OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.
If 10/64 Election had been narrowly won by the incumbent Party, they would have canx TSR.2 instantly (I give the quite elsewhere), then as Labour, to DC 12/64 to talk Alms and Arms. LBJ wanted bagpipers in SVA and offered a package of kit, fixed price, deferred payment, if UK retained EoS - he could manage UK reduction in NATO; he could manage UK abandonment of the SSBN; he needed (Oz+) UK in distant parts, so inc RN Strike Carriers. Wilson took LBJ's package as means of keeping all the above (until £ devaluation, 11/67). Tory Ministers could not abandon the Deterrent (sacred), nor Empire (ditto), so...must reduce UK-in-NATO.
No need for VTOL EoS so sayonara P.1154, HS681, welcome C-130K, a bunch of J79 Phantoms for NEAF/FEAF interim Canberra replacements; more F-4K for CVA-02 and CVA-03 (mixed fleet with Spey/RN shrugged as insignificant). AFVG (tentatively explored since mid-64) to be the Land/Sea Multi Role Combat A/c. No Harrier.
So: CDG "Non" again, 27/11/67; AFVG spreadeagled 29/6/67; EoS unaffordable 11/67, all as actual, Tories still there.
VTOL tarnished, so FRG about to dump ridiculous AVS and set up an F-104G replacement Study. That so easily might not have been F-16/F-18, Mirages for some, Tornado for 4.
OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.My point is that the setup is irrelevant, provided that the UK has enough more money to not mind continuing the projects, but not so much more as to grossly distort the global power balance. Because this isn't supposed to be a discussion about the UK.
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.
Maybe? I mean, I'm assuming dual Vigilante VERDANs for the interim capability avionics until the UK-designed-and-made avionics are ready, so that part would be ready around the mid 1960s.Assuming the British persevere with the TSR2, we've had threads that there was no technical problem that was impossible to overcome, would the RAAF get ~24 airframes for less than US$350 million and prior to 1973?
For what it's worth that's what happened in Derek Wood's Scenario 1964.Australia's F111Cs were built in 1967, delivered into storage and not accepted by the RAAF until 1973, I would think this is not a high bar to beat. The British could take until 1972 to deliver TSR2s and still beat the US, however the Canberras were very old by then and the US leased us F4Es to cover the gap. Ideally the TSR2 would be delivered from 1970, which should be plenty of time to sort out it's issues.
That's not the point of the thread, which is what would the rest of the world have done if it, HS.681 and P.1154 had survived.Contributors here need to read and watch last year's Cosford event
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TSR2 was flawed in too many ways to survive.
All the more reason not to perpetuate the old myths about TSR2 notably by Derek Wood.That's not the point of the thread, which is what would the rest of the world have done if it, HS.681 and P.1154 had survived.
The P.1154, probably. There was certainly plenty of interest in the less-capable Harrier. But the USAF has no need of the other two; as the OP note, the HS.681 isn't going to be competing with the C-130, and the TSR.2 is in the same role as the F-111, so they have no need of it, either.Here's a thought, could the US have bought these 3 designs into service?
Probably.Here's a thought, could the US have bought these 3 designs into service?
In that case, I'd say that the US could have made all 3 happen. IIRC, the P1154 and HS681 both used the same engines, right? So getting one more or less gets you the other, assuming that the engines were the major challenge to both.To clarify, I meant 'could' in a technical and industrial sense, rather than if the US wanted them. With their money and ability in the 60s to deliver great planes into service quickly and efficiently could they have waved a bit of US exceptionalism at the P1154 and HS681 and made them happen the way the UK couldn't.
I honestly expect a TSR2 made with US levels of funding would end up looking a lot like an FB111, complete with swing wing.TSR2 straddled a range of US designs(F4, F105, A5, B58, FB111) already in service or in development. So it is hard to see even a "working" version repeating the success of Canberra.
If a production version was still VTOL capable, the USMC would be all over it.P1154 might have interested the US Marines if it had been a succesful STOVL alternative to the A4/F4. Evidence suggests a production version would have been mainly STOL, so perhaps not as attractive as P1127.
That's probably the real downside.HS681 is very similar to the YC15 which failed to win orders in the 70s as a Hercules replacement. More likely is that C130s are ordered after the 681 fails to atttact overseas orders and prove expensive to operate. France did the same with Transall.
No. Not for this thread. And for the reasons given previously. You should post it in one of the get the TSR.2 to work threads. Which is where it belongs.All the more reason not to perpetuate the old myths about TSR2 notably by Derek Wood.
They’d certainly need the cva 01 for that scenario. And I’m sure I’ve read somewhere on this site that they were interested in the tomcat/phoenix combo for interceptor duties, but if the premise of the thread is the Brits don’t cancel their projects, I gotta imagine they’d be in position to build their own naval fighter. But I guess the question is how successfully we imagine those uncanceled projects end up selling, and if they provide enough of a shot in the arm to keep the momentum going for the British air industry. Maybe they try to license the Phoenix and radar, but not the tomcat? Even if things are going well, that combo is pretty expensive to develop, and if there’s a system available from an ally, even a more successful British arms industry might just buy off the shelf. Of course, so far as I know, we only made the Phoenix AWG-9 combo available to the Shah, so there’s a few changes that need to take place, but maybe.What if McNamara goes big? The US cooperates with the UK on TSR2 for the USAF and in return the UK cooperates/buys the Navy interceptor which turns out to be the F-14?
There are two answers to the question.
Given enough time, resources and money TSR2, P1154, and 681 could have been made to work.
But even the US knew its limits in all three and produced F111, F4, and C130 by having more realistic requirements than the UK.
Well, the US did have all weather low altitude strike aircraft with terrain following radar in 1965: The A-6 Intruder. But IIRC the F-111 had close to the TSR2s required performance and even the -D model didn't really have the avionics reliability needed.My idea is that the Americans build THE TSR2, P1154 and HS681, not some American conception of them, and overcome THE problems they faced, not some American conception of them, indeed if these problems would have arisen at all in the American context.
For example in my mind the biggest problem with the TSR2 was the avionics overloading the computer system. The TSR2 had Britain first integrated circuit and first digital data bus, one example of each. In 1965 would America have the same problem, or would they have been able to give the TSR2 numerous integrated circuits and multiple digital data buses so the double VERDANs were not overloaded? Would US metallurgy and NASA aerodynamic data and AMerican 'can do' project management methods sort out the TSR2s other problems?
Neither the A-6 or F-111 really got their avionics really sorted until the A-6E and F-111F, which were both introduced in 1970.Well, the US did have all weather low altitude strike aircraft with terrain following radar in 1965: The A-6 Intruder. But IIRC the F-111 had close to the TSR2s required performance and even the -D model didn't really have the avionics reliability needed.
So I think even the US would have struggled with the avionics. Wouldn't have struggled as much as the UK did, but still would have struggled.
Yeah, which suggests that the TSR2 would be on whatever "interim" electronics fit was decided on till about then.Neither the A-6 or F-111 really got their avionics really sorted until the A-6E and F-111F, which were both introduced in 1970.
USAF would have little to no interest in the P1154. It'd be purely a Navy/Marines plane like the P1127 Harrier was.I struggle to see where the P.1154 would fit in the USAF, but it might work for the navy and marines in the role the F-18 eventually had, which would mean no F-18, and that might mean a new USN and USMC fighter coming on line around 1990, with design starting a decade earlier. That would imply no stealth, but supercruise and super-maneuverability, perhaps with STOVL.
Better than the Crusader, worse than the Corsair. It's got similar performance and firepower to the Crusader in a much friendlier package, but compared to the Corsair it has worse payload and range.What would be interesting is how the P1154 would stand up compared to say, the F8 Crusader and A7 Corsair II.
It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?What would be interesting is how the P1154 would stand up compared to say, the F8 Crusader and A7 Corsair II.
Wouldn't be surprised if most of them bought P1154s.It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?
I fully expect the P1154 would take the VSTOL-A slot, which would make the CL-84 a lot more likely to get developed out into ASW and AEW. Which would make the UK carriers a lot more capable in the Falklands.Or it might just take the VSTOL-A slot from Rockwell, which might mean the VSTOL-B would also be followed through with (CL-84 would be the obvious choice since it was flying).
TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.It wouldn't hit the fleet until what, mid '70s? That's why I mentioned the F-18. Is there a need for a low end to the F-14 if you already have a low end that also happens to be VSTOL? If it knocks the F-18 out before it can get going, what do the countries that bought it do instead?
But if the USN already has a bunch of P1154s in service only a few years old, would they even be in the market for the Hornet?TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.
Except the Navy, at least most? of it, didn't want the F-18, they wanted F-14B and F-14C. Congress forced it on them. If they can point at P.1154 and say "see, light naval fighter/attack", F-18 could seem to be a duplication of effort and Congress would be much less likely to fund it.TBH, like the Corsair the Hornet is just plain better than the P.1154, in all applications where the latter's V/STOL capabilities aren't needed. So while the Marines might not bother to buy the F/A-18 the Navy would still be interested.