I always thought the bolt and gas system was more Lewis Gun/FG42 on the AK47....?
A feature common to all the Polikarpov fighters was their longitudinal instability, caused by the short length of their fuselage that had been designed to save weight and building materials. For their part, the Polikarpov fighters suffered snaking problems that affected weapon accuracy during combat manoeuvres.
The Soviets believed to have found the solution by increasing the rate of fire of the machine guns. In 1933 they began to build the ShKAS, a 7.62 mm gas-operated machine gun that used the Polish Szakats revolver-feed system and the French Berthier gas regulator.
The ShKAS had a rate of fire of 1,300-1,800 rounds/minute, but it presented numerous problems of maintenance and jamming, due to the low manufacturing quality of the 7.62x54R ammunition.
The reality of the aerial combat in Spain showed that the ShKAS was effective against slow aircraft built in wood and fabric, but to destroy the new German fast bombers it was necessary to use more powerful weapons.
The British chose to equip their fighters with eight or even twelve 0.303 in Browning machine guns. That proved to be a wrong solution that allowed too many German bombers to escape during the Battle of Britain. The Americans and Italians preferred to use a lower number of 12.7 mm heavy machine guns and the French trusted the destructive power of its 20 mm Hispano-Suiza H.S. 404 cannons.
The Soviets failed with the 12.7 mm ShVAK of 1932 and could only build the version of 20 mm after studying the gas-operated locking bolt of the French cannons. The H.S. 9 technology was acquired on February 1936, together with the Dewoitine D.510R c/n 45, while the H.S. 404 was considered a secret weapon by
l'Armée de l'Air and not authorized for export. But in May 1936 the communists of the
Front Populaire stole an entire set of drawings from the H.S. 404 from the Bois-Colombes Hispano-Suiza headquarters.
Not to mention that the vast majority of Soviet casualties were civilian victims of the Hunger Plan and Generalplan Ost.
Exactly. And our military casualties in 1941-1942, while enormous, were almost unavoidable; the only way we could stop the Blitzkrieg was to attack at any possibility presented. Trying to sit in defense - this simply did not work out, as France experience clearly demonstrated. The bloody Red Army counterattacks in 1941-1942 pursued one goal - to deny Germany the initiative, force them to REACT, to deplete their limited supply of mechanized troops countering our attacks, not commencing theirs. And it worked. By the time of Stalingrad, the scale were on balance, and Stalingrad tipped it completely in our favor.
By the beginning of 1933 the Soviets had nothing that could overcome the P.Z.L. fighters and looked for new ideas in the world of air races. In 1931 and 1932 the Gee Bee aircraft had achieved great publicity with reported speed records in the Shell Speed Dash. In 1932 also, five low-wing monoplanes managed to overcome the Hall's Bulldog, a racer equipped with Pulawski wing, in the Thompson Trophy.
In January 1934, the soviet prototype TsKB-12 flew for the first time. It incorporated in its design many of the innovations used by Gee Bee Model Z and R-1, as well as some of its dangerous defects. It had a small low-wing, without flaps, based on structural solutions of the Lorraine Hanriot 41 and 130, designed for the Coupe Michelin air races of 1930-1932.
The retractable undercarriage, which was operated by use of a hand crank, had been copied from the Lockheed Altair model 1930 but never worked properly. The wheels did not completely retract frequently, due to an abnormal extension of the cables, generating considerable drag and turbulence. At other times the mechanism was flattened, and the pilots had to free it by cutting the cables with pliers.
The production version, Polikarpov I-16 Type 4, had been intended to use the M-25 engine, but its availability was delayed by the difficulty in copying the American engine and the new fighter entered service propelled by an old M-22.
The new fighter was presented to the public by the Soviet propaganda services as the most advanced in the world in May 1935. In fact, the insane tendency to flat spin, caused by its longitudinal instability, the high landing speed, due to the absence of flaps, and the unreliable undercarriage killed almost as many pilots as the Axis fighters.
The I-16 failed in Spain, Finland, Khalkin Gol, China and in its own country, having been unable to stop the Luftwaffe in 1941, even resorting to carry out numerous
Taran suicide attacks. It also failed the more modern MiG-3, burdened by the 830 kg of its Italian engine it could only carry three machine guns and was finally used in
Taran attacks against German reconnaissance planes. These acts of desperation, caused by the low level of Soviet technology, were presented by the official propaganda in heroic terms.
During the Second World War, the Soviets made massive use of French Hispano-Suiza H.S.12 Y engines, version Klimov M-105, to propel their Yak and LaGG fighters. The M-22 did not have the Bristol license and it was manufactured in accordance with the Gnôme-Rhône French version. The M-85 used by the bombers Ilyushin DB-3 was also a version of the Gnôme-Rhône 14 Kdrs.
The German attack forced the Soviets to interrupt the production of armament while they moved their industry to new locations, to the East of the Urals. The former offender was forced to survive thanks to the massive aid sent by Americans and British: 18,000 aircraft, 500,000 vehicles, 20,000 tanks, 16,000 km of telephone cable, 35,000 R/T devices, 380,000 phones, chemicals product to improve the poor quality of Soviet fuel, 100 octane fuel for the fighters, information about the movements of the Werhmatch provided by the British Intelligence Centre of Bletchley Park, millions of boots and all types of military equipment for the Red Army.
Actually, the VVS could only fight the Luftwaffe on equal terms after receiving 143 Lend-Lease Spitfire Mk VB through Iran in February 1943 and 1,183 Mk IX almost a year later.
It was not a selflessly aid. The democracies could not afford the millions of casualties that the defeat of the Reich required.