Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

[Hood]

3,024 submariners would equal enough to crew 22 Virginias, or 11 if you were running Blue/Gold teams.
Either way its a bit vague and sounds like an overstated figure.

Remember career management and ship-shore rotation. Submariners don't spend every day of their time in service assigned to a submarine. At least half their time would have to be in shore tours for training, support, etc.

Very much so, no doubt some of that contingency is additional trained crew, spares, training staff etc., which is why I estimated a Blue/Gold team (2 crews per sub) figure as being perhaps closer to what you'd need (even then 270 per sub feels generous).

The Collins crew was expanded from 42 (6 officers, 36 enlisted) to 58 to spread the workload more effectively when they were having problems crewing more than three subs. It seems that there are four 58-personnel crews available at least, given no more than 4 seem to operational at any one time (though perhaps our Australian members can correct me if there 6 full 58-person crews available).

The Attack-class had a complement of 60, which implies the current Collins team would need to expand slightly, and with double the number of hulls to the need to man twelve submarines would have required doubling the submariners in the RAN (or a two-thirds increase if only 4 boats are currently manned) .
Buying SSNs with crews of around 100-110 would imply another expansion, but 6 SSNs would probably need as many personnel as 12 Attack-class. I have a hunch the Virginia figure quoted was for 12 submarines.

The strength of the RAN (as of last June according to Wiki) is 15,285 permanent full-time personnel (2,914 commissioned officers, remained enlisted), 161 gap year personnel and 3,932 reserve personnel.

The cynic in me would doubt whether even the expansion for 4 operational Collins to 9-10 operational Attacks was feasible, let alone manning however many SSNs it thinks it can afford (I'd be surprised if they get more than 6 SSNs), 5 operational at once would be about a 500 person commitment nearly three decades time up from 232 today).

 

[Grey Havoc]

Time to bring back the press gangs....

 

[H_K]

In an undated briefing to judge Australia’s ability to go with US Virginia class submarines, one of two design options now being considered, the federal government was told the 3024 submariners required would be: “A major and perhaps deciding factor against the feasibility of this proposal”. Click to expand... Seemed pretty relevant to me.

3,024 submariners would equal enough to crew 22 Virginias, or 11 if you were running Blue/Gold teams.
Either way its a bit vague and sounds like an overstated figure.

Actually that seems reasonable to me.

The equivalent numbers I found for the French sub force are 3,000 men, of which 1,900 are active submariners to man 10 subs with 17 Red/Blue crews (8 double crewed subs + 2 uncrewed subs in deep refit at any time + 1 reserve SSBN crew).

Those crews actually have ~1,450 “seats” so at any given time there’s a surplus of 30% (~450 submariners) who are probably in training or short-term assignment ashore.

Then you have 1,100 of 3,000 on shore duty
to cover all the command, training, and support functions at 2 sub bases. Many of these must also be submarine qualified.

 

[jeffb]

Pretty sure RAN submariners already get extra bonuses over and above their standard navy pay but the Australian government's going to have to really give that a boost just to get the numbers they'll need.

 

[starviking]

I'd say the whole problem of whether or not previous Australian governmental or military studies thought nuclear submarine construction was practical or not is rather moot since at that time the USA and UK were adamantly against giving such technology and now they are not.

Infrastructure can be built, people can be trained, certification can be gained. If there is will and enough cash it can happen.

Just sharing the technology doesn't fix the problem though. Australia's going to have to build a nuclear industry capable of handling weapons grade fuel to give themselves a truly sovereign capability. They have to be able to fix them or refuel them if they break or get used up too soon. If they don't have that ability they're effectively just operating a SSN flotilla that's been loaned to Australia, at a staggering cost.

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

 

[jeffb]

I'd say the whole problem of whether or not previous Australian governmental or military studies thought nuclear submarine construction was practical or not is rather moot since at that time the USA and UK were adamantly against giving such technology and now they are not.

Infrastructure can be built, people can be trained, certification can be gained. If there is will and enough cash it can happen.

Just sharing the technology doesn't fix the problem though. Australia's going to have to build a nuclear industry capable of handling weapons grade fuel to give themselves a truly sovereign capability. They have to be able to fix them or refuel them if they break or get used up too soon. If they don't have that ability they're effectively just operating a SSN flotilla that's been loaned to Australia, at a staggering cost.

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

 

[Rickshaw]

I'd say the whole problem of whether or not previous Australian governmental or military studies thought nuclear submarine construction was practical or not is rather moot since at that time the USA and UK were adamantly against giving such technology and now they are not.

Infrastructure can be built, people can be trained, certification can be gained. If there is will and enough cash it can happen.

Just sharing the technology doesn't fix the problem though. Australia's going to have to build a nuclear industry capable of handling weapons grade fuel to give themselves a truly sovereign capability. They have to be able to fix them or refuel them if they break or get used up too soon. If they don't have that ability they're effectively just operating a SSN flotilla that's been loaned to Australia, at a staggering cost.

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

Who will be the manufacturer? The hull is apparently meant to be 100% Australian, the reactor 100% US or UK? Who does the boat go to if something goes wrong? Australian ASC or US or UK shipyards? How do you remove a reactor from a hull to fix problems without dismantling the sub? Costly and difficult...

 

[starviking]

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

And how does that happen? I’m sure reactor problems will be covered in the contracts.

 

[starviking]

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

Who will be the manufacturer? The hull is apparently meant to be 100% Australian, the reactor 100% US or UK? Who does the boat go to if something goes wrong? Australian ASC or US or UK shipyards? How do you remove a reactor from a hull to fix problems without dismantling the sub? Costly and difficult...

First, I think we are talking about an unlikely problem. Second, if a reactor problem does occur, it can be assumed that it will be progressive, and likely to occur in all reactors of the same type and manufacturer. Thus it will return to the reactor manufacturer for fixes, and will be a US-Oz, UK-Oz, or a US-UK-Oz programme.

 

[Archibald]

Previously the complaints about the French deal were cost, timelines, AUS work share, and sovereign capability.

Apparently none of those things that were said to be critical just a year ago matter anymore… therein lies the magic advantage of SSNs!

For some reasons when I red that post I smiled and thought about these fellows

"This is no longer our problem ! " and thus...

 

[Josh_TN]

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

Who will be the manufacturer? The hull is apparently meant to be 100% Australian, the reactor 100% US or UK? Who does the boat go to if something goes wrong? Australian ASC or US or UK shipyards? How do you remove a reactor from a hull to fix problems without dismantling the sub? Costly and difficult...

First, I think we are talking about an unlikely problem. Second, if a reactor problem does occur, it can be assumed that it will be progressive, and likely to occur in all reactors of the same type and manufacturer. Thus it will return to the reactor manufacturer for fixes, and will be a US-Oz, UK-Oz, or a US-UK-Oz programme.

If there is a problem with the fueled for life reactor design, one assumes one of the twenty Virginia class boats would suffer from the problem first.

 

[kaiserd]

I think the point that some contributors are making but is perhaps being lost is that while “whole life” reactors may somewhat reduce the nuclear infrastructure and expertise otherwise needed in Australia it does not eliminate the need for nuclear infrastructure and expertise and that the cost and scale of what will still be required is being somewhat undersold, particularly when sovereignty aspects are considered.
Plus the “ease” of maintaining such reactors (and of in some/ many scenarios potentially being totally dependent on infrastructure etc. on the US west coast) is perhaps being oversold by some contributors.
This is not a jet engine that can be flown back and forth by a C-17 or something smaller.
Enthusiasm for Australian nuclear subs is understandable if you are convinced they are required. By the complications, challenges and costs of going in this direction are considerable and are perhaps best not minimised/ undersold if the widest support is to be maintained medium-long term (and you wish the aspiration to be fulfilled and then maintained).

 

[NeilChapman]

I think the point that some contributors are making but is perhaps being lost is that while “whole life” reactors may somewhat reduce the nuclear infrastructure and expertise otherwise needed in Australia it does not eliminate the need for nuclear infrastructure and expertise and that the cost and scale of what will still be required is being somewhat undersold, particularly when sovereignty aspects are considered.
Plus the “ease” of maintaining such reactors (and of in some/ many scenarios potentially being totally dependent on infrastructure etc. on the US west coast) is perhaps being oversold by some contributors.
This is not a jet engine that can be flown back and forth by a C-17 or something smaller.
Enthusiasm for Australian nuclear subs is understandable if you are convinced they are required. By the complications, challenges and costs of going in this direction are considerable and are perhaps best not minimised/ undersold if the widest support is to be maintained medium-long term (and you wish the aspiration to be fulfilled and then maintained).

I think it's important for AU to realize that they have a considerable bargaining position at present. The US has considerable need for AU basing of submarines. Guam is under threat and AU is the next best choice. That being said, if Ceasar for a day the deal I'd make would include at least the following...

1. AU select US as strategic partner with EB as prime. This will likely require an extended contract with EB to supervise Osborne.

2. Osborne yard accepted as extension of EB to build a section of Virginia Block VI under the direct supervision of EB through the Joint Production Agreement. AU pays for modernization of yard to include capacity for a deep maintenance facility. I would make the deep maintenance facility large enough to handle Columbia-class.

3. Under EB supervision, Osborne ramped as deep maintenance facility for US and AU boats. A contracted number of US boats would receive maintenance over the contract period.

4. US provides nuclear propulsion systems and agrees to dispose of reactor and all costs associated with that process at end of life.

5. AU boats final assembly in US.

Yes, it is flashy to build your own boat. It's the shiny object. But there is no scenario where final production of these boats in AU makes fiscal nor schedule sense. And, removing the nuclear issue with the above condition negates that concern.

Maintenance is not shiny, it's muck. Where there's muck, there's money. AU can underwrite a significant portion of their fleet lifecycle cost on maintenance of US Virginia-class boats. I believe 5 are dockside at the moment awaiting maintenance with no capacity to get them done. With 60 some Virginia's it will be the gift that keeps on giving.

This scenario allows the RAN to focus on all the administrative, staffing and training requirements that will themselves take a decade to complete. There will new weapons systems such as cruise and hypersonic missiles that will need to be integrated. Other opportunities we cannot yet foresee will also arise. And, over time, AUs in-country support capacity will expand and perhaps additional modules may be added to the yard- but with limited risk to cost and schedules.

 

[Rhinocrates]

From Peter Coates' Submarine Matters:

Report To Donors: Advantages of Australia's Future SSNs

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.

gentleseas.blogspot.com

Essentially, Australian elections will be held in May this year. If the current coalition wins, the project is likely to go ahead. Polls indicate that a Labor-led government is more likely and if they win, then 'Australia's SSN aspirations will likely die off'.

 

[Rickshaw]

From Peter Coates' Submarine Matters:

Report To Donors: Advantages of Australia's Future SSNs

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.

gentleseas.blogspot.com

Essentially, Australian elections will be held in May this year. If the current coalition wins, the project is likely to go ahead. Polls indicate that a Labor-led government is more likely and if they win, then 'Australia's SSN aspirations will likely die off'.

Interesting. On what basis is that conclusion reached? The ALP has stated that they support the decision. Why would they reverse their position?

 

[Rhinocrates]

From Peter Coates' Submarine Matters:

Report To Donors: Advantages of Australia's Future SSNs

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.

gentleseas.blogspot.com

Essentially, Australian elections will be held in May this year. If the current coalition wins, the project is likely to go ahead. Polls indicate that a Labor-led government is more likely and if they win, then 'Australia's SSN aspirations will likely die off'.

Interesting. On what basis is that conclusion reached? The ALP has stated that they support the decision. Why would they reverse their position?

Coates cites 'tension' as in, 'A tension is inevitable concerning the extent Australian SSNs will participate in protecting or destroying nuclear submarines - as such functions have been restricted to nuclear weapons powers'. It could be a major doctrinal and political issue. If Albanese as leader of the opposition has committed to it, then my feeling is that he's likely to continue with it - his tilt is quite centrist. Coates doesn't say that it would be cancelled outright, but might wither on the vine. I'm afraid that you have to be a donor to access the full report, which would doubtless explain his reasoning.

 

[starviking]

I think the point that some contributors are making but is perhaps being lost is that while “whole life” reactors may somewhat reduce the nuclear infrastructure and expertise otherwise needed in Australia it does not eliminate the need for nuclear infrastructure and expertise and that the cost and scale of what will still be required is being somewhat undersold, particularly when sovereignty aspects are considered.

What infrastructure are we talking about? If it’s a shore reactor for tests, I think that’s unlikely - the RN has shifted to computer simulation for reactor life testing. If it’s monitoring of operational reactors, that will involve reactor chemistry tests. I have to assume that having a nuclear science organization (ANSTO), which among other things runs the OPAL research reactor, and various universities which feature nuclear-based studies, that these will cover that angle.

 

[Archibald]

I was tempted to throw a brief summary of France past efforts leading to MN Redoutable in 1971...
It took 15 years from 1956, with the Q-244 failure along the way (Redoutable was Q-251). Also the RAT - Reacteur a terre: nuclear sub prototype reactor, on the ground.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/frances-cancelled-first-generation-ssn-q-244-later-converted-to-gymnote.1410/

Réacteur d'essais à terre — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

But France started from scratch (or near scratch, American helped through Skipjack technology).

 

[GTX]

From Peter Coates' Submarine Matters:

Report To Donors: Advantages of Australia's Future SSNs

A professional level blog on strategic matters, especially submarines (nuclear and conventional) in English, Hindi & most other major languages.

gentleseas.blogspot.com

Essentially, Australian elections will be held in May this year. If the current coalition wins, the project is likely to go ahead. Polls indicate that a Labor-led government is more likely and if they win, then 'Australia's SSN aspirations will likely die off'.

Interesting. On what basis is that conclusion reached? The ALP has stated that they support the decision. Why would they reverse their position?

Agreed. I don't see the SSN plans being changed at this stage. The ALP is playing a very small target strategy here.

 

[jeffb]

Article discussing the "The Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information Agreement" between the AUKUS members signed in November and some of the wrinkles being considered by the IAEA.

AUKUS States Sign Information Exchange Deal | Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org

 

[jeffb]

Another article which is a good summary of the submarines deal at the moment along with some NPT discussion.

The Australia-UK-U.S. Submarine Deal: Not Necessarily a Sure or a Good Thing | Arms Control Association

www.armscontrol.org

A couple of standouts:

In June 1987, Canada announced that it intended to build 10 to 12 nuclear-powered submarines, based on a French or UK design and fueled with highly enriched uranium (HEU) possibly of Canadian origin. Faced with insurmountable strategic, political, financial, logistical, and nonproliferation obstacles, the idea sank without trace within two years. Although the Australian nuclear-powered submarine proposal, announced 34 years later on September 16, is different in several respects, it faces equally strong headwinds that may deliver the same result.

Despite an opinion poll indicating immediate domestic support for the AUKUS announcement, there remains significant public skepticism in Australia about the use of nuclear energy for any purpose. It remains to be seen whether this will shift as the 18-month study proceeds, details emerge, and the political, diplomatic, military, economic, nonproliferation, security, and opportunity costs become clearer. Although the opposition Labor Party has felt it politically expedient to support the AUKUS announcement, this is conditional on nonproliferation concerns being assuaged. A general election is due within a year. The Australian nuclear-powered submarines could be destined to go the way of Canada’s. In the meantime, the AUKUS partners need to explain how they propose to deliver the gold standard safeguards, transparency, verification, and accountancy measures they have promised.

 

[Archibald]

Canada's example with Rubis (the irony !) is indeed not exactly encouraging. We have a thread about this on this very forum (it blew my mind back then !)

Canada considered SSNs for very specific reasons, not unlike Australia nowadays.

In the case of Canada, it was a matter of endurance when diving under the Greenland ice cap: nuclear remain unmatched for such job.

In the case of Australia, it's also a geography problem: of how to patrol near far, far away China coastline. The Attack-class tried pushing AIP submarine technology to its extreme limits for that mission, and ended... well, you know. Australia then found nuclear would be far superior... and just like Canada: have just run into the same caveats.

 

[NeilChapman]

Coates cites 'tension' as in, 'A tension is inevitable concerning the extent Australian SSNs will participate in protecting or destroying nuclear submarines - as such functions have been restricted to nuclear weapons powers'. It could be a major doctrinal and political issue. If Albanese as leader of the opposition has committed to it, then my feeling is that he's likely to continue with it - his tilt is quite centrist. Coates doesn't say that it would be cancelled outright, but might wither on the vine. I'm afraid that you have to be a donor to access the full report, which would doubtless explain his reasoning.

Are you suggesting that there are those in AU that believe AU SSN submarines would be restricted in warfare? How us that case made?

 

[Rhinocrates]

Are you suggesting that there are those in AU that believe AU SSN submarines would be restricted in warfare? How us that case made?

Not having access to the report, I can't tell, but since I've opened the wine, I'll speculate.

Arguably, the only real threat to a nuclear submarine is another nuclear submarine and it's no secret that AUKUS is aimed at countering China, which has a lot of them, along with nuclear weapons. This suggests that conflict with Chinese forces could put Australia on the ladder of escalation to conflict involving nuclear weapons, even if it's 'cold' conflict with deliberate manoeuvring for political reasons rather than 'kinetic' engagement - that is, firing stuff and blowing things up.

A number of countries have anti-nuclear legislation. Australia's neighbour, New Zealand, for example, has law prohibiting nuclear armed or powered vessels in its territorial waters. The USN has not visited for decades now because a visit would require them to either break that law or disclose that there are no such weapons carried. That violates their policy of neither confirming nor denying a vessel is currently nuclear armed. If they make an exception for NZ, then they'd have to justify why they make just one exception, and give away the tactical status of their warships.

I would guess therefore that the possession of SSNs would mean that Australia would be involving itself, strategically and doctrinally, in a level of war planning that would be very contentious politically.

This also might be of tangential interest. Scroll down to the 'Political' subheading. Other issues that have discussed here, such as cost and industrial infrastructure are also mentioned.

The reasons HMS Queen Elizabeth is not nuclear powered | Navy Lookout

www.navylookout.com

Paperwork, security and restrictions to peacetime use are not insignificant. Before WWII, HMS Hood was an immensely charismatic ambassador for her nation, as was HMS Vanguard after WWII for a while (Princess Elizabeth went on tour with her parents on board Vanguard, I can't imagine Queen Elizabeth II doing so in that ship's current namesake). Today, conventional surface vessels can still serve that ambassadorial role and appear like angels in disaster relief efforts. Not so with a submarine, and certainly not with a nuclear one.

 

[Archibald]

Paperwork, security and restrictions to peacetime use are not insignificant. Before WWII, HMS Hood was an immensely charismatic ambassador for her nation, as was HMS Vanguard after WWII for a while. Today, conventional surface vessels can still serve that ambassadorial role and appear like angels in disaster relief efforts. Not so with a submarine, and certainly not with a nuclear one.

Damn interesting point here. Note that France "floating embassy" including "disaster relief / hospital ship" were, along the years
- WWII carriers in the 1960's: Lafayette, Bois Belleau old carriers (Agadir horrible and very murderous earthquake, 1960)
- Jeanne d'Arc and Arromanches in the 1970's
- PH75 was to replace Arromanches in that role, yet it was nuclear for power generation essentially (led to PA.75 / Richelieu / CdG being nuclear, too)
- Jeanne d'Arc carried on in the 1980's, 1990's and 2000's (!)
- Nowadays it is NOT CdG but the Mistral class BPC amphibious that are "floating embassy".

But I digress...

 

[GTX]

Tangentially related:

Nuclear subs and military cooperation to dominate Australia–UK talks this week

The British foreign and defence secretaries are due to arrive in Sydney ahead of formal talks with Marise Payne and Peter Dutton.

www.abc.net.au

Particularly the comment:

The ABC has been told that during the AUKMIN talks, the UK and Australia will also consider further areas of more immediate military cooperation, including the possible temporary basing of British nuclear submarines here.

Will be interesting to see future official announcements.

 

[Volkodav]

I'd say the whole problem of whether or not previous Australian governmental or military studies thought nuclear submarine construction was practical or not is rather moot since at that time the USA and UK were adamantly against giving such technology and now they are not.

Infrastructure can be built, people can be trained, certification can be gained. If there is will and enough cash it can happen.

Just sharing the technology doesn't fix the problem though. Australia's going to have to build a nuclear industry capable of handling weapons grade fuel to give themselves a truly sovereign capability. They have to be able to fix them or refuel them if they break or get used up too soon. If they don't have that ability they're effectively just operating a SSN flotilla that's been loaned to Australia, at a staggering cost.

I think it can safely be said that the physics of life-of-submarine reactors is pretty well understood now. If there are problems then it will be a case of “return to manufacturer”. (Emphasis above mine).

And if you're not able to 'return to the manufacturer'? What then?

Who will be the manufacturer? The hull is apparently meant to be 100% Australian, the reactor 100% US or UK? Who does the boat go to if something goes wrong? Australian ASC or US or UK shipyards? How do you remove a reactor from a hull to fix problems without dismantling the sub? Costly and difficult...

I personally know five nuclear engineers in Australia, four in Adelaide, four with extensive nuclear submarine experience/expertise, three of them with extensive industry/infrastructure experience. There are many more than that around. I also know a great many engineers, technical officers and trades, who while not nuclear engineers, have extensive experience working i.e. maintaining, if not actually building Nuclear submarines but in non reactor areas.

If you are worried about safety, just remember that no matter how much pressure the government applied, no matter how much they cut the sustainment budget, ASC never delivered an unsafe sub, they would delay and slip schedules and take the heat rather than compromise on engineering or safety.

ASC also has an extremely strong relationship with GD EB that will only grow. Besides the Collins Fast Track upgrades, EB also assisted the UK recover from their submarine building blackhole helping get the Astutes back on track, as well as fixing Spains S80 debacle.

Looking at the GD people I know with sub experience, I am sure most if not all would jump at the chance to come back to Adelaide for this program.

 

[starviking]

Are you suggesting that there are those in AU that believe AU SSN submarines would be restricted in warfare? How us that case made?

Not having access to the report, I can't tell, but since I've opened the wine, I'll speculate.

Arguably, the only real threat to a nuclear submarine is another nuclear submarine and it's no secret that AUKUS is aimed at countering China, which has a lot of them, along with nuclear weapons. This suggests that conflict with Chinese forces could put Australia on the ladder of escalation to conflict involving nuclear weapons, even if it's 'cold' conflict with deliberate manoeuvring for political reasons rather than 'kinetic' engagement - that is, firing stuff and blowing things up.

This seems to be conflating nuclear power with nuclear weapons - use nukes, get nukes.

I see no reason why China would escalate to use of nuclear weapons if one of their SSNs was destroyed by an Oz SSN, as opposed to a conventional sub waiting at a chokepoint, or a Hunter-class frigate or a Poseidon prosecuting a contact. And even if China decided this was a ‘red line’, how would they know it was an Oz SSN as opposed to a UK or US one?

 

[kaiserd]

Are you suggesting that there are those in AU that believe AU SSN submarines would be restricted in warfare? How us that case made?

Not having access to the report, I can't tell, but since I've opened the wine, I'll speculate.

Arguably, the only real threat to a nuclear submarine is another nuclear submarine and it's no secret that AUKUS is aimed at countering China, which has a lot of them, along with nuclear weapons. This suggests that conflict with Chinese forces could put Australia on the ladder of escalation to conflict involving nuclear weapons, even if it's 'cold' conflict with deliberate manoeuvring for political reasons rather than 'kinetic' engagement - that is, firing stuff and blowing things up.

This seems to be conflating nuclear power with nuclear weapons - use nukes, get nukes.

I see no reason why China would escalate to use of nuclear weapons if one of their SSNs was destroyed by an Oz SSN, as opposed to a conventional sub waiting at a chokepoint, or a Hunter-class frigate or a Poseidon prosecuting a contact. And even if China decided this was a ‘red line’, how would they know it was an Oz SSN as opposed to a UK or US one?

Please think through the logic of your statements.
If Australia is part of a military alliance aimed at China, and a shooting war then breaks out between that alliance and China, then China will be shooting at Australia with conventional and/or nuclear weapons. You are quite right that there probably won’t be much attention paid to if it’s a US or Australian nuclear or conventional sub doing this or that.

I appreciate the potentially valid arguments for effective deterrence, impact of lack of a deterrence, etc. But there is plenty of scope for this general scenario to not be wildly popular with Australians, with the proposed nuclear subs being an element and symbol of that scenario.

 

[Rhinocrates]

This seems to be conflating nuclear power with nuclear weapons - use nukes, get nukes.

Well, I am describing how it would be interpreted politically, which has its own logic. In the public eye, the two are conflated and this influences politicians' decision-making. It always struck me as odd that Australia would originally order a nuclear design and yet plan to fit it with conventional propulsion, but that 'makes sense' of a sort in this framing.

 

[GTX]

Folks,

This discussion is going nowhere. There is a lot of speculation and opinion but until there are further developments in the real world it is pointless. Until the Nuclear-Powered Submarine Taskforce or the RAN or the Australian Govt provides more information or there is a meaningful announcement there is little point in this speculation. I suggest people chill until then.

 

[jeffb]

ASPI article going through the issues:

Nuclear-powered submarines for Australia: what are the options? | The Strategist

The political and strategic ramifications of the AUKUS pact involving the US, UK and Australia continue to reverberate, but the details of how Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) have often been overlooked. There are ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[stealthflanker]

So. i'm curious if there is already a design or maybe concept of it ? Like buying existing US sub would be the fastest but i'm curious if Australian have anything in mind. e.g double hull or maybe how many land attack missiles they plan to install. Or will there be any capability to control UUV's.

 

[GTX]

There is nothing public and I doubt anything specific.

 

[jeffb]

So. i'm curious if there is already a design or maybe concept of it ? Like buying existing US sub would be the fastest but i'm curious if Australian have anything in mind. e.g double hull or maybe how many land attack missiles they plan to install. Or will there be any capability to control UUV's.

RAN Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead has said, ‘It is our intention that when we start the build program, the design will be mature and there will be a production run already in existence.’

 

[H_K]

For the historical record...

Top defence official was to report ‘good progress’ on French submarine project weeks before axing

Documents obtained under FoI show defence leadership given positive advice about Attack-class submarine progress

www.theguardian.com

The newly released paper trail shows Gregory Sammut, the general manager of submarines at the defence department, told his superiors that France’s Naval Group had made an updated offer for the next phase of work on 23 August. “Notwithstanding the due diligence we are exercising in reviewing the offer, it is affordable and acceptable, and compliant with contractual terms and conditions, and the statement of work,” Sammut wrote on 27 August.

Sammut also said “a sound integrated master schedule” had been established, with the first of the conventional diesel-electric Attack-class submarines forecast to be delivered “within the window August 2033 to February 2035”.

Sammut’s email to defence leadership on 27 August estimates the updated total cost of the French submarine program as $46.4bn in 2016 constant dollars – a way of describing the cost that assumes a dollar has the same buying power over time. He wrote that this figure “remains within the original acquisition cost estimate of $50 billion in 2016 constant dollars announced at the outset of the Attack class submarine program in April 2016”.

 

[MihoshiK]

Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

 

[Josh_TN]

Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

Over a longer time line, assuming it actually goes to completion, I would agree. But there is a lot more risk involved. It's a shame Australia didn't try to go down this road from the get go, but then I suppose this was a brand new offer that only became available with the Biden administration.

 

[jeffb]

Really, GTX?

Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

That depends on what they end up paying for it.

 

[MihoshiK]

Really, GTX?

Even if there was faith in the French offer, the deal Australia got from the US/UK is FAR more extensive and valuable than anything they could have gotten from France.

That depends on what they end up paying for it.

There's a lot more to the US/UK/AUS deal than the subs, is what I mean. The geopolitical/strategic side of that deal is something France simply can not offer.