Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

[overscan (PaulMM)]

Edited posts for language. This isn't Facebook or 4chan or something. There's no place for words like "idiotic", 'childish" etc on this forum.

 

[bobbymike]

https://nuclearnetwork.csis.org/fulfilling-central-enduring-role-u-s-nuclear-weapons/

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trumps-nuclear-review-will-bring-the-us-closer-to-all-out-war-critics-say/article/2645542

I find it interesting, but am willing to be proven wrong with article links, that unbuilt US systems are dangerous and destabilizing while the ongoing massive Russian tactical arsenal and full strategic modernization gets nary a mention from these so-called 'arms controllers'

I'd be interested to why they focus only on the US?

 

[sferrin]

http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trumps-nuclear-review-will-bring-the-us-closer-to-all-out-war-critics-say/article/2645542

I find it interesting, but am willing to be proven wrong with article links, that unbuilt US systems are dangerous and destabilizing while the ongoing massive Russian tactical arsenal and full strategic modernization gets nary a mention from these so-called 'arms controllers'

I'd be interested to why they focus only on the US?

And let's not forget the new Chinese, mobile, DF-41 10-warhead ICBM (in flight testing). Or the DF-31 mobile ICBM, or the plethora of other mobile ballistic missiles they are actually producing RIGHT NOW that are nuclear capable (DF-26, -21, etc.). Yep, it's the evil Yankees with their 40 year old MMIIIs that are the devils.

These little ol' things? Well, this is just what "Peaceful Rise®" looks like:

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.defensenews.com/space/2018/01/12/nuclear-posture-review-draft-leaks-new-weapons-coming-amid-strategic-shift/

They should name this NPR Manhattan Project 21: Rebuilding the Nuclear Enterprise

 

[sferrin]

WASHINGTON — A draft of the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review confirms the existence of an underwater nuclear drone made and operated by Russia, a capability the U.S. Defense Department had not previously publicly acknowledged.

“In addition to modernizing ‘legacy’ Soviet nuclear systems, Russia is developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers,” stated an unclassified draft of the nuclear posture review first published by the Huffington Post.

“These efforts include multiple upgrades for every leg of the Russian nuclear triad of strategic bombers, sea-based missiles and land-based missiles. Russia is also developing at least two new intercontinental range systems, a hypersonic glide vehicle and a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed undersea autonomous torpedo.”

https://www.c4isrnet.com/space/2018/01/12/russias-nuclear-underwater-drone-is-real-and-in-the-nuclear-posture-review/

But those Capitalist Pig Americans, and their plans to replace a 40 year old ICBM are going to cause the end of the world.

 

[lastdingo]

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/1/3/analysts-outline-options-to-cut-nuclear-forces

These 'we can save $100 billion' over 30 years when the federal government will spend over $190 TRILLION are idiotically redundant. By never putting spending in proportion to anything they are just being deceptive.

At 3% compounded growth in spending the US government will have a budget of ~$5.7 trillion in 2030 when nuke weapons spending is estimated at $50 billion/annum or 9/10ths of one percent.

If you had take home pay of $57k per annum and had to spend $500 for a key 'home security' upgrade would you say that's too expensive placing your home and family at risk?

You are implying an unproved and unprovable assumption: That the alternative options provide less deterrence.

That assumption is self-evident only to those who greatly prefer to stay on the current path trajectory (conservative-minded people) and those who believe that more nukes = more security, regardless of everything else.

Edited posts for language. This isn't Facebook or 4chan or something. There's no place for words like "idiotic", 'childish" etc on this forum.

Then let me clarify that I utterly disrespect the opinion of those who negligently act as proponents for unnecessarily large nuclear arsenals.

 

[bobbymike]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5708271444001/?#sp=show-clips

Two minute clip, interesting but there should be entire shows that discuss the current debate and explicitly discuss WHY the US is doing what they're doing in the face of massive Russian/Chinese nuke programs.

 

[kaiserd]

Original post deleted/ amended following clarifications by other posters.

 

[bobbymike]

Do I need to click on the link to know it will be filled with breathless the-US-is-going-to-end-the-world hysteria?


"In his first year in office, President Barack Obama gave a landmark address in Prague in which he famously affirmed “clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” The commitment to total nuclear disarmament was a major departure from the George W. Bush administration — the first time, in fact, that the United States had declared a nuclear-free world a major policy goal.

Now, eight years later, it’s the Trump administration’s turn to lay out its nuclear weapons policy. And according to a pre-decisional draft of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) obtained by HuffPost, Trump’s Department of Defense has gone a decidedly different route: new nukes, for no good reason."

Yep. Pure politics. This isn't a thread about politics. Please see the nuclear politics thread. Thanks.

I’ve had similar conversations with bobbymike on editorial/ opinion type articles he and you have repeatedly posted; according to Bobbymike (and you) there were no issues with them and that that this issue had been specifically agreed with moderators.
Has the guidance of moderators changed on this or is a double standard being applied to such articles you don’t agree with?

Our conversation was with regard to the nuclear weapons NEWS ONLY thread where as owner of the thread I recall saying opinions were fine because as “news only” there was no further “opinion” or follow up from members allowed. You were bringing outside content into the thread for members benefit as reported external to SPF. In my opinion with no back and forth counter posts you avoid the flame war.

This is Scott’s thread and IIRC he has tried to limit the politics and focus on the weapons and competing strategic visions. Admittedly this is not an easy thing to accomplish as I myself have transgressed to which Scott indicated the article I posted was too political.

I give Scott credit for the intent, consistency and follow through.

 

[sferrin]

Looks like Triton removed his post. I've removed my response. Would the various parties clean up their recent posts please? Thanks.

 

[Triton]

"Just How Much of a Threat is Russia’s Status-6 Nuclear Torpedo?"
by Dave Majumdar

January 16, 2018

Source:
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/just-how-much-threat-russias-status-6-nuclear-torpedo-24094

The United States’ new Nuclear Posture Review asserts that Russia’s Status-6 intercontinental, nuclear-armed undersea autonomous torpedo (AUV) is a real weapon and could be a genuine threat. Analysts are divided as to how genuine the threat is.

“It certainly is a threat U.S. forces will need to take into account,” Bryan Clark, a former U.S. Navy submarine officer and current senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“It is large enough to carry a megaton-class nuclear weapon, although the 100 MT weapon they advertise may be too heavy. Torpedoes are generally negatively buoyant due to the weight of the engine and warhead and the lack of space for ballast tanks like a submarine would have. A really heavy warhead in this vehicle would make it difficult to control in depth without going very fast and using control surfaces to stay at depth—like an airplane. I don’t see control surfaces that would enable that approach here.”

If the weapon proves to be feasible, the main concern for Washington is that the weapon would be able to bypass American missile defense systems.

“The main U.S. concern would be that the Status-6 could circumvent U.S. ballistic missile defenses,” Clark said. “It would likely be as noisy or even noisier than a submarine, however, because it uses a small reactor and steam turbine for propulsion like a submarine but has none of the space for sound silencing features like floating decks or extensive sound mounting like a submarine. The U.S. Navy would need to look for this AUV [autonomous underwater vehicle] using similar systems as it does for ASW [anti-submarine warfare], including SOSUS.”

While the weapon would be easily detectable to American sonar, the United States has not fielded good defense against a torpedo like the Status-6.

“The problem then would be how to engage it,” Clark said. “A submarine could be deterred or harassed by active sonar or unsuccessful torpedo attacks. The Status-6 would not respond like a submarine crew, though, and would just keep going until physically stopped. The U.S. has not deployed good UUV-stopping weapons or technology yet.”

The Status-6, despite being an innovative weapon, is not likely to be an effective weapon.

“Overall, the Status-6 is not a practical weapon,” Clark said. “Unlike a bomber with nuclear bombs or cruise missile that has a human pilot who can be recalled or redirected as a scenario escalates and deescalates, the AUV could be recalled in theory, but could experience mechanical failures or communication outages that prevent its activation or deactivation when desired.”

In Status-6 would not be particularly useful from the standpoint of nuclear brinksmanship. “It is less useful from an escalation management perspective, bombers and mobile ballistic missile launchers provide a way to signal to an adversary that you are escalating the conflict without any irreversible actions,” Clark said. “As an AUV, the Status-6 cannot signal to an adversary except by blowing up or revealing itself in the adversary’s waters – which could expose it to tampering.”

Perhaps most troublingly—if U.S. intelligence is correct about the weapons’ existence—is that the Status-6 warhead could be lost or stolen.

“Deploying a Status-6 with a nuclear warhead would place one of Russia’s nuclear weapons in a position where it could be lost or stolen,” Clark said. “Even with tamper protection, it seems unlikely the Russian government would want a nuclear weapon out of its control, particularly given their concern about escalation management and reflective control.”

Former Soviet and Russian nuclear weapons negotiator, Nikolai Sokov, now a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said that the concept is a relic of the Soviet-era.

“The concept is very old, dating back to days when ICBMs and SLBMs were few, unreliable, and vulnerable,” Sokov told The National Interest. “In this day and age, it would be difficult to see much value in a 100-MT slow vehicle. When the slide was accidentally shown on Russian TV a few years ago, I thought it was a hoax to make US intelligence busy. The big question, really, is how reliable is intel on recent tests. Russia has been actively working on small submarines; I can certainly see them working on submarine mothership that carries small subs that can descent to considerable depths. I just do not see much value in equipping them with 100-MT warheads.”

Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, suggested that the slow-moving torpedo would be used to target coastal targets such as naval facilities. “It would detonate in a port—could be used to target naval ships or just to hold urban areas like New York at risk,” Lewis said. “I think we could build defenses against it, yes, although I am not sure how effective they would be. It should be easier than intercepting a missile, for sure.”

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/01/17/the_bomb_for_australia_112909.html

 

[bobbymike]

http://aviationweek.com/defense/pentagon-wants-its-nuclear-tomahawks-back

Attachments to 80's warhead activities

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/18/asia/india-icbm-tests/index.html

 

[bobbymike]

http://amp.nationalreview.com/article/455569/nuclear-posture-review-trump-must-build-and-modernize-our-forces

 

[sferrin]

"Long Range Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile, Agni-5, was successfully flight-tested for its full range today at 0953 hrs from Dr Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha. This was the fifth test of the Missile and the third consecutive one from a canister on a road mobile launcher. All the five missions have been successful."

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/190008/fifth-flight_test-success-of-india%E2%80%99s-agni-v-long_range-ballistic-missile.html

Hmm. So that's Russia, China, India, and even North Korea all producing or testing mobile ICBMs. Yet in the US it's apparently unpossible. (For those using visions of ICBMs trucking down I-405 as the reason, here's a map of government land, well away from the interstate highway system, where they could be deployed. I'm sure we could find somewhere, in all that red, for ICBMs to live.) Personally, I'd put a modern Peacekeeper, each silo defended by a couple HiBEX analogs, in the ground, and have Midgetman out driving around.

 

[Triton]

"God No, America Does Not Need Mobile Nuclear Missile Launchers"
Robert Beckhusen
April 13, 2016

Source:
https://warisboring.com/god-no-america-does-not-need-mobile-nuclear-missile-launchers/

...The general theory goes like this. The argument for mobile launchers is that they promise to be harder to destroy than what currently comprises America’s “nuclear triad” of land-based ICBMs, nuclear-armed bombers and ballistic missile submarines.

See, each “leg” of the triad is designed to complement the other by making up for comparative advantages and disadvantages.

ICBMs are almost impossible to stop and they travel extremely fast, but other countries know where the silos are. Submarines are nearly impossible to find and destroy, but can take hours or days to move into position. Bombers are extremely visible and have a deterrent effect — and can be recalled — but are vulnerable to being shot down or destroyed on the ground.

However, mobile launchers could feasibly be anywhere and launch their nuclear payloads much faster than bombers or submarines. But like submarines, they would be difficult for Moscow and Beijing to track and destroy. Even if you had a general idea of where the mobile launchers are, you’d need a lot of missiles to get them all — forcing the attacking nation to expend most of their valuable nukes.

But in reality, the Pentagon has studied mobile launchers for decades and has generally found them to possess several distinct disadvantages. America nearly built two versions, a rail-mounted Peacekeeper and road-mobile “Midgetman” missile. When the military did commission prototypes such as the Hard Mobile Launcher in the 1980s, among others, budget priorities and domestic politics scuttled them. And that was during the Cold War.

Mobile launchers are also expensive — more so than upgrading silo-based ICBMs. “Developing transportable ICBM forces would cost at least $80 billion more over the next 50 years than retaining only silo-based missiles,” Arms Control Today reported.

The vehicles will be heavy at around 100 tons each. The vehicles must be radiation-protected and capable of handling shocks to sensitive electronic components and tanks full of flammable and toxic rocket fuel. If they drive exclusively off-road, the government needs vast tracts of land to keep them hidden. The problem is that 100-ton trucks carrying nuclear missiles will inevitably tear up the environment.

The military could drive them on roads, but they will not be able to cross most bridges due to the great weight. This option would also make them harder to hide, and create security risks by mixing with civilian traffic. A nuclear missile in a remote silo far away from population centers is never completely danger proof. Try driving one down the highway and convince American voters to accept it.

There is a similar set of problems moving launchers by rail. And during the Cold War, the Pentagon also considered mounting nuclear missiles on barges, although it didn’t go anywhere because of limited space on America’s rivers and the proximity of major waterways to population centers.

In any case, the scenario of nuclear weapons traveling the American countryside may never happen short of imminent nuclear war, as the United States is bound by treaty to keep mobile ICBMs — if it ever builds them — locked away.

The New START treaty between the United States and Russia, which went into force in 2011, restricts deployed mobile launchers to ICBM bases and nondeployed launchers to military production, repair and storage facilities. Which, in the event of a nuclear war, negates mobile launchers’ mobility advantage. It would take hours to disperse the slow-moving vehicles away from their bases as the nukes begin flying.

All told, this means they’re vulnerable like bombers, more expensive than silos and less stealthy than submarines...

 

[Triton]

"Long Range Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile, Agni-5, was successfully flight-tested for its full range today at 0953 hrs from Dr Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha. This was the fifth test of the Missile and the third consecutive one from a canister on a road mobile launcher. All the five missions have been successful."

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/190008/fifth-flight_test-success-of-india%E2%80%99s-agni-v-long_range-ballistic-missile.html

Hmm. So that's Russia, China, India, and even North Korea all producing or testing mobile ICBMs. Yet in the US it's apparently unpossible. (For those using visions of ICBMs trucking down I-405 as the reason, here's a map of government land, well away from the interstate highway system, where they could be deployed. I'm sure we could find somewhere, in all that red, for ICBMs to live.) Personally, I'd put a modern Peacekeeper, each silo defended by a couple HiBEX analogs, in the ground, and have Midgetman out driving around.

Perhaps because the United States builds a better radiation-hardened truck/launcher?

Jan Lodal, in his 1987 article "SICBM Yes, HML No", estimated the cost of the Hardened Mobile Launcher as $30 billion for a force of 500 deployed missiles:

Deploying the SICBM on mobile launchers undoubtedly improves the missile’s survivability against a large-scale surprise attack. Mobile launchers would also enhance U.S. ability to respond to a large-scale Soviet nonnuclear attack with land-based ICBMs, should such a capability become necessary in the future. But as explained above, making the SICBM mobile requires buying a hardened mobile launcher (the HML), which will cost about $30 billion. Added to roughly $12 billion for 500 SICBMs, this brings the total cost of the HML/SICBM combination to a total of $42 billion for 500 deployed warheads.

Source:
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205381/return-of-the-hard-mobile-launcher/

 

[sferrin]

"God No, America Does Not Need Mobile Nuclear Missile Launchers"
Robert Beckhusen
April 13, 2016

Source:
https://warisboring.com/god-no-america-does-not-need-mobile-nuclear-missile-launchers/

...The general theory goes like this. The argument for mobile launchers is that they promise to be harder to destroy than what currently comprises America’s “nuclear triad” of land-based ICBMs, nuclear-armed bombers and ballistic missile submarines.

See, each “leg” of the triad is designed to complement the other by making up for comparative advantages and disadvantages.

ICBMs are almost impossible to stop and they travel extremely fast, but other countries know where the silos are. Submarines are nearly impossible to find and destroy, but can take hours or days to move into position. Bombers are extremely visible and have a deterrent effect — and can be recalled — but are vulnerable to being shot down or destroyed on the ground.

However, mobile launchers could feasibly be anywhere and launch their nuclear payloads much faster than bombers or submarines. But like submarines, they would be difficult for Moscow and Beijing to track and destroy. Even if you had a general idea of where the mobile launchers are, you’d need a lot of missiles to get them all — forcing the attacking nation to expend most of their valuable nukes.

But in reality, the Pentagon has studied mobile launchers for decades and has generally found them to possess several distinct disadvantages. America nearly built two versions, a rail-mounted Peacekeeper and road-mobile “Midgetman” missile. When the military did commission prototypes such as the Hard Mobile Launcher in the 1980s, among others, budget priorities and domestic politics scuttled them. And that was during the Cold War.

Mobile launchers are also expensive — more so than upgrading silo-based ICBMs. “Developing transportable ICBM forces would cost at least $80 billion more over the next 50 years than retaining only silo-based missiles,” Arms Control Today reported.

The vehicles will be heavy at around 100 tons each. The vehicles must be radiation-protected and capable of handling shocks to sensitive electronic components and tanks full of flammable and toxic rocket fuel. If they drive exclusively off-road, the government needs vast tracts of land to keep them hidden. The problem is that 100-ton trucks carrying nuclear missiles will inevitably tear up the environment.

The military could drive them on roads, but they will not be able to cross most bridges due to the great weight. This option would also make them harder to hide, and create security risks by mixing with civilian traffic. A nuclear missile in a remote silo far away from population centers is never completely danger proof. Try driving one down the highway and convince American voters to accept it.

There is a similar set of problems moving launchers by rail. And during the Cold War, the Pentagon also considered mounting nuclear missiles on barges, although it didn’t go anywhere because of limited space on America’s rivers and the proximity of major waterways to population centers.

In any case, the scenario of nuclear weapons traveling the American countryside may never happen short of imminent nuclear war, as the United States is bound by treaty to keep mobile ICBMs — if it ever builds them — locked away.

The New START treaty between the United States and Russia, which went into force in 2011, restricts deployed mobile launchers to ICBM bases and nondeployed launchers to military production, repair and storage facilities. Which, in the event of a nuclear war, negates mobile launchers’ mobility advantage. It would take hours to disperse the slow-moving vehicles away from their bases as the nukes begin flying.

All told, this means they’re vulnerable like bombers, more expensive than silos and less stealthy than submarines...

Must be why everybody else is going mobile. Because they suck.

 

[sferrin]

"Long Range Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missile, Agni-5, was successfully flight-tested for its full range today at 0953 hrs from Dr Abdul Kalam Island, Odisha. This was the fifth test of the Missile and the third consecutive one from a canister on a road mobile launcher. All the five missions have been successful."

http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/190008/fifth-flight_test-success-of-india%E2%80%99s-agni-v-long_range-ballistic-missile.html

Hmm. So that's Russia, China, India, and even North Korea all producing or testing mobile ICBMs. Yet in the US it's apparently unpossible. (For those using visions of ICBMs trucking down I-405 as the reason, here's a map of government land, well away from the interstate highway system, where they could be deployed. I'm sure we could find somewhere, in all that red, for ICBMs to live.) Personally, I'd put a modern Peacekeeper, each silo defended by a couple HiBEX analogs, in the ground, and have Midgetman out driving around.

Perhaps because the United States builds a better radiation-hardened truck/launcher?

Jan Lodal, in his 1987 article "SICBM Yes, HML No", estimated the cost of the Hardened Mobile Launcher as $30 billion for a force of 500 deployed missiles:

Deploying the SICBM on mobile launchers undoubtedly improves the missile’s survivability against a large-scale surprise attack. Mobile launchers would also enhance U.S. ability to respond to a large-scale Soviet nonnuclear attack with land-based ICBMs, should such a capability become necessary in the future. But as explained above, making the SICBM mobile requires buying a hardened mobile launcher (the HML), which will cost about $30 billion. Added to roughly $12 billion for 500 SICBMs, this brings the total cost of the HML/SICBM combination to a total of $42 billion for 500 deployed warheads.

Source:
https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205381/return-of-the-hard-mobile-launcher/

Not sure I follow what you're trying to say. ???

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SsEvI7dB5Ak

 

[bobbymike]

Because the New START arsenal of the Russians is much smaller than when Midgetman mobile was contemplated could you not have a less hardened vehicle?

When Peacekeeper 'racetrack' was contemplated the Soviets were expected to launch something like 4600 warheads into the area requiring a certain amount of hardening. I believe the same was contemplated if they targeted Midgetman. X number of warheads equally spread out in Y square miles means a potential average over pressure of Z psi over the entire area. Number of warheads falls dramatically in a given area average over pressure would decrease as well.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.atimes.com/article/china-pursuing-missile-defenses-indian-nukes-main-worry/

 

[Desertfox]

You don't need a harden launcher with the much lower number of warheads currently. What needs to be done is go back to the old shell game idea. Say 300 launchers each with 5-10 harden launch hangars. Keep moving the launchers around. Now the Russians would require 1500-3000 warheads to take all of them out, all while being limited to 1550 under the treaty. Its cheaper than Midgetman, its mobile, its a warhead sponge, and the missiles would not be rolling around the highways, being limited to only transfers between hangars, which could be secured easier than a launcher on the road.

 

[marauder2048]

Say 300 launchers each with 5-10 harden launch hangars. Keep moving the launchers around. Now the Russians would require 1500-3000 warheads to take all of them out, all while being limited to 1550 under the treaty.

Under New START, the hardened launch hangers would each count towards the total number of ICBM launchers.
That and on-site inspections makes preserving the probability of location uncertainty doubtful.

 

[marauder2048]

"God No, America Does Not Need Mobile Nuclear Missile Launchers"
Robert Beckhusen
April 13, 2016

Source:
https://warisboring.com/god-no-america-does-not-need-mobile-nuclear-missile-launchers/

The New START treaty between the United States and Russia, which went into force in 2011, restricts deployed mobile launchers to ICBM bases
a nd nondeployed launchers to military production, repair and storage facilities. Which, in the event of a nuclear war, negates mobile
launchers’ mobility advantage. It would take hours to disperse the slow-moving vehicles away from their bases as the nukes begin flying.

This is not accurate. From the Office of Treaty Compliance

https://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/NST/Art%20By%20Art/art_treaty%20text.htm

There are no restrictions on where deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. These launchers may leave their basing areas for field
deployments, similar to the deployments from their bases of ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers. Because mobile ICBMs are
considered survivable when deployed in the field and therefore stabilizing, their unhampered operation while deployed in the field is permitted.

 

[Hood]

Must be why everybody else is going mobile. Because they suck.

The picture you posted perhaps reveals another deeper motivation, all those countries have regular military parades and nothing looks more impressive than having a leader basking in glory as a convoy of multi-wheeled missile launchers rumbles past in plain sight of your population.
A few holes in the ground are much less easy to show off to your neighbours and tax-paying population. The question is which is more effective, a quiet deterrent that's there doing its job without fuss or something that you need to roll out in public to convince everyone how much power you have?

Also worth noting that of that list only Russia and China have the capability to build and field a full triad. India and North Korea have to rely on ground based missiles. Also, those nations build wheeled launchers for smaller IRBMs so the rationale and the technology base is already there.

 

[sferrin]

Must be why everybody else is going mobile. Because they suck.

The picture you posted perhaps reveals another deeper motivation, all those countries have regular military parades and nothing looks more impressive than having a leader basking in glory as a convoy of multi-wheeled missile launchers rumbles past in plain sight of your population.
A few holes in the ground are much less easy to show off to your neighbours and tax-paying population. The question is which is more effective, a quiet deterrent that's there doing its job without fuss or something that you need to roll out in public to convince everyone how much power you have?

Also worth noting that of that list only Russia and China have the capability to build and field a full triad. India and North Korea have to rely on ground based missiles. Also, those nations build wheeled launchers for smaller IRBMs so the rationale and the technology base is already there.

Are you serious? You think mobility has been the holy grail since day once because they look good in parades? :

 

[sferrin]

You don't need a harden launcher with the much lower number of warheads currently. What needs to be done is go back to the old shell game idea. Say 300 launchers each with 5-10 harden launch hangars. Keep moving the launchers around. Now the Russians would require 1500-3000 warheads to take all of them out, all while being limited to 1550 under the treaty. Its cheaper than Midgetman, its mobile, its a warhead sponge, and the missiles would not be rolling around the highways, being limited to only transfers between hangars, which could be secured easier than a launcher on the road.

"Rolling around highways"? As pointed out earlier (which you'd have seen if you'd actually read the thread) Midgetman, or any other mobile ICBM would not be "rolling around highways".

 

[lastdingo]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5708271444001/?#sp=show-clips

Two minute clip, interesting but there should be entire shows that discuss the current debate and explicitly discuss WHY the US is doing what they're doing in the face of massive Russian/Chinese nuke programs.

"massive" is hardly the correct word when describing the Chinese nuke program. Their warhead count has a mere three digits.

 

[Hood]

Are you serious? You think mobility has been the holy grail since day once because they look good in parades? :

I think its a psychological factor that shouldn't be overlooked, its a common denominator for all those nations. I'm not saying its a military factor but its a bonus feature of having a mobile deterrent. You can show it off easily when you need to and hide it when you don't. I'm not questioning the obvious fact that mobility imparts a high-degree of survivability and is therefore desirable in itself. Also, wheeled transports are generally cheaper when you haven't got an aviation and/or submarine shipyard capability to give you other mobile options (I don't count the sole North Korean SSB).

 

[bobbymike]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5708271444001/?#sp=show-clips

Two minute clip, interesting but there should be entire shows that discuss the current debate and explicitly discuss WHY the US is doing what they're doing in the face of massive Russian/Chinese nuke programs.

I think we are going to be surprised one day.


"massive" is hardly the correct word when describing the Chinese nuke program. Their warhead count has a mere three digits.

 

[sferrin]

http://video.foxnews.com/v/5708271444001/?#sp=show-clips

Two minute clip, interesting but there should be entire shows that discuss the current debate and explicitly discuss WHY the US is doing what they're doing in the face of massive Russian/Chinese nuke programs.

"massive" is hardly the correct word when describing the Chinese nuke program. Their warhead count has a mere three digits.

"Massive" is correct. Two types of new ICBM, a new SLBM, numerous types of sub-ICBM ballistic missiles, most of which are nuclear capable, and all of which are mobile. New nuclear capable cruise missiles. They aren't pulling the warheads off old DF-5s and putting them on cruise missiles. China is well on it's way to a "Prompt Global Strike" system the US merely talks about. It ALREADY has such a system regionally. Between the DF-11/15/16/17/21/26 it can reach out to 2,200 miles in a matter of minutes. The US doesn't even have that kind of control over the Gulf of Mexico.

 

[sferrin]

Are you serious? You think mobility has been the holy grail since day once because they look good in parades? :

I think its a psychological factor that shouldn't be overlooked, its a common denominator for all those nations. I'm not saying its a military factor but its a bonus feature of having a mobile deterrent. You can show it off easily when you need to and hide it when you don't. I'm not questioning the obvious fact that mobility imparts a high-degree of survivability and is therefore desirable in itself. Also, wheeled transports are generally cheaper when you haven't got an aviation and/or submarine shipyard capability to give you other mobile options (I don't count the sole North Korean SSB).

The "psychological", "parade value" is, at best, a happy coincidence. Mobility has been desired from the outset and the lessons of Desert Storm only magnified its benefits.

 

[marauder2048]

The picture you posted perhaps reveals another deeper motivation, all those countries have regular military parades and nothing looks more impressive than having a leader basking in glory as a convoy of multi-wheeled missile launchers rumbles past in plain sight of your population.

Ensiloed missiles typically have wheeled transporter erectors; the Russians used to
roll those around the parade routes.

A few holes in the ground are much less easy to show off to your neighbours and tax-paying population.

Which is funny given that one of the (sometimes unstated) reasons for retaining silo-based ICBMs
is the economic dislocation that would be caused by the decommissioning of an ICBM wing.

 

[sferrin]

The picture you posted perhaps reveals another deeper motivation, all those countries have regular military parades and nothing looks more impressive than having a leader basking in glory as a convoy of multi-wheeled missile launchers rumbles past in plain sight of your population.

Ensiloed missiles typically have wheeled transporter erectors; the Russians used to
roll those around the parade routes.

Yep. Don't need mobile ICBMs to parade ICBMs through Red Square.

 

[Desertfox]

Under New START, the hardened launch hangers would each count towards the total number of ICBM launchers.
That and on-site inspections makes preserving the probability of location uncertainty doubtful.

Under New START only the mobile launcher itself would count, the harden shelters would not. On-site inspections only tell you where the launchers are during the inspection, if they are in inspectable areas (theoretically you could have "wartime" hideouts in non-inspectable areas). As soon as the inspection is over the launchers could be re-shuffled.

"Rolling around highways"? As pointed out earlier (which you'd have seen if you'd actually read the thread) Midgetman, or any other mobile ICBM would not be "rolling around highways".

The point is Americans do not like nuclear warheads running around our deserts or highways, so this way they can be kept in secure locations most of the time, with only short periods of transit time between shelters.

 

[marauder2048]

Under New START only the mobile launcher itself would count, the harden shelters would not.

IIUC, Since the hardened shelters have or are intended to have all of equipment required
to launch an ICBM they would get counted as launchers albeit of the non-deployed variety
which is a slightly higher limit but not on order of the typical MPS:missile ratio.

As soon as the inspection is over the launchers could be re-shuffled.

Which means the price-to-attack is potentially much less than GBSD in silos. That's typically
been the concern with mobile missiles; the minimum price-to-attack is conceivably achievable
with one close-in SSBN.

What would change the minimum would be HMLs operating in the vicinity of
ensiloed hit-to-kill ABM interceptors; there's no limit on the latter.

 

[Desertfox]

All the launch equipment would be on the mobile launcher itself. The shelters would have no launch equipment at all. Why would they be counted?

How is the price-to-attack lower? They would still have to target every single shelter, whether its empty or not. Could one SSBN target 1500+ shelters?

 

[bobbymike]

http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/369592-as-russia-looms-modernizing-us-nuclear-arsenal-is-non-negotiable