Replacing the Hunter

Didn't the Jag have fancy stuff like LRMTS and moving map display?
Good, so let's have that installed in the Mirage.

This is on top of the general efficiency of the Jag, it's deployability and the fact that it is at least half controlled by Britain as a design and production partner.
Same stuff with Mirage made in UK, with British engine and avionics of interest.
 
Good, so let's have that installed in the Mirage.


Same stuff with Mirage made in UK, with British engine and avionics of interest.

How much will that cost, how long will it take, what project gets dropped to do it, what benefit does it provide?
 
How much will that cost, how long will it take, what project gets dropped to do it, what benefit does it provide?

Less cost than developing something new, shorter time than developing something new, Jaguar can be dropped, main benefit is that it can be had soon enough, plus it is fast, and can carry a lot.

Since it makes sense, it will not get the green light. Same as Draken.
 
Less cost than developing something new, shorter time than developing something new, Jaguar can be dropped, main benefit is that it can be had soon enough, plus it is fast, and can carry a lot.

Since it makes sense, it will not get the green light. Same as Draken.

Another benefit is that a Mirage IIIA was flown with a RR Avon in Feb 61 and the Spey was proposed as well, so some of the major Anglicisation is already done.

However in this scenario the RAF has bought the Spey Phantom, in large part because the RN has already initiated the Anglicisation. Thus the RAF doesn't need a new fighter until the mid 70s, by which time the Mirage V is well and truly superseded by the Mirage F1.
 
Thus the RAF doesn't need a new fighter until the mid 70s, by which time the Mirage V is well and truly superseded by the Mirage F1.
Note that we're replacing the Hunter, not the 'real' fighters of 1960s.
Mirage F1 superseded the Mirage IIIs; France bought just a small number of the Vs, about 90% or the Vs was exported.
 
Note that we're replacing the Hunter, not the 'real' fighters of 1960s.
Mirage F1 superseded the Mirage IIIs; France bought just a small number of the Vs, about 90% or the Vs was exported.

Yes, and the the Hunter has to be replaced by 1970. Therefore for the Mirage V to replace the Hunter means developing both the Spey Phantom for the RN as well as developing the RR engine Mirage V at the same time, not to mention the money being spent on the TSR2, F111K, AFVG.

The Treasury would have a fit.
 
Yes, and the the Hunter has to be replaced by 1970. Therefore for the Mirage V to replace the Hunter means developing both the Spey Phantom for the RN as well as developing the RR engine Mirage V at the same time, not to mention the money being spent on the TSR2, F111K, AFVG.

The Treasury would have a fit.

They will be just fine, since there is no Jaguar now to spend the money and manpower on it.
 
They will be just fine, since there is no Jaguar now to spend the money and manpower on it.

Now they have to spend the Jaguar money on replacing the Lightning in the mid 70s.

The Hunter and Canberra replacement became intertwined and competed with each other for both funding and fleet choice. If the AFVG is to replace the Lightning it can't then replace the Canberra/Buccaneer/Vulcan effectively.
 
Now they have to spend the Jaguar money on replacing the Lightning in the mid 70s.
<need more data>

The Hunter and Canberra replacement became intertwined and competed with each other for both funding and fleet choice. If the AFVG is to replace the Lightning it can't then replace the Canberra/Buccaneer/Vulcan effectively.
Horses for courses.
If the RAF/AM/Government changes plans as they see fit, and has the French 'help' in that regard (AFVG promisses and then cancellation), plus later Canada, Belgium and Netherlands also 'help' (during the MRCA quagmire), plus later Germany also 'helps' with penny-pinching during the Tornado development, the word 'effectively' has left the chat a long time ago.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again:
The less faith in multi-national coopperation the UK has, the better.
The more faith the UK has in it's own industry, the better.
The earlier they 'fix' on a design and have it in production, the better.
The earlier the UK figures out that time cannot be dialed back, the better.
Th earlier the commercial part of the design is understood (ie. less of a fixation for UK-only details), the better.
 
Now they have to spend the Jaguar money on replacing the Lightning in the mid 70s.
Actually, I don't need more data.

With a Mach 2 bomber in service by mid-1960s, there is no need to make the MRCA/Tornado. Meaning that 'Tornado money' is spent on the next-gen fighter instead. Thus the UK has a good competitor to the F-16, F-18 and Mirage 2000 come the 1980s.
 
<need more data>


Horses for courses.
If the RAF/AM/Government changes plans as they see fit, and has the French 'help' in that regard (AFVG promisses and then cancellation), plus later Canada, Belgium and Netherlands also 'help' (during the MRCA quagmire), plus later Germany also 'helps' with penny-pinching during the Tornado development, the word 'effectively' has left the chat a long time ago.

I've said it before, and I'll say it again:
The less faith in multi-national coopperation the UK has, the better.
The more faith the UK has in it's own industry, the better.
The earlier they 'fix' on a design and have it in production, the better.
The earlier the UK figures out that time cannot be dialed back, the better.
Th earlier the commercial part of the design is understood (ie. less of a fixation for UK-only details), the better.

While in real world UK governments probably had too much faith in what their own industry, services and ministries where telling them (and, in truth, had their own culpability for being rather too keen to believe what they wanted to hear).

And in the real world, for all its messy real-world complications, compromises and issues, multi-national cooperation saved, continues to save, and will continue to save well into the future, the UK military aviation sector.
And the likes of France will probably have to learn some of the same or very similar lessons and learn to live with some the same or very similar compromises.
 
While in real world UK governments probably had too much faith in what their own industry, services and ministries where telling them (and, in truth, had their own culpability for being rather too keen to believe what they wanted to hear).
To clarify, under 'UK' I assume 'services' and 'ministries'.

And in the real world, for all its messy real-world complications, compromises and issues, multi-national cooperation saved, continues to save, and will continue to save well into the future, the UK military aviation sector.
And the likes of France will probably have to learn some of the same or very similar lessons and learn to live with some the same or very similar compromises.

British industry made the Mach 2 bomber (TSR.2) in early 1960s. It will take a lot of bitter pills to make a Mach 2 bomber (and less capable one) decade and half later by a co-op where UK was part of. Had the TSR.2 been introduced, there would've be no need for co-op to 'save' British aero industry.
One cannot bring back time.

In contrast, Dassualt and Snecma were rolling in money for in the next 40 years starting from early 1960s. French were keeping international co-op bi-lateral, and away from the high-ticket items. When high-ticket items were in stake, French had no problems in leaving the table if they figured out that they will not be the ones calling the shots, and were not worse off by doing that.
 
The TSR2 was a flying prototype by 1964, the P.1154 and AW.681 were nowhere near that stage, yet they were competing with the TSR2 and promising to be expensive and protracted development programmes.

I think Britain was constantly trying to do expensive things on the cheap, made things over-complicated in the hope they will be amazing for the money, got nervous when the true costs were revealed and cancelled things only to have their replacements be equally expensive but lacking the benefits that the original UK only programmes would have provided. My suggesting the Lightning for the Venom replacement is because it's a simple solution for a project management perspective, it gets the RAF an all British Mach 2 fighter bomber by 1960-61, avoids the P.1154 debacle and the pressure that aircraft put on the TSR2.

Just as an aside, project leadership is very important. Despite having an equal 42.5% work-share with the British the Germans said they needed ~600 Tornado as opposed to 385 that the British wanted. On the strength of this it was decided that the project HQ and first flight would be in Germany, once this was in the agreement the Germans promptly dropped their requirement down to ~325 Tornado.
 
Mirage IV have had the positive stance of the French government, from the get-go and on.
TSR.2 - no such luck.

But that’s quite ahistorical.

The reality is that the TSR.2 was very much supported by the then Conservative government from its instigation (rather too much support and not enough oversight and challenge, with the project ending up digging itself a rather deep and deepening financial hole).

While the last rites were administered by a by then deeply sceptical new Labour Government the reality is that a Conservative government would have also had little choice but to cancel the TSR.2 by that stage. The issue was never lack of support, the issue was that too much support was provided, a level of support that just wasn’t sustainable given other demands. The TSR.2 should have been cancelled sooner, or it needed to have been a significantly different aircraft than it was if it was to have survived and even moderately successful.

The Mirage IV was a different aircraft in a different context. In terms of importance to and priorities for France it was closer (in terms of UK equivalents) to the V-bombers than the TSR.2.
 
With total hindsight it's obviously easy to avoid spending money on everything that failed. It's more difficult to do this from the time frame. No spending this money also ignores the value that's generated even in failure. Future successful projects stand on the shoulders of this previous failure.

The TSR.2 should have been cancelled sooner, or it needed to have been a significantly different aircraft than it was if it was to have survived and even moderately successful.
This is the key lesson. Don't start to try to do things that you can't afford or aren't technically feasible.
I think Britain was constantly trying to do expensive things on the cheap,
I think you mean "value for money", rather than "giving Industry a blank cheque"?
 
But that’s quite ahistorical.

The reality is that the TSR.2 was very much supported by the then Conservative government from its instigation (rather too much support and not enough oversight and challenge, with the project ending up digging itself a rather deep and deepening financial hole).

It is historical.
Note that I've said 'from the get-go and on'. Mirage IV enjoyed the support of the french government from the get go and on.
TSR.2 did not.
 
Australia went supersonic bomber shopping in late 1963 looking at in-service dates of 1966 and 1969. It's interesting, and therefore relevant to a thread on Hunter replacement, that a tactical fighter (F4C) was looked at in the context of a virtual/regional strategic bomber.

The fact of the matter is that there is no 'affordable' or 'easy' alternative to the TSR2, that's why it should have been persevered with.

I think you mean "value for money", rather than "giving Industry a blank cheque"?

Blank cheque? Britain was penny wise and pound foolish, trying to do million pound things with thousands of pounds.

Here is the 1963 'Island Base Strategy' study undertaken by a panel of scientists looking for the best (cheapest?) way to discharge Britain's East of Suez commitments. It's the carriers vs land-based aircraft argument. Go to Page 158, the rest is HMAS Melbourne replacement stuff.
 

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It is historical.
Note that I've said 'from the get-go and on'. Mirage IV enjoyed the support of the french government from the get go and on.
TSR.2 did not.
UK government should have continued to fund an aircraft where cost was spiralling upwards, performance downwards, and there were no mitigations? Value for money has to come into decisions.

There was an easy alternative to TSR2. Buy something lower performance but cheaper (e.g. F-111, Buccaneer, Mirage IV etc.).
 
UK government should have continued to fund an aircraft where cost was spiralling upwards, performance downwards, and there were no mitigations? Value for money has to come into decisions.

Cost of foreign aircraft was also spiraling upwards; money paid abroad will never be used to pay the workforce in the UK, and will keep the industry in shape to tackle the following projects - unlike the money paid to the UK-based companies.
Mitigation was possible with installing the electronics from Buccaneer, and upgrade later (early 1970s) with transistor-based electronics.

Big payload + long range + high speed does not come in cheap.

There was an easy alternative to TSR2. Buy something lower performance but cheaper (e.g. F-111, Buccaneer, Mirage IV etc.).

I have nothing against either of these.
 
Certainly it would help the RAF if they could expedite introduction of a Lightning FG(A) and do this circa 1962 onwards. Aiming for IOC by 1968. But this could actually be earlier.

There would be an initial 70 aircraft, using Blue Parrot version of AI.23.
Cleared for tactical use of a single Red Beard, 1,000lb bombs and rockets.
An improved capability would be TFR s development of AI.23 and integration of AS.30 and possibly Martel.

This would not break the bank.

This would keep finance in the UK instead of loans for F4M. No matter how good they be.

It would relieve the need for tactical MRI from any Anglo-French joint venture. Which would in turn allow a focus on the Fighter elements.
 
Mitigation was possible with installing the electronics from Buccaneer, and upgrade later (early 1970s) with transistor-based electronics.
So that's just accepting lower performance, and at this point there is no inkling of the transistor revolution. And the airframe and engine still have massive risks and performance issues.

Cost of foreign aircraft was also spiraling upwards;
Nowhere near like the TSR2 cost rises.
 
Australia paid $350 million for 24 F111s that were built in 1967 and sat in storage until 1973 while problems were worked out and airworthy aircraft could be delivered. From November 1967 the exchange rate was 1 pound got US $2.40, so Britains 50 would cost in the ballpark of 300 million pounds.

Is that cheap? How does that stack up against the TSR2?
 
So that's just accepting lower performance, and at this point there is no inkling of the transistor revolution. And the airframe and engine still have massive risks and performance issues.
Australians said that performance was excellent (see post #300 here). Performance = speed + RoC (granted, not much of an importance in a bomber) + range + payload. Radar/electronics is not in that equation.
Engine was used in aircraft before the TSR.2 and after it.
Transistors were invented 15 years before TSR.2 took flight.

Nowhere near like the TSR2 cost rises.

RAF was looking for a bomber that can do Mach 2 while carrying 2 (and at the end 4) nuclear bombs. Bucc can't do it, Mirage IV can't do it. Both will require either a big redesign, or that RAF buys double the number of aircraft vs. the number of TSR.2s (still Bucc can't do it, being subsonic).
As for the foreign A/C being so affordable, FWIW:
link1
link2
 
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Certainly it would help the RAF if they could expedite introduction of a Lightning FG(A) and do this circa 1962 onwards. Aiming for IOC by 1968. But this could actually be earlier.

There would be an initial 70 aircraft, using Blue Parrot version of AI.23.
Cleared for tactical use of a single Red Beard, 1,000lb bombs and rockets.
An improved capability would be TFR s development of AI.23 and integration of AS.30 and possibly Martel.

This would not break the bank.

This would keep finance in the UK instead of loans for F4M. No matter how good they be.

It would relieve the need for tactical MRI from any Anglo-French joint venture. Which would in turn allow a focus on the Fighter elements.
Early Lightnings ( a bit like Buccaneer S1) were not encouraging. The RAF had P1154 in its sights to be in service by 1968.
Arguably they should have realised it could not be done and switched to P1127 RAF or an upgrade to the Hunters.
But by 1965 the RN had ordered Phantoms. The RAF had the F4 in mind as a Lightning replacement for the 70s so getting it earlier was fine.
Post in thread 'RAF with TSR2 etc: But what Fighters?' https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/raf-with-tsr2-etc-but-what-fighters.10445/post-98246
 
The RAF operated Harrier GR1 and 3 into the 80s. The planes carried similar ordinance to the Hunter. I cannot see why FGA9s could not serve until the 70s and then hand over to similarly armed Hawks (it was good enough for the Luftwaffe to use G91 and Alpha Jet).
Close air support with every Pound for ground.
If you get AFVG in 1974 instead of Jaguar you have Tornado a decade earlier.
With the cash saved you buy 50 F111s from the US to replace SACEUR's Vulcans.
No Phantoms join the RAF either. Buccaneer S2 replaces TSR2 which is canceled in 1962 instead of Blue Water and PT428 by the Sandys government.
AFVG replaces some Buccaneers and all Lightnings by 1978.
 
Is that cheap? How does that stack up against the TSR2?
As per Burke's book, F-111K purchase was about half the cost of continued TSR2 development, even if you wrote off the massive sunk costs till that point, and assuming there would be no further growth in TSR2 costs that appeared to be completely out of control. Who knows how it would have turned out, but it's pretty easy to see why the RAF was fine cancelling it.

As pointed out before, cancelling earlier would have been better. The issues were already pretty clear in 1960 but money continued to sink in for another 5 years. The UK couldn't deliver what was wanted to performance, time or cost. So you either go lower performance (e.g. Buccaneer) or go abroad.
 
As per Burke's book, F-111K purchase was about half the cost of continued TSR2 development, even if you wrote off the massive sunk costs till that point, and assuming there would be no further growth in TSR2 costs that appeared to be completely out of control. Who knows how it would have turned out, but it's pretty easy to see why the RAF was fine cancelling it.

As pointed out before, cancelling earlier would have been better. The issues were already pretty clear in 1960 but money continued to sink in for another 5 years. The UK couldn't deliver what was wanted to performance, time or cost. So you either go lower performance (e.g. Buccaneer) or go abroad.

I'd be inclined to agree with you if the original idea of a more or less straight swap of 193 TSR2 for 110 F111K was pushed through, after all once it was delivered the F111C served the RAAF well for 37 years and was a great strategic asset in the region. However that idea lasted for about 5 minutes, the actual TSR2 replacement was 50 F111K and a bigger fleet of AFVG, so what is the cost of that? Further given that the F111K was cancelled and the French withdrew from the AFVG it shows that plan was unworkable, forcing Britain to buy Buccaneers and retain Vulcans in the tactical role while they undertook a 42.5% workshare in the prolonged development of the Tornado. How much did that cost?

Therein lies my objection to TSR2 cancellation and the Hunter-P.1154-Phantom-Jaguar path. Simple and likely effective options were rejected ostensibly on cost grounds in favour of complex and ultimately even more expensive options that exposed Britain to substantial strategic risk.
 
Given the F-111K had the same avionics (with some added UK content) as the F-111D, I expect the UK's procurement of them would be significantly delayed in much the same way as the USAF's procurement was.
 
A lot of "reasons, reasons, reasons, and therefore 'we' were correct in what 'we' did".
One of the two Elite statements they trot out.
Post act justifications, seize on every quibble, every compromise, every flaw to assemble the cover for why.

Lots of Obfuscation to cover the reality. No matter technical concerns TSR.2 could be made to work....

As per certain ex-governement source "An Ocean Apart" an Adam Curtis series, narrated by a Dimbleby. I forgot which.

Wilson wins late '64 and another Run on the Pound....as if US induced Suez humiliation wasn't enough.

"The Americans would lend us more money, but insisted they determine what it was spent on. TSR.2 was in their sights"

At least Macmillan had achieved Polaris!
 
Lightning overwing bombs... intriguing.

Flight, 05 Sep 1968

"From the overwing pylons, bombs can be 'blown off' safely from exceptionally low altitudes by means of cartridge links."
 

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