Post WW2 with no German wonder weapons

[Dilandu]

It seems that the impact of German innovative designs on postwar devlopments both in the Soviet Union and the West has tended to obscure what was already being done by their own people.

Its a VERY serious problem, I fully agree. Thing is, that "wunderwaffe" myth is so well-established, that most peoples simply do not even bother to doubt it.

The main reason, IMHO, is just that German experimental works and secret projects became well-known to public soon after war. Nobody bothered with making them very secret, because, well, both East and West have access to them, and they see no reason to make secret things that other side also have)

On the other hands, East and West own experimental works and projects were still secret for quite a long time. Both sides most definitely didn't want each other to knew about their own advances.

So, with a lot of information about German experimental tech available, and almost no information about contemporary works of USA, Britain and USSR (not to mention Italy, France and Japan), peoples naturally started to assume that Germany was very advanced. While in reality, German technology was lagging behind Allied - especially American - in almost any area. And even Italy and Japan managed to have some better ideas than Germans...

 

[Dilandu]

Where were these fighters manufactured?

Most of them were produced in such places as Omsk, Novosibirsk, Ulan-Ude - far outside the range of any bombers Germany could produce. When our leadership ordered industry to be evacuated, they logically decided to move it far enough to guarantee its safety.

Some aircraft factories - like in Gorky and Tbilisi - were theoretically in range of German bombers, but they were well-protected.

If there was more logical thinking in Nazi weapons aquisition, they might well have had long range strategic bombers in some numbers,

Nah. Germans simply did not have neither the technology, nor resources for any significant long-range bomber fleet. While it could be annoying, a few hundreds of long-range bombers at most would not change the course of war; at most, some RAF and USAAF fighter squadrons would be send to Ural to help protect the USSR industry (in 1942, some RAF fighters were send to help with Murmansk defense, so sending more was not impossible).

 

[pathology_doc]

Angela Merkel's democratic Germany

Don't make me laugh.

 

[uk 75]

compared with the UK the FRG's handling of Corona is surely worth recognising and the Chancellor is a scientist not a PPE graduate. I was not meaning any more than that.

 

[zen]

compared with the UK the FRG's handling of Corona is surely worth recognising and the Chancellor is a scientist not a PPE graduate. I was not meaning any more than that.

I think one should wait at least a year before making such a assessment.
German behaviour has not covered them in glory over this, or in european solidarity.

But that's all we should say here as this element of the debate is strictly inappropriate for this section.

 

[uk 75]

fair point. I was tending to see it from the narrow perspective of an old f**t locked down in Oxfordshire while friends in Berlin get their lives back. Not sure if I can wait a year...

 

[Orionblamblam]

Most of them were produced in such places as Omsk, Novosibirsk, Ulan-Ude - far outside the range of any bombers Germany could produce.

Omsk and points east are indeed a long way from the alt-1941 front lines of Novgorad, beyond the 750 or so mile range of the Ju 90. However, in early 1942 when the Luftwaffe introduces the Ju 290, those factories start getting turned into rubble. The Soviets then pull up stakes and move further east still, extending the supply lines even more.

at most, some RAF and USAAF fighter squadrons would be send to Ural to help protect the USSR industry (in 1942, some RAF fighters were send to help with Murmansk defense, so sending more was not impossible).

However, if the Brits have an armistice with the Nazis, sending aid to the Soviets might be the sort of violation that the UK won't risk. Rather, they might prefer to sit there and build up their own collection of weapons for the day when the armistice finally breaks. Either because the Nazis have defeated the Soviets and turn their attention west again, or because the Soviets have trashed the Nazis and the Brits finally break the armistice themselves to get in on the action.

 

[Dilandu]

However, in early 1942 when the Luftwaffe introduces the Ju 290, those factories start getting turned into rubble.

Are you serious? Ju.290 with its pathetic speed and altitude was absolutely useless as long-range bomber. It wasn't exactly good even as maritime patrol plane.

However, if the Brits have an armistice with the Nazis, sending aid to the Soviets might be the sort of violation that the UK won't risk. Rather, they might prefer to sit there and build up their own collection of weapons for the day when the armistice finally breaks. Either because the Nazis have defeated the Soviets and turn their attention west again, or because the Soviets have trashed the Nazis and the Brits finally break the armistice themselves to get in on the action.

You are inventing some particularly improbable scenarios, with very little logic in them.

 

[Orionblamblam]

However, if the Brits have an armistice with the Nazis, sending aid to the Soviets might be the sort of violation that the UK won't risk. Rather, they might prefer to sit there and build up their own collection of weapons for the day when the armistice finally breaks. Either because the Nazis have defeated the Soviets and turn their attention west again, or because the Soviets have trashed the Nazis and the Brits finally break the armistice themselves to get in on the action.

You are inventing some particularly improbable scenarios, with very little logic in them.

You're suggesting that it's improbable that the British would act in a manner consistent with Machiavelli? That someone like Churchill wouldn't sit back and let two of his opponents beat each other to death if given the option?

We are, after all, discussing an alternate history here. If we assume changes such as much less reliance upon wacky science projects and more on rational weapons, perhaps the Nazis, when they enter into Ukraine, will spend less effort on brutalizing the Ukranians and more on equipping their very own "Holodomor Brigade," a ten-million-strong Waffen SS division made up of Ukrainians intent upon eating the Soviets.

 

[Dilandu]

You're suggesting that it's improbable that the British would act in a manner consistent with Machiavelli? That someone like Churchill wouldn't sit back and let two of his opponents beat each other to death if given the option?

I'm suggesting, that British aren't idiots, and perfectly understood, that if they try to sit out the war in Europe, then they may as well already start to prepare either Nazi or Soviet banners to replace national flag. Because whoever would won, would have zero interest to allow Britain to ever exist as anything except of satellite state. And Britain would find it kinda hard to seek for allies, because everyone would immediately recall their "acting in a a manner consistent with Machiavelli" and suggest that if Britain is so smart, they should figure the way out of blunder themselves.

We are, after all, discussing an alternate history here.

Alternate history, yes. Generic "Soviets-were-as-bad-as-Nazi-proclaimed-the-uppermost-Democrator" propaganda - no. Or should we start to use the other side propaganda too? Let's discuss the scenario in which Ku-Klux-Klan in 1941 came to power using the support of Wall Street bankers, burn the Constitution at the White House front door, put blacks in prison camps and invade Canada. Quite "plausible"? Doubt so.

If we assume changes such as much less reliance upon wacky science projects and more on rational weapons, perhaps the Nazis, when they enter into Ukraine, will spend less effort on brutalizing the Ukranians and more on equipping their very own "Holodomor Brigade," a ten-million-strong Waffen SS division made up of Ukrainians intent upon eating the Soviets.

Please excuse me for being blunt, and with all possible respect, but your knowledge about this matters are just annoyingly generic. Any kind of initial sympathy to the Germans was characteristic only to the Western Ukraine, due to both national and economical factors - they were, a "fresh" addition (after being under Poland for the most part of Interbellum). The majority of Ukrainians viewed the Germans as invaders on the Motherland, who came to destroy everything, when things just start to finally look brighter. Ukrainean nationalism simply wasn't as deep-rooted at this time, especially after Tsarist regime took nearly 200 years of effort to assimilate Ukraine completely. Being a half-Ukrainean (by father line), believe me, I knew that a bit better than you...

Most importantly, I just do not see how your scenarios are linked with the theme of the post. Nazi with no interest in wunderwaffe did not automatically means that Nazi became any more "sane" or "pragmatical". Mao "great leap forward" was all about "simple, proven methods", but it was utterly senseless.

 

[zen]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

So first up ought to have been driving the Germans out of Norway. Along with keeping Spain and Portugal out of the war. Ultimately driving the Germans out of western France and containing the U-boat threat into the North Sea.

Direct European landfall is after they've been squeezed out of our flanks.

 

[Dilandu]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

Exactly. Especially with the advent of air force, when Britain stopped to be invulnerable. Now, to have a friendly (or at least not outright hostile) buffer in continenal Europe was for Britain the Number One priority.

 

[kaiserd]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

So first up ought to have been driving the Germans out of Norway. Along with keeping Spain and Portugal out of the war. Ultimately driving the Germans out of western France and containing the U-boat threat into the North Sea.

Direct European landfall is after they've been squeezed out of our flanks.

Re: strategy In WW2 (or any remotely likely alternative WW2) sorry but that’s a load of old cobblers; “Norway First” a terrible strategy that would also have been virtually impossible to implement.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Generic "Soviets-were-as-bad-as-Nazi-proclaimed-the-uppermost-Democrator" propaganda - no. Or should we start to use the other side propaganda too? Let's discuss the scenario in which Ku-Klux-Klan in 1941 came to power using the support of Wall Street bankers, burn the Constitution at the White House front door, put blacks in prison camps and invade Canada. Quite "plausible"? Doubt so.

As an alternate history, it's not *that* crazy given how powerful the Klan was for a while. But here's the thing: "Klan takes over" is alternate history. "Commies were as bad as Nazis" is established history, not some fanciful alternative. That's not some conclusion based on nationalism or racism or partisan position... it's just looking at the numbers.

Nazi with no interest in wunderwaffe did not automatically means that Nazi became any more "sane" or "pragmatical".

It does seem to follow. Less interested in crazy would generally seem to imply more interested in the sensible.

 

[Orionblamblam]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

And had the Germans done only a little better, British independence would have been a matter of *surviving* in the face of other European states being consumed by the Reich. It not that unlikely that had Dunkirk gone a bit different, Britain might have sued for peace.

 

[zen]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

And had the Germans done only a little better, British independence would have been a matter of *surviving* in the face of other European states being consumed by the Reich. It not that unlikely that had Dunkirk gone a bit different, Britain might have sued for peace.

No I think this is a temptation to hijack this thread and argue over the 'unmentionable sea mammal'.
Politically there was a window and a uneasy peace could result.

But no Germany didn't have a serious ability to take Britain.

 

[Orionblamblam]

argue over the 'unmentionable sea mammal'.

Narwhals? Dugongs? Jason Momoa?

But no Germany didn't have a serious ability to take Britain.

People have been arguing about that for generations. But Germany managed to take France, Poland, Czechoslavakia and, at least for a while, an expensive bit of Russia, so I'd be hesitant to say that Britain would be impossible for them.

The Germans probably came *really* close to achieving air supremacy over Britain and had they done so an invasion becomes a lot more likely. Whether the Germans could have poured enough soldiers across the Channel to dominate Britain can be argued, but I will point out that the United States was able to pour enough force across the Pacific to dominate the empire of Japan. However, a successful Operation Sea Lion would probably have to have been roughly on scale with D-Day, and, AFAIK, there wasn't the kind of sealift capability the Wermacht would have needed. Where were the thousands of landing craft and troop ships? The Gigants were not going to be near enough.

 

[zen]

argue over the 'unmentionable sea mammal'.

Narwhals? Dugongs? Jason Momoa?

But no Germany didn't have a serious ability to take Britain.

People have been arguing about that for generations. But Germany managed to take France, Poland, Czechoslavakia and, at least for a while, an expensive bit of Russia, so I'd be hesitant to say that Britain would be impossible for them.

The Germans probably came *really* close to achieving air supremacy over Britain and had they done so an invasion becomes a lot more likely. Whether the Germans could have poured enough soldiers across the Channel to dominate Britain can be argued, but I will point out that the United States was able to pour enough force across the Pacific to dominate the empire of Japan. However, a successful Operation Sea Lion would probably have to have been roughly on scale with D-Day, and, AFAIK, there wasn't the kind of sealift capability the Wermacht would have needed. Where were the thousands of landing craft and troop ships? The Gigants were not going to be near enough.

No don't hijack this thread.
Start one yourself.

 

[Dilandu]

No don't hijack this thread.
Start one yourself.

Second that.

 

[uk 75]

The Britain under Prime Minister Halifax sueing for an 18 Century style time out peace with Hitler seems unthinkable.now, but many Tories wanted to focus on defending the Empire and leave Europe for the time being.
Churchill was in the Whig tradition like his ancestor the Duke of Marlborough. Like Louis XIV Hitler had to be defeated at any price. That clear war aim marked him out.

 

[galgot]

I remember reading, and seeing very good documentary on the subject stating that
without Churchill, and had Halifax and Chamberlain ideas being followed by the war cabinet, good chance GB would have sough peace with hitler in may 40.
Churchill had to defeat these two before he could continue the fight with Germany.

Lord Halifax tried to negotiate peace with the Nazis

Lord Halifax, Britain's Foreign Secretary at the outbreak of the Second World War, secretly met with an Old Etonian who tried to broker a peace deal with the Nazis, according to newly-declassified security files.

www.telegraph.co.uk

Darkest Hour: The People Who Helped Shape the Future of Britain in May 1940

In May 1940 Britain was confronted with two of the most important questions in its history. Who should lead Britain in the war against Nazi Germany? Should Britain make a negotiated peace with Hitler? At stake was the very survival of Britain itself.

www.iwm.org.uk

 

[RanulfC]

In our world, the horrific Third Reich left us a slew of technology from Von Braun's rockets to swept wing jets. But supposing the Reich had simply generated dull unimaginative stuff.
What would our postwar world have looked like?

The United States would have launched the first satellite in 1950 atop a North American Aviation, Douglas or Martin Co. rocket. The US had a healthy space-launch-concept-industry at the end of WWII... which was overturned and replaced by the German imports. Not because the Germans necessarily had better ideas, but because they had better press. By 1957 the United States Space Force had regular manned missions to LEO; by 1962 or so, the first bases on the Moon. By 2000, Olympus Mons is petitioning for statehood. By 2020, the United States flag replaces the field of stars with a graphic of the solar system.

Additionally: since the Germans didn't waste so much effort on wunderwaffen, they devoted more to practical weapons. The Soviet Union eventually emerges victorious, but they are wore the frak out and have no neato German stuff to copy, and there's no post-war economic recovery for them. So by 1955 communism collapses with no Red China, no Korean or Viet Nam wars, no Cuba. Without Soviet agitprop, the nuclear industry never staggers; the last gas station in the US closes in 1995. By 2020, people are tearing their hair out about the rise of glaciers in the far north, with the first hints of sea level drop causes beaches around the world to expand. With no Soviet agitprop, western universities fail to become bastions of woke nonsense, and students largely get educations in useful and productive fields, fueling the expansion of the United Worlds of America.

YMMV.

Er, no actually. American rocketry suffered from the duel issue of being associated with "far-future/science-fictiony/emphisis on the "fiction" part" Buck Rogers fantasy and, worse lack of support and funding. IF this alt-history still has Truman as President then US missile development is still-born in the late 40s just like our timeline as the Air Force had to make a choice due to funding shortfalls. And their hired expert, Dr. Karman, stated catagorically that guided air-breathing missiles had more near-term utlity and could be developed faster than the more capable, (in the long run) ballistic missile.

So it was written, so it was done

The Germans developed rockets, specifically liquid fueled rockets, to get around the Versailles Treaty on not allowing them long range artillary. Really they figured out pretty quickly that rockets were going to be much more expensive and take longer to develop than just fudging the treaty but by that point, as Scott points out, one thing Von Bruan was better at than engineering and organization was his own propaganda.

The US actually had better and more advanced rocket work going on by the end of WWII and had people in place that were ready and willing to move forward when the budget crunch hit. In fact Von Braun and the Germans were specifically posted to the middle of nowhere to keep them isolated till their knowledge was out of date. (The fact most of the V2's the US brought back failed due to undetected sabotage really didn't impress the US with their work)

Nothing changed until Korea broke out, (and in fact Truman having won so unexpectedly in 1948 was aiming to double down on the budget cuts) and money suddenly became available. Von Braun's team was moved to Alabama to help the Army program since they were even further behind than the Air Force but also unlike the Air Force both the Army and Von Braun were used to building the initial machine before it was turned over to industry to produce so they got Redstone up and running before the Air Force got things organized. (It having taken the Missile folks in the Air Force to around 1952 to come to a compromise agreement with the Bomber folks in the Air Force to actually develop missiles in the first place)

And then when the Army had any chance of long range missile developement taken away by the Air Force they needed a 'project' to keep Von Braun's team togther so they pitched a 'super-ICBM' to ARPA and thus the Saturn 1 was born. (Meanwhile the Air Force was pitching a not-even a drawing concept of 'clustered-Titan' missile bodies using one or more still undeveloped F1s for the same job, and managing more often than not to have the Saturn funding slashed and then reinstated)

The Navy Vanguard in and of itself probably would have worked if they had gotten any decent budget or support. As it was the Air Force was told to concentrate on simply getting the Atlas to work the majority of the time and Ike specifically suggested that no one let that "ex-Nazi" launch anything into orbit. But despite that Von Braun and the Army had a ready and waiting "Jupiter-C" (in the same configuration they used to test the Jupiter and Atlas missile warheads and had preperd to launch a possible satellite in 1954) ready to go when needed so they got the nod. Then since Saturn 1 was the only large launcher on the drawing boards of the US at the time it only made sense to have NASA absord the Von Bruan team and move on from there but pretty much all the Saturn V was more based on American than German ideas.

So back to the original question? Well, a lot of the 'wonder weapons' weren't really all that much of a 'wonder' as it might seem. The US deployed "cruise missiles" in WWI but the weapons were delayed in loading so only the personel every reached Europe before the war was over. Similarly both Britan and the US developed and deployed 'flying bombs' during WWII but they were rarely used because they weren't really effective. (Had we invaded Japan that would have been a different story all together) Both Britan and the US had jet engines under development prior to the opening of the war. Similarly rocket technology was moving forward but in contrast to the development in Germany it was slow and haphazard. Likely without the successful example of the V2 we would have seen the development dropped once again post-war.

That is probably the biggest effect of the various advanced German weapons of WWII in that the technology and development in and of itself wasn't the most important thing but that they provided example of those technologies working, (even if not consistantly) that spured further development and more importantly more public and political support (and less ridicule using Robert Goddard and rockets for a prime example) that translated to more consistant interest.

Randy

 

[Dilandu]

The US actually had better and more advanced rocket work going on by the end of WWII and had people in place that were ready and willing to move forward when the budget crunch hit. In fact Von Braun and the Germans were specifically posted to the middle of nowhere to keep them isolated till their knowledge was out of date. (The fact most of the V2's the US brought back failed due to undetected sabotage really didn't impress the US with their work)

IMHO, if not for LeMay, the USA could really launch the HATV space rocket - proto-"Atlas" design with pressurized "balloon" tanks - as early as in 1951-1953.

 

[RanulfC]

The US actually had better and more advanced rocket work going on by the end of WWII and had people in place that were ready and willing to move forward when the budget crunch hit. In fact Von Braun and the Germans were specifically posted to the middle of nowhere to keep them isolated till their knowledge was out of date. (The fact most of the V2's the US brought back failed due to undetected sabotage really didn't impress the US with their work)

IMHO, if not for LeMay, the USA could really launch the HATV space rocket - proto-"Atlas" design with pressurized "balloon" tanks - as early as in 1951-1953.

Careful LeMay was actually an early supporter and advocate of missiles and rockets. After all the initated and pushed through the "Earth Circling Spaceship" study of 1946 and suppored the HATV program. Again the problem was budget and by the time he was moved to SAC to take over he was convinced, (as were most others) that manned bombers and air-breathing cruise missiles were more near-term and could be developed faster than missiles. To be fair he actually sided with Schriever to broker the compromise of 52 that got the majority of the Air Force brass to allow a missile development program at all.

It really does all come down to Truman NOT being selected for VP in the first place or at worst not being elected in 1948. He was so concered with 'normalizing' the US to a post-war economy he litterally paid the military with "what was left over" from the budget with the Air Force, (specifically what would become SAC) and atomic weapons getting the lions share. And even then there wasn't enough to maintain the nuclear delivery aircraft or the existing weapons supply!

Had Dewey won in 1948 he had already planned to reverse the military budget even if he had to raise taxes again. While at that point the various development programs were badly damaged they could have been saved but once he was elected people understood that the money was never coming back so the programs and development work was shelved and forgotten. Dewey in '48 most likely means the five-engine "Super-Atlas" by the early 50s which while not a very good ICBM would have been more of a match for the R7 when all was said and done and likely the Air Force could have made a vastly more credible argument for launching a satellite with it. (And likely we'd have gotten a much more capable Mercury-analog as well )

Of course if one actually considers the time period having the US launch the first satellite would have been anti-climatic as that's exactly what everyone, (incuding the USSR0 had expected to happen. The reason there was so much 'panic' in the US and so much hype around the world when the USSR did it in OTL was for exactly that reason that no one expected it. And we also need to keep in mind the hype and excitment was BECAUSE someone other than the US did it, (which suprised the USSR most of all) first!

Just like having Alan Sheppard manage to launch into 'space' first (yes suborbital is still 'space' and would be treated as such) before Gagarin changing the early dynamics of the "Space Race" actaully takes a lot of the incentive we see OTL out of the picture.

Randy

 

[royabulgaf]

While I think that the Germans did a lot, I don't tend to view most it as revolutionary or so important to a field of technology that we'd not develope a lot of the most obvious stuff anyway.

Swept wings was coming anyway. However it's the funding a supersonic wind tunnel that mattered.

Jet engines? Don't make me laugh!

Rockets.....now here is some very good work on rockets and gyros.

Electronics.....not so much, save their efforts drove the allies to put a lot of effort into electronics....including turning the theory of Mr Turing and the Reverend Church into hardware.

I'm given to understand that several major states were in the process of investigating the switch to intermediate ammunition and rifles. Inuding the US with the Pedersen .276. And while semi-auto and automatic rifles efforts included some very good designs, other states produced good functioning weapons of this sort.

As for submachine guns, the Sten was cheaper, Hungarian Kirali was more powerful (and more liked by the troops using it) and the Italian developments just miles better weapons. The Finns had probably the most potent and the Russians had a astonishing rate of fire.

Tanks might qualify, but does it or is it the post war world that really saw the rise of the MBT?

Submarines.....we tend to hear most about the U-boat, but in the hullabaloo we ignore the Allied efforts....

Nuclear? Seriously?

Radar?

Artillery?

Mortars?

Diesel engines? Weren't they unreliable on their warships?

Encryption......actually you have to hand that one to them. If perhaps a flawed effort, it was impressive nevertheless. The Lorentz machine combining enigma rotors with a teleprinter was the driver for Colossus.

Logistics? Not even funny.

Drugs....actually theres a real development, though not an influential one today.

That's about as long as I can go at the moment. But I'm sure there is more.

The German thype 21 and 23 boats were step forward, but more of a "why didn't we think of this before" step forward. While not stealth as such, the streamlining and elimination of the deck guns had to cut down on passive sonar noise and improve underwater speed/range. Not a wonder weapon as such, they were just first to see the obvious.

As for nuclear weapons, Germany was barking up the wrong tree. Anyway, they didn't have a means to deliver it. Any B-29 type for the Lwaffe were paper projects with a little pie in the sky ideas thrown in. BTW, we had two very heavy bombers in production. Something like a B-35 or 36, we were building prototypes of each. Goering would need Tony Montana piles of coke to even dream of such things. Oh. Slipped my mind. We also had two different A Bomb designs under construction.
why

 

[zen]

While I think that the Germans did a lot, I don't tend to view most it as revolutionary or so important to a field of technology that we'd not develope a lot of the most obvious stuff anyway.

Swept wings was coming anyway. However it's the funding a supersonic wind tunnel that mattered.

Jet engines? Don't make me laugh!

Rockets.....now here is some very good work on rockets and gyros.

Electronics.....not so much, save their efforts drove the allies to put a lot of effort into electronics....including turning the theory of Mr Turing and the Reverend Church into hardware.

I'm given to understand that several major states were in the process of investigating the switch to intermediate ammunition and rifles. Inuding the US with the Pedersen .276. And while semi-auto and automatic rifles efforts included some very good designs, other states produced good functioning weapons of this sort.

As for submachine guns, the Sten was cheaper, Hungarian Kirali was more powerful (and more liked by the troops using it) and the Italian developments just miles better weapons. The Finns had probably the most potent and the Russians had a astonishing rate of fire.

Tanks might qualify, but does it or is it the post war world that really saw the rise of the MBT?

Submarines.....we tend to hear most about the U-boat, but in the hullabaloo we ignore the Allied efforts....

Nuclear? Seriously?

Radar?

Artillery?

Mortars?

Diesel engines? Weren't they unreliable on their warships?

Encryption......actually you have to hand that one to them. If perhaps a flawed effort, it was impressive nevertheless. The Lorentz machine combining enigma rotors with a teleprinter was the driver for Colossus.

Logistics? Not even funny.

Drugs....actually theres a real development, though not an influential one today.

That's about as long as I can go at the moment. But I'm sure there is more.

The German thype 21 and 23 boats were step forward, but more of a "why didn't we think of this before" step forward. While not stealth as such, the streamlining and elimination of the deck guns had to cut down on passive sonar noise and improve underwater speed/range. Not a wonder weapon as such, they were just first to see the obvious.

As for nuclear weapons, Germany was barking up the wrong tree. Anyway, they didn't have a means to deliver it. Any B-29 type for the Lwaffe were paper projects with a little pie in the sky ideas thrown in. BTW, we had two very heavy bombers in production. Something like a B-35 or 36, we were building prototypes of each. Goering would need Tony Montana piles of coke to even dream of such things. Oh. Slipped my mind. We also had two different A Bomb designs under construction.
why

? You're telling me?
Their reactor effort was a mess, no reflector, no cooling and no control rods......
So even if they got it working it would kill everyone in the facility and for miles around.

Any serious analysis concludes they didn't have the resources to waste on this. Not even enough heavy water.

Afterwards their own people in a bugged house thought we were lying when it was announced on the radio the US had hit Nagasaki and Hiroshima. They couldn't believe it.

 

[Dilandu]

LeMay was actually an early supporter and advocate of missiles and rockets

Hm! Thank you for insight.

 

[Dilandu]

And I think it is only fair to acknowledge that in a number of technical areas Nazi Germany was more advanced than its rivals,

Actually, in most areas Nazi lingered behind. And even those in which they managed to get some kind of upper hand were used quite... stupidly.

The absorption of Nazi Germany technology by the victors of WW2 did have an impact on them and their technology, though again that impact is consistency overstated and overestimated.

Agreed completely!

 

[zen]

What is always present is the mixture of the glamour of the bad guy, and the teenage male's instincts for detailed knowledge and group acceptance.
Fascism isn't necessarily present.
Though a few fall afoul of it.

 

[Hood]

I think the myth of German techowonders is probably because of the extensive efforts to get and exploit German scientists, engineers and obtain copies of aircraft, tanks, submarines, rockets, anything they could lay their hands on. Operation Paperclip, Force T and Soviet efforts weren't kept secret for long and I think the scale of the effort has tended to suggest that the Allied powers were somehow technologically weaker and therefore desperate to gain advantages from German technology. For things like rocketry and hydrogen-peroxide Walter turbines that was probably true, but more often the wartime intelligence claims and fears proved groundless but that was made less evident in public accounts. But we can't deny that a lot of material and equipment did result in advances and German engineers were employed in research institutes and aircraft companies for decades after. That has probably vindicated the 'wonderwaffen' claims to some extent, but it was probably the sheer mass of material gathered up and later released that was awe inspiring. But having every doodle and sketch rather inflated the scope of work and its real intent at a time when no Allied aircraft designer was going to send his fagpacket doodles for publication and when Allied efforts were firmly behind secrecy acts.

Also. we can't overlook the effect of things like the V-1 and V-2 on the man in the street. They were new weapons of war and made an immediate impact on people when the war was in its last stages and the guard had slipped slightly due to Allied air superiority. The public looks up and see the skies full of thousands of B-17s, B-24s, Lancasters and Halifaxes but the Germans are killing and injuring thousands without the same visible effort - lone V-1s are seen and heard but you dread the engine stopping... the V-2 you can't see or hear until it hits. That's a psychological impact hard to underestimate for 1944. A tankie sat in a Sherman might think 'Oh Christ' if he sees a King Tiger, but he knows its a tank with weak spots if he gets the chance to exploit them, a P-51 or Tempest pilot knows he can tackle an Me 262 with the right tactics - the fighting man was less awed.

 

[zen]

True, and the most potent instrument of war is the least visible and most complained about. Logistics.

For what ordinary conscript wont complain about the lack of this or that, and moan forever about their equipment.
But utterly fail to comprehend that he is fed, clothed, trained, equipped, and transported to where he is deemed necessary by a vast institutional machine dedicated to war.
A machine that has analysed every aspect what it does, what it uses and where it goes.
All effectively invisible to the man in the street or even the front line.

Yet logistics wins long wars.

 

[Dilandu]

I think the myth of German techowonders is probably because of the extensive efforts to get and exploit German scientists, engineers and obtain copies of aircraft, tanks, submarines, rockets, anything they could lay their hands on. Operation Paperclip, Force T and Soviet efforts weren't kept secret for long and I think the scale of the effort has tended to suggest that the Allied powers were somehow technologically weaker and therefore desperate to gain advantages from German technology.

Yes, and also the fact, that neither USA nor USSR kept captured German technology secret for long. It was just senseless - since the other side have nearly the same captured tech anyway. So, the German technology became well-known early.

On the other hand, the Allied and Soviet own development stayed secret for much longer. Both sides wanted to hide from each other their actual technological advances and capabilities.

As a result, while peoples became accustomed with "wacky Nazi superweapon" rather soon, they did not knew much about Allied or Soviet experimental projects and advanced weapon development until much later. And so the illusion of "advanced German weapon" was created.

 

[zen]

May we be enlightened as to who has been reported?

 

[zen]

No I'd rather we have things out in the open.
These times include some seriously disturbing behaviour on the internet and media in general towards freedom of expression and thought.

 

[Justo Miranda]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

And had the Germans done only a little better, British independence would have been a matter of *surviving* in the face of other European states being consumed by the Reich. It not that unlikely that had Dunkirk gone a bit different, Britain might have sued for peace.

After the fall of France, the German Army High Command (OKH) planned the invasion of the British Islands by landing over forty divisions. After collecting 2,400 barges, 471 tugs and 155 transports from the invaded countries, the planners were informed that the Kriegsmarine had suffered great losses in Norway, that it had only three cruisers and four destroyers to escort the improvised invasion fleet and that at the other side of the English Channel, that was mined, the Royal Navy had eight cruisers, 54 destroyers and 700 small coastal motorgun boats, corvettes and minesweepers.

In the face of the hesitations of the OKH, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), poorly informed about the British radar system, about the number of aircraft of the Fighter Command and on the ability of British industry, decided to start an attrition campaign over the territory between London and the south coast of England. Its objective was the annihilation of the RAF fighter force, which had already lost 195 Hurricanes and 67 Spitfires in France, so that it could not oppose an airborne invasion. The Luftwaffe, conceived as a tactical air force specialized in supporting the operations of the Wehrmacht, was not prepared for this kind of strategic war as it lacked four engine heavy bombers.

During the fighting in Poland the Germans had lost 285 aircraft, 260 in Norway, 317 in the Netherlands, 432 in Belgium and 1,279 in France. One third of the total were Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft that could had been used in the invasion project. Outside combat operations, the 'usual' attrition rate of the Luftwaffe was 85 aircraft destroyed and 96 damaged every month, a third of them in accidents.

By the end of July 1940, the Germans had 769 medium bombers, 656 single-engine fighters, 168 twin-engine fighters, 316 dive bombers and 100 reconnaissance serviceable airplanes in France. The Fighter Command only had 650 fighters at that time, but the British aeronautical industry had already accelerated production and on 13 August, the day of the German offensive, it already had 1,381 fighters.

At the end of August, the German intelligence services estimated that 800 British fighters had been destroyed, with an attrition rate of 100 aircraft per week. They believed that by the end of September the Fighter Command would have been neutralized, but in fact it still had 750 fighters capable of fighting at that time. In its vised attempt to achieve air superiority the Luftwaffe lost 1,887 aircraft. The price of British survival were 1,023 aircraft of the Fighter Command, 376 of the Bomber Command and 148 of the Coastal Command.

France had only the Maginot Line for its defence, but the British Islands were protected by eight barriers that the Germans did not manage to cross. The English Channel, the Royal Navy, the Chain Home with 21 radar stations, the Anti-Aircraft Command with 350,000 personnel, 1,340 heavy guns and 370 low level guns, the Balloon Command with 40,000 personnel and 1,400 balloons, the Royal Observer Corps with 30,000 personnel, the Fighter Control System force multiplier and the Hurricanes, Spitfires, Defiants and Blenheims of the Fighter Command.

 

[Justo Miranda]

I think the myth of German techowonders is probably because of the extensive efforts to get and exploit German scientists, engineers and obtain copies of aircraft, tanks, submarines, rockets, anything they could lay their hands on. Operation Paperclip, Force T and Soviet efforts weren't kept secret for long and I think the scale of the effort has tended to suggest that the Allied powers were somehow technologically weaker and therefore desperate to gain advantages from German technology. For things like rocketry and hydrogen-peroxide Walter turbines that was probably true, but more often the wartime intelligence claims and fears proved groundless but that was made less evident in public accounts. But we can't deny that a lot of material and equipment did result in advances and German engineers were employed in research institutes and aircraft companies for decades after. That has probably vindicated the 'wonderwaffen' claims to some extent, but it was probably the sheer mass of material gathered up and later released that was awe inspiring. But having every doodle and sketch rather inflated the scope of work and its real intent at a time when no Allied aircraft designer was going to send his fagpacket doodles for publication and when Allied efforts were firmly behind secrecy acts.

Also. we can't overlook the effect of things like the V-1 and V-2 on the man in the street. They were new weapons of war and made an immediate impact on people when the war was in its last stages and the guard had slipped slightly due to Allied air superiority. The public looks up and see the skies full of thousands of B-17s, B-24s, Lancasters and Halifaxes but the Germans are killing and injuring thousands without the same visible effort - lone V-1s are seen and heard but you dread the engine stopping... the V-2 you can't see or hear until it hits. That's a psychological impact hard to underestimate for 1944. A tankie sat in a Sherman might think 'Oh Christ' if he sees a King Tiger, but he knows its a tank with weak spots if he gets the chance to exploit them, a P-51 or Tempest pilot knows he can tackle an Me 262 with the right tactics - the fighting man was less awed.

One of the main reasons for the success of the Blitzkrieg against the French and British Armies, in May 1940, was the aerial superiority obtained when the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-3 entered service with the Luftwaffe. It happened at the right time, when the main French fighter Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 was replaced by the second generation fighters Dewoitine D.520 and Arsenal VG 33. During the Phoney War, l’Armée de l’Air tried to fill the gap with the Bloch M.B.152 and Curtiss H.75A fighters, helped by the British Hawker Hurricane Mk.I. But the Messerschmitt would prove superior.

This seems to be the origin of the commonly accepted paradigm about the assumed inferiority of the French technology. It is not common knowledge that France already had operational naval radar in 1934. And that, at the beginning of June 1940, the antiaircraft artillery defending Paris was controlled by the most advanced radar in the world, able to operate in wavelengths from 80 to 16 cm against the 3.5 to 1.5 m of the British or the 2.4 m to 53 cm of the German radar.

The French scientists were also ahead of their German equivalents in the field of nuclear fission. By early 1940, the CNRS controlled the highest reserve in the world of uranium (8 tons coming from the Belgian Congo) and 200 kg of heavy water from the Norwegian enterprise Norsk Hydro.

The French tanks of 1940 had better armour and armament than the Germans. The Marine Française (the French combat fleet) was superior to the Kriegsmarine in firepower with the Béarn carrier and six squadrons of Loire Nieuport L.N.401/411 dive bombers that technically surpassed the German Ju 87.

The destructiveness of the air-to-air weapons installed in the French fighters was slightly higher that their German equivalents, although the quality of the aiming devices OPL 31, RX 39 and GH 38 used by l’Armée de l’Air was somehow inferior to the Zeiss Revi C/12 reflector gunsight of the Luftwaffe.

 

[zen]

British independence is fundamentally tied to the independence of other neighbouring European states from other great powers.
This is the basis of 500 years of British foreign policy since the breach from Rome.

And had the Germans done only a little better, British independence would have been a matter of *surviving* in the face of other European states being consumed by the Reich. It not that unlikely that had Dunkirk gone a bit different, Britain might have sued for peace.

After the fall of France, the German Army High Command (OKH) planned the invasion of the British Islands by landing over forty divisions. After collecting 2,400 barges, 471 tugs and 155 transports from the invaded countries, the planners were informed that the Kriegsmarine had suffered great losses in Norway, that it had only three cruisers and four destroyers to escort the improvised invasion fleet and that at the other side of the English Channel, that was mined, the Royal Navy had eight cruisers, 54 destroyers and 700 small coastal motorgun boats, corvettes and minesweepers.

In the face of the hesitations of the OKH, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), poorly informed about the British radar system, about the number of aircraft of the Fighter Command and on the ability of British industry, decided to start an attrition campaign over the territory between London and the south coast of England. Its objective was the annihilation of the RAF fighter force, which had already lost 195 Hurricanes and 67 Spitfires in France, so that it could not oppose an airborne invasion. The Luftwaffe, conceived as a tactical air force specialized in supporting the operations of the Wehrmacht, was not prepared for this kind of strategic war as it lacked four engine heavy bombers.

During the fighting in Poland the Germans had lost 285 aircraft, 260 in Norway, 317 in the Netherlands, 432 in Belgium and 1,279 in France. One third of the total were Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft that could had been used in the invasion project. Outside combat operations, the 'usual' attrition rate of the Luftwaffe was 85 aircraft destroyed and 96 damaged every month, a third of them in accidents.

By the end of July 1940, the Germans had 769 medium bombers, 656 single-engine fighters, 168 twin-engine fighters, 316 dive bombers and 100 reconnaissance serviceable airplanes in France. The Fighter Command only had 650 fighters at that time, but the British aeronautical industry had already accelerated production and on 13 August, the day of the German offensive, it already had 1,381 fighters.

At the end of August, the German intelligence services estimated that 800 British fighters had been destroyed, with an attrition rate of 100 aircraft per week. They believed that by the end of September the Fighter Command would have been neutralized, but in fact it still had 750 fighters capable of fighting at that time. In its vised attempt to achieve air superiority the Luftwaffe lost 1,887 aircraft. The price of British survival were 1,023 aircraft of the Fighter Command, 376 of the Bomber Command and 148 of the Coastal Command.

France had only the Maginot Line for its defence, but the British Islands were protected by eight barriers that the Germans did not manage to cross. The English Channel, the Royal Navy, the Chain Home with 21 radar stations, the Anti-Aircraft Command with 350,000 personnel, 1,340 heavy guns and 370 low level guns, the Balloon Command with 40,000 personnel and 1,400 balloons, the Royal Observer Corps with 30,000 personnel, the Fighter Control System force multiplier and the Hurricanes, Spitfires, Defiants and Blenheims of the Fighter Command.

There is a brief window of a few weeks after Dunkirk that HAD there been a second German Army, fully provisioned, and HAD there been the requisite level of transport to arrive at the coast and HAD there been a full fleet of ships ready to go......they might have stood a chance.
They didn't.
The army was still digesting France, awaiting supplies, troops in need of rest, transport choked on resupplying and so they couldn't do it.
By the time they could even try, it was too late.
If anything had they tried after that, it would only have shortened the war as the loss of men and material would be a massive humiliation and break the myth of invincibility.

 

[Dilandu]

This seems to be the origin of the commonly accepted paradigm about the assumed inferiority of the French technology. It is not common knowledge that France already had operational naval radar in 1934. And that, at the beginning of June 1940, the antiaircraft artillery defending Paris was controlled by the most advanced radar in the world, able to operate in wavelengths from 80 to 16 cm against the 3.5 to 1.5 m of the British or the 2.4 m to 53 cm of the German radar.

Not to mention French sub-caliber anti-tank shells, their remote-controlled tracked demolition vechicles (that Germans adopted as "Goliath") and their BHT-38 guided bomb, which is under strong suspicion of influencing German guided weapon development greatly.

 

[Justo Miranda]

This seems to be the origin of the commonly accepted paradigm about the assumed inferiority of the French technology. It is not common knowledge that France already had operational naval radar in 1934. And that, at the beginning of June 1940, the antiaircraft artillery defending Paris was controlled by the most advanced radar in the world, able to operate in wavelengths from 80 to 16 cm against the 3.5 to 1.5 m of the British or the 2.4 m to 53 cm of the German radar.

Not to mention French sub-caliber anti-tank shells, their remote-controlled tracked demolition vechicles (that Germans adopted as "Goliath") and their BHT-38 guided bomb, which is under strong suspicion of influencing German guided weapon development greatly.

And the moteur-canon technology.
After the experience in combat against the fast and well armoured He 111 and Do 17 German bombers obtained during the Spanish Civil War, the engine designer Mark Birkigt decided to develop the H.S. 404 cannon with higher performance. It was gas operated with a 166 per cent higher rate of fire and a muzzle velocity of 880 m/sec compared to the 820 m/sec of the H.S.9. The new weapon entered service in 1939 and could be installed either in the H.S.12 Y-31 engines of the M.S. 406 or in the H.S.12 Y-45 of the Dewoitine D.520, M.B. 155 and Arsenal VG 33 fighters.

The H.S. 404 was a formidable weapon when integrated in a Hispano-Suiza engine or installed in the nose of the twin engine Potez 631 fighters. However, it was less resilient when installed in the wings of the Bloch fighters, causing different problems of vibration, stoppage, freezing and dispersion of firing.

The H.S. 404 was acquired by the RAF and manufactured under license in the United Kingdom as Hispano-Suiza Mk I, Mk II and Mk V and as Hispano AN/M2 in the USA.

The Germans tried to use the moteur-canon system with their Bf 109 V4, C-2 and E-2 fighters, trying different combinations of Jumo 210 and Daimler Benz 601 engines with MG 17 machine guns and MG FF cannons. But they found insoluble problems of cooling and crankcase destructive vibrations. On October 1940, they finally adapted an Oerlikon-Ikaria MG FF cannon behind the DB 601N engine of the Bf 109 F-0, but the device suffered structural damages during tests. The problem could not be solved until the MG 151/20 gun was available and could be installed in the Bf 109 F-2 in March 1941.

The Luftwaffe version was extensively modified to adapt the original design to the German production techniques, being mass manufactured by the Ikaria Werke Berlin as MG FF (Maschinen Gewehr Flügel Fest = Machine Gun Wing Installation) from 1935 onwards. It was the lightest short barrelled weapon in its class with just 28 kg. But it had a lower effective range and power of penetration than the contemporary French and Swiss designs.

These shortages were partially compensated by a higher rate of fire and the introduction of the MG FFM (Modifizierung = Modification) which could fire the HE ammunitions Minengeschoss.

It is unclear if the MG FFM was ever used during the Battle of France. Some authors state that the Bf 109 E-2 were armed with four MG 17 machine guns and at 20 mm cannon located behind the engine, firing through the axis of the hub propeller. As per this version of facts, the 'M' meant Motor.

The Bf 109 E-2 passed through some operational tests with discouraging results because of the strong vibrations that the cannon produced in the engine crankcase during firing. Apparently, the decision to mount the two cannons in the wings of the Bf 109 E-3 went against the initial German project that preferred the French moteur-canon device. This system was eventually adopted as a matter of urgency after the failure of the Bf 109 E-2 to alleviate the big difference in firepower between the Bf 109 E-1 and the Morane and Hurricane fighters.

The Luftwaffe always considered the MG FF a transition weapon to fill the gap until the excellent MG 151 was available.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Also. we can't overlook the effect of things like the V-1 and V-2 on the man in the street. They were new weapons of war and made an immediate impact on people when the war was in its last stages and the guard had slipped slightly due to Allied air superiority. The public looks up and see the skies full of thousands of B-17s, B-24s, Lancasters and Halifaxes but the Germans are killing and injuring thousands without the same visible effort - lone V-1s are seen and heard but you dread the engine stopping... the V-2 you can't see or hear until it hits. That's a psychological impact hard to underestimate for 1944.

Actually, it's the sort of psychological impact we see *to* *this* *day.* The average Joe did not see the years of work that went into turning the V-2 from a vague notion into a functional - if not terribly practical - mass produced weapon. To the average Joe, the V-2 just sprang up out of nowhere.

Where have we seen this elsewhere? The development of the transistor. The laser. Optical fiber. Carbon fiber. Stealth technology in general. The SR-71 in particular. Those of us on this forum are doubtless all aware to some elevated degree the level of effort required for these things, how the SR-71 evolved from humbler beginnings into the sci-fi lookin' spaceshippy thing that it became. But most people aren't. All they know is, one day this thing *wasn't* and the next day it *was.* and so today we have a whole industry built around claiming that these things came from aliens.

But in 1945, "ancient aliens" and "the reptilians" and whatnot were not the go-to explanations they've become in the last couple decades. So even though the Allied militaries and intelligence services and aeronatical industries had some idea about how these wunderwaffen came about... Average Joe (or Average Giorgio) didn't and just natually glommed onto the easiest explanation: Nazis had something special going on. Couple that with the discoveries about the horrors of the Holocaust, and the Nazis became almost mythically evil - "mythical" in the sense of maybe being in cahoots with dark arcane forces From Beyond. and thus "Raiders of the Lost Ark" and "Hellboy" and "Constantine" and the rest.