Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.
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Brickmuppet
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From 38North: [quote]...the preliminary seismic magnitude estimates varied from 5.8, as published by both the CTBTO and NORSAR, to 6.3 by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). More recently, both the CTBTO and NORSAR have officially revised their estimates upward to 6.1. This revision is significant because, rather than providing an equivalent yield of about 120 kilotons derived from the lower magnitude estimates, the application of standard formula with appropriate constants shows that the yield can now be estimated to have been roughly 250 kilotons (one quarter megaton)... [/quote]
Full article here: http://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/
The article goes on to mention that there appears to have been significant damage to the mountain, to the extent that its structural integrity at least with regards to mitigating radioactive venting in any future high yield nuke tests is in doubt. That seems to be based on tenuous data and in any event North Korea does not lack for mountains.
(Edited 9/13 22:17 EST)
Full article here: http://www.38north.org/2017/09/punggye091217/
The article goes on to mention that there appears to have been significant damage to the mountain, to the extent that its structural integrity at least with regards to mitigating radioactive venting in any future high yield nuke tests is in doubt. That seems to be based on tenuous data and in any event North Korea does not lack for mountains.
(Edited 9/13 22:17 EST)
"Defense Secretary Mattis says U.S. must keep all 3 parts of nuclear force"
Source:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-north-korea-nuclear-arsenal-20170913-story.html
Source:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-north-korea-nuclear-arsenal-20170913-story.html
Brickmuppet
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I have a yield question, I initially posted this in an earlier post, but it didn't really fit.
Is there a good general figure for how much a fissionable tamper will increase the yield of a Teller-Ulam device?
Historically the B-41 went to a theoretical yield of 25megatons from 9 megatons for the clean version, the dirty version of RDS220 (Tsar Bomba) was estimated at twice the clean yield.These assume an increase in yield from two to just under three times the yield for a enriched uranium tamper or somesuch. Neither was actually tested.
The W-71 was especially "clean". Could replacing its (purported) gold tamper result in a 10+ MT device?
Regarding current events, ASSUMING the DPRK test was a "clean" version of their weapon, (with say, a lead tamper)
Would 500-700 kt be a reasonable assumption for maximum yield if one assumes that...
A:this was a clean version and
B: the DPRK does not lack for enriched uranium?
(See here for that last assumption...
http://www.38north.org/2015/08/jlewis081215/)
Very high yields rapidly get into diminishing returns, but high yield dirty weapons might be an area of development that would seem logical for a nation with a limited number of fusion warheads. I'm not sure how much difference it would make as a practical matter, but I was curious about this.
Is there a good general figure for how much a fissionable tamper will increase the yield of a Teller-Ulam device?
Historically the B-41 went to a theoretical yield of 25megatons from 9 megatons for the clean version, the dirty version of RDS220 (Tsar Bomba) was estimated at twice the clean yield.These assume an increase in yield from two to just under three times the yield for a enriched uranium tamper or somesuch. Neither was actually tested.
The W-71 was especially "clean". Could replacing its (purported) gold tamper result in a 10+ MT device?
Regarding current events, ASSUMING the DPRK test was a "clean" version of their weapon, (with say, a lead tamper)
Would 500-700 kt be a reasonable assumption for maximum yield if one assumes that...
A:this was a clean version and
B: the DPRK does not lack for enriched uranium?
(See here for that last assumption...
http://www.38north.org/2015/08/jlewis081215/)
Very high yields rapidly get into diminishing returns, but high yield dirty weapons might be an area of development that would seem logical for a nation with a limited number of fusion warheads. I'm not sure how much difference it would make as a practical matter, but I was curious about this.
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Brickmuppet said:
I recall reading somewhere that the main difference between the Peacekeepers W87 (300kt) and the D-5s W88 (475kt) was the tamper. There was also a plan to make a 475kt variant of the W87 by doing the same.
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Despite recent pair of $900M contracts, LRSO's future still TBD
The Air Force's award last month of a pair of contracts to launch a Long Range Standoff weapon competition does not necessarily reflect a firm Defense Department decision to procure a new, nuclear-armed cruise missile, according to the defense secretary.
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What??
The Air Force's award last month of a pair of contracts to launch a Long Range Standoff weapon competition does not necessarily reflect a firm Defense Department decision to procure a new, nuclear-armed cruise missile, according to the defense secretary.
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What??
bobbymike said:
It doesn't seem like the Defense Science Board report or the Nuclear Posture Review 2017 are advocating lower-yield nuclear weapons to address numerical gaps in conventional forces. I don't quite understand what foreign policy strategy is lacking to which Tom Nichols refers. How does increased spending on conventional forces by the United States address a low-yield nuclear attack by an adversary? Does the prospect of a conventional counter-attack by numerically superior forces have the necessary deterrent effect? Does a superior conventional force change the Russian Federation military doctrine of the use of low-yield nuclear weapons for "de-escalation of a conflict"?
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IMHO, I've found over the decades I've followed nuclear issues the arms control community seems to either create a strawman and/or incorrectly, by accident or intention, misstate the other sides arguments, strategies, theories and argue to the point they wanted in the first place, mainly we really don't want any nukes starting with the US disarming.Triton said:
bobbymike said:
They seem to not consider the military doctrines, foreign policies, and military capabilities of potential adversaries when expressing their arguments against nuclear weapons. The United States isn't the only nuclear power pursuing lower-yield nuclear weapons. Other nations seem to believe that they can control the rungs on the nuclear escalation ladder.
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From Air Force Association Daily Report 9/21/17
GBSD Fits in Current ICBM Facilities, New Installations Not Needed
The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program will make use of existing ICBM launch facilities, program director Col. Heath Collins told Air Force Magazine at ASC17. An Air Force analysis of alternatives concluded “the effort, the cost, the schedule impacts”—including the necessity of gaining land-use rights and navigating “the environmental protection rules and laws of today”—made building 450 new launch facilities “very cost prohibitive,” Collins said. While the Minuteman III launch facilities will need to be refurbished to house modernized ICBMs, Collins said his team has conducted “analysis on the concrete” at the facilities and found them “very strong. Those are still solid launch facilities.” He also said using the existing silos would present no significant technical limitations on the GBSD design. “We’ve gone through hundreds and thousands of different iterations of what the launch vehicle could look like and what size it needs to be to meet our requirements,” Collins said. “The existing launch facilities are plenty big enough.” —Wilson Brissett
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More on Bomber Vector
When will we get to see the new bomber “vector,” which lays out the 30-year-plus plan for bringing on new bombers and phasing out old ones? It’s up to Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein and Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson, according to Global Strike Command chief Gen. Robin Rand. “We’ve done a great job,” Rand said at an ASC17 press conference Tuesday. “We’ve provided (Goldfein) our inputs, we have socialized this with our teammates in Congress, so I’ve gone over and had multiple engagements with staffers and chairmen and ranking members of our key defense committees, I’ve spoken to Senators and (representatives) from … states that have bombers. We want to make sure we give the Secretary of Defense the headspace that he needs to review the plan. And I won’t speak for him about when that will happen.” Rand also reported a “lessons learned” study is underway—internal to AFGSC but with Northrop Grumman—that is a “deep dive” into what went right and wrong with the B-2 program, in order to make the B-21 a more seamless and cost-effective project. “A lot of the expertise that was on the B-2 is still going to be part of the B-21, so we want to capture the people who worked that program … these folks will transition into the B-21.” —John A. Tirpak
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http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2017/September%202017/Bomber-Flooring-and-LRSO-.aspx
GBSD Fits in Current ICBM Facilities, New Installations Not Needed
The Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program will make use of existing ICBM launch facilities, program director Col. Heath Collins told Air Force Magazine at ASC17. An Air Force analysis of alternatives concluded “the effort, the cost, the schedule impacts”—including the necessity of gaining land-use rights and navigating “the environmental protection rules and laws of today”—made building 450 new launch facilities “very cost prohibitive,” Collins said. While the Minuteman III launch facilities will need to be refurbished to house modernized ICBMs, Collins said his team has conducted “analysis on the concrete” at the facilities and found them “very strong. Those are still solid launch facilities.” He also said using the existing silos would present no significant technical limitations on the GBSD design. “We’ve gone through hundreds and thousands of different iterations of what the launch vehicle could look like and what size it needs to be to meet our requirements,” Collins said. “The existing launch facilities are plenty big enough.” —Wilson Brissett
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More on Bomber Vector
When will we get to see the new bomber “vector,” which lays out the 30-year-plus plan for bringing on new bombers and phasing out old ones? It’s up to Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein and Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson, according to Global Strike Command chief Gen. Robin Rand. “We’ve done a great job,” Rand said at an ASC17 press conference Tuesday. “We’ve provided (Goldfein) our inputs, we have socialized this with our teammates in Congress, so I’ve gone over and had multiple engagements with staffers and chairmen and ranking members of our key defense committees, I’ve spoken to Senators and (representatives) from … states that have bombers. We want to make sure we give the Secretary of Defense the headspace that he needs to review the plan. And I won’t speak for him about when that will happen.” Rand also reported a “lessons learned” study is underway—internal to AFGSC but with Northrop Grumman—that is a “deep dive” into what went right and wrong with the B-2 program, in order to make the B-21 a more seamless and cost-effective project. “A lot of the expertise that was on the B-2 is still going to be part of the B-21, so we want to capture the people who worked that program … these folks will transition into the B-21.” —John A. Tirpak
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http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2017/September%202017/Bomber-Flooring-and-LRSO-.aspx
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Nuclear Posture Review Provides Opportunity to Reset US Policy
9/29/2017
—Wilson Brissett
The last of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs is removed from a launch facility at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo., in compliance with the New START agreement with Russia. The Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence said the US must move away from its primary goal of nonproliferation toward a top goal of cultivating nuclear power for strategic deterrence. Air Force photo by A1C Breanna Carter.
The Trump administration’s ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) offers an opportunity to fundamentally reshape US nuclear policy, experts in deterrence and arms control said at a Task Force 21-Minot event in Washington, D.C., Thursday. In response to a newly complex strategic threat environment, the US needs to shift away from a primary goal of nonproliferation toward a top priority of cultivating nuclear power for strategic deterrence, said Frank Miller, principal at the Scowcroft Group, and Robert Joseph, senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.
The most recent NPR, completed by the Obama administration in 2010, was “explicit about its objective,” Joseph said, and its “first priority is nonproliferation.” In that NPR, Russia is “described more as a partner than a threat,” China is “not mentioned” at all, and the threat of a North Korean ICBM attack against the US homeland is considered unrealistic, Joseph said.
The 2010 NPR also considers it “acceptable for Russia to have a larger nuclear force” than the US, and it establishes a US policy of “no new nuclear capabilities,” Joseph said.
But “much has changed in the past seven years,” Joseph said, and the strategic threat around the world is “much more complex and dangerous.” For one, Russia has “vastly superior theater nuclear forces,” he said. This means that Russia has developed new, low-yield nuclear weapons and has conducted exercises to explore their tactical deployment, according to Miller.
As a result, the US has “deterrent gaps” in its strategic policy, Joseph said, that need to be addressed in the NPR. The administration’s process marks “an opportunity … to turn the current situation around dramatically,” Miller said. The goal should be to “restore nuclear deterrence as the first priority of our nuclear policy,” Joseph said.
“We need to explore some new capabilities” as well, Miller insisted, including a focus on low-yield nuclear weapons and enhancing nuclear command and control infrastructure. To do so, he said, “is easily affordable.” Estimates show that total spending on nuclear forces at the height of the current modernization effort would represent “seven percent of all defense spending,” Miller said.
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Sustaining, Modernizing Nuclear Forces Vital to US Survival
Maintaining current US nuclear forces and replacing aging systems with modern weapons is “indispensable for national survival,” Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, said Thursday. The current global “strategic environment” is “more dangerous” and “more polarized than ever before,” he told the audience at a Task Force 21-Minot event in Washington, D.C. While the US reduced nuclear forces in the decades after the Cold War, when hopes for lasting peace with Russia and other adversaries ran high, “history tells us that today’s behavior is normal,” Weinstein said, noting that history gives us no example of a nation that “voluntarily got weaker and survived.” Given the complexities of strategic threats today, “we’ve had some really great news,” Weinstein said, in the announcements of new contracts for the ICBM system, cruise missile, and the B-21 nuclear-capable bomber program. But those programs are all in early stages of development, Weinstein said, and “we have to maintain our current capabilities until the new capabilities are ready.” Key to speeding the arrival of new nuclear systems will be clear requirements, stability of natural resources and supply chains, and the identification and empowerment of “thought leaders” within program management, Weinstein said. —Wilson Brissett
9/29/2017
—Wilson Brissett
The last of 50 Minuteman III ICBMs is removed from a launch facility at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyo., in compliance with the New START agreement with Russia. The Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence said the US must move away from its primary goal of nonproliferation toward a top goal of cultivating nuclear power for strategic deterrence. Air Force photo by A1C Breanna Carter.
The Trump administration’s ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) offers an opportunity to fundamentally reshape US nuclear policy, experts in deterrence and arms control said at a Task Force 21-Minot event in Washington, D.C., Thursday. In response to a newly complex strategic threat environment, the US needs to shift away from a primary goal of nonproliferation toward a top priority of cultivating nuclear power for strategic deterrence, said Frank Miller, principal at the Scowcroft Group, and Robert Joseph, senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy.
The most recent NPR, completed by the Obama administration in 2010, was “explicit about its objective,” Joseph said, and its “first priority is nonproliferation.” In that NPR, Russia is “described more as a partner than a threat,” China is “not mentioned” at all, and the threat of a North Korean ICBM attack against the US homeland is considered unrealistic, Joseph said.
The 2010 NPR also considers it “acceptable for Russia to have a larger nuclear force” than the US, and it establishes a US policy of “no new nuclear capabilities,” Joseph said.
But “much has changed in the past seven years,” Joseph said, and the strategic threat around the world is “much more complex and dangerous.” For one, Russia has “vastly superior theater nuclear forces,” he said. This means that Russia has developed new, low-yield nuclear weapons and has conducted exercises to explore their tactical deployment, according to Miller.
As a result, the US has “deterrent gaps” in its strategic policy, Joseph said, that need to be addressed in the NPR. The administration’s process marks “an opportunity … to turn the current situation around dramatically,” Miller said. The goal should be to “restore nuclear deterrence as the first priority of our nuclear policy,” Joseph said.
“We need to explore some new capabilities” as well, Miller insisted, including a focus on low-yield nuclear weapons and enhancing nuclear command and control infrastructure. To do so, he said, “is easily affordable.” Estimates show that total spending on nuclear forces at the height of the current modernization effort would represent “seven percent of all defense spending,” Miller said.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sustaining, Modernizing Nuclear Forces Vital to US Survival
Maintaining current US nuclear forces and replacing aging systems with modern weapons is “indispensable for national survival,” Lt. Gen. Jack Weinstein, deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration, said Thursday. The current global “strategic environment” is “more dangerous” and “more polarized than ever before,” he told the audience at a Task Force 21-Minot event in Washington, D.C. While the US reduced nuclear forces in the decades after the Cold War, when hopes for lasting peace with Russia and other adversaries ran high, “history tells us that today’s behavior is normal,” Weinstein said, noting that history gives us no example of a nation that “voluntarily got weaker and survived.” Given the complexities of strategic threats today, “we’ve had some really great news,” Weinstein said, in the announcements of new contracts for the ICBM system, cruise missile, and the B-21 nuclear-capable bomber program. But those programs are all in early stages of development, Weinstein said, and “we have to maintain our current capabilities until the new capabilities are ready.” Key to speeding the arrival of new nuclear systems will be clear requirements, stability of natural resources and supply chains, and the identification and empowerment of “thought leaders” within program management, Weinstein said. —Wilson Brissett
kaiserd
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bobbymike said:
1. Your comment appears almost totally unrelated to the actual content of the article
2. The view your proposed article advances is at best a fringe view with little to no serious support.
NeilChapman
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kaiserd said:
1. Perhaps the poster may have elucidated his view for discussion? I, for one, would have been interested in his argument. The comment is not totally, or even almost totally unrelated to the actual content of the article.
2. To which view are you referring? There are several views the article expresses.
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Not to be "that guy" but let's be careful not to veer into politics. I think if we stick specifically to the effectiveness of say, treaties controlling behavior of all parties, that's one thing but let's try to keep politics out of it. Personally I think treaties can be useful if everybody can be 100% certain everybody else is adhering to both the letter and the spirit of said treaties. How often does that actually occur though?
kaiserd
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sferrin said:
I too am not looking to drift into politics.
I would be wary of those who are opposed to any limits (externally or self-imposed) on a particular nation state setting up a purposely impossible threshold for the utility of international treaties (I am not saying you fall within this category re: the US).
Specifically re: your specified threshold, even with the latest inteligence gathering capabilities and technologies, it is extremely unrealistic that everybody can be 100 percent certain everybody else is adhering to both the letter and the spirit of a given treaty.
While this great as an aspiration human nature is incapable of this; if this was the threshold no one would ever sign an international treaty and no one would ever do any type of deal with anyone.
Even if the other party was objectively totally fulfilling their requirements, even with detailed effective verification and inspection provisions, would the other party necessarily be 100 percent certain this was the case?
In the real world it is about judging the risk/reward and deciding the threshold for non-material versus material breaches of an agreement or treaty and deciding categories of material breach and what you will do in reaction to each such category.
This is in no way a defense of those that fail to fulfill their international commitments by breaching treaties. What your are proposing as a threshold is like proposing ending the institution of marriage because some people cheat on their partners and some other partners live in fear that they will be cheated on.
(I work in the area of regulatory compliance.)
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I appreciate everyone's feedback but I should have been clearer. While I do believe every nuke treaty since START I has been worthless I really meant to say in the original comment that the method the arms controllers wanted to use to achieve disarmament has been folly and what actually achieved the disarmament was doing the opposite of what they wanted to do.bobbymike said:
They wanted a nuke freeze, no Pershing II, no GLCM, no D5, no MX, no SDI and believed this show of conciliation [weakness] would bring the Soviets to the arms control table. History of course showed they were about as wrong as one could be that's why I wonder why they are still at it. Misleading people about the current "Cold War arsenal" even though it's down 90%. Then coming up with this ONE TRILLION in nuke costs over the next 30 years while NEVER mentioning this represents about one half of ONE PERCENT of total government spending over that time frame.
Sorry in the grand scheme of things nukes are cheap and largely keep the peace.
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https://www.defensenews.com/air/2017/10/04/lockheed-rockwell-get-contracts-to-develop-airborne-c2-system-for-launching-icbms/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DFN%20DNR%2010.4.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
kaiserd
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bobbymike said:
Following the articles own "logic" then such award should be given to ALL crews of every nations nuclear deterrence force including those not mentioned; US (US airforce aircrew and ICBM crew all the way back to SAC, non-sub US Navy when they were in the deterrent business), UK (RAF re: the V-bomber force), French crew (airmen, submariners and other missile crew), Soviet and now Russian crew of various nuclear armed forces, and all their Chinese, Israeli, Pakistani and Indian contemporaries. Same logic wound see North Korean missile crew added to this list.
I wonder why it doesn't go there....
The article also claims an insight into Putins mind/ decision making (happy to kill tens of millions to win an advantage) that hopefully isn't true and for which the writer/ article doesn't appear to have any real basis for. I'm no fan of Putin and if this was true would suggest that nuclear deterrence would have little to no effect on him. Which would somewhat undermine the point of the article....
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https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-10/news/air-force-nuclear-programs-advance
Arms controllers always want to delay programs to save money the inference being, "Then we'll support modernization"
Ya right, pull the other leg it plays Jingle Bells.
Arms controllers always want to delay programs to save money the inference being, "Then we'll support modernization"
Ya right, pull the other leg it plays Jingle Bells.
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bobbymike said:
Pay a billion dollars today or two billion tomorrow (because your industrial base is tanked). Arms controllers will be happy with nothing less than unilateral disarmament. They figure if they can't get the US to scrap them outright they'll try to get rid of them through attrition. Notice they rarely talk about getting the other side to reduce their weapons anymore. If they were honest they'd hold up the INF Treaty as the way to get real weapons reduction. The other guy isn't going to scrap his when he knows you'll scrap yours and let him keep his.
kaiserd
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sferrin said:
Again this intentional confusion of terms and conflation of different groups of people with very different views and objectives.
Advocates of nuclear arms controls are not advocates of unilateral disarmament.
And unilateral disarmament advocates hate nuclear arms control as they see it as an attempt to enshrine and legitimise the continued existence of nuclear weapons.
Some of the contributors on this topic clearly have real issues with both groups but lumping them together is an attempt to unfairly malign and delegitimise both groups.
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kaiserd said:
Almost every Arms Control article I've ever seen, when you got past all the window dressing, boiled down to, "this is why the US should reduce its number of nuclear weapons / shouldn't build more". IMO a robust nuclear arms control strategy would be very similar to what happened in Europe that led to the INF Treaty. The US made it clear, in no uncertain terms, that those SS-20s weren't worth the headache and that the USSR would be happier without those Pershing IIs and GLCMs pointed at it. The USSR gave up a LOT to make it so. Win - win.
kaiserd
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sferrin said:
That's a massive generalisation and quite probably a far from unbiased one given your a previous comments on nuclear control advocates.
What you described as a "robust nuclear arms strategy" was an intermediate range deliver system arms race that in retrospect was massively wasteful for both sides. And that was part of an even wider, even more expensive and wasteful arms race.
I am no advocate of unilateral disarmament and see the necessity of deterrence, and recognise that much of what was involved in the nuclear arms race (both sides caught by their own and each other's histories and decisions).
But the damage and waste of that arms race, and its own distabling dangerous nature is what lead to arms control agreements. The USSR inflicted terminal damage on its own economy and the US moved from being the worlds largest lender to debtor; we are still experiencing the consequences of this endeavour. The opertunities cost of the arms race is simply staggering.
The apparent nostalgia for it is misplaced.
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