Replacing Canberra sensibly

[zen]

In the spirit of the above....

Are there any remotely plausible ways in which the "real world's" TSR2 could have been put into service on time and at cost?

In a vastly reduced 'barebones' capability.......?
I'd love to say yes, but I suspect the answer is still no.

 

[Hood]

I would say no.
Just too much advanced avionics involved as well as Olympus woes to be sorted. On cost was never likely, nobody really knew what the R&D costs would be and the estimates were wide of the mark and indeed the whole management structure was severely flawed in the misguided attempts to reign in the costs.
Everybody knew it would be expensive but quite simply the MoA was never up to the task. That and Vickers and EE made uneasy bedfellows, plus having Olympus forced on them - an Olympus variant that liked slicing its airframe in half at regular intervals....

The bits of the avionics hived off into successor projects seemed to have worked ok, but nobody really knows how the TSR.2 package would have fared. The trials programme was early days when it was cancelled.
How barebones could you go without having a fancy go-faster Canberra? If it can't match the capability of a 1963 Buccaneer on service introduction in 1970 then you might has well pack it in and buy F-111s. Oh wait....

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Well, whilst deliberating about a Blackburn Buccaneer derivative for the RAF as a Canberra replacement, I've always loved the look and potential of the larger supersonic Hawker-Siddeley P.150 [aka 'Super Buccaneer'].
In essence a Buccaneer S.2 with the airframe being lengthened by five feet, four-wheel bogies on the main landing gear, removal of folding wing ability, a new thin wing and improved Spey engines with reheat capability giving it a top speed of Mach 1.8.

Regards
Pioneer

I think projects like the "Super Buccaneer" would be subjected to the "Spey Phantom Effect". That is the changes to the airframe, engines and avionics would result in R&D and production costs comparable to designing and building a new aircraft.

That said the R&D and production costs of the improved Spey engines for "Super Buccaneer" might have been shared with the R&D and production costs of the engines for the "Spey Phantom".

Thanks for your feedback NOMISYRRUC, I concur with your analogy.

The fact that the Buccaneer was a proven design with appreciated capabilities in the strike role, as well as it's potential in growth would allow for any avionics growth derived from the development of the P.150 to be incorporated into Royal Navy Buccaneer S2's. While as you state, the R&D being applied to an afterburning Spey turbofan could be shared and the benefit of a RN/RAF F-4K/M Phantom II or F-8K Crusader.

Regards
Pioneer

I need to clarify.

The original Phantom II was a proven design with appreciated capabilities too. The British version cost about £100 million to develop (about half of which was for the Spey engines) and the manufacturing costs were several times more than the original Phantom II.

I suspect that the R&D costs of "Super Buccaneer" would have been substantial and that the "Super Buccaneer" would have cost several times more to build than the standard Buccaneer S.2. If that turned out to be true (and I think it would) "Super Buccaneer" may not have been significantly cheaper than TSR.2. That's what I meant by, "R&D and production costs comparable to designing and building a new aircraft."

For example the avionics. Would the the avionics the RAF wanted for TSR.2 have been any quicker & cheaper to develop for a "Super Buccaneer" and would they have cost less to make? We'll never know for sure, but I think not and I suspect that they'd be too expensive to incorporate into the RNs Buccaneers.

 

[zen]

So as I've alluded to previously on this topic. One of the means to actually achieve all this was to have funded earlier work on such automated systems on the Pathfinder V-Bombers. Albeit that would be much more bulky, heavy and crude.
But they were cancelled.

And arguably the Thunderchief would more than 'do' with a set of strap in RATOG units for STO.
As in fact would 'interim' Buccaneers.

 

[Pirate Pete]

This is going to be a very simplistic approach to the question asked for this discussion….
There are SO many if’s, but’s and maybe’s relating to the TSR-2 project…
The whole subject has oft become distorted by bias and accusations of political interference, but, anyway, here we go with my two penny-worth:
I think that, instead of ‘Establishment’ opting for the Vickers proposal, followed by the forced ‘marriage’ with English Electric, the choice should have been the English Electric P.17!
Yes, I appreciate this is simplistic, but the whole debacle comes from the fact that following the 1957 Defence White Paper, the R.A.F. We’re basically left with just the one new aircraft project. Thus, TSR-2 becomes the Holy Grail of what they must have and, as a result, more, more, more is demanded of the project than originally intended.
The mad panic regarding no airfields and therefore STOL performance was misguided at best, criminal at worst…
IF you can jettison at least some of the demands made as a result of it becoming just about the only new aircraft project for the R.A.F., then, just perhaps, we get a ‘good enough’ as opposed to ‘best of the best’ aircraft on time and at reasonable cos!

 

[starviking]

As in the competition winner, P17? Possible, if this whole design by committee can be avoided.

But Vickers concept won, and was then smashed together with EE's P.17 configuration. Then centre of gravity moved to EE and airframe development and totally lost the "cost conscious" part of Vickers' concept that won...

Maybe being firmer that Vickers is prime / lead systems integrator, and EE are subcontracted for airframe?

Damien Burke’s book mentions that the Ministry folks favoured the P.17 design, and Vickers was there as lead because of their stronger position in the industry.

 

[starviking]

This is going to be a very simplistic approach to the question asked for this discussion….
There are SO many if’s, but’s and maybe’s relating to the TSR-2 project…
The whole subject has oft become distorted by bias and accusations of political interference, but, anyway, here we go with my two penny-worth:
I think that, instead of ‘Establishment’ opting for the Vickers proposal, followed by the forced ‘marriage’ with English Electric, the choice should have been the English Electric P.17!
Yes, I appreciate this is simplistic, but the whole debacle comes from the fact that following the 1957 Defence White Paper, the R.A.F. We’re basically left with just the one new aircraft project. Thus, TSR-2 becomes the Holy Grail of what they must have and, as a result, more, more, more is demanded of the project than originally intended.
The mad panic regarding no airfields and therefore STOL performance was misguided at best, criminal at worst…
IF you can jettison at least some of the demands made as a result of it becoming just about the only new aircraft project for the R.A.F., then, just perhaps, we get a ‘good enough’ as opposed to ‘best of the best’ aircraft on time and at reasonable cos!

Burke has a nice table detailing the differences between the P.17 and the Vickers 571. Among the P.17 advantages was removing engines by dropping them down from the engine bays, as opposed to the onerous removal through the tailpipe, which made it onto the TSR2.

Would have saved a lot of time and tears in the test programme.

 

[zen]

Vickers preferred the Single English Type 571, which would have meant more simpler aircraft.

But EE's design could more easily include a FAW variant.

 

[uk 75]

The parallel development of the TSR2 with the F111 is interesting as both aircraft encounter numerous problems in their development and the F111 takes many years of work and money before it becomes a mature and successful aircraft in USAF and RAAF service.
Both aircraft fit midway between a strike fighter and a medium bomber in capabilities. The F111 replaces the B57, B47 and F105 in US service.
Sadly such an aircraft was beyond the organisational and financial resources of the UK to develop even if the technology was.
The F4 offered the RAF an attractive alternative. As a tactical fighter it could replace some Lightnings and Canberras.
The other solution was to use Buccaneer S2s in RAFG and Vulcan B2 (available after Polaris enters service) in Bomber/Strike Command.
The P1154 was slated to carry out some Canberra as well as Hunter roles in RAFG, NEAF and FEAF. Jaguar ends up doing this in RAFG (as well as replacing 38 Group Hunters in UK).
It is no accident that even as TSR2 lumbers through its development looking like a fourth V Bomber (Vickers Vindicator?) BAC is looking at smaller aircraft with VG technology. The P45 looks remarkably similar to the Tornado which eventually replaces Canberra and other RAF frontline aircraft.
TSR2 was an anachronism which was made obsolete because the RAF no longer needed just a purely nuclear strike aircraft. And where it did, Vulcan and Buccaneer were already available.

 

[alertken]

#49: all so true.

OP's "Sensibly". '58-65, MoD/Treasury moved from (me: )Silo-Budgeting (kit) to Functional Costing (job). So: speak not of replacing Canberra (in some of its roles), but define the Task(s), then the best fix(es). (So, 1965: F-111K or CVA-01 for the nuclear umbrella job in the Indian O). No-one did that for (to be) TSR.2 until '64/65, and then only because it was out of cost/time control...because Canberra roles ranged from recce, to iron, to small nukes on short-range precise/mobile targets, to large ones on fixed/deeper targets, especially in NEAF/FEAF. All were wrapped 1957 into one Canberra Replacement Reqt.: heavyweight, to undo Sandys' 4/57 Storm. But Canberra had become a multi-role combat a/c, not by design (blind bomber B.1, target marker B.5 had been chopped), but because DoD had part-funded in cascades in Korean War frenzy: RAF could put surplus to other roles free-of-extra-charge.

So: The Impossible Dream: sortie 1, to find/iron-attack a moving target; same a/c, within hours: sortie 2, Big Bang. Misguided (chess players do not hazard a capital asset on a cheap target), yet accepted by axeman Sandys, and issued to industry 9/57, because he needed stick/carrot to induce firms to "coalesce". So he trapped himself into (minimally: R&D-)funding the most-compliant such Bid.​

If: (1SL,13/7/59: ) CDS Mountbatten had wined and dined Sandys at his Broadlands pad earlier*, so that Strike Carriers were reprieved earlier ...Ministers would have demanded (TSR.2) Bids be tested against a Buccaneer variant (R&D funded {7/55, corrected 26/11:} 2/6/55} to fly 30/4/58). Sandys had not put up NA.39 to knock down 1957 RAF Reqt. as he intended to chop it and its CVs: Best is the enemy of Good Enough.

So: A1 to OP, "sensibly", is exactly that: Buccaneer S.RAF (A.N.Other(s) to ease Blackburn's resultant overload, as Cos. various built, and BPA, MCE, Shorts took some design/mod on Canberras). (to be TSR.2) Bids were {corrected 27/11: 31/1/58}. He resolved UK AW 7-8/58 with the Mutual Defense Agt and “inextricably linked” USAF/SAC: RAFBC. So he assigned Big Bang to Skybolt, lesser bangs to US Bombs on enhanced Canberra B.6/8, and chiselled unaffordable notions of (?upto 300) newcraft. He could have separated recce/iron/precision strike (A), from deeper interdiction, Bigger Bang (B) and replaced (A) Canberras with nearly-free F-100D+US Bombs (like all the sane), and (B) Canberras+UK Bombs in NEAF/FEAF with a new type, sans the precision kit. Range/payload, not supersonic dash: aka Buccaneer.

A2 to OP: that is, sort-of, Actual: but with F-4M, not F-100D, and Vulcans until we decided NEAF/FEAF hosts should defend themselves.

(A thought on TSR.2: ) Sandys-at-MoA 1/1/59 funded (V-A+EE: ) new BAC for TSR.2, new BSEL for B.Ol.22R and sought MWDP $ to R&D (he had that for NA.39's novel BLC). DoD declined, late-59. Did they wonder why they should pay again for aerodynamics of an evident A3J cover, for avionics derived from Bendix (AFCS), Kearfott (INS), Westinghouse (TFR), Autonetics (Main Computer), or for its engine, front end already licensed by Wright as J67 and rejected, its reheat derived from Solar A/c Co Inc. Move along, Nothing to see here).

(27/11: * Grove,Vanguard,P210 suggests that smoozing was 11/57, Invitation to Tender for (TSR.2) already out to industry).​

 

[red admiral]

The need was light strike and recce, either delivering tactical nuclear or conventional weapons, across central Europe.

So basically what a Mosquito had done in WW2 (save the nukes). Canberra then came as simply a jet powered faster/higher replacement, but scaled up a bit to carry a few more weapons. Both are reliant on offboard radio nav aids or navigator skill / good weather to try to find their targets.

Come the mid 50s, and the faster / higher approach isn't as practicable any more in the face of SAMs in particular. Hence the move to low level. But low level means no radio nav aids so you're reliant on the navigator's dead reckoning and visual updates - possible for some, but not that practical across hundreds of crews?

What gets offered by Industry are basically pointy-er Mosquito/Canberras with limited effort put into how to nav and find the targets. But that was really the crux of the problem. The systems required, INS + SLAR for nav, TFR for low low level flight away from SAMs and AAA, we're probably just too much for the UK to develop in the time, and even more so to integrate together.

Maybe the better solution was a majority F-105D/A-6/F-111 avionics package and a new airframe built around this? I'm pretty sure I'd ditch the supersonic at altitude requirement though - M0.9+ at sea level is the key at lower complexity and cost

 

[zen]

If: (1SL,13/7/59: ) CDS Mountbatten had wined and dined Sandys at his Broadlands pad earlier*, so that Strike Carriers were reprieved earlier ...Ministers would have demanded (TSR.2) Bids be tested against a Buccaneer variant (R&D funded {7/55, corrected 26/11:} 2/6/55} to fly 30/4/58). Sandys had not put up NA.39 to knock down 1957 RAF Reqt. as he intended to chop it and its CVs: Best is the enemy of Good Enough.

This.
In a nutshell a lot flows very effectively if Mountbatten's effective arguments win D.Sandys around earlier.
As is Blackburn proposed B.108 to OR.339 a more affordable and practical solution.
A bulk order means Gyron Junior gets funded it's fixes. A benefit to the F.177 effort and T.188.

1955 would also drive forward Medium Fleet Carrier effort and D.Sandys favourite topic....missiles, in the form of the NIGS effort.

This all allows more focus to the avionics effort.

Potential here to port stand-off Anti-ship Green Cheese to a land attack INS variant. Obviating need for freefall lay down.

 

[Hood]

But that was really the crux of the problem. The systems required, INS + SLAR for nav, TFR for low low level flight away from SAMs and AAA, we're probably just too much for the UK to develop in the time, and even more so to integrate together.

Yes, I agree that the navigational aspects get overlooked. If fact they get overlooked for the V-Force too (I hope to rectify this in a couple of forthcoming articles).
Bomber Command knew full well it needed better navigational accuracy. Gee-H wasn't as accurate has hoped and too short-ranged. Ideas of dropping radio beacons were unworkable. Trials flogging Vampires at low level in 1950 showed that pilots really needed a moving map display. The only alternative was internal aids - the Doppler radar getting the nod pretty rapidly. All this was worked out pretty much before Vulcan and Victor Mk.1 got into service and indeed Green Satin was added to the Mk.2s and Blue Silk to Canberra. Green Satin was also part of the Red Devil bombing system combining radar with visual aiming.

All these threads led to OR.324 in 1953 as the Low Altitude Bomber. Attached with it was a Navigation and Bombing System with Doppler to OR.3567 and an integrated control system to OR.941 and for good measure added an inertially-guided Red Cat missile for good measure (which needed Doppler too for a fix before launch) to OR.1125. All this was far too technically demanding and expensive for 1953 (Red Devil was axed not long after for example). But GOR.339 threw away the Red Cat (inertial-guidance fading from popularity by 1957) and kept all the rest.
Delivering any weapon post 1950 was more complicated that just relying on a reticule and hoping gravity would do the rest.

It is interesting to note that OR.324 was called for 2,500nm radius (5,000nm range) at 1,500 ft at subsonic speed. GOR.339 in March 1957 called for 1,000nm radius with at 1,500ft with supersonic dash (supersonic at low level cost range but 2,500nm was probably excessive anyway). I agree that Mach 2 at altitude was wasteful. When the cost cutting reviews began and it was looked at ditching the high-altitude supersonics the savings were barely 1% of the programme cost - the cost effectiveness studies happened too late when the design was already firmly cast. That kind of analysis should have happened far sooner.

1955 would also drive forward Medium Fleet Carrier effort and D.Sandys favourite topic....missiles, in the form of the NIGS effort.

Sandys didn't like missiles either. He canned Blue Envoy and Bloodhound 3 - which admittedly was overkill for naval use, but he killed off the Stages and I doubt he would necessarily go for NIGS.
The question I suppose being which can get to the Tu-16/95 first before it drops its 'Kennels'? A Vixen with Firestreak, a fancy fighter with swingy-wings and back-of fag-packet missile ideas for the future, a Saro P.177N or NIGS?
Alternatively, what can shoot down the missile you failed to destroy while it was still hanging on the bomber? A Bofors, Sea Felines with Mk.1 eyeball guidance, SIGS, a P.177N pilot wishing he had ADENs, a Vixen pilot with ADENs wishing he had moar power?
Answers on a postcard.

Potential here to port stand-off Anti-ship Green Cheese to a land attack INS variant. Obviating need for freefall lay down.

Oddly given the mania for TV and inertial-guided bombs in the mid-1950s (Blue Boar and Red Cheeks) and stand-off missiles (Red Cat), TSR.2 was probably an outlier of the post-war bombers in not having a specific weapon tailored to it and specifically to have a complete free-fall armoury (AS.30 was added later). This may well have been due to internal carriage being the primary means of delivery. But it is odd given the guided air-to-ground weapons efforts of the period and especially when in the tactical role accuracy mattered far more than sprinkling 1,000lb bombs from V-Bombers over a wider area (200ft CEP).

EDIT: edited, thank you to altertken for reminding me that the Canberra B.15 was armed with the AS.30 in RAF service.

 

[The Wooksta!]

Surprised no one has gone back to '57 and the HSA P.1121. Some figures were saying it was a better fit for GOR 339 than the tedious competition that was reality, plus with a two seat naval variant drawn up, plus a two seaters for 339, you'd have something to suit everyone. With R&D costs spread around and economies of scale with longer production runs with RAF and RN as end users, it would have been cheaper.

With an ITP in 58, it would be in service before the Navy got Phantoms, so that's all that money kept in the UK.

 

[alertken]

Camm long banged on about P.1121 as missed opportunity for a UK Phantom.

Sandys did not cancel it because it was never up and running to be cancelled. RAF 1957/58 Reqt was Close Air Support/Ground Attack/Recce vice RAFG Swift FR.5, NEAF/FEAF Venom FB.5. (It is a calumny that Sandys rejected the manned combat a/c: he accepted this Reqt). Flyoff in Aden was armed Hunter F.6/armed JP/armed Gnat. NATO concurrently was trying hard to launch NBMR.1, which FIAT G.91 "won" v. Breguet Taon, but few bought. UK interest in anything lapsed because Fighter Command and RAuxAF were dramatically to be slimmed, liberating shoals of part-US-funded Hunter F.6. Many of the kits to make them FGA.9 were installed in RAF MUs. Why pay HSAL for a-bit-better, when the Good Enough was near capital-free?

Camm had extracted £1.9Mn. of HSAL's own money to scheme P.1121/P.1129; he extracted little from DH Engine Co, none to persevere with Gyron after Sandys ceased its funding, 4/57; RR was ill-disposed to scheme Medway for it, PV...because the logic of "free" Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 was decisive. If Camm perceived vast exports it was for him to go to his owner, specifically HS Grp. Tech.Dir Sir A.Hall (ex-D/RAE running the Comet crash fatigue test) and mentor him on Say's Law of Economics: Supply Creates Demand: Build it and they Will Come to our Field of Dreams!

A divergent What If is if Sir A.Hall had felt he had sufficient clout to attempt what Sir T.O.M.Sopwith had not: to make one team, from the ego-clashes of HS Units. They made 3 bids to TSR.2, not plumping for one, Camm-led, until 10/58, by when the V-A+EE die had been cast.

 

[red admiral]

Looking back I suppose the last version of 1121 got a lot closer to GOR339 but wasn't really a good fit, and was too late as VA+EE had already won.

Radius with 4 drop tanks got to the 1,000nm range
Speed was fine
Only one weapon, maybe acceptable
Made an effort at the avionics fit with both forward looking radar and solar

But take-off distance was about 3 times longer
And any real effort at low altitude ride quality? Here the "fighter" elements count against it

I think RAF Buccaneer S.2 (ish) for low level strike + 1121 for FGR sounds pretty sensible, apart from the costs...

 

[Yellow Palace]

I think RAF Buccaneer S.2 (ish) for low level strike + 1121 for FGR sounds pretty sensible, apart from the costs...

Buccaneer actually happened of course, so cost is a wash. I guess the question then is, could P.1121 be developed into a servicable aircraft for less money than was spent on TSR.2, F-111 and Phantom? Probably P.1154 and Harrier, too, since I expect it would swallow them up.

 

[Hood]

After reading this I don't think that Hawker would be capable of completing a P.1121 for GOR.339 - or at least one that was cutting edge enough. And trying to get Camm to share 'his' design would have been difficult too.

A divergent What If is if Sir A.Hall had felt he had sufficient clout to attempt what Sir T.O.M.Sopwith had not: to make one team, from the ego-clashes of HS Units. They made 3 bids to TSR.2, not plumping for one, Camm-led, until 10/58, by when the V-A+EE die had been cast.

Agreed 110%. Hawker Siddeley wasn't helping the situation, had they been more centralised pre-57 maybe the government/MoS might have been less frantic in their efforts to rationalise things.

 

[red admiral]

After reading this I don't think that Hawker would be capable of completing a P.1121 for GOR.339 - or at least one that was cutting edge enough. And trying to get Camm to share 'his' design would have been difficult too.

I think we'd be much more into "worse F-105" but with longer range for 1121 rather than British Phantom.

Hawkers was never much one for Avionics or Avionics integration. Maybe earlier consolidation with dH under HSA would have helped. But it just doesn't feel like real consolidation between companies was possible given the different personalities, cultures and locations. We've still got quite different Warton and Brough people today; whereas in the US it seems a much more mobile aerospace job market: bring together the best people for a specific project rather than stick them in the same role and office for 40 years

 

[zen]

Buccaneer was funded and that's Government Money.
Ready to go as interim, and cheaply fund-able to most of the OR bar supersonic speed.
At the time DH Gyron Junior was still being funded for higher performance and T.188 orphans with DH 'not bothered' to fix was after massive order for F.177 cancelled.

Scimitar was available almost immediately as is, a twin easy to achieve....had the Type 565 been funded it would be flying for FAW development at the time and variant for Strike would be relatively trivial from that position.

P.1121 was not fully funded and what was, was Company Money. Gyron was no already heading to the dustbin before F.155 was cancelled, as Fairey, Rolls-Royce and Armstrong Siddeley were already heading towards better supersonic jet only propulsion.

Strictly Type 571 Single Engine was the OR.339 solution. In bulk and run off with variants for specific roles.

Vickers, HP and Avro had the most knowledge relevant to the whole system development. EE's grasp was relatively over stated. Canberra this wasn't.

Blackburn, having gone through hell, was now climbing up the learning ladder hard on Buccaneer. But Buccaneer was taking up everything relevant.
However their offerings later on show how far they had come.

HP effectively walked away because the OR was nuts and their calculations proved it.

 

[Yellow Palace]

We've still got quite different Warton and Brough people today; whereas in the US it seems a much more mobile aerospace job market: bring together the best people for a specific project rather than stick them in the same role and office for 40 years

I've observed in the past that it appears to make a difference whether your bit of the company was part of Vickers or Armstrong Whitworth when the two merged in 1927.

 

[Yellow Palace]

There was an earlier squadron pattern planned for TSR-2. Note that the squadrons and associated UEs are my guess based on the given aircraft numbers and alignment with the existing Canberra/Valiant squadron pattern:

View attachment 687468

This would have given a frontline of 170 aircraft. Against the light bomber force proposed in Plan L there are the following variations:

1. 24 TSR-2s in Bomber command against 64 Canberras; this reflects the May 1958 decision to replace 4 x 16 UE Canberra squadrons with 3 x 8 UE Valiant squadrons as discussed above
2. RAFG actually gains 2 aircraft, though FEAF loses 2 (the split between strike and recce in FEAF isn't given in the source document for the above table)
3. NEAF, the Akrotiri Strike Wing, loses 1 x 8 UE strike squadron

I have seen this described as the "initial plan" but suspect that in the very earliest days of OR.339 there were assumptions, if not plans, for even larger forces. This one was pared back by reallocating some specific roles to the P.1154 and accepting that the double nuclear weapons carriage of the TSR-2 allowed for a smaller force.

Interestingly, this seems to line up with planned TSR.2 weapons allocations in mid-late 1963 from AVIA 65/1834 E18 p4 - namely 102 WE.177 already, with about half being high-yield WE.177B. If one assumes the 12-aircraft strike squadron from later plans (which is compatible with these numbers!) the FEAF squadron counts as half strike (6 aircraft) and half recce (4 aircraft), bringing the total to 102 strike and 68 recce. This is an interesting comparison to Damien Burke, who gives figures of 76 WE.177 (plus eight reserve) in July 1963, of which 53 were (in August) be WE.177B - which is indeed 'about half' of 102, though the total number of weapons is rather lower.

Evidently, at some point between 1963 and 1966, between the 300 kiloton weapon was enlarged to the 420 kilotons of RE.179 to better meet the need for an interim strategic weapon.

 

[pathology_doc]

You are never going to replace Canberra sensibly if you're doing it in the environment pertaining to the British aircraft industry of the time.

1) TSR.2 might have got out of the starting gate less over-budget and not as late (therefore avoiding cancellation) if English Electric had been absolute project lead, with Vickers merely building part of the airframe and EE being free to choose the engines.

2) Specify an off the shelf avionics fit for the Mark 1 to get it into service while reserving space and weight for the system that was subsequently developed. This cheaper version then becomes the basis for service airframe familiarization and possibly for export.

Of course the chances of any of this being allowed politically are minimal. TSR2 or any Canberra replacement was always doomed until the Tornado era.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Any aircraft designed to the GOR.339 requirement was going to be expensive and probably run into similar development challenges as the actual TSR-2 did. For instance, as interesting as the Vickers Type 571 is it doesn't really overcome any of the development challenges that subsequently appeared, neither does it reduce the development cost burden. Its only notional advantage would have been a lower production cost and, theoretically, lower operating cost.

The best, and probably last, offramp from the TSR-2 programme is the proposed Blackburn B.108 Buccaneer development in mid-1958. The concept got a lot of attention in Government circles (Brundrett, Chief Scientific Advisor, seems to have been keen) and estimates by Controller Aircraft stated a development cost of £16m against £35m for a GOR.339 type though procurement costs were estimated to be closer (£0.5m against £0.6m for the GOR.339 type). Of course we now know the early GOR.339 cost estimates to have been fantastically wrong.

The slightly depressing thing is that over the course of the subsequent 5 years or so Hawker Siddeely would progressively come-up with Buccaneer modifications that would take the type closer to the RAF's perceived need; four wheel undercarriage bogies, larger slipper tanks, a reconnaissance pack, etc. The arrival of the Spey gave a significant performance improvement. At one point the RN even wanted to use the TSR-2 TFR (albeit without the SLR for terrain referencing) in a Buccaneer S.2 upgrade. Its not hard to imagine the Buccaneer as a joint programme with two basic variants:

1. The basic Spey S.2 but upgraded with the TSR-2 TFR and other goodies from that programme
2. A Spey Powered B.108 derivative with four wheel undercarriage, non-folding wings and the extra 18" of fuselage length used to provide the SLR for terrain reference

This would have the added advantage of aligning replacement dates between the two services to sometime in the early-mid 1970s. For that a common VG type, with the Type 583 planform, could be developed. An airframe common to both services and both strike and interceptor roles (which is what the RN actually had in mind for OR.346) with different equipment fits for each, e.g. Elliots Q/X band with the Ferranti LRMTS for strike and an AI.25 (of whatever flavour) for interception. The problem with this is that would have required incredible political will to overcome the RAF's objection to the Buccaneer, and RN aircraft in general, and impose a joint aircraft programme. Such will was possible, unfortunately when it was next displayed the result was the P.1154RN.

This doesn't solve the Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 conundrum, that remains an outstanding requirement and its where I find the P.1121 quite tragic. In reality, the RAF didn't decide until 1959-61 that the next incarnation for this role needed to be supersonic, that decision in turn drove the P.1154. An alternative that saw the earlier adoption of the P.1121 in that role could have given that aircraft a significant life. Alternatively, the UK acquiring (possibly even joint developing) the Viggen with Sweden, with the type using the Medway instead of the JT8D as a trade, as the Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 replacement would have been an excellent solution.

I wouldn't get to hung up on the high-level configuration of the TSR-2 nav-system. The RAF had been using H2S to provide navigational fixes for a long time and Blue Shadow with roller maps had been fitted to pathfinder Canberras to enhance navigation too. An interesting aspect is how the basic description of low level operations and the technical solutions from the OR.314/324 work made their way into TSR-2, the TFR/SLR/INS nav-attack combination and the small highly loaded wing.

In terms of weapons and weapons delivery TSR-2 carried over the Canberra approach, LABS for delivering free-fall bombs, which isn't surprising as both aircraft had the same mission. Equally, the Nord AS.30 had been adopted for the Canberra so its hardly surprising it was considered for the aircraft meant to replace it. Subsequently it was intended to integrate Martel.

 

[Hood]

There is one big political issue with ordering B.108 though - it does nothing to contract the aircraft industry as Brough could probably handle it alone with a little assistance from another company for systems integration - even with the delays in Buccaneer development in real terms a medium-tier company had pulled off a modern R&D programme.
But then how to dangle any more carrots for EE, VA, DH, HS etc.?
So its massively good for cost effectiveness but hoping BEA airliner (Trident) is going to handle rationalisation on its own is probably not feasible. GOR.339 was set up for the big boys to compete, the minnows were just fodder, doubtless the MoS hoped they wouldn't even bother tendering. Blackburn & General Aircraft was a mere appendix to be snipped out.

The Hunter FGA.9/FR.10 conundrum would solve itself when the ludicrous notion of supersonic trainers finally got a long hard look and Jaguar arrived (of course had it not been cancelled P.1083 would have given a transonic Hunter that might have been perfectly adequate). The Jaguar was not 100% perfect but a happy occurrence nevertheless. Of course the high-tech whiz-kids were too seduced by VTOL chimeras.

 

[Yellow Palace]

You are never going to replace Canberra sensibly if you're doing it in the environment pertaining to the British aircraft industry of the time.

1) TSR.2 might have got out of the starting gate less over-budget and not as late (therefore avoiding cancellation) if English Electric had been absolute project lead, with Vickers merely building part of the airframe and EE being free to choose the engines.

2) Specify an off the shelf avionics fit for the Mark 1 to get it into service while reserving space and weight for the system that was subsequently developed. This cheaper version then becomes the basis for service airframe familiarization and possibly for export.

Of course the chances of any of this being allowed politically are minimal. TSR2 or any Canberra replacement was always doomed until the Tornado era.

This is, IMO, the way to do it. The precise selection of the winning bid is less relevant, as long as it goes to a competent firm - either Vickers or English Electric would likely be satisfactory - given clear status as prime contractor.

With a finger in the air, I reckon you get an initial model with off-the-shelf (and probably some conservative development) avionics in service circa 1969, but the fully compliant version likely takes until 1976 or so before all the bugs are worked out of the nav/attack system.

There is one big political issue with ordering B.108 though - it does nothing to contract the aircraft industry as Brough could probably handle it alone with a little assistance from another company for systems integration - even with the delays in Buccaneer development in real terms a medium-tier company had pulled off a modern R&D programme.

There is always the politically unattractive, but economically reasonable, course of action: let the contracts lie where they fall, and don't get in the way of companies going out of business. With the same amount of work to go around, that also leads to contraction of industry and the 'winners' consolidating their position. Just not in a way that's likely to be palatable to a British government in the 1960s.

 

[pathology_doc]

but the fully compliant version likely takes until 1976 or so before all the bugs are worked out of the nav/attack system.

Either that or the electronics are superseded by a better system pretty quickly at that point (e.g. the one that actually went into the historical Tornado).
I can easily see:
Mk1 - Initial run with off the shelf electronics.
Mk 2 - Production run with full nav-attack system as designed and contracted.
Mk 3 - Mk 1 retrofitted with upgraded 70s system (Mk 1A probably doesn't do such a complete makeover justice).
Mk 3A - Final tranche of Mk 2 retrofitted on the production line with upgraded 70s system.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It is no accident that even as TSR2 lumbers through its development looking like a fourth V Bomber (Vickers Vindicator?) BAC is looking at smaller aircraft with VG technology.

It's more than 30 years since I read it but I'm reasonably certain that SPECTRE stole a Vindicator in "Thunderball" the book.

I've some notes upstairs that I made from a PRO file (which were written when it was still called the Public Records Office) on the name for the F-111K. The preamble of the file said something along the lines of, "It has come to the attention of the Air Board that the NAME GAME has begun."

One of the options discussed was to revive the practice of naming bombers after towns in the UK & Commonwealth and "Richmond" was thought to be a good choice because Australia, the UK and USA had a town of that name. Though if I remember correctly (because I haven't looked at the notes) the preferred name was "Merlin".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

One of the highlights of my 1970s childhood would have been listening to the incomparable Raymond Baxter's commentary on the BAC Merlin as part of the coverage of the "Biggin Hill Air Fair" and "Farnborough Air Show" on Sunday afternoons on BBC1 if the TSR.2 hadn't been cancelled.

This is the clip from a documentary about him doing his "day job" presenting "Tomorrow's World" which was one of the highlights of my 1970s childhood.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IPg9Y9Aliz0

 

[uk 75]

Me and you both:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/farnborough-1974-the-brits-as-they-should-have-been.4448/

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I have a hazy memory of some Harriers and Jaguars attacking mock targets with live ordnance (if that's the right expression) in a "Biggin Hill Air Fair" in the 1970s. I'm reasonably sure that it included dropping parachute-retarded bombs.

Was that what inspired "Brits as they should have been"?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

On the subjects of Raymond Baxter and the name for the TSR.2 he made a documentary about the Spitfire which was imaginatively called "Spitfire!" in which he claimed that the Spitfire was nearly called the Shrew.

"Spitfire!" is on Youtube and it looks like a VHS recoding made in the 1980s from the BBC2 logo. Although I'm sure that I watched it on BBC1 on a Sunday afternoon in 1976.

 

[uk 75]

The RAF set piece was a well loved feature of September Battle of Britain open days.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Continuing the tangent on Raymond Baxter. His nephew was Carl Andre the artist who made "The Bricks" sculpture that perplexed Fife Robertson. I learned this from a 1990s Channel Four documentary called "Upholding the Bricks" that Baxter made about his nephew.

 

[publiusr]

NASA still kept a big wing Canberra…the old Wings channel had a bomb bay with downwards firing machine guns if memory serves.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Me and you both:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/farnborough-1974-the-brits-as-they-should-have-been.4448/

In that thread you also mentioned a naval fighter called the BAC Type 583 "Cutlass". That reminded me of another highlight of my "real" 1970s childhood - being allowed to stay up late and watch "Sailor". It would be a more cherished memory that if the ship had been a CVA.01 class aircraft carrier.

 

[uk 75]

Me and you both:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/farnborough-1974-the-brits-as-they-should-have-been.4448/

In that thread you also mentioned a naval fighter called the BAC Type 583 "Cutlass". That reminded me of another highlight of my "real" 1970s childhood - being allowed to stay up late and watch "Sailor". It would be a more cherished memory that if the ship had been a CVA.01 class aircraft carrier.

I had a friend help me make a similar wish come true back in 2019. A one off which I now treasure.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/triang-cva-01-that-might-have-been.33278/

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the spirit of the above....

Are there any remotely plausible ways in which the "real world's" TSR2 could have been put into service on time and at cost?

In a vastly reduced 'barebones' capability.......?
I'd love to say yes, but I suspect the answer is still no.

As the RAF had to "make do" with the Buccaneer in the "real world" how about an interim TSR.2 with the Buccaneer's avionics? The money that was spent during the 1970s on the R&D of Tornado is spent on an avionics upgrade of the surviving interim aircraft. Any any new aircraft that can be afforded as attrition replacements are built to that standard.

The "method in the madness" is that as far as I know the airframe and engines problems of TSR.2 had been "sorted out" by the time it was cancelled or at least "the end was in sight" and it was the avionics that were the problem.

If you agree please will you ingratiate a "Blake's 7" fan by writing "Confirmed!"

 

[zen]

Scanning.......
You request has a 98% probability of success.

 

[uk 75]

Confirmed...

View: https://youtu.be/7UtkbHL2tZg