Frankly, most of the tactical systems back in the day were effectively Fisher-Price My First Sonar in comparison to systems today. Old "if X breaks replace Y" troubleshooting methods simply don't work anymore. As I alluded to in a previous post, you have to have a deeper understanding of system function and be able to approach troubleshooting holistically. I'm not even sure you can train people on that--you just have to have experience working with the systems and develop that toolbox, and that's not something the fleet can do given their ridiculous optempo.
Way back in the day, before I was in even, the USN had a special school called Undocumented Troubleshooting. Friend of mine went to that school.

He is currently one of 3 people with red-line/rewrite authority on the digital depth detectors. He's a WG employee, not even a GS.
 

So, what is the shelf life on a Mk48.

Regards,
 

So, what is the shelf life on a Mk48.

Regards,
As far as I know, pretty long. Otto fuel is long term stable, as is the filler.
 
As far as I know, pretty long. Otto fuel is long term stable, as is the filler.
Yeah they're also generally delivered in pieces for final assembly and test in Australia--so that total will include all necessary in-service support equipment updates etc etc.

Given they aren't delivering fully-assembled fueled-up torpedo bodies, you really can't break that price tag down to an estimated number of fieldable weapons.
 
My guess is the lifespan is more or less indefinite given periodic (every decade or two) maintenance recertifications. The Tomahawks are like this; they go on to have everything inspected and any shelf unstable parts replaced and get a new sell by date. USNs blk V is actually an electronics update package applied to the blk IV as they cycle through recert.
 
Yeah they're also generally delivered in pieces for final assembly and test in Australia--so that total will include all necessary in-service support equipment updates etc etc.
Part of that may be so that Oz can shoot them as exercise torpedoes.

Mk48s get shot several times as unarmed exercise torpedoes before they get a warhead installed. Mk14 trauma still haunts the USN.
 
Mk48s get shot several times as unarmed exercise torpedoes before they get a warhead installed. Mk14 trauma still haunts the USN.
Yeah, we were first in the class so we shipped and shot a lot of exercise weapons.

(I'd rather shoot them than have to unship them again though. It's an unpleasant evolution at any time of the year.)
 
Yeah, we were first in the class so we shipped and shot a lot of exercise weapons.

(I'd rather shoot them than have to unship them again though. It's an unpleasant evolution at any time of the year.)
Yeah, the offload so we could load EXTORPs for TRE was a pain in the ass.



Do those exercise weapons get recovered?
Yes, there's a small tugboat that drags a net through the water as a target, plus there's a ballast tank in the exercise "warhead" section, and finally there's a very significant reward if random fishermen recover one.

They get recovered, refueled, shot again, repeat till required number of firings is reached. Edit: Then, and only then, are they fitted with a live warhead and declared "ready for use" as a warshot.
 
Last edited:
What's the date again?

Ha, Alex is still on ex-Twitter I see. Good commentary as always.

Not that I'm up on speed on TKMS's capacity but actually mating a Type 212 variant with a K15 reactor tickles more than just my funny bone. As all kinds of bad previously unlikely ridiculous things are made to happen then why not make good previously unthinkable beneficial things happen too? I mean, the potential risks that could be realized for France, Germany and any potential (democratic-human-rights-respecting-rules-based-world-order-preferring) customer for such a contraption are magnitudes greater than making a further asset to help dissuade those that would willfully realize those risks. Come to think of it - besides Australia's predicament - given the huge sales of Ozempic in the US (and the market appreciation that goes with it), Denmark could now reinvest some of that income, return the courtesy and have some real assets patrol, say, around somewhere like Greenland. To help slim down some bloated ambitions as well, so to say. Win-win.

I know, I know, easier ways to go about it but gimmeabreak, can't you see I'm indulging here?
 
Last edited:
Rear Admiral Peter D Briggs RAN Rtd weighing in again about the increasingly delusional AUKUS submarine program.

"The reality and not the fantasy of the US submarine building situation needs to be accepted. It is not disloyal or inappropriate to point out the consequences for Australia, as seems to be implied. It cannot be ignored in the hope that it will all be OK on the day in 2031 when the next US administration has to make a decision on whether to sell Australia the first of three to five Virginia class submarines."

 
Briggs always struck me as a Naval Group shill. People assure me he isn't, but he always throws "we should return to the French option" in pretty much every article he writes.

As someone who has spent most of his adult life in the industry, I can assure you that a retired admiral honestly doesn't know enough about how the industry actually works to speak so confidently on the topic.
 
As someone who has spent most of his adult life in the industry, I can assure you that a retired admiral honestly doesn't know enough about how the industry actually works to speak so confidently on the topic.
Do you think the handful of people in the know who approved AUKUS on the aussie side knew what they were talking about ?
 
Last edited:
Briggs always struck me as a Naval Group shill. People assure me he isn't, but he always throws "we should return to the French option" in pretty much every article he writes.
Well there are no other viable SSN options in the 2030s if Virginia doesn't pan out, so what else should he put forward?

In his article his tone is pretty balanced - he merely says that it's a glaring mistake not to look at the French option now (and other options too, however other countries can only offer SSKs not SSNs).

IMHO the French option was very viable until mid last year, but now Naval Group Cherbourg is going to be busy for the next decade with the 4 Dutch Barracuda SSKs, in addition to the French SSBN program. That said, NG claim that they still have some extra production capacity (they have enough capacity to build 1 SSN/year*) so perhaps a Barracuda SSN could be fast tracked in Cherbourg for delivery after 2035. Giving enough time to set up Australian production for the follow-ons (and still faster than waiting for AUKUS SSN in the 2040s). That would not be incompatible with a short-term lease of 1-2 USN Virginias, which might be more acceptable to the US than giving up in-service SSNs and US production slots for good.

* Note: Cherbourg's capacity is 5,000 tonnes/year of which ~60% is currently taken up by the French SSBN program (15,000t every 5 years) and ~25% by the Dutch SSK program (12,000t over 10 years), leaving perhaps ~15% capacity available, as a very rough estimate... just about enough to start building 1 Barracuda SSN
 
Last edited:
Very interesting debate on the Aukus submarine program.

Sovereignty and Security forum Canberra 2025​

This panel discusses the viability of AUKUS in its current form, and what needs to change to deliver sovereign undersea warfare capabilities that Australia can afford to own and man. Panellists include:
  • Dennis Richardson AO, served as Secretary of Defence, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was the Director General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) for almost a decade to 2005, and was the Australian Ambassador to the United States for 5 years until 2010;
  • Jennifer Parker, served for 20 years with the Royal Australian Navy, specialising in Principal Warfare Officer. She was second in command of the HMAS Darwin, our guided missile frigate;
  • Rear Admiral Peter D Briggs AO OAM served in the Royal Australian Navy for 40 years, specialising as a submarine operator. He was in Command of HMAS Stirling, and was Head of Submarine Capability resolving Collins introduction into service issues.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LtXSr0QsME

Adm. Briggs kicks off with the flaws in the current SSN Aukus plan:
  • "A plan designed by a couple of political advisors in a coffee shop, who have never been nowhere near anyone who has ever operated and maintained submarines... a flawed plan, heading for the wrong destination."
He then goes into "Virginia we have a problem" - the reasons why the US submarine fleet is aging faster than it can be replaced by new Virginias, and how Virginia deliveries are behind schedule and further build delays inevitable. His conclusion:
  • "There is no scenario under the current plan that does not severely degrade the USN's SSN availability. (...) Getting [the Virginia build rate] to 2.33, even though it's not going to happen, will not tick the box [mandated by Congress] which is not to degrade US undersea warfare capability"
He discusses how the current and future US administrations can be expected to view AUKUS:
  • "The current US administration is not going to dump AUKUS. It's such a good deal. No one is going to object to that deal. They're getting access to a base we're going to build, maintenance that we're going to pay for, we're sending Australians to serve in their SSNs, filling gaps in their crewing, paying their wages, and sending money to support the US shipbuilding industry"
  • "In 2031 it will be a different administration. They will be looking at the legislation that says "does not degrade" [US undersea warfare capability]. There is no way the next administration will choose to cut their own SSN years in order to sell us submarines which we cannot man and cannot get operational."
He then goes into the other flaws of SSN AUKUS, the UK's inability to deliver, complex supply chains with 2 variants, excessive manning requirements etc.

Finally Briggs finishes in favor of a Plan B based on 12 Suffrens, which are smaller, require fewer crew, will be less expensive to build and maintain than 8 US or UK SSNs, won't have to be debugged, can be bought in large enough numbers to enable an Australian supply chain...
  • "It won't be low risk, but it will be much lower risk than SSN Aukus. We will be in charge of our own destiny... this is the only sovereign option"
On the other hand, Parker, a supporter of AUKUS, argues that Australia must work with the US to obtain the Virginias and must stop constantly changing approaches. She repeats claims that the French SSK purchase wasn't working, it was delayed and above cost (however, she is corrected by the moderator Turnbull, who cites government official statements that there were no delays or cost increases), and argues that the current partnership has been progressing remarkably well.
  • "In 3.5 years, a lot has been achieved. Of course there is risk... but we know the risk, and it is being treated."
 
Last edited:
Also some interesting comments in the Q&A, including by:
  • Kim Gillis (who negotiated and oversaw part of the Attack SSK program) who emphasizes the amount of misinformation in the Australian media about the Attack program, as Attack was actually under budget and progressing well, despite the usual challenges (like any big program). However, at this point he doesn't think a French SSN "Plan B" is viable as the relationship has been burnt and the French are busy with the Dutch SSK program
  • Admiral Peter Clarke (only Australian to have commanded an SSN) who was part of the Operational Analysis that led to the initial SSK decision, which he claims was "flawed". He's skeptical that French SSNs would have long enough reactor life ("EFPH" - Effective Full Power Hours) for Australia's long patrol distances, which could lead to accelerated refuelings every 7-8 years instead of 9-10 years
[Note: This seems a bit of a stretch as the old Rubis SSNs had a reactor output of ~250,000 nautical miles between refuelings, and the new Suffren SSNs have 25-33% more time between refuelings. The patrol distance from Perth to the Chinese coast is ~3,500 - 4,000nm each way. The French subs are double crewed so spend more time at sea than US and UK SSNs, which would tend to offset shorter patrol distances and increase reactor usage).
  • And others... Kym Bergmann (editor of APDR - Asia Pacific Defence Reporter), Rex Patrick (lol)
 
Last edited:
I thought US sbmarines had two crews, if that has gone, when?
Only SSBNs and the Trident SSGNs. IIRC the old SSBNs that were converted to SSNs, like the Kamehameha, kept a single crew.

You need to make some very specific design choices to make dual crewing work well. The Tridents allow for removing the entire escape trunk to allow for larger items to be brought aboard than the 25" hatches limit you to, plus they have larger watertight doors in the compartment bulkheads. You also need a shipyard dedicated to support the subs, which also works out to be a good place to assign Sailors for their shore tour. But you still need a lot of shipyard folks in addition to the Sailors on shore duty. Because you're doing all the work that you'd usually do in 6 months in 1.

In exchange, you can keep a sub at sea for 2/3 to 3/4 of its life.
 
Thanks for posting the link to this presentation H_K, I'd meant to do it myself but was procrastinating and still haven't watched parts 3 & 4. Well worth a watch for anyone interested in the ongoing Australian subs fiasco as it's well balanced and includes many government and industry leaders who've been involved over the years. The other parts address AUKUS more generally and Trump's impact.

Bloody refreshing honestly to see some grown ups discussing things which rarely if ever get mentioned in the mainstream media. Hats off to former PM Turnbull for putting it together.
 
Last edited:
Funny to think that France, all alone in its little corner building AIP Scorpene / Attacks and Barracudas has more "wiggle room" in its production schedule than the USA and UK, combined, to answer Australia requirements.
Nah, somebody had to say it, and I said it !
I wonder whether the flexibility comes from the non-nuclear, yet similar enough, AIP submarines ?
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom