Project Azorian - documentary on Glomar Explorer

AeroFranz

AeroFranz

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Just a heads up. If you get the chance, watch "Project Azorian". I am by no means a naval fan, but the engineering behind the project is mind boggling and well explained in the 1 hour 42 minutes of the film. Really enjoyed it. For those in the US, it's streaming on Netflix.
 
You can get the DVD cheap. It has great computer graphics and I think they did some outstanding research.

The book is excellent as well.

Two guys have also written an article about the recovery of the satellite vehicle from the bottom of the Pacific in spring 1972 that will be published in the next few months. It's a great story.
 
The Project Azorian documentary is now available on Amazon Prime. I was involved in making the film with Michael White back in the 2005-2009 era. We have lots of background research which I can share with anyone interested, The CGI in the original film was done by Markus Cermak.

For the best "insider" story of Azorian, I recommend David Sharp's book: The CIA's Greatest Covert Mission: Inside the Daring Mission to Recover a Nuclear-Armed Soviet Sub

​

 
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I remember Discovery Channel’s program where they called it the Jennifer Project.
 
Jennifer was a general overarching control system, named for the deceased daughter of one of the officers. Azorian was the name of the first recovery operation which brought up the bow section. The subsequent follow on was codenamed Matador to go back in the summer of 1975 to retrieve the remaining part, but was cancelled when the story broke and the Soviets were alerted.

The Discovery channels version is way off base in many areas.
 
The failure of the Capture Vehicle (CV = claw) was due to a couple of factors. First, an earlier expedition wit the Glomar II had failed in an attempt to get a sample of the sea bed to estimate the soil hardness. Remember the davits on the CV had to be driven under the K-129 Target Object (not through it!). The soil turned out to more compacted and harder than calculated under what were believed to be worst case circumstances. The other potential contributing factor was that immediately after initial lift of the CV with the K-129 Target Object section, the Heavy Lift System heave compensator failed, which meant putting the CV and K-129 back on the bottom. This placed an unusual stress never intended on several of the arms and davits. Best description I have heard was to image the difference of doing a push up with your flat hand vs. trying to do one using your knuckles. So, these two unplanned factors contributed to more than one of the arms and davits failed.

Another possible factor has been identified was the use of managing steel, which was found to become more brittle at the lower temperatures (29F in seawater at that depth). The plan was to switch to another steel in the subsequent Matador operation to retrieve the lost portion. Matador was aborted when the mission was revealed in the press by Jack Anderson.
 
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TJDougherty01 said:
[...]

Another possible factor has been identified was the use of managing steel, which was found to become more brittle at the lower temperatures (29F in seawater at that depth). The plan was to switch to another steel in the subsequent Matador operation to retrieve the lost portion. [...]
Click to expand...

Since reading 'Project Azorian. The CIA and the raising of the K-129' for the first time shortly after it was published, I always wanted to ask - were the 'grabbers' (as they are labeled in 'Project Azorian', on the color insert depicting 'Capture Vehicle') made out of titanium or maraging steel?

'Kelly. More Than My Share of It All', (1989 edition, p. 198) reads: "Lockheed's participation in Glomar was to design the mechanism that would pick up an abandoned Russian submarine sunk to depths of 15,000 feet. Skimping on static testing of the remotely-controlled titanium arms-failure to conduct one last test before the retrieval attempt-resulted in less that 100 percent success."

'Project Azorian', (p.135) reads: "Related to this situation was Lockheed's choice of maraging steel for the capture vehicle's beams and davits. Other steels would have allowed more deflection or 'bending,' permitting a better distribution of the load among the beams. Lockheed had selected maraging steel for those components because it has superior strength and toughness compared to ordinary structural steels. However, maraging steel is also relatively brittle, especially at low temperatures [...] Recently, information on Lockheed's selection of maraging steel has come to light. It has been revealed that the CIA provided a last-minute lift estimate that had increased the target object's weight by 500 tons. Since the capture vehicle's beams and davits were sized and the drawings released, Lockheed had no choice but to select another steel with a higher yield strength and equal ease of machining and workability in order to meet schedules."

Obviously, two versions of the same story. Intuitively, Lockheed using their titanium fabrication know-how for another CIA project in the late '60 seems plausible.
 
Yes, actually Lockheed did the redesign of the CV. The original design was deemed too massive and added to the lifting problems. That is when the CIA brought in Kelly Johnson and the Skunk Works team for the CV. The heaviest component was the actual lift pipe string itself (roughly 4000 tons) when full deployed. The redesigned CV was roughly another 2000 tons, and the K-129 forward Target Object about 1600-1800 tons.

The CV itself was built in Redwood City, California, specifically at the Lockheed facility on the small isthmus where Redwood Creek is. Now the site of biotech companies (Relapse, Menlop Therapeutics, Impossible Foods and the Marine Institute). The partially built CV was transferred into the HMB-1 barge and finished under cover.

See also this analysis of the CV arms and davits failure: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11837-013-0691-3.pdf
 
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No, there are no replies to FOIA requests. There are various exceptions that can be employed to refuse any FOIA requests. If a project is still classified, then someone has to actively investigate and act on the declassification. Hasn't happened with most of Azorian except for the written material on the CIA Reading Room web site.

The most recent information was that the CIA museum allowing the BBC British film company access to part of their collection for a short film. Scroll down for the K-129 wreck model. This *may* be the model that was employed in the simulator that built to help the CV operators practice putting the CV down in the precise orientation to engage the target object. The simulator employed the submarine model and a model CV with the TV cameras in the same places as on the real CV. The desire was to engage certain target points on the wreck (e.g., towing eye) to insure the CV was correctly placed before lifting. In the actual recovery, the CV was just one foot off of the desired targets. So the simulator practice was extremely helpful for the remote CV operators.

You may want to visit the museum, but you can't. It's on headquarters property in Langley and is only for CIA and other cleared individuals. The BBC team was granted access and carefully allowed to film only certain objects. I do know that they have one of the A-12 aircraft there as well as U-2 artifacts.

Here's the connection: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63023876
and at around 2:30 of this video:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpZubTxenvE

K-129 Simulator Model.jpg
 
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patryk said:
TJDougherty01 said:
[...]

Another possible factor has been identified was the use of managing steel, which was found to become more brittle at the lower temperatures (29F in seawater at that depth). The plan was to switch to another steel in the subsequent Matador operation to retrieve the lost portion. [...]
Click to expand...

Since reading 'Project Azorian. The CIA and the raising of the K-129' for the first time shortly after it was published, I always wanted to ask - were the 'grabbers' (as they are labeled in 'Project Azorian', on the color insert depicting 'Capture Vehicle') made out of titanium or maraging steel?

'Kelly. More Than My Share of It All', (1989 edition, p. 198) reads: "Lockheed's participation in Glomar was to design the mechanism that would pick up an abandoned Russian submarine sunk to depths of 15,000 feet. Skimping on static testing of the remotely-controlled titanium arms-failure to conduct one last test before the retrieval attempt-resulted in less that 100 percent success."

'Project Azorian', (p.135) reads: "Related to this situation was Lockheed's choice of maraging steel for the capture vehicle's beams and davits. Other steels would have allowed more deflection or 'bending,' permitting a better distribution of the load among the beams. Lockheed had selected maraging steel for those components because it has superior strength and toughness compared to ordinary structural steels. However, maraging steel is also relatively brittle, especially at low temperatures [...] Recently, information on Lockheed's selection of maraging steel has come to light. It has been revealed that the CIA provided a last-minute lift estimate that had increased the target object's weight by 500 tons. Since the capture vehicle's beams and davits were sized and the drawings released, Lockheed had no choice but to select another steel with a higher yield strength and equal ease of machining and workability in order to meet schedules."

Obviously, two versions of the same story. Intuitively, Lockheed using their titanium fabrication know-how for another CIA project in the late '60 seems plausible.
Click to expand...

That’s really interesting information as I’ve always wondered at the poor material choice the CV arms. Having worked with the materials mentioned, here’s few observations on the choices from my own experience ;-
Maraging steel - AMS6514 is a exceptionally strong steel with about 7-8% yield upon rupture @ peak UTS, normally shattering into several pieces, which resembles broken china. While it can give excellent service it must be employed in just the right way or it will bite. In addition to the well reported cold embrittlement it has a number of other traits which make its use on the CV arms challenging. A key consideration is that it’s very intolerant of surface imperfections. When exposed to salt water it corrodes at an alarming rate;- Red rust corrosion has been observed to form within as little as 15 minutes. Rust forms as a surface cavity that will significantly concentrate stress and therefore act to seed rupture at lower than predicted loads. The same is true for surface scratches or indentation (ie local yielding). Corrosion is normally stopped with surface plating (Cadmium in those days) which itself is protected by paint. The thought of such a sensitive material system being forced/grated between a steel sub hull and potentially rocks shows a large degree of optimism or desperation. Other problems are;- (i) it’s highly intolerant to any local yielding even if there’s no apparent rupture, and it’s noted that this may have occurred just prior to the lift. (ii) in time hydrogen embrittlement in a saltwater environment will significantly compromises its strength. (iii) It’s generally regarded as unweldable so the arms would have been made from a hand forging. Forging Maraging steel is tricky which can take more than one attempt to get the process right. A successful static test informs that its alright.

The Titanium alloy that was around at that time was Ti 6.4. This doesn’t corrode, is less sensitive to surface imperfections, and is easily weldable. However it’s only about 40% of the strength of Maraging Steel and 60% of the weight. So as said above, if faced with a last minute increase in a dead lift load, it makes prefect sense to switch the material, albeit at much, much greater risk.

That would have been a memorable day at the office.
 
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The arms and davits for the planned follow on mission (Matador) were made with different material than managing steel. Other modifications were made to the CV as well. At least one of those arms was reoriented 90 degrees to accommodate the section that dropped back onto the ocean floor. You are correct; the photos of the broken arms and davits post-mission show clean breaks of the material.

The mission was originally planned for 1973, but delays in several areas had it pushed back to 1974. The original test of the HGE-Pipestring-CV did not go well. A subsequent test run just prior to the mission was more successful. There is a relatively narrow window of time in the summer in which the North Pacific was calm enough to carry out the mission, so the time pressure was on to complete tests as best as possible.
Most people don't realize that the pipe string was stabilized by massive set of bearings and a heave compensatory system on the HGE. This dampened out any side to side and up and down motion of the ship, keeping the pipe string vertical and not moving up and down. Otherwise, sideward motion or heaving would have stressed the 3 mile long deployed pipe string with the CV on the end well beyond the breaking point of the pipes.

The best account of the mission by a senior engineer onboard the Glomar Explorer is David Sharp's book. I highly recommend it!
Here is the Amazon link: https://www.amazon.com/CIAs-Greatest-Covert-Operation-Nuclear-Armed/dp/0700619410
and the original publisher link: https://kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700619412/the-cias-greatest-covert-operation/
Dave on HGE.jpg
 
Tom,
Any idea of who made the Model? Great job, especially how it shows the bow seemingly "pushed in" toward the sail rather then imploded / crushed in. Who did the annotation? Excellent idea to help viewers spot the important parts.
Yo! Thanks for getting on the discussion.

Most appropriate timing, this Project Azorian review, what with Russia going down to get our Drone.
 
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Sorry for the delay, been busy with serious life issues.

No, I do not know who built the K-129 model for the simulator system. It was based on the many photographs obtained of the K-129 by the Halibut towed body "Fish". The model was used extensively to practice maneuvering the Capture Vehicle (CV) precisely onto the target "aim points".

Important to note that the seafloor was not level but had a pronounced slope to it. It sloped downward both from starboard to port as well as from aft to bow. The CV was designed to deal with this slope when engaging the target, with adjustable "leg" lengths at the corners.

Also the K-129 target was largely leaning on its starboard side, and two of the three missile silos were largely destroyed and missing. A very different reality from the "Blind Man's Bluff" book description of the Golf II looking like "it was driven there and parked", with just a 10 foot diameter hole in its side.
 
August 25, 2023

New Netflix docuseries explores '70s CIA mission with Chester connection​

'Spy Ops' tells the story of Project Azorian, an operation to recover a sunken Soviet submarine. The show premieres Sept. 8​

 
Well, yeah. There was a lot of "behind the scenes" work done on this by several people in the know, to fix some...how shall I say....misperceptions? Anyhow, It is in decent shape. It isn't a terribly long program and while worth watching, little new is there. Some good interviews, especially with Todd Bennett on the behind the scenes political ramifications.

Maryin- Sorry, Dave had nothing to do with this.
 
I *think* he was there when I gave the long presentation on it, including some video from the CV, way back in 2010.
 
TJDougherty01 said:
The best account of the mission by a senior engineer onboard the Glomar Explorer is David Sharp's book. I highly recommend it!
Here is the Amazon link: https://www.amazon.com/CIAs-Greatest-Covert-Operation-Nuclear-Armed/dp/0700619410
and the original publisher link: https://kansaspress.ku.edu/9780700619412/the-cias-greatest-covert-operation/
Click to expand...

@TJDougherty01, thank you for sharing the link to Mr. Sharp's book. Have just finished reading it - indeed, a 'must read' for anyone interested in the Azorian program.

patryk said:
After all these years, is there any additional information available on the 'CIA's Tiger Team' report mentioned there?
Click to expand...

To answer my own question, found more on 'Tiger Team' and its findings on pages 236-242 of Mr. Sharp's book.

Zoo Tycoon said:
That’s really interesting information as I’ve always wondered at the poor material choice the CV arms.
Click to expand...

From Mr. Sharp's book:

"[...] Parangosky [...] went to his old friend Kelly Johnson, president of the Lockheed Skunk Works in Burbank, for assistance. Kelly agreed that the [initial LMSC's] design [of capture vehicle] was too complex for the intended application and sent one of his most experienced mechanical engineers, Henry Coombs [spelling from the book], to work with LMSC team on the new approach.

The collaboration of LMSC and Skunk Works resulted in a greatly simplified concept. The space-frame structure was thrown out and replaced with a single massive weldment as the spine, or strongback, of the capture vehicle. HY-100 steel was specified in the order to reduce cost and simplify the construction. (Simplifying the welded construction was of considerable importance, since the strongback was at that time the largest known HY-100 weldment in the world.)" p. 94-95

"[...] The Tiger Teams's findings that cracked beams and davits were the direct cause of the breakaway only confirmed what many had suspected. The more important issue, though, was identification of all the technical factors that might have contributed to the tine failures. There was no single, identified cause for the fracturing. Rather, there appeared to be a number of problems experienced during the mission that led to the eventual failures. The contractors and the Tiger Team came up with the following list of technical issues that might have contributed to the breakage.

Material Selection for the Beams and Davits
The selection of Maraging 200 steel for the beams and davits had never been universally popular. At the time of the capture vehicle design, there was not a very large database on the performance of the steel in extreme environments (such as freezing temperatures and very high pressures). Lockheed, however, had felt strongly that it was important to take advantage of the high-tensile-strength material in order to keep the weight of the capture vehicle within reasonable limits. The metallurgy team doing the postmission analysis was divided on the extent to which the material selection was responsible for the failures. They all agreed that Maraging 200 was known to be subject to hydrogen embrittlement (a phenomenon that results in cracking of some metals after exposure to atomic hydrogen), and that the cold temperatures and high water pressures might have exacerbated that susceptibility. But were the tine failures during the ascent due to the material selection? Or were the problems caused by unplanned-for events that occurred during the bottom operations?

The Lockheed designers contended that the Maraging 200 would have been entirely satisfactory material selection if the procedures for driving the tines under the target had been less aggressive, and if the tines hadn't been exposed to compressive and twisting loads while sitting on the ocean bottom for twenty hours waiting for completion of heave compensator repairs. [...]" p. 238

"Although in hindsight the Maraging 200 steel might not have been the best choice for construction of the tines, it's problematical whether any other choice of steel would have survived the unplanned-for conditions that the CV and to endure for nearly twenty hours without similar fracture problems." p. 241
 
Here's another interesting analysis of the CV failure by engineering students at the University of Florida:
link.springer.com

Cold War Thriller Brings Classroom Theory to Life - JOM

link.springer.com link.springer.com

Back about three years ago, I found out that Dave Sharp didn't have a model of the K-129. To rectify this, I built one and dropped it off at his home. Photos attached.
DSC_6909.jpeg DSC_6925.jpeg
 

I recently came across secret projects and the discussion about Project Azorian and the loss of the K-129. It is without doubt the best exchange of ideas I have come across but I have one minor quibble. Captain Newman’s background says he is the last living member of the CIA’s Project Azorian Hughes Glomar Explorer team. From 1970 to 1975 I was the Chief Marine Geologist on the Project. Most of what I did was helping to create and maintain the seabed mining cover, but I was also the photographer with Team B that continued to exploit the K-129 while the Explorer was anchored off Lahaina.​

​

 
When Michael White and a few others were contacting Jack Newman, I think he was referring to being the A Team that was the one onsite over the K-129 wreckage. That's not entirely correct, because Sherman Wetmore is still alive as far as I know. I assume you are referring to Jack's recent article in Naval History on the Naval Institute Site.

Of course the original plan was to recover the entire 134 foot section of the forward end of the submarine. the B Team would have had plenty of work to do off Lahaina exploiting the bulk of the wreckage. But with the loss of all but about 30+ feet of the bow, there was less for the B Team to work on. As well, the A Team started the exploitation of the recovered section on the way back to Hawaii.

As far as the above discussion on the managing steel employed on the CV beams and davits, another contributing factor (per Sherman Wetmore) was the failure of the Glomar II to obtain a bottom core sample near the wreck site. The instrumented platform was lost on the bottom. This would have told the designers that the bottom was far more compressed and hard than had been expected. The forward part of the submarine (target object) had sat for 6 years on the ocean bottom, and had over time partially sunk into the bottom. Since it was necessary to run the davits through the bottom under the submarine to lift it out, additional weight had to be offloaded to get the beams and davits to penetrate into the sea bottom. This stressed the beams. Also doing the initial lift off, the heave compensator pump failed, and the CV had to be set back down on the ocean floor with the K-129 target engaged. This also stressed the beams in ways they were not designed for. I've attached a diagram of the beam failure points from a study by University of Florida engineering students on the CV failure which led to the loss of much of the target object. As well, the article that discusses the engineering analysis by the students.

If you contact me off line, I have some more interesting details about their findings.
 

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