/67, all as actual, Tories still there.
VTOL tarnished, so FRG about to dump ridiculous AVS and set up an F-104G replacement Study. That so easily might not have been F-16/F-18, Mirages for some, Tornado for 4.

The US is good at providing good payment terms for its kit, Australia was allowed to pay for it's first 2 DDGs over 8 years despite a 3 year build time.

Again this makes me think of the decision point/timeframe to change Britain's trajectory as during Sandys' tenure, by the time Britain got on the P1154/AW681 train it was too late to get a good result, one with TSR2 and CVAs.
 
OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

I must respectfully disagree.

(There now follows a shameless plug.)

May I recommend my Drake's Drum series of books, where the fundamental UK problems of penury and loss of confidence are ameliorated and thus defence spending (indeed, all government spending) is chopped with less enthusiasm than in OTL.
 
My point is that the setup is irrelevant, provided that the UK has enough more money to not mind continuing the projects, but not so much more as to grossly distort the global power balance. Because this isn't supposed to be a discussion about the UK.
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.
 
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.

In 1963 the RAAF recommend 36 RA5Cs, so a good/better buy of TSR2 would likely be 36 units, for 1, 2 and 6 sqns.

That's an interesting scenario, even the expensive and late TSR2 vs the F111C. The Australian government didn't specify what constituted an airworthy aircraft for delivery, so was at least partly responsible for the cost escalation instead of holding GD and the US government to a contract. Defence Minister Malcolm Fraser went over and basically threatened SecDef Melvin Laird to sort out the contract conditions, it was this meting that saw the RAAF get the leased F4Es.

Assuming the British persevere with the TSR2, we've had threads that there was no technical problem that was impossible to overcome, would the RAAF get ~24 airframes for less than US$350 million and prior to 1973?
 
Assuming the British persevere with the TSR2, we've had threads that there was no technical problem that was impossible to overcome, would the RAAF get ~24 airframes for less than US$350 million and prior to 1973?
Maybe? I mean, I'm assuming dual Vigilante VERDANs for the interim capability avionics until the UK-designed-and-made avionics are ready, so that part would be ready around the mid 1960s.

But the airframe was also in a death-spiral of weight gain.
 
Australia's F111Cs were built in 1967, delivered into storage and not accepted by the RAAF until 1973, I would think this is not a high bar to beat. The British could take until 1972 to deliver TSR2s and still beat the US, however the Canberras were very old by then and the US leased us F4Es to cover the gap. Ideally the TSR2 would be delivered from 1970, which should be plenty of time to sort out it's issues.
 
Australia's F111Cs were built in 1967, delivered into storage and not accepted by the RAAF until 1973, I would think this is not a high bar to beat. The British could take until 1972 to deliver TSR2s and still beat the US, however the Canberras were very old by then and the US leased us F4Es to cover the gap. Ideally the TSR2 would be delivered from 1970, which should be plenty of time to sort out it's issues.
For what it's worth that's what happened in Derek Wood's Scenario 1964.
 
Contributors here need to read and watch last year's Cosford event


TSR2 was flawed in too many ways to survive.
 
That's not the point of the thread, which is what would the rest of the world have done if it, HS.681 and P.1154 had survived.
All the more reason not to perpetuate the old myths about TSR2 notably by Derek Wood.
 
Here's a thought, could the US have bought these 3 designs into service?
The P.1154, probably. There was certainly plenty of interest in the less-capable Harrier. But the USAF has no need of the other two; as the OP note, the HS.681 isn't going to be competing with the C-130, and the TSR.2 is in the same role as the F-111, so they have no need of it, either.
 
Here's a thought, could the US have bought these 3 designs into service?
Probably.

P.1154 would definitely have some interest.
TSR2 has equivalents in US service, like the A-5 Vigilante and the F-111, so it was technically capable of being completed.
HS681, though, I'm not sure about.
 
To clarify, I meant 'could' in a technical and industrial sense, rather than if the US wanted them. With their money and ability in the 60s to deliver great planes into service quickly and efficiently could they have waved a bit of US exceptionalism at the P1154 and HS681 and made them happen the way the UK couldn't.
 
To clarify, I meant 'could' in a technical and industrial sense, rather than if the US wanted them. With their money and ability in the 60s to deliver great planes into service quickly and efficiently could they have waved a bit of US exceptionalism at the P1154 and HS681 and made them happen the way the UK couldn't.
In that case, I'd say that the US could have made all 3 happen. IIRC, the P1154 and HS681 both used the same engines, right? So getting one more or less gets you the other, assuming that the engines were the major challenge to both.

The US definitely could have delivered at least an interim capability for the TSR2's avionics, straight out of the Vigilante. But there was so much other trouble with the TSR2 engines and airframe that I'm not sure it could be unsnarled easily.
 
TSR2 straddled a range of US designs(F4, F105, A5, B58, FB111) already in service or in development. So it is hard to see even a "working" version repeating the success of Canberra.

P1154 might have interested the US Marines if it had been a succesful STOVL alternative to the A4/F4. Evidence suggests a production version would have been mainly STOL, so perhaps not as attractive as P1127.

HS681 is very similar to the YC15 which failed to win orders in the 70s as a Hercules replacement. More likely is that C130s are ordered after the 681 fails to atttact overseas orders and prove expensive to operate. France did the same with Transall.
 
TSR2 straddled a range of US designs(F4, F105, A5, B58, FB111) already in service or in development. So it is hard to see even a "working" version repeating the success of Canberra.
I honestly expect a TSR2 made with US levels of funding would end up looking a lot like an FB111, complete with swing wing.

The swing wing really helps out with the short field takeoff requirement over and above the blown flaps.


P1154 might have interested the US Marines if it had been a succesful STOVL alternative to the A4/F4. Evidence suggests a production version would have been mainly STOL, so perhaps not as attractive as P1127.
If a production version was still VTOL capable, the USMC would be all over it.

And because the P1154 existed, it might convince the USN to follow through on the SCS/VSS/Through-Deck Cruisers in the 1970s.


HS681 is very similar to the YC15 which failed to win orders in the 70s as a Hercules replacement. More likely is that C130s are ordered after the 681 fails to atttact overseas orders and prove expensive to operate. France did the same with Transall.
That's probably the real downside.

However, if the US had VTOL HS681s in the late 1970s, all of a sudden Op Eagle Claw and Desert One is a success. Seeking reductions in operating costs and making it easier to work under an HS681 in the hover may still lead to tilt-rotor aircraft instead of turbine VSTOLs.
 
The British would only have been able to pay for the construction and maintenance of the cancelled projects if the UK had withheld Iraq's oil production and not withdrawn from Suez, but in that case the Soviets would not have been as aggressive and perhaps such an extensive armaments programme would not have been necessary.
 
All the more reason not to perpetuate the old myths about TSR2 notably by Derek Wood.
No. Not for this thread. And for the reasons given previously. You should post it in one of the get the TSR.2 to work threads. Which is where it belongs.
 
The reason I ask if the Americans could build the 3 planes is because of the problems that are always bought up. I can't help but wonder if all the TRS2s (for example) hurdles would seem so huge if they were being faced by US industry.
 
It depends on which US company is doing it and how similar to TSR2 it would be. e.g. NAA doing a "big Vigilante" with greater range and a conventional weapon bay doesn't seem particularly challenging because of their recent experience with developing the Vigilante itself and many other supersonic combat aircraft. But solving problems generally involves changing the design - so how much has to change before it's a new aircraft? e.g. GD could produce the F-111
 
My idea is that the Americans build THE TSR2, P1154 and HS681, not some American conception of them, and overcome THE problems they faced, not some American conception of them, indeed if these problems would have arisen at all in the American context.

For example in my mind the biggest problem with the TSR2 was the avionics overloading the computer system. The TSR2 had Britain first integrated circuit and first digital data bus, one example of each. In 1965 would America have the same problem, or would they have been able to give the TSR2 numerous integrated circuits and multiple digital data buses so the double VERDANs were not overloaded? Would US metallurgy and NASA aerodynamic data and AMerican 'can do' project management methods sort out the TSR2s other problems?
 
There are two answers to the question.

Given enough time, resources and money TSR2, P1154, and 681 could have been made to work.

But even the US knew its limits in all three and produced F111, F4, and C130 by having more realistic requirements than the UK.
 
What if McNamara goes big? The US cooperates with the UK on TSR2 for the USAF and in return the UK cooperates/buys the Navy interceptor which turns out to be the F-14?
 
What if McNamara goes big? The US cooperates with the UK on TSR2 for the USAF and in return the UK cooperates/buys the Navy interceptor which turns out to be the F-14?
They’d certainly need the cva 01 for that scenario. And I’m sure I’ve read somewhere on this site that they were interested in the tomcat/phoenix combo for interceptor duties, but if the premise of the thread is the Brits don’t cancel their projects, I gotta imagine they’d be in position to build their own naval fighter. But I guess the question is how successfully we imagine those uncanceled projects end up selling, and if they provide enough of a shot in the arm to keep the momentum going for the British air industry. Maybe they try to license the Phoenix and radar, but not the tomcat? Even if things are going well, that combo is pretty expensive to develop, and if there’s a system available from an ally, even a more successful British arms industry might just buy off the shelf. Of course, so far as I know, we only made the Phoenix AWG-9 combo available to the Shah, so there’s a few changes that need to take place, but maybe.
 
The idea is that McNamara instead of pushing the USN and USAF to work together instead pushes the US and UK to work together. US gets TSR2 and the UK gets the F-14, with the deal saving the UK projects in the process.
 
There are two answers to the question.

Given enough time, resources and money TSR2, P1154, and 681 could have been made to work.

But even the US knew its limits in all three and produced F111, F4, and C130 by having more realistic requirements than the UK.

I'm inclined to agree. I also think that if these exact aircraft were being developed in the US they'd need less time, resources and money than the UK because the US had better protect management, a much larger depth of research to lean on and I suspect a larger parts bin of things like data busses, integrated circuits and double-sided (double the memory) VERDANs.
 
My idea is that the Americans build THE TSR2, P1154 and HS681, not some American conception of them, and overcome THE problems they faced, not some American conception of them, indeed if these problems would have arisen at all in the American context.

For example in my mind the biggest problem with the TSR2 was the avionics overloading the computer system. The TSR2 had Britain first integrated circuit and first digital data bus, one example of each. In 1965 would America have the same problem, or would they have been able to give the TSR2 numerous integrated circuits and multiple digital data buses so the double VERDANs were not overloaded? Would US metallurgy and NASA aerodynamic data and AMerican 'can do' project management methods sort out the TSR2s other problems?
Well, the US did have all weather low altitude strike aircraft with terrain following radar in 1965: The A-6 Intruder. But IIRC the F-111 had close to the TSR2s required performance and even the -D model didn't really have the avionics reliability needed.

So I think even the US would have struggled with the avionics. Wouldn't have struggled as much as the UK did, but still would have struggled.
 
Well, the US did have all weather low altitude strike aircraft with terrain following radar in 1965: The A-6 Intruder. But IIRC the F-111 had close to the TSR2s required performance and even the -D model didn't really have the avionics reliability needed.

So I think even the US would have struggled with the avionics. Wouldn't have struggled as much as the UK did, but still would have struggled.
Neither the A-6 or F-111 really got their avionics really sorted until the A-6E and F-111F, which were both introduced in 1970.

I struggle to see where the P.1154 would fit in the USAF, but it might work for the navy and marines in the role the F-18 eventually had, which would mean no F-18, and that might mean a new USN and USMC fighter coming on line around 1990, with design starting a decade earlier. That would imply no stealth, but supercruise and super-maneuverability, perhaps with STOVL.
 
Neither the A-6 or F-111 really got their avionics really sorted until the A-6E and F-111F, which were both introduced in 1970.
Yeah, which suggests that the TSR2 would be on whatever "interim" electronics fit was decided on till about then.


I struggle to see where the P.1154 would fit in the USAF, but it might work for the navy and marines in the role the F-18 eventually had, which would mean no F-18, and that might mean a new USN and USMC fighter coming on line around 1990, with design starting a decade earlier. That would imply no stealth, but supercruise and super-maneuverability, perhaps with STOVL.
USAF would have little to no interest in the P1154. It'd be purely a Navy/Marines plane like the P1127 Harrier was.

What would be interesting is how the P1154 would stand up compared to say, the F8 Crusader and A7 Corsair II.
 
What would be interesting is how the P1154 would stand up compared to say, the F8 Crusader and A7 Corsair II.
Better than the Crusader, worse than the Corsair. It's got similar performance and firepower to the Crusader in a much friendlier package, but compared to the Corsair it has worse payload and range.
 
What would be interesting is how the P1154 would stand up compared to say, the F8 Crusader and A7 Corsair II.
It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?

Or it might just take the VSTOL-A slot from Rockwell, which might mean the VSTOL-B would also be followed through with (CL-84 would be the obvious choice since it was flying).
 
It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?
Wouldn't be surprised if most of them bought P1154s.

Not Canada, they specified a 2 engine plane. So they'd likely get Tornado IDS because Tomcats aren't affordable.



Or it might just take the VSTOL-A slot from Rockwell, which might mean the VSTOL-B would also be followed through with (CL-84 would be the obvious choice since it was flying).
I fully expect the P1154 would take the VSTOL-A slot, which would make the CL-84 a lot more likely to get developed out into ASW and AEW. Which would make the UK carriers a lot more capable in the Falklands.
 
It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?
TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.

As far as foreign Hornet buyers, I don't see anyone except maybe Switzerland buying them. The Swiss might like the V/STOL capabilities, but everyone else would want the better combat capabilities of the Hornet.
 
TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.
But if the USN already has a bunch of P1154s in service only a few years old, would they even be in the market for the Hornet?
 
The P1154 would be expensive to buy and run, 'big plane' expensive despite it being a small-medium plane in terms of size and capability. Countries don't mind paying F4 prices to get an F4 but aren't really keen on paying the same price to get a Mirage III (more or less).
 
TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.
Except the Navy, at least most? of it, didn't want the F-18, they wanted F-14B and F-14C. Congress forced it on them. If they can point at P.1154 and say "see, light naval fighter/attack", F-18 could seem to be a duplication of effort and Congress would be much less likely to fund it.

However, if P.1154 is in service, a follow up VSTOL with F-18 performance might be in the cards. One of the non-stealth ASTOVL designs, including P.1216 or related designs. I can see US/UK VSTOL/STOVL collaboration becoming institutionalized in that case.
 
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