Indeed, it would have rightly terrified the Soviets if push ever came to shove. ;)
 
OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

If 10/64 Election had been narrowly won by the incumbent Party, they would have canx TSR.2 instantly (I give the quite elsewhere), then as Labour, to DC 12/64 to talk Alms and Arms. LBJ wanted bagpipers in SVA and offered a package of kit, fixed price, deferred payment, if UK retained EoS - he could manage UK reduction in NATO; he could manage UK abandonment of the SSBN; he needed (Oz+) UK in distant parts, so inc RN Strike Carriers. Wilson took LBJ's package as means of keeping all the above (until £ devaluation, 11/67). Tory Ministers could not abandon the Deterrent (sacred), nor Empire (ditto), so...must reduce UK-in-NATO.

No need for VTOL EoS so sayonara P.1154, HS681, welcome C-130K, a bunch of J79 Phantoms for NEAF/FEAF interim Canberra replacements; more F-4K for CVA-02 and CVA-03 (mixed fleet with Spey/RN shrugged as insignificant). AFVG (tentatively explored since mid-64) to be the Land/Sea Multi Role Combat A/c. No Harrier.

So: CDG "Non" again, 27/11/67; AFVG spreadeagled 29/6/67; EoS unaffordable 11/67, all as actual, Tories still there.
VTOL tarnished, so FRG about to dump ridiculous AVS and set up an F-104G replacement Study. That so easily might not have been F-16/F-18, Mirages for some, Tornado for 4.
 
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OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

If 10/64 Election had been narrowly won by the incumbent Party, they would have canx TSR.2 instantly (I give the quite elsewhere), then as Labour, to DC 12/64 to talk Alms and Arms. LBJ wanted bagpipers in SVA and offered a package of kit, fixed price, deferred payment, if UK retained EoS - he could manage UK reduction in NATO; he could manage UK abandonment of the SSBN; he needed (Oz+) UK in distant parts, so inc RN Strike Carriers. Wilson took LBJ's package as means of keeping all the above (until £ devaluation, 11/67). Tory Ministers could not abandon the Deterrent (sacred), nor Empire (ditto), so...must reduce UK-in-NATO.

No need for VTOL EoS so sayonara P.1154, HS681, welcome C-130K, a bunch of J79 Phantoms for NEAF/FEAF interim Canberra replacements; more F-4K for CVA-02 and CVA-03 (mixed fleet with Spey/RN shrugged as insignificant). AFVG (tentatively explored since mid-64) to be the Land/Sea Multi Role Combat A/c. No Harrier.

So: CDG "Non" again, 27/11/67; AFVG spreadeagled 29/6/67; EoS unaffordable 11/67, all as actual, Tories still there.
VTOL tarnished, so FRG about to dump ridiculous AVS and set up an F-104G replacement Study. That so easily might not have been F-16/F-18, Mirages for some, Tornado for 4.

The US is good at providing good payment terms for its kit, Australia was allowed to pay for it's first 2 DDGs over 8 years despite a 3 year build time.

Again this makes me think of the decision point/timeframe to change Britain's trajectory as during Sandys' tenure, by the time Britain got on the P1154/AW681 train it was too late to get a good result, one with TSR2 and CVAs.
 
OP: there is no credible AH of no 1965 canxs.

I must respectfully disagree.

(There now follows a shameless plug.)

May I recommend my Drake's Drum series of books, where the fundamental UK problems of penury and loss of confidence are ameliorated and thus defence spending (indeed, all government spending) is chopped with less enthusiasm than in OTL.
 
My point is that the setup is irrelevant, provided that the UK has enough more money to not mind continuing the projects, but not so much more as to grossly distort the global power balance. Because this isn't supposed to be a discussion about the UK.
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.
 
How it happens is relevant. For example, if they weren't cancelled because they were coming into service on time and at cost other people may buy them. So Australia may have bought 25 TSR.2s in 1963 instead of F-111Cs and as they were delivered on time and at cost the Australian government may have used the money saved to buy another 25 for a one-for-one replacement of its Canberras.

In 1963 the RAAF recommend 36 RA5Cs, so a good/better buy of TSR2 would likely be 36 units, for 1, 2 and 6 sqns.

That's an interesting scenario, even the expensive and late TSR2 vs the F111C. The Australian government didn't specify what constituted an airworthy aircraft for delivery, so was at least partly responsible for the cost escalation instead of holding GD and the US government to a contract. Defence Minister Malcolm Fraser went over and basically threatened SecDef Melvin Laird to sort out the contract conditions, it was this meting that saw the RAAF get the leased F4Es.

Assuming the British persevere with the TSR2, we've had threads that there was no technical problem that was impossible to overcome, would the RAAF get ~24 airframes for less than US$350 million and prior to 1973?
 
Assuming the British persevere with the TSR2, we've had threads that there was no technical problem that was impossible to overcome, would the RAAF get ~24 airframes for less than US$350 million and prior to 1973?
Maybe? I mean, I'm assuming dual Vigilante VERDANs for the interim capability avionics until the UK-designed-and-made avionics are ready, so that part would be ready around the mid 1960s.

But the airframe was also in a death-spiral of weight gain.
 
Australia's F111Cs were built in 1967, delivered into storage and not accepted by the RAAF until 1973, I would think this is not a high bar to beat. The British could take until 1972 to deliver TSR2s and still beat the US, however the Canberras were very old by then and the US leased us F4Es to cover the gap. Ideally the TSR2 would be delivered from 1970, which should be plenty of time to sort out it's issues.
 
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