Re: Royal Navy Amphibious shipping in the 1960s

sealordlawrence said:
Ark Royal on her own was a joke. One carrier is no carriers especially when it is a creaking World War 2 museum piece that can only just get its planes of its deck and its retention owed more to a desire to retain a skill base whilst the harrier carriers were developed rather than any doctrinal purpose.
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I think the people of British Honduras and the Grenadier Guards might disagree with that assessment... Learn some about the 1973 British Honduras Crisis before making calls not backed by facts.

Ark Royal was actually retained because it was needed in the NATO north Atlantic force because the Americans did not have another carrier available. That was real carrier capability, real naval work, not gap filling until the SHAR and Invincibles were ready. It was actually MoD policy to transfer most of the RN's fixed wing work force to the RAF just almost none of the people in question took up the offer.

But this whole discussion is exceedingly knowledge poor. The Royal Navy’s mission both at home and abroad required carrier battle groups and amphibious groups well above what was planned after ’67. Of course the UK did not have the money to pay for this in addition to what they actually spent. The problem was much of the allocated defence monies to date had been frittered away on all sorts of stuff that did not provide a significant return on capital investment. If the money had been spent more wisely then it’s likely a more economical to sustain RN would have been available to get through the lean budget years of the 1970s and early 80s.
 
The problem was much of the allocated defence monies to date had been frittered away on all sorts of stuff that did not provide a significant return on capital investment. If the money had been spent more wisely then it’s likely a more economical to sustain RN would have been available to get through the lean budget years of the 1970s and early 80s.
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Exactly.
Had the UK government had several new carriers and relatively modern fighters onboard them in 1966, the decision could have been very different. As was they faced running a disparate fleet of carriers with the first to retire in 1972 (HMS Victorious as planned), faced the delays and cost overruns of the F4K AND the costs associated with a new generation of carriers AND the costs of a new generation of AAW Destroyers.

Example.
Say the Scimitar FAW is proceeded with and upgraded in the mid60's. Pressure to buy the F4 in 1964 for ISD by '69 in the latest, is much reduced by this decision which is 1955.

Say the Medium fleet CV or the earlier 1952 CV had been built, they'd be in service by the early 60's, with a 25 year lifetime planned ahead. Plenty of time to defer a decision on their replacements.

just two examples of how things could have been different in 1966.
 
As I am sure most here know there was a constant design process throughout the 50s early 60s that finally led to the decision to proceed with what became CV01. Had different decisions, that were entirely plausible, been made to abandon some of the wartime hulls such as Hermes, Lion Tiger and Blake, much earlier, then there is clearly the scope within the money actually spent to fund two or three new carriers. The cost of the Eagle refit could also come into this. Perhaps the Hermes decision was marginal within this timeframe but the others all had funding being spent late enough for the lessons of the cost of the Victorius modernisation to be weighed against the costs of new build and altenate decisions made to those actually reached.

Could two or three carriers have been run through the 70s and into the 80s? Well I would say yes, the two converted Tigers cost millions in rebuild funding and 1700 men to crew them both. Funding was made available to the RAF for F4 and Bucc squadrons to provide maritime air defence and maritime strike. With relatively new carriers there would have been no good argument to land lock this capability, adding to the demands of the limited air refueling capacity.

One key question, which I will admit that I find hard to anwer is AEW. Would the Blackburn double ended AEW plane (P139?) have been abandoned early enough to have avoided the money bonfire that the Nimrod AEW became? If so there is c.1 billion in 70s money available, and that is a hell of a lot. The RN and RAF could have received gold plated Haweyes with diamond encrusted seats for that kind of money and still have had change left to upgrade all the Buccs with Tornado avionics. The RAF wanted AWACS all along and may well have had the chance to join the NATO AWACS force with the UK (mostly overwater AEW) provided by a joint RN/RAF Hawkeye force.

Of course as with any altenate history debate, the effects of one decision that may not have been perceived as in anyway as significant at the time can grow to have disproportionate effects later on. This 'multiverse' effect is why such debates are such fun and why they have no definitive outcome. The decision to abandon the CV52 or the medium CV are clearly such decisions. Getting back to the origins of the topic such a decision would mean that commando carrier replacements would fall broadly into the timeline of the historical Invincibles. I can't help but guess that in these altered circumstances cost reduction and lean manning of these and furture escorts would have become increasingly essential if the navy was to continue to run its carriers. So yes something like early Oceans would seem likely. Here is a thought I wounder if they could have shared the machinery or even a common hull (up to the waterline) with the big RFAs needed to service the carrier battle groups.
 
AEW is a vexing question IMO, and its hard to say what would succeed the Gannet in the role.

Hawkeye or some turbo-tracker seem the main options, especialy to a cash strapped RN struggling to field a CVBG.
 
Although this thread is completely different from the topic I had wanted to cover
(designs and sketches etc) I have found it very interestiing and sometimes informative.

From my reading and other study I am not sure I would make the strict division that
some make here between General War/NATO commitment roles and East of Suez factors.

Britain gave up the East of Suez commitment after, not before, cancelling CVA 01 and
its related task group.

CVA 01 and its task group were wanted by NATO as part of Striking Fleet Atlantic. In the 70s
Ark Royal filled the same role that CVA 01 might have filled. The downgrading of the
UK commitment to the Striking Fleet was reluctantly accepted because of the valuable
ASW contribution promised by the new Invincibles. However, NATO would definitely have
preferred a UK strike carrier like CVA 01 in its Atlantic fleet.

The same applies to the Commando carriers. I suspect the RN wanted to try and reduce the
number of platforms needed by merging the ASW and Commando roles (something done with
Hermes and Bulwark in the 70s and the Invincibles in the 80s). It even planned at one stage
to use CVA 01 as a swing Commando ship- a step too far of course. 2 Commando ships
remained the RN and NATO desired component right up to HMS Ocean, which was supposed
to have a sister ship.

What killed CVA 01 and successive big surface ships right up to the present CV(F) was the
cost of manning and operating them in a shrinking Navy. Noone has been able to convince the Treasury that they are more useful to the UK than the missile and hunter killer submarine fleets, which are the RN's new capital ships. In a trade between nuclear submarines and big surface ships the RN
will always be forced to choose the latter. Neither the Army nor the RAF of course are willing to give up any of their roles and assets to preserve the surface fleet. Just as BAOR was sacrosanct in the Cold War period the Army has used Iraq and Afghanistan to preserve itself today. As for the RAF, the evocation of Spitfires over Kent in 1940 is usually sufficient to preserve some kind of fast jet force (or perhaps the importance of the Aircraft industry in key marginals)

I shall continue to follow this topic with interest.

UK 75
 
Hi UK 75

I am afraid I can't contribute any details regarding the designs of the 1960s commando carriers, in fact I would be delighted to see any myself!

I think your comments are very apposite regarding the utility of good attack carriers to NATO. Also they are essential for the UK maintaining a balanced naval capability, which for someone like myself who remembers listening to the news each day of the warships and auxiliaries of the RN being bombed on a daily basis during the Falklands War, is very VERY desirable.

There were certainly severe issues with manpower and funding but I don't think we should overestimate the scale of the resources needed to run a two or three carriers in comparison with the global resources of the MOD. Two carriers would take 5000 to 6500 (assuming two Ark equivalents or two CV 01s manned at any time) crew to man them. In the late 70s the RN had about 68,000 men. If the carriers are the at the core of the fleet then they draw manpower to them and the rest of the fleet will be built around them. Their existence would have made the later Leanders seem a little manpower intensive at 260 men and the Type 22 could hardly have proceeded with a similar manpower requirement. The Kortenaer for example had a crew of 176. Assuming the RN escorts for the 70s/80s were designed to similar lean manning requirements then 40/50 such escorts would easily recover a carriers worth of men.

Also it is easy to forget what proportion of the carrier crew were air group. Historically the RN in loosing the carriers lost 800, 801, 890, 893 and 899 Squadrons. They managed to keep 809 and 892 for most of the 70s and the RAF stood up 43 and 206 squadrons for maritime operations. There is no justification for the RAF landlocking maritime aviation if there are new carriers so the RAF will bear more of the brunt of the concentration on European defence, wth global air power being the job of the carriers with intermittent deployment. In this alt history the RAF are hit in the way that the Navy was in the real one. With a somewhat reduced defence vote they speak at cabinet with a quieter voice and the CVBGs carrier the bulk of UK air contributions to two gulf wars, Bosnia, Kossovo and Sierra Leone. Todays view of the reavent utility of naval air would therefore be very different.

I have without a doubt simplified this hugely and I am sure there are some assumptions that can be challenged, but I don't think its is so floored as to be completely impossible.
 
In the 1950s the RN considered Eagle to have 2,550 as a crew and expected the new 1952 ship to have around the same number, though more tonnage was slated for their accomodation.

The build schedule was expected to be 6 years and three months roughly from laid down to completion.
It was unlikely to be laid down in 1953, and would cost some to gain the available slip (booked for a liner). So the next available slip in January 1955, which means a completion around May 1961.
Another slip is available in June 1955.

In the Medium Fleet CV study of 35,000tons we have a figure of 2,400 for its crew (I have no figure for the 28,000ton study), reflecting that it carries less aircraft and uses one less set of boilers and machinary than the 1952 design, and has just four twin 3" turrents.
Build schedule was 4 years and 11 months roughly as provisionaly outlined in 1954, for laydown in August 1957 and completion by May 1962.

Long term costing in '59-60 shows the provision for three new fleet carriers completing 1970-71, 1971-72 and 1972-73. Clearly the decision had been put off.
 
Whats the saying 'never put off till tomorrow what you can do today'. If only they could have imagined what would befall their plans once deferred to the 60s.

The 1952 design looks quite a substantial beast in Brown's book, but I have never seen any drawings of the later ones, before CVA01. I wonder if the 35,000 ton design would have put the Phantom off the shopping list, would have thought the 28,000 ton one certainly would. This would certainly have had an impact on aircraft decisions for the 60s, as they would have to fit the new ship, not a proposed future one.
 
Graeme65 said:
Whats the saying 'never put off till tomorrow what you can do today'. If only they could have imagined what would befall their plans once deferred to the 60s.

The 1952 design looks quite a substantial beast in Brown's book, but I have never seen any drawings of the later ones, before CVA01. I wonder if the 35,000 ton design would have put the Phantom off the shopping list, would have thought the 28,000 ton one certainly would. This would certainly have had an impact on aircraft decisions for the 60s, as they would have to fit the new ship, not a proposed future one.
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Perhaps Shorts would be in with a chance with the Crusader?

http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1963/1963%20-%202107.html
 
The Crusader seems to have had a good reputation as a fighter with the USN, so may not be a bad choice in the short term. The BAC 583 seems the best medium to long term option though. But this would require a UK only aircraft project to survive the 1960s and make it into production. The RAF would hate being pushed towards a RN fighter project after TSR2 and and P1154 are cut, but a joint service project would be essential to make it cost effecive.
 
Second piece of the puzzle.

RN ordered the Vickers Supermarine Type 556 (twin seater Scimitar with reheated RA.24R Avons, and a 30 inch AI.18 for Red Dean, or Blue Jay AAMs), in Septemer 1954 to NR/A.38. A single prototype XH451 was ordered and a mockup started to be built.

DH's DH110 had been declared the winner of NA.38 in 1953, but then it had been a contender to the NA.14 issued August 1946, 6 prototypes ordered in April 1949, two for the RAF, two for the night fighter role and two for the strike role. It was expected DH would take 5 years to produce the machine in 1946, and by ordering or prototypes was expected to reach service by 1953.

In a review in 1950 it was realised the DH110 would not be ready before 1956-57. To cover the delay, they went for the SeaVenom, a modified Vampire as an interime solution.

So we can see the RN was hedging its bets with the Type 556 order and viewed that design as having more scope for development than the DH110.

Work on the mockup Type 556 was suspended on 27 April 1955 and the order was canceld in July 1955. Due to the funding constraints of the DH110, NA.39 (B103 Buccaneer) and the oncomming OR.337/Specification F.177 mixed powerplant interceptor, in which Saro's P.177 was recomended on 21 April '55. Though the OR was completed in 17 May 1956, "Mixed Powerplant Interceptor Fighter".
The Admiralty wrote a sister specification NA.47 and Saro was the made the winner.

So we can see they threw away a chance for a moderately decent machine, that could be upgraded for supersonic flight and given ever more powerful engines, with a decent sized radar that by its nature would drive the effort for radar guided AAMs. In favour of the mixed powerplant machine that was smaller, lighter, faster and very nearly the same machine as the RAF where opting for.
Trying to run before they could walk so to speak and in the process they lost both by 1957, with just the DH110 continuing, by that time out of date already, but at least it was funded and working.

Assuming they had carried on the with Type 556, we'd likely see IOC around the very late 50's to early 60's. Weight increases over the existing Scimitar could be handled by increaing the extend of blow over the whole leading edge of the wing countering the overwise increased take off and landing speeds, rather than the partial affair the F.1 had.
Again the spend is both possible and way before the financial crisis of the Wilson government.
It also paves the way for a mk2 version, and removes the degree of urgency that forced the choice the F4K Phantom.
Scimitar F.1 as was, is to NA.19, a sort of barebones, quick and dirty solution until the NA.39 came into service. No reheat, no radar, not even a second seat, and only able to launch with Red Beard, but not land on a carrier with it, rather it had to divert to land. This due to the weapon being 'armed and live' and the wing mounting raising the possibility that it would impact the deck on recovery.
 
Alternatives?

In 1952 the RN had chosen the DH116 SuperVenom as its interim fighter. Equipped with existing radar and a reheated Avon it was supersonic at altitude and operable from Colossus sized carriers. It was also remarkable compact and clearly had scope for further increases in speed.

DH had to give the project up (supposedly due to the lack of draughting office staff) and tendered the DH110 instead.

At a similar time the RN had issued NA.34 for a hooked Swift. Although less than sparkling as a fighter it would go on to serve as a decent attack and recce machine for the RAF. Unlikely to handle Red Beard though, the F.7 trialed the Fireflash missile and AI.20 radar.

After the cancelation of the 1952 CV in 1953, there was a number of studies into Trade Protection Carriers, DAW and DNC seem to be having a debate (possibly an argument) over what could be squeezed onto a Colossus length hull, though quite what the beam is, is another matter. These where to carry a small airwing of conventional machines and have them replaced with VTOL aircraft later on.
DNC's sketch in Feb 1954 is more reasonable for fitting onto something roughly Colossus sized, but still has the mk13 arrestors and 180ft track catapult able to handle the Scimitar of which its likely only about 12 such machines could be operated from such a CV.

DAW seems to produce a parallel deck study in May 1953, the first hints of the sort of thing CVA-01 would develope. But this is parallel with the ships lengthwise axis, with two 200ft track catapults, quite how enough steam would be generated for them both is another question mind.

SO we can see a possible path forward with smaller lighter aircaft operating from smaller cheaper carriers, the aircraft also giving a certain weight of numbers to the existing larger fleet carriers.
This could see either successor machines designed in the UK or purchase of the likes of the A4 and F8 from the US. Quite plausable since thse ships are being designed around the Scimitar.

Another alternative
By 1956 DNC is developing a guided missile ship/carrier of 30,000tons, seemingly offloading the DLI mission onto SAMs but retaining CAP AEW and strike aircraft. This with Stage 1 and 3/4 missile. Admiralty thought he could develope Straf Requirements by 1958 and get the ship delivered by 1965.
Missile cut in 1957, Controller Air, specifialy ruled out SAM based DLI in Fed 1957.

CVA-01 has a medium range SAM, clearly DLI is dead as such by the 1960s, and CAP Buccaneers where being offered by 1958. So here is another route out of the 1966 bottleneck.
 
It seems that there was no end of routes around the car crash of the mid 60s. Then again when you think about it the UK, whose military traditions and economic prosperity had been so tied to the sea for so long, to go from 4 fleet carriers with full air groups to none in 12 years (66 to 78) is truly astonishing. The decline of naval aviation far outstrips the rate of economic decline suggesting it is in no small part the result of a combination of ill luck, poor timing and bad decision making with a liberal dose of the law of unexpected consequences.

I bought the Scimitar file book late last year, an interesting read. I was struck just how Sea Harrier like some of the front ends of the advanced Scimitars looked. Not that that really has much relevance to anything. The thin wing, bigger options available looked perfectly good prospects to me.

Above all though its the provision of new ships in the 60 to 65 timeframe that makes the difference. C.30 years of service life pushes the need for replacement past the economic nightmare of the mid 60s to mid 80s.
 
Well during the '66 year, discussions with the US showed they would carry on running the existing fleet into the 70's, and it would be unable to carry on beyond 1975, since they'd have at best only one CV after that date. Long term they did expect to loose the carriers on the assuming land based airpower would suffice.
As it was the crisis got worse and they drew down the fleet such we could say it was over in 1972.

But if there had been a several new CVs then it comes down to how long they can run them, which is more a matter of willpower and likely to hit the buffers under Notts Review. The Falklands could still have happened under such circumstances.

There is of course the possibility of an Anglo-French carrier project to replace their respective fleets if the new ships are going to leave service between 1985 and 2000 depending on the precise circumstances.

Interestingly UK-USA discussions show several other things.

The centrality of the F111 purchase, which seems more important to the EoS roles than Europe in their minds. The MRCA was both viewed as "a poor mans F111" and is clearly aimed at the European theatre, thus some of the compromises made on range.

The retention of EoS commitments, but a narrowing of focus on just a few bases, one of which was to be in northern Australia as Singapore was viewed as too vulnerable.

The sheer size of UK forces in Malaysia.

The UKs seeming search for a closer relationship with four states in SE Asia, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore. This ran counter to the US desire to get the UK into Europe and use them to leaverage the Europeans to take on more committments outside of Europe.
As such we can say the UK failed and the US was only partialy successful.
 
The subject of the possibilities for the RN's carrier fleet and its aircraft have
been often discussed on the excellent Royal Navy Discussion Board, the Whatifmodelers
site, and also on this site. I have learned a lot from these, and still have no firm
conclusions, but can offer some personal takes.

I first discovered CVA 01 as a schoolboy in 1967 when looking at the Janes
Fighting Ships 1963-4 in our local library and loving its futuristic American
appearance. At that stage the drawing showed 2 sets of Seadart aft and
various versions of what I years later learnt were the Fighter/Attacker
aircraft (BAC 581 etc) once thought of for the 70s. It was not until the
70s that I found a picture of the 1966 artists impression with Phantoms and
Buccaneers. Something which struck me was that this was much the same
as Ark Royal but looked a little snazzier. I still love that original CVA 01
version and in an ideal world of UK 75 it and its fighter/attackers would
have been around in the 70s.

In a more realistic vein, the RN wanted the best aircraft it could get and
opted for the Phantom/Buccaneer combo (much the same as it is trying to
do today with JSF). In doing so it tied itself to a carrier the size of HMS
Eagle as a minimum. It is hard to see the UK being able to build more than
2 of such ships at any time post 1945, so we end up back with one active
carrier, just as we are now talking about in 2010.

Sadly, one just cannot buck history and £££££s.

UK 75
 
I think the trick the Royal Navy failed to pull off was to build as big as they practically could before the size started to impose serious risk with construction and cost escallation. They could almost cetainly have afforded three c. 45,000 ton carriers in the 52 to 65 timeframe. And could have manned and provided air groups for at least two at a time into the 80s. Look at the estimated costs and what was spent on Lion, Tiger Blake, Hermes, and the Eagle refit.

The problem was that they appear to have looked at 35,000 tons then immedietely realised that 45,000 tons would be a much more efficient design in terms of numbers of aircraft that you could opperate divided by cost. Then 55,000 tons seems more efficient than 45,000. The Treasury on the other hand looked at the cost not the efficiency, and also equated tons to cost, even in an age when systems were starting to drive cost. Carrington wanted them to build a smaller ship but the RN shot for CVA01 and got nothing sadly.
 
The 35,000ton study is never clarified as to what that figure is, light, standard or deepload, its never made clear.
However.....

The propulsive power is vicariously described as three sets of Y300, and between 135,000shp (45,000shp per set) and 144,0000shp (48,000shp per set).
Considering the speed deep and dirty it would seem the 35,000ton figure could be standard load, due to the similarities between this and Akagi and Hood, in terms of displacement, power and speed. In which case the deep load could be between 42,000tons and 45,000tons.

Similarly with the 28,000ton study, having 100,000shp from two Y300. Which could suggest a ship approximately the size of Victorious, but with lighter AAA, not much armour and more flightdeck.
 
Some more musings

One of the Shipbucket drawings features a version of the 1950s
design carrier built along CVA 01 lines. Looks a bit like a hybrid
CVF/CVA01.

One can imagine the UK being able to build a Hermes successor
aircraft carrier from the 50s on, which might also have been a
good ship for export to navies like Australia, Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Netherlands, India etc who had to make do with
older cast offs or then get out of the carrier business altogether.

Had the Wilson Government been less doctrinaire about flattops and
let the RN order a Hermes size carrier with a range of capabilities
instead of the Escort Cruiser type ships these might have been a
real success. The RN would probably have still only been able to
fly Sea Harriers, but others might have used such ships with A4
Skyhawks or even the Italian/Brazilian AMX or Jaguar. Propulsion
would have been an issue for catapult users though.

On balance although it cost a lot of money the RN muddles through
quite well. In the absence of the Malta class (unlikely to have survived
the Post War austerity), Eagle and Ark Royal do a good job. Hermes as well.
Victorious and Centaur suffer in order to keep the others going.

Bulwark and Albion earn their keep in the 60s as much needed Commando
Carriers. Tiger and Blake may seem odd and wasteful but they do allow
the RN to put together ASW task groups for NATO and out of area, and
provide Seaking platforms.

Despite their political origins, Invincible, Illustrious and Ark Royal have been
good and useful ships for both the Cold War and out of area RN. Hermes type
proper carriers might have been somewhat better, but may well not have survived
the political and financial crises of the last forty years.

On balance the RN makes the best of a bad job, but it is hard to see a better one
surviving.

UK 75
 
Graeme65 said:
It seems that there was no end of routes around the car crash of the mid 60s. Then again when you think about it the UK, whose military traditions and economic prosperity had been so tied to the sea for so long, to go from 4 fleet carriers with full air groups to none in 12 years (66 to 78) is truly astonishing. The decline of naval aviation far outstrips the rate of economic decline suggesting it is in no small part the result of a combination of ill luck, poor timing and bad decision making with a liberal dose of the law of unexpected consequences.

I bought the Scimitar file book late last year, an interesting read. I was struck just how Sea Harrier like some of the front ends of the advanced Scimitars looked. Not that that really has much relevance to anything. The thin wing, bigger options available looked perfectly good prospects to me.

Above all though its the provision of new ships in the 60 to 65 timeframe that makes the difference. C.30 years of service life pushes the need for replacement past the economic nightmare of the mid 60s to mid 80s.
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You have made a whole range of intellectual mistakes, I will try to summarize as best I can.

1) The UK's prosperity was not tied to the Sea but to the Empire, the Sea was merely a means of acquiring it and linking it together; unless you think fish have a requirement for steel and wool? Once the Empire was gone the need to retain global naval dominance went with it.

2) The 1960s was not a 'car crash' but a rational re-evaluation of UK defence needs based on economic and and strategic requirements. The conclusion was that the EoS presence in its previous form was no longer affordable or necessary. Consequently, the Navy and not the Government redesigned the fleet to confront the Soviet Union in Northern waters rather than police an Empire that no longer existed.

The reason for your mistakes is based on two misunderstood relationships.

1) You seem to think that the relationship between a Navy and its ships is based on a strange notion that all Navies are based on the same structure and that that structure is defined solely by funding. This is not the case at all, all navies are bespoke to their national requirements and acquire the ships they need. 1966 is the perfect example of this, once the strategic posture was changed it was not just the carriers that were cancelled but the entire fleet structure that was to be built around them (helicopter cruisers, Type 82's and Type 19 as well as the amphibs that were the original driver of this thread); this was then replaced with a new fleet structure to meet the new strategic posture.

2) You seem to believe that the relationship between governments and Armed Forces is a combative one; which it is not. Armed Forces are rightly subservient to the government and follow the strategic directives they set. When the government states that it no longer has requirements to intervene on a global scale in the manner it did previously the Armed Forces must respond and reshape themselves as they did in the mid 60s.

In conclusion, trying to find ways for the RN to cling on to carrier power after the 1960s is a waste of time as the ships were canned for strategic reasons just as much as they were economic reasons (the strategy was unaffordable rather than the ships). And newsflash for you, the RN would not be acquiring CVF if the Cold War was ongoing.
 
You have made a whole range of intellectual mistakes, I will try to summarize as best I can.
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So have you Lawrence, you appear to have the assumption that this is a history site - News flash this is secret projects we are supposed to be discussing the various plans, projects and proposals that were seriously considered by the government, the military and industrry during this period. Most of know exactly what the causes were for the bubble to crash during the 60's and many lived with the consequencies during the 70's & 80's.

Not only that but this aspect of the discussion has been migrated to the Alt History section and still your insulting members by dismissing what was planned by the governement during the period just becuase they the economic situation towards the end of the decade forced us to drawn down our commitments and withdraw our forces to a more Northern European focus.

If you don't like the concept of the thread dont bother reading it and stop attempting to dismiss any discussion on the subject because it doesn't match your rigid view of the history of the period.

Geoff
 
Zen,

The Supermarine Type 556 certainly seems like a fascinating design, the section in BSP implies that the mock-up was completed. It seems odd that no photos or other images have emerged regarding the design, although it is notable that there seems to have been few imaged of the Supermarine Type 545 make it into the open source either.......perhaps its just something about Supermarine?

The context of the type is certainly interesting, as you say it falls right on top of the Sea Vixen and seems to be ancestor of the later 576 design. Equally interesting is the Type 558 Scimitar Mk2 design which reads like an effort to improve the original day fighter variant. I wonder what the link between the 556/558 was, did Supermarine see the two operating side by side? Or was it an effort to get something from the navy after they realised that the 556 was going nowhere fast?

Lets not forget that Supermarine was playing with the Type 545 (supersonic Swift) as early as 1952 and the RB106 seems to have come on the scene in late 1953/ early 1954 so theoretically some of this experience/power could have made it into the 556/558?

Edit: On reflection I doubt the possibility of a link between the 556 and the 576 on the basis that the latter seems to be little more than a plumped up Scimitar F.Mk.1 whilst the former talks of splayed engines suggesting some quite considerable differences with the original design.
 
In an ideal world, I like to have seen a two seater fighter (tandem, not side by side) with two side-by-side reheated scaled RB.106's as used in the EE P6.D (2/3 of the standard engine) study with a Type 545 type crescent wing.

The components in essence of what would both fit on the RN's CVs, operate from them and do the job they wanted.

I say the scaled RB.106 since it roughly matches the Avon in power, but does so at a smaller size and weight, with potentialy lower fuel burn, though not as good as a Spey. The alternative was the Bristol offering for the B.103, again about the same power output as a Avon.
The Gyron Junior just never seems to cut it and the RB.106 being two spool is going to be the more efficient engine. AWA's efforts seem all focused on supercruise with a single spool, not really whats needed.

I say the crescent wing, since its the ideal form for the periode, and its benign handling into the stall. Not necessarily ideal for low level flight, but very much the thing for medium to high altitudes.

We can add in the Ferranti AI.23 with a 30 inch dish and Fairey's SARH J-band missile offering.
And Fairey's power controls, certainly NOT the Scimitars fuel system, perhaps giving that task to Blackburn instead as they handled the development of the Buccaneer's very well indeed.

I think Type 558 was later 1958? I'll have to dig out the books again and ponder those questions.
Must say it seems Vickers Supermarine had just too much on its books in this periode that covers the development of Swift and Scimitar, and there had to be a rationalisation of designs to focus on what was achievable.

Irony is the splayed engines and fatter nose-to-cockpit make the Type 556 more able to be fully area ruled, something the F1 did'nt get only an aproximation, with all the attendant consequences for what should have been a very transonic machine.

I think some of those strike offerings had internal carridge, which supports the idea of retaining the splayed engnes.

Type 556 probably is the basis for the strike versions of the Scimitar, with their side-by-side seating. The RN was'nt going to trade the NA.39 for it by the time those where in the offing. But it might have been forced to, had the Type 556 been in development by say 1957.

Which of course raises the other possibility. Shorts PD.13. Which might have been a better Fighter than it was a Strike design.
 
Zen,

According to BSP the Type 558 appears in April 1954, about the same time as work is stopped on the 556 mock-up. There is then a big gap before the strike designs and supersonic versions of 1958.

If anybody has access to Norman Friedmans British Carrier Aviation, Google Books is telling me that there is a reference to the Supermarine Scimitar XH451 and one thus assumes to the Type 556???
 
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There are more Scimitar designs than you shake a stick at !
It does'nt look like they stopped proposing variants of the Scimitar until 1959.
Type 537 to NA.19 circa 4.50
Type 544 to N.113 N.9/47 fighter to NR/A.19. This is the Scimitar F1
Type 556 circa 3.54
Type 558 circa 4.55
Type 560 denavalised Scimitar 1956
Type 561 Scimitar to low level strike requirement for the RAF 1956.
Type 562 Interceptor and strike development of the Scimitar 1.56 to 3.57
Type 563 denavalised Type 544 for Swiss Airforce.
Type 564 Revision of Type 562 as naval strike aircraft 1956/57
Type 565 Scimitar tactical bomber 2.57
Type 566 Scimitar strike variant to Navy 2.57
Type 567 single and two seater strike developments for Navy 4.57
Type 572 denavalised Scimitar for RAF 1958
Type 574 Scimitar project? 1958
Type 576 Supersonic Scimitar 12.58

RAF tried to get the Buccaneer canceld in 1957, saying a modified Scimitar could do the task for about 5 million compared to the Bucc's projected 20 million cost.

Looking at the 576 and the 556, I don't see that much difference in the engine locations or the cockpit seating.
Friedman states the 556 had Ferranti AIRPASS, which is curious. Work on mockup is supended in 27 April 1955. (or 27.3.55 in Tony Butlers terminology)
 
Zen,

BSP suggests that work was not suspended until after the mock-up was completed. There must be a photo somewhere? Tony Butler is explicit that the 556 was to have the AI.18. I wonder if Friedman has the 556 and the 558 confused, according to Butler the 558 was to have firestreak as its main armament making some sort of radar a requirement. Butler states a 1959 interim Scimitar was to have an Airpass?

Do we know if either the 556 (unlikely) or the 558 had either area ruling or thin wings for true supersonic performance? Certainly Supermarine was getting a lot of experience from the 545 development by this time? Did the 558 even have re-heat?
 
I suspect theres some sort of mix up there over the mock-up, but clearly it was well underway when the stop came, so yes, some sort of photo or two ought to exist. Perhaps the basic frame was completed but the 'real' components intended to fit into it where never incorporated?

Friedman may be confused, or there maybe inacuracies in the book, as I think there are others elsewhere. After all he talks of a Medway powered SeaVixen as an alternative to the Saro P.177, but that might related to the early life of the Spey as a scaled down Medway.

Some Type 525 did recieve waisting of the fusilage after 1954, along with changes to the wingtips. I suspect but cannot prove that the increased cross section of the Type 556 may bring the machine to more full area ruling, but I cannot prove it either way. Area Ruling was 'The' thing by this time to have.

Red Dean is undergoing its development and the Type 556 was intended to field this sort of weapon. My gut instinct on the radar is GEC with the AI.18 is correct and Friedman has gotten things mixed up.

Blue Jay mk5 is '56 after the cancelation of Type 556, but also after the '55 offering the Type 558. Type 576 is firmly into Blue Dolphin territory.

Odd question on reheat in the 558, but your right to raise it. Logic would suggest it did, as the 556 had and since 558 was intended as a fighter.
 
The reason I raised the Type 558 reheat question was that I had been assuming that it had reheat on the basis that the 556 had it and the 558 was given a significantly larger wing, one assumes for high altitude, thus making reheat desirable if not essential. However I can not confirm this anywhere.

I agree with you regarding the Type 556 radar, I see no reason why it would not be AI.18 given that the aircraft was built to a modified version of the original Sea Vixen requirement. Not to mention the deliberately widened nose and two seat configuration.

The curious thing about the 558 is that we dont really know if it was just a Scimitar with a bigger wing (kind of like the Hawker 1083) or whether it was an after-burning thin winged sound barrier busting beast?
 
The Air Britain Scimitar File books say for the 558 that with the larger wing there were weight problems incuding reheat and meeting the required landing characteristics. They therfore proposed an increased dry thrust R.A. 24 at 13,400 lbs and no reheat. Subsonic with a service ceiling of 49,450 ft. Hope this is helps.
 
The book has 19 pages of unbuilt Scimitar variants and Scimitar precursors (including the undercarriageless 543) so there ida lot of detail.

The 556 was the competitor to the DH 110, as Zen has stated, with side by side two seat cockpit, big radar and variants with and without reheat. The 558 appears to be a big wing scimitar with a beefed up fin, aimed at high altitude performance. The 562 is a radar nosed scimitar (looks just like the front end of a Sea Harrier FRS 1) with a wide variery of proposed powerplants considered: Conway, Avon (with and without reheat), Sapphire (reheated), Gyron Junior (reheated) and mixed power with rocket engine. The 563 was a two seat variant.

The powerlant varient studies seem to have led to the 564 a Gyron Junior version of the 562 with provisoon for Sparrow II and III. The 565 an attack variant with more stores pilons and optimised for low level.

566 a scimitar modification with a new flight control system.

567 updated attack Simitar with wing tip tanks

572 reconnaissance version as Swift replacement.

575 Scimitar for the RCAF

The 576, again I think Zen has posted details, a single seat R.B. 146 powered version (rocket motors in addition as an option) of the Scimitar with a bulged upper fuselage to increase fuel load. Radar equiped dual role both attack and fighter with Redtop (though Sparrow seems to have remained an option). The drawn version in the book does not sho reheat.

As I say there are 19 pages of this so if you are curious about abny details let me know and I will see if its included.
 
The three-view plan reproduced in the book depicts a very standard Scimitar version aft of the cockpit. It has an AI 23 radar and the wing looks standard thickness too, there is no mention in the text of it being thinned and no indication that the aircraft was supersonic. It appears to have led to a series of studies with a variety of engines (other than the standard Avon) and weapons. Some of the reheated or mixed fuel versions may well have been supersonic at altitude, but no mention is made.

No mention is made of how the SARH Sparrow that was considered were to be directed using the AI 23.

Your welcome, and enjoy the book.
 
Hmmm.....

Will have to consider getting that book.

From the sound of it, and the timing the 558 seems an effort to get a radar equipped fighter out into production, perhaps as an additional run from the Scimitar line?
Certainly DAW thought by this time all fighters needed radar, not just Nightfighters. So even a single seater day fighter would need radar, and idealy the latest weapon systems for bringing down attacking bombers, in this case Firestreak or Fireflash.
The increased wing and fin for altitude work suggests they might still be trying to topple DH from the RN's favour. After all they chose the DH110 in 1954...again. (must check book for this one)

The 562 seems an effort by Supermarine to head off the Saro machine, thus the variety of options studied for the propulsion. Its about the right time again and ends about the right time in April 1957.

I had not known about the Sparrow options, that puts these in a new light for me and it makes it both more attractive as an option and more problematic over that weapon.

Sad truth is by 1959 the US had rejected stern chase interceptions as too marginal to be of value, collision course was the way to go.

Personaly I'm not even a fan of the Scimitar, would rather some alternative was there instead, but this does seem the most likely path forward.
 
Hi Zen

I did enjoy the book, but then again I have a bit of a soft spot for the aircraft, though for no reason other than its an attractive looking jet. It is not a cheap book but since I recently spent £150 on the two volume Wearmouth and Jarrow excavation report and there is this saying about people in glass houses, I will just say that if your as obsessional about getting to the detail as I am you would enjoy it. I liked the Sea Vixen book too.

The permutations and politics of such development programmes is such that it really needs a dedicated, well researched, book rather than a chapter in a book on the aircraft that was actually developed. Sadly the environment for getting a punisher interested in books that don't have a celebrities name on the cover is very tough at the moment. Or so friends that publish in the popular market tell me.

The sparrow options are not discussed in any detail. I wonder how much Supermarine knew about the missile and what it would take to integrate and support it. Were they basing it on a brochure or info from the manufacturer? The drawing of the radar equipped 562 with the AI 23 seems to depict the Lightning radar as it fitted in the bullet fairing. This means that as the nose of the aircraft widens heading aft the radar unit narrows, leaving increasing space for additional electronics. I am sure you are familiar with the lightning radar so that just might make sense to you. The implication being that there may have been room for a continuous wave illuminator providing it could utilize the same antenna. You seem to know a great deal more about radars of that period than I do so you probably know better than I if his is plausible.

The proposal in the text is that the radar equipped 562 would be the 101st off the line in 1959 i.e, at the end of the proposed run of 100 Scimitars. This was clearly based on the original order not the 76 actually delivered, with the last in 1960. Whether the 558 was planned to have run on in this manner is not stated in the book.

Of course the Scimitar's main problem regarding continuous development is that the RN had a much better aircraft, the Buccaneer, that followed it in production only a very few years later. Had Albion and Bulwalk been refitted in a sub-Hermes fashion with cats and arrestor gear then it would have made a good second eleven multi-role aircraft for a single type light carrier. But the RN really didn't have the resources to indulge in such things.
 
The Scimitar certainly gives the impression of an aircraft that was never quite 'right'. There seems to have been considerable criticism of its altitude performance which may also explain 558-562, especially big wings and after-burning Gyrons (IIRC The P.177 was to be supersonic with the Gyron on re-heat and without the rocket???). The lack of a Super-sonic variant until the 576 seems odd though, especially with the pursuit of re-heated engines as well as missiles and radars.

The sad truth is that whilst Supermarine was messing around with Scimitar variants the US was pursuing the Phantom! There only seems three options for UK industry to reach anywhere near this quality in the time frame:

Supersonic Scimitar: A development of a subsonic aircraft with a bad reputation
Supersonic Sea Vixen: That may or may not have blown its own tail structure off at some point
P.177: It is difficult to think of this as anything beyond a point interceptor and required pure aluminium tanks to be installed in aircraft carriers! Although one can not help but think that the Rocket may have vanished if development had progressed.
 
The pilots interviewed in the book repeatedly say that a new wing was desirable to improve the altitude performance. But then as Zen pointed out the aircraft was seen as a stopgap before the arrival of the Bucc, so no real drive for later marks.

Revamped subsonic designs were not the way to go. I suspect that this was understood given that no thin-wing Vixen, Javelin or Scimitar ever made it further than paper designs. There were potentially very good, clean sheet, supersonic designs in the offing in the UK in the 50s, such as the P1121, its just that none were being built for the navy. They picked a mixed fuel fighter, but mixed fuel went out of fashion and it never made it into production. There is also the issue of the numbers that the RN were buying in, hardly justifying the expense of what were increasingly complex weapon systems. Given the rate of change in aviation in the 50s you can't help but be a little sympathetic to those trying to navigate their way through this maze in a world with too many aircraft companies competing in an environment of scarce resources.
 
Graeme,

Do you know which Gyron Junior variant was proposed / studied for the Scimitar? It seems genuinely strange that an aircraft designed with two Gyron Juniors (an engined always intended for super-sonic flight) would not possess some supersonic capability, especially with the SR.177 in the same timeframe and expected to enter service in 1960: the best that could be hoped for the Type 562. It is quite possible that Supermarine did intend this version to be subsonic but it does seem rather strange. The curious question is whether the 562 was to use the PS.50 of the SR.177 and later the Bristol 188 or the PS.43 of Buccaneer???

Apologies for bombarding you with questions, I am awaiting on the arrival of the Scimitar Air File, but this aircraft is genuinely intriguing and like yourself I have something of a soft spot for the Scimitar. Despite its obvious issues it is rather attractive aircraft.
 
I think part of the answer to the 'subsonic' reheated Scimitar is about climb performance rather than straight line performance. Getting upto altitude was a vital issue, especialy for DLI.

And in this context higher thrust even if not necessarily aiming for supersonic flight both increases the rate of climb and increases the launch weight of the aircraft.

The increase in wing area however is clearly more about manouverability at altitude.

SR.177 was about mach 0.92 or somesuch reheated at low level, so presumably at about 36,000ft it might have been mildly supersonic possibly better than that. The inlet is one of the features clearly aimed at getting the most out of the jet engine and one of the comments from the designers was the new inlet compared to the Sr.54 gave so much more.
A move to the Avon would help, as would improvements to the reheat chamber. Idealy a move to the RB.106 even if it required some reworking of the rear fusilage to handle the reheat chamber diameter, would make for quite a nice machine.

Its reasonably clear that had it continued, it would've evolved quite a lot. Loosing the rocket motor and focusing on the jet engine being the obvious move. The big issue is to my mind the radar, that 18 inch diameter is rather too small. But I have heard it raised from critics it might have suffered undue drag. My counter is since the bulk of the fusilage over the wing is pure fuel tank (rocket or jet fuel), theres plenty of scope for Area Ruling if need be.

All in all, a lot of work needs to be done, and the Saro research offering with the full size Gyron, seems a better starting position.

P1121, or more accurately the P1103 to start with had some clear potential if Hawkers had seen it for a naval variant. The main gear is the biggest issue, with perhaps visibility over the nose the second.
The final P1121 offering, as a twin seater with good over the nose visability is very attractive. Podd the main gear and we're almost there.
The P1125 is the closest to the ideal for a Naval machine, with the French SO.4060 being the other.

Really rather saddend by the Type 545, its a crying shame that machine never got to flight test, and why was'nt a twin engined offering ever produced? Considering the veritable blizzard of variants the companies where pumping out, it does seem very strange that has not come to light.

Still think the best option is to continue with the Type 556, and add in more refinements over time. Thinner wings, full area ruling, improved reheat etc... would turn it into a viable system for far longer than the SeaVixen. It slips through the decision processes in the most logical manner considering how they thought and had to act. Cutting it in 1955 was in my view the major mistake, but not necessarily one the RN could see at the time.
But a more critical atitude to the DH110 might have changed that decision. It was late and only going to get yet more late and ever less viable in their eyes at the time.
 
Zen,

I agree about the need for altitude performance and climb but the choice of an after-burning engine specifically designed for supersonic flight just seems strange if the aircraft itself was not going to display some performance in that direction.

The P.1121 really belongs to a different paradigm to what we are discussing here, being as it is essentially an early 60s design (the P.1103 is late 50's but the 1121 is a quite different beast) and thus does not really fit into the Scimitar / SR.177 paradigm.

I have brought the SR.177 thread back from the dead with a q regarding the RR engine proposals, I can only find evidence for the RB.153 being proposed and have never seen a reference to any other offering and certainly no suggestion a rocketless version with the exception of the light attack variant (which would of had virtually no need for any altitude performance). Any rocketless version would require a considerably more powerful engine, in the region of 20,000lb +to match the performance expected from the rocket version. A single Avon just does not cut the mustard in this regard and the only viable option looks like the RB.106 or something much larger like a Gyron.
 
It does seem strange, I agree, but then its whats available, and the Gyron Junior is a bit smaller than a Avon, leaving more room for other things, perhaps fuel?

P.1121 is indeed a bit outside the scope of this thread, a solution for the 1960s and a quite a potent one, but considering the decision processes one that requires quite a change of attitude for the RN or indeed the MoD. Had Hawkers flown their prototype things might have been different.

I've given an answer of sorts on the Saro thread.
 
There seem to have been a substantial number of studies. There is a list of 5 powerplant versions, but just as a list and mention in the text of: 'A number of egines were considered, including the Rolls Royce RA 24.29 non reheat but with a rocket, th same engine with reheat but no rocket, the RR Conway 32 plus rocket no reheat, two Armstrong Siddely Sapphire 10R with reheat or one DH Gyron Junior PS.78 plus rocket and reheat'.

When I said it needs a book not a chapter I wasn't kidding!
 

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