The $66B figure is a fiction, not mentioned by any official or unofficial sources.$66B!!! I don't think much of their chances!
Small nit: Block V boats can be constructed without the VPM, the first boat in the block will be delivered to the USN without it. If Australia wanted "Block V short," they absolutely could go that route.
The $66B figure is a fiction, not mentioned by any official or unofficial sources.$66B!!! I don't think much of their chances!
Another example of the (deliberate?) disinformation campaign that went on for years to torpedo this contract… apparently the bigger and more unbelievable the lie the easier it spreads.
The raison d’état behind Australia’s submarine decision | The Strategist
French anger over Australia’s decision to dump the diesel–electric submarine project is entirely justified and understandable. Even if, as some argue, the project’s inadequacies were increasingly apparent, there seems little doubt that Australia seriously misled ...www.aspistrategist.org.au
“7.30 can reveal a group of eminent former ambassadors, regulators, presidential advisors, scientists and academics in the field of nuclear arms control have today written to President Biden saying the AUKUS deal poses a risk to not just nuclear non-proliferation, but to US national security because of the amount of weapons grade or highly enriched uranium that will have to be exported.”Questions raised as to where leased nuclear subs might come from - neither the US or the UK have any to 'spare'.
Other questions raised regarding impact of Australian HEU powered boats on the NNPT.
7.30
www.abc.net.au
“7.30 can reveal a group of eminent former ambassadors, regulators, presidential advisors, scientists and academics in the field of nuclear arms control have today written to President Biden saying the AUKUS deal poses a risk to not just nuclear non-proliferation, but to US national security because of the amount of weapons grade or highly enriched uranium that will have to be exported.”Questions raised as to where leased nuclear subs might come from - neither the US or the UK have any to 'spare'.
Other questions raised regarding impact of Australian HEU powered boats on the NNPT.
7.30
www.abc.net.au
HEU, that will become much more radioactive with use, encased in a reactor that will not need refueling, encased in a submarine that Australia will want to use, which would be noticed if it suddenly disappeared.
Most of these experts are people motivated by anti-nuclear dogma, from the soft science and arts.
...eminent former ambassadors, regulators, presidential advisors, scientists and academics in the field of nuclear arms control
First of all, a lot of countries have enrichment facilities:
...eminent former ambassadors, regulators, presidential advisors, scientists and academics in the field of nuclear arms control
It's not the threat that someone will steal or repurpose the Australian HEU for weapons, it that other nations will say, "If Australia can use HEU in submarine power reactors, why can't we?" Leading to a proliferation of other nations refining HEU, ostensibly for submarine power reactors. If they do, then the amount of HEU available globally, that can be diverted or repurposed, goes up leading to...
Come on fellas, it's not that complicated.
India was already a nuclear armed state when it obtained the Akula. The Indian Akula doesn't set a precedent because it doesn't open the door for non-nuclear nations to obtain nuclear weapon technology.
Centrifugally enriching uranium is just physics.
Mea culpa.Must I say again?
To be fair, you were induced into it.Mea culpa.Must I say again?
Australia will be only the second country to be provided the naval propulsion reactor (NPR) technology by the US, which had produced the world’s first SSN, the USS Nautilus, in 1954. The UK had been the first, when the US supplied it the S5W pressurised water reactor (PWR) design, complete propulsion machinery set, auxiliary equipment, as well as fissile material for core fabrication and the offer to reprocess spent fuel in the US.
American nuclear submarines – and, as a corollary, also British - operate on reactors fuelled by weapons-grade highly-enriched uranium (HEU) having 93.5% of U-235, the only naturally occurring fissile isotope that makes it widely usable in nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons.
Chinese and French NPRs use low-enriched uranium (LEU) that contains less than 20% U-235, rendering it not weapon-useable. Russia and India use medium-enriched uranium. The US Congress was also concerned that non-weapon states, like Iran or Brazil for instance, which are interested in acquiring or developing SSNs, could well use the US example to justify producing and stockpiling weapon-usable HEU, thereby destabilising the non-proliferation regime.
Russia is the only country that leases out its nuclear-powered submarines, and India is the only country that leases them. In a move that had then raised concerns globally, Moscow had leased out a Soviet-built Project 670 Skat (NATO classification Charlie-I class) nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN) to India from 1988 to 1991. It was bereft of the cruise missiles to adhere to the NPT, but gained Indian Navy the crucial capability to operate a high technology vessel.
Though the NPT bans outright the sale of nuclear-submarines, it has no specific guidance on leasing or on trade in NPRs. In 2012, the Indian Navy took another SSN, of the Akula class, on a 10-year lease at a cost of $2 billion. The double-hulled submarine was returned in June, a year earlier, owing to an explosion on board that damaged both its hulls. Russia is reportedly modernising another Akula class attack submarine that will be delivered to the Indian Navy by 2025 under a $3 billion 10-year lease.
India, however, has high stakes in the matter of submarine powerplay, being a lessee as well as a lessor, apart from being a builder of its own submarines as also those under technology transfer.
In December 2019, it helped the Myanmar Navy acquire its third dimension by transferring a 3,000-tonne 1988-commissioned Russian-built Kilo class Type 877EKM SSN, INS Sindhuvir, from its own fleet. The five-year lease was undertaken through a Line of Credit (LOC), and followed a two-year refit of at an Indian defence shipyard.
From memory, it went into a spin this way: nuclear submarines - HEU - nuclear proliferation - Gaddafi - Lybia - Clinton (and Sarkozy)
Looking at the likelihood of this project, I can see the next gen US sub being chosen and Oz buying into the project at a reasonably early may bring a cost benefit (MAY). This would give them more opportunity to get the best system for the longest operational life cycle and relevance re potential opposition.
Ir perhaps a variant of it...
No I said some suggest this, which is not the same thing. But I knew if I didn't include it, others would make a mountain out of that mole hill.My fault. Zen remarked that the NATO intervention in Libya was a result of their starting a nuclear program, which is wrong. I should have left it.
Either way.No I said some suggest this, which is not the same thing. But I knew if I didn't include it, others would make a mountain out of that mole hill.My fault. Zen remarked that the NATO intervention in Libya was a result of their starting a nuclear program, which is wrong. I should have left it.
Examples please?
Given Australia's troubles with keeping to major programs, or at least with investing sufficiently to maintain and build on them.
I disagree. US production is booked solid decades in advance for the Virginias, Columbias, and SSN(X), and unlike the Italians with some of their recent FREMM sales cannot afford to interrupt that to give Australia a couple of boats. The Brits may have some room to squeeze in Australian boats in between the Astutes and their Vanguard replacements - emphasis on maybe.Australia doesn't build the F-35 for a reason - and the same reason applies to nuclear submarines. It would be both faster and cheaper to buy them from the US (or UK).
I think it'd make more sense to expand US capacity than build a new facility in Australia. The US could use it once the Australian boats were built. Kill two birds with one stone.I disagree. US production is booked solid decades in advance for the Virginias, Columbias, and SSN(X), and unlike the Italians with some of their recent FREMM sales cannot afford to interrupt that to give Australia a couple of boats. The Brits may have some room to squeeze in Australian boats in between the Astutes and their Vanguard replacements - emphasis on maybe.Australia doesn't build the F-35 for a reason - and the same reason applies to nuclear submarines. It would be both faster and cheaper to buy them from the US (or UK).
Now, obviously, most of the systems are likely to be sourced from one of the two countries, the reactor especially, but it's probably outright necessary to assemble the whole thing in Australia simply from a building space perspective.
And if the funding was there to make use of those expanded American facilities the Navy would be all over it. But the funding isn't there to increase the rate of submarine procurement, so the expansion would threaten to sink Electric Boat once the Australian order finishes and no one wants that.I think it'd make more sense to expand US capacity than build a new facility in Australia. The US could use it once the Australian boats were built. Kill two birds with one stone.
Examples please?
Given Australia's troubles with keeping to major programs, or at least with investing sufficiently to maintain and build on them.
All six of the navy’s Collins-class submarines will undergo a $10 billion rebuild with the introduction of first of 12 new French Attack-class submarines now scheduled for 2035.
“It’s well overdue; eight long years ago when the government was elected, they were advised to make a decision on the life-of-type extension on the Collins-class submarines by mid-2015,” Mr O’Connor said.
“That was six years ago and the cost of the life-of-type extension would’ve been around $3-5 billion, that’s gone up to at least $10bn, if not $15bn, so major delays, massive timeline blowouts and expenditure blowouts on the future submarine program.