Nuclear Weapons - Discussion.

[kaiserd]

I know Senator Diane Feinstein may not be the most attractive women but that no reason for your 'gender switching' mocking and cynicism.

LOL! It really goes to show the level of "knowledge" some are operating on in these discussions.

My apologies to the Senator, honestly thought she was was a he. I don't really see the relevance of her gender to this topic discussion.

Considering you called her a "disgusting human being" and are making misogynist comments disparaging her physical appearance (all because you disagree with her?) perhaps your catty comments re: "knowledge" of other contributors is missing the bigger picture.

Funny you disagree with someone on most things implying you've studied their positions and didn't once come across the fact the senator is a women. In fact I question the veracity of your original statement and believe you just made up knowing anything about the Senator in order to assert you morally superior "hey I disagree but don't call names" comment

Of note the same names always show up at the same time threads get shitty. In fact the trend is consistent a negative comment for good or for ill is made about a politician and certain members respond with an attack on other members. That said it is practically impossible in my humble opinion to remove politics from a nuke weapons discussion they being the most political of weapons around.

You are right the same names show up again & again; your and sferrin's.
Your comments were the shitty ones; perhaps your deeper knowledge of the Senator in question justifies you calling her digesting & ugly/ man-like in appearance but I doubt it.
I read the link, quickly googled her without realising she was a she.
I am not an expert on individual US Senators, sorry about that.

I am all for reasonable discussion and think multiple political perspectives add to the debate.
But too often you & Sferrin (in fairness more often him than you) cross the line versus reasonable discussion and tolerance for views that don't match your perspectives.
Don't be surprised when other contributors pull you up when this occurs.
Honestly I'm sick of being attacked while the unreasonable contributors peddling somewhat extreme views try to present themselves as innocent victims.
I don't want this great forum to be lost to everyone who don't subscribe to your end of the political spectrum.

 

[marauder2048]

Just how useful would the anti-radiation lining the Soviets installed on many tanks and AFVs have been against neutron bombs? Enough to minimize their concern about the threat such weapons posed?

Well considering that neutron weapons largely weren't actually fielded this suggests that no one had much fate in their deterrent value; from my own limited reading on neutron bombs my understanding that no one was actually sure such measures would actually be effective at protecting tank crews but given the uncertainty can understand preference shown in practise for instead going for alternative non-nuclear and nuclear weapons.

They were fielded. Just not in Europe. The Boron polyethylene liners in Soviet armor of the period were not really able to reduce the amount of penetrating neutrons but could reduce the armor-induced
secondary gammas. So ERWs would still have been effective. Modern armor is a different story.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981

 

[sferrin]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981

I could live with no first use (provided our forces are large enough and survivable enough). Given today's means of verification of launch (I assume they could actually image the launches) sitting there doing nothing while waiting to die would be lunacy. Definitely no logical reason to get rid of launch on warning.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981

I could live with no first use (provided our forces are large enough and survivable enough). Given today's means of verification of launch (I assume they could actually image the launches) sitting there doing nothing while waiting to die would be lunacy. Definitely no logical reason to get rid of launch on warning.

I could live with no first use IF we deploy prompt global strike weapons capable of taking out an Iranian or NORK nuke missile (or at least it is ambiguous whether it may or may not carry a nuke) about to be launched.

 

[marauder2048]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981

From the article:

Obama demanded new efforts to reduce U.S. reliance on launch-on-warning (otherwise known as launch-under-attack).

Uh..these are very distinct force employment approaches.

 

[Rickshaw]

Topic is getting shitty and a candidate for closing

Removed mine. :-[ It's definitely a tough one when political forces directly effect nuclear. Perhaps it would be easier to stay on target if we limited the topic to the weapons themselves, effectivity, and deployment rather than if we should or shouldn't have them and who is doing what in DC and the Kremlin?

Effectively removing the reason why they exist in the first place...

 

[Rickshaw]

An if anyone would like to stand up and say neutron bombs were a good idea I'll be able to point at a lunatic ....

I struggled loose from my straight jacket just long enough to write this: ERWs were about the only way (during the period in which they were developed) to cost-effectively counter the Warsaw Pact's 4-to-1 advantage in armor.

What by slowly killing their crews and giving them incentive to actually take on the NATO's tanks and breakthrough before dying?

The problem with Neutron warheads is that their radiation kills (relatively) slowly. It does not instantly fry the target. The result would more than likely have been a lot of very enraged, slowly dying Warsaw Pact army crews.

Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not... :

The 4-to-1 armor disparity figures comes from Carter-era DoD publications which were not known for their alarmism. ERWs kill relatively slowly but incapacitate and impair quickly particularly with a crew under the strain of operating a Warsaw Pact tank of that era.

Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. It went up and down like a yo-yo.

 

[Rickshaw]

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/barack-obama-nuclear-weapons-213981

I could live with no first use (provided our forces are large enough and survivable enough). Given today's means of verification of launch (I assume they could actually image the launches) sitting there doing nothing while waiting to die would be lunacy. Definitely no logical reason to get rid of launch on warning.

Assuming that the detection systems are 100% reliable. As the Soviets showed, theirs' weren't and as the US showed, neither were theirs'. Launch-on-warning is actually an insane system which removes your highest command from the war making decision process and devolves it down to the lowest level where the information is gathered, often mistakenly...

 

[marauder2048]

An if anyone would like to stand up and say neutron bombs were a good idea I'll be able to point at a lunatic ....

I struggled loose from my straight jacket just long enough to write this: ERWs were about the only way (during the period in which they were developed) to cost-effectively counter the Warsaw Pact's 4-to-1 advantage in armor.

What by slowly killing their crews and giving them incentive to actually take on the NATO's tanks and breakthrough before dying?

The problem with Neutron warheads is that their radiation kills (relatively) slowly. It does not instantly fry the target. The result would more than likely have been a lot of very enraged, slowly dying Warsaw Pact army crews.

Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not... :

The 4-to-1 armor disparity figures comes from Carter-era DoD publications which were not known for their alarmism. ERWs kill relatively slowly but incapacitate and impair quickly particularly with a crew under the strain of operating a Warsaw Pact tank of that era.

Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. It went up and down like a yo-yo.

I don't recall huge variablitiy in armor force ratios but I think that "Soviet Military Power" tended to err on the upper-bound of capability estimates if I can put it diplomatically.

Still, I regard an attacker with a 4-to-1 advantage in armor as a horde since that advantage enables them to pin the defender frontally while enveloping both flanks.

 

[sferrin]

I don't recall huge variablitiy in armor force ratios but I think that "Soviet Military Power" tended to err on the upper-bound of capability estimates if I can put it diplomatically.

Thing is, when it comes to procurement one NEVER gets what they ask for. So they do everything in their power to justify their request. And even then it doesn't work. The USAF made the mistake of saying that it needed 750 F-22s to replace the roughly 800 F-15s they bought. The pols said no. The USAF said, "342 is the absolute bare-ass minimum we need to replace the F-15C". What'd they get? About half that. (Which is why the F-15C is still around.) On top of that most politicians wouldn't know an F-15 from a Su-27 so you have to paint a picture they understand. Thus you get Soviet Military Power.

Kman
"Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not."

"Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. "

The notion Soviet Military Power was written for the electorate is asinine. Joe 6-pack didn't even know it existed. But yeah, we get it, Reagan and his evil Rethuglicans were worse than Goebbels. :

 

[bobbymike]

I don't recall huge variablitiy in armor force ratios but I think that "Soviet Military Power" tended to err on the upper-bound of capability estimates if I can put it diplomatically.

Thing is, when it comes to procurement one NEVER gets what they ask for. So they do everything in their power to justify their request. And even then it doesn't work. The USAF made the mistake of saying that it needed 750 F-22s to replace the roughly 800 F-15s they bought. The pols said no. The USAF said, "342 is the absolute bare-ass minimum we need to replace the F-15C". What'd they get? About half that. (Which is why the F-15C is still around.) On top of that most politicians wouldn't know an F-15 from a Su-27 so you have to paint a picture they understand. Thus you get Soviet Military Power.

Kman
"Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not."

"Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. "

The notion Soviet Military Power was written for the electorate is asinine. Joe 6-pack didn't even know it existed. But yeah, we get it, Reagan and his evil Rethuglicans were worse than Goebbels. :

I posted an article by Los Alamos historian that showed the US during the 80's to the end of the Cold War UNDERESTIMATED the Soviet nuclear arsenal by 20k warheads, so no everyone wasn't running around trying to distort and lie about the USSR. In fact a lot of patriots were just trying to do as good a job as they could given the obviously opaque nature of a communist regime. But the Kman had two modes 1) Agree with him 2) You are a crazy right winger/liar nut job.

 

[sferrin]

Okay, we all get it people. Some think neutron weapons are "technically sweet", others think they're useless. Can we please move on to discussion of the weapons themselves rather than what some politician may or may not have been doing 30 years ago? Thank you.

 

[Rickshaw]

An if anyone would like to stand up and say neutron bombs were a good idea I'll be able to point at a lunatic ....

I struggled loose from my straight jacket just long enough to write this: ERWs were about the only way (during the period in which they were developed) to cost-effectively counter the Warsaw Pact's 4-to-1 advantage in armor.

What by slowly killing their crews and giving them incentive to actually take on the NATO's tanks and breakthrough before dying?

The problem with Neutron warheads is that their radiation kills (relatively) slowly. It does not instantly fry the target. The result would more than likely have been a lot of very enraged, slowly dying Warsaw Pact army crews.

Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not... :

The 4-to-1 armor disparity figures comes from Carter-era DoD publications which were not known for their alarmism. ERWs kill relatively slowly but incapacitate and impair quickly particularly with a crew under the strain of operating a Warsaw Pact tank of that era.

Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. It went up and down like a yo-yo.

I don't recall huge variablitiy in armor force ratios but I think that "Soviet Military Power" tended to err on the upper-bound of capability estimates if I can put it diplomatically.

I am not so kind. There was once published in Armed Forces Review a nice, little worded article which pointed asked what constituted a "horde" and which pointed out the differences in each (up till that point) copy of Soviet Military Power. I suspect the author wasn't popular in the White House afterwards.

Still, I regard an attacker with a 4-to-1 advantage in armor as a horde since that advantage enables them to pin the defender frontally while enveloping both flanks.

It all depends on where they are deployed. Under Reagan, the estimate changed, with the geographic boundaries being pushed ever further eastward until the Urals were reached, whereas the NATO estimate remained firmly set in Western Europe and wasn't pushed a comparable distance to the East coast of the USA. "4-to-1" rolls easily off the tongue but without seeing where the Soviet armoured units are actually based and what means they have to deploy them to the Inner-German Border, it is a useless number. The real problem was in that means of deployment. In war time, railways and highways are going to be subject to interdiction and once you figure in the difference in NATO versus Warsaw Pact airforces, the numbers become a great deal more even.

 

[Rickshaw]

The notion Soviet Military Power was written for the electorate is asinine. Joe 6-pack didn't even know it existed.

He didn't need to know it existed. The Congresspeople and the Senatepeople and the media outlets all knew it existed and relied upon it (rather than more reputable estimates) for how "evil the Soviet Evil Empire was". It shaped attitudes, along with all the other propaganda. The US Government is and never has been an honest actor as far as those it opposes and to assume otherwise is foolish indeed. One only has to look at the lies it told about Iraq/Vietnam/Cuba/etc. to see that in action.

But yeah, we get it, Reagan and his evil Rethuglicans were worse than Goebbels. :

Why the continual exaggeration? Why the erection of a strawman argument?

 

[Rickshaw]

I don't recall huge variablitiy in armor force ratios but I think that "Soviet Military Power" tended to err on the upper-bound of capability estimates if I can put it diplomatically.

Thing is, when it comes to procurement one NEVER gets what they ask for. So they do everything in their power to justify their request. And even then it doesn't work. The USAF made the mistake of saying that it needed 750 F-22s to replace the roughly 800 F-15s they bought. The pols said no. The USAF said, "342 is the absolute bare-ass minimum we need to replace the F-15C". What'd they get? About half that. (Which is why the F-15C is still around.) On top of that most politicians wouldn't know an F-15 from a Su-27 so you have to paint a picture they understand. Thus you get Soviet Military Power.

Kman
"Of course, it also depends on how you count the Warsaw Pact's armoured "horde", something the Pentagon was remarkably loose at doing under Reagan, with their numbers varying markedly from issue to issue of "Soviet Military Power". Propaganda? No, of course not."

"Yet it was, as I pointed out, the Reagan administration which made the "disparity" variable and more dependent on how they were manipulating their home electorate than on anything the Kremlin was doing at the time. "

The notion Soviet Military Power was written for the electorate is asinine. Joe 6-pack didn't even know it existed. But yeah, we get it, Reagan and his evil Rethuglicans were worse than Goebbels. :

I posted an article by Los Alamos historian that showed the US during the 80's to the end of the Cold War UNDERESTIMATED the Soviet nuclear arsenal by 20k warheads, so no everyone wasn't running around trying to distort and lie about the USSR. In fact a lot of patriots were just trying to do as good a job as they could given the obviously opaque nature of a communist regime. But the Kman had two modes 1) Agree with him 2) You are a crazy right winger/liar nut job.

No, if you disagree with me, you need reasons to disagree with me, just as I need reasons to disagree with you. Please stop erecting strawman arguments against me.

 

[bobbymike]

https://news.usni.org/2016/06/29/pakistans-nuclear-weapons

 

[totoro]

Re: Nuclear Weapons NEWS ONLY

Can someone explain just how much does development of new icbm cost, and how much does a single missile with its warheads cost later on in production?

The graph above says acquisition costs - so these should not include lifetime cost past the initial delivery.

Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile.

Or the Ohio replacement program. Developing a sub costs 10-30 billion? Building a sub later on costs several billion per sub. So then one is left with say 60-ish billion for almost half as many SLBMs than are ICBMs yet they cost the same?

 

[bring_it_on]

Can someone explain just how much does development of new icbm cost, and how much does a single missile with its warheads cost later on in production?

The graph above says acquisition costs - so these should not include lifetime cost past the initial delivery.

Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile.

Or the Ohio replacement program. Developing a sub costs 10-30 billion? Building a sub later on costs several billion per sub. So then one is left with say 60-ish billion for almost half as many SLBMs than are ICBMs yet they cost the same?

Across the FYDP the RDT&E spend on the Ground Based SD program is just a bit shy of $950 Million. In the FY15-FY24 time frame the DOD estimates to spend a little over $6 Billion on the GBSD. I assume this is mostly on RDT&E since they don't expect production till a few years later.

Tod Harrison over at CSBA presented some of their findings a while go: https://www.scribd.com/doc/317132241/Cost-of-Nuclear-Forces-Slides

 

[bring_it_on]

Re: Re: Nuclear Weapons NEWS ONLY

Can someone explain just how much does development of new icbm cost, and how much does a single missile with its warheads cost later on in production?

The graph above says acquisition costs - so these should not include lifetime cost past the initial delivery.

Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile.

Or the Ohio replacement program. Developing a sub costs 10-30 billion? Building a sub later on costs several billion per sub. So then one is left with say 60-ish billion for almost half as many SLBMs than are ICBMs yet they cost the same?

Here

 

[sferrin]

"Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile. "

We haven't designed an ICBM for 30 years. Almost anybody who worked on the last design is either retired, working on other projects, and likely not even working for the same company. The industrial base for ICBMs will need to be built from the ground up. That costs money. There will be many delays and overruns due to lack of experience. That also costs money. Imagine if Ford hadn't designed a car since 1986, and not only couldn't they just poach some design engineers from Chevy or Jeep, but none of THOSE companies had designed a car for even longer. That's why it's expensive.

 

[bobbymike]

"Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile. "

We haven't designed an ICBM for 30 years. Almost anybody who worked on the last design is either retired, working on other projects, and likely not even working for the same company. The industrial base for ICBMs will need to be built from the ground up. That costs money. There will be many delays and overruns due to lack of experience. That also costs money. Imagine if Ford hadn't designed a car since 1986, and not only couldn't they just poach some design engineers from Chevy or Jeep, but none of THOSE companies had designed a car for even longer. That's why it's expensive.

IIRC over on the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Thread - adding to what sferrin has said - this includes infrastructure refurbishment, possibly new RVs, ICBM C2, etc. not just the missile.

 

[sferrin]

"Still, how can 450 or so new ICBM cost 60 billion to develop and produce? That's 133 million per missile. "

We haven't designed an ICBM for 30 years. Almost anybody who worked on the last design is either retired, working on other projects, and likely not even working for the same company. The industrial base for ICBMs will need to be built from the ground up. That costs money. There will be many delays and overruns due to lack of experience. That also costs money. Imagine if Ford hadn't designed a car since 1986, and not only couldn't they just poach some design engineers from Chevy or Jeep, but none of THOSE companies had designed a car for even longer. That's why it's expensive.

IIRC over on the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent Thread - adding to what sferrin has said - this includes infrastructure refurbishment, possibly new RVs, ICBM C2, etc. not just the missile.

And those silos are ancient and the ones that had been rebuilt (for Peacekeeper) were destroyed.

 

[marauder2048]

I am not so kind. There was once published in Armed Forces Review a nice, little worded article which pointed asked what constituted a "horde" and which pointed out the differences in each (up till that point) copy of Soviet Military Power. I suspect the author wasn't popular in the White House afterwards.

Still, I regard an attacker with a 4-to-1 advantage in armor as a horde since that advantage enables them to pin the defender frontally while enveloping both flanks.

It all depends on where they are deployed. Under Reagan, the estimate changed, with the geographic boundaries being pushed ever further eastward until the Urals were reached, whereas the NATO estimate remained firmly set in Western Europe and wasn't pushed a comparable distance to the East coast of the USA. "4-to-1" rolls easily off the tongue but without seeing where the Soviet armoured units are actually based and what means they have to deploy them to the Inner-German Border, it is a useless number. The real problem was in that means of deployment. In war time, railways and highways are going to be subject to interdiction and once you figure in the difference in NATO versus Warsaw Pact airforces, the numbers become a great deal more even.

Aside from river bridges, railways and highways were generally regarded as too easy to repair to be worth the effort.
The vulnerable chokepoints were the rail transloading complexes along the Russian-Polish border which NATO could not reach until the introduction of GLCM and Pershing II.

 

[sferrin]

I am not so kind. There was once published in Armed Forces Review a nice, little worded article which pointed asked what constituted a "horde" and which pointed out the differences in each (up till that point) copy of Soviet Military Power. I suspect the author wasn't popular in the White House afterwards.

Still, I regard an attacker with a 4-to-1 advantage in armor as a horde since that advantage enables them to pin the defender frontally while enveloping both flanks.

It all depends on where they are deployed. Under Reagan, the estimate changed, with the geographic boundaries being pushed ever further eastward until the Urals were reached, whereas the NATO estimate remained firmly set in Western Europe and wasn't pushed a comparable distance to the East coast of the USA. "4-to-1" rolls easily off the tongue but without seeing where the Soviet armoured units are actually based and what means they have to deploy them to the Inner-German Border, it is a useless number. The real problem was in that means of deployment. In war time, railways and highways are going to be subject to interdiction and once you figure in the difference in NATO versus Warsaw Pact airforces, the numbers become a great deal more even.

Aside from river bridges, railways and highways were generally regarded as too easy to repair to be worth the effort.
The vulnerable chokepoints were the rail transloading complexes along the Russian-Polish border which NATO could not reach until the introduction of GLCM and Pershing II.

And lets not forget that the USSR, knowing it was about to start a war, could easily move a lot of equipment West before kickoff time. So even if one had the weapons to hit those choke points, they'd already be past them.

 

[Rickshaw]

I am not so kind. There was once published in Armed Forces Review a nice, little worded article which pointed asked what constituted a "horde" and which pointed out the differences in each (up till that point) copy of Soviet Military Power. I suspect the author wasn't popular in the White House afterwards.

Still, I regard an attacker with a 4-to-1 advantage in armor as a horde since that advantage enables them to pin the defender frontally while enveloping both flanks.

It all depends on where they are deployed. Under Reagan, the estimate changed, with the geographic boundaries being pushed ever further eastward until the Urals were reached, whereas the NATO estimate remained firmly set in Western Europe and wasn't pushed a comparable distance to the East coast of the USA. "4-to-1" rolls easily off the tongue but without seeing where the Soviet armoured units are actually based and what means they have to deploy them to the Inner-German Border, it is a useless number. The real problem was in that means of deployment. In war time, railways and highways are going to be subject to interdiction and once you figure in the difference in NATO versus Warsaw Pact airforces, the numbers become a great deal more even.

Aside from river bridges, railways and highways were generally regarded as too easy to repair to be worth the effort.
The vulnerable chokepoints were the rail transloading complexes along the Russian-Polish border which NATO could not reach until the introduction of GLCM and Pershing II.

Bridges, "too easy to repair"? Well, I suppose it all depends on how long you expect the war to last. Wasn't it a week, usually before nuclear release in most scenarios?

In reality, bridges and railways and roadways are difficult to repair, bridges particularly to the point where they can carry sufficient loads to make it worthwhile. Once destroyed, their replacements would need to be redestroyed and redestroyed again.

 

[Rickshaw]

And lets not forget that the USSR, knowing it was about to start a war, could easily move a lot of equipment West before kickoff time. So even if one had the weapons to hit those choke points, they'd already be past them.

Except the massive redeployment westward would of course, alert NATO as to their plans, now wouldn't it?

One of the great myths about the Cold War was the predeployed "secret" Warsaw Pact materiale' depots and sites. After the Wall came down, guess what? They didn't exist.

Just like the CIA's "secret" Russian missile silos inside the war memorials didn't exist... :

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/July%202016/0716gb.pdf

GBSD

http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2016/July%202016/0716russia.pdf

Russia cheats

 

[bobbymike]

There was a post about the UK's 'new' D5 warhead that included some discussion about US/UK nuke weapons cooperation/collaboration. I knew I had posted something on the topic on the "News Only" thread, anyway found this:

U.S., U.K. to Deepen Cooperation on Warhead Designs: Report

Official documents show the United States and United Kingdom plan to deepen their cooperation on nuclear warhead designs, the London Guardian reports. Partially censored papers provided through an open-records request reveal the two longtime military allies' plans to increase collaboration on nuclear weapon work and the sharing of materials essential for the production and retention of warheads, the newspaper reported on Thursday. London and Washington are expected to formalize the terms of their enhanced nuclear cooperation in the coming weeks with a quiet signing ceremony in the U.S. capital of an updated Mutual Defense Agreement, according to the Guardian. The U.K. defense ministry said it anticipates the defense pact will be reauthorized before 2014 is over. The defense pact enables the United Kingdom to benefit from research and design work done in U.S. atomic weapon laboratories, much of which focuses on ways to ensure a reliable, safe and credible nuclear arsenal absent a return to testing. The Trident weapons deployed on both U.S. Ohio-class and British Vanguard-class ballistic missile submarines have long been assumed to be jointly designed and sustained by the two countries.


A paper written in preparation for the visit of a high-ranking U.S. atomic official to the Atomic Weapons Establishment in Aldermaston mentions "enhanced collaboration" on "nuclear explosive package design and certification," on "maintenance of existing stockpiles," and the "possible development of safer, more secure, warheads," the newspaper reported. A separate document characterizes the bilateral Mutual Defense Agreement as an accord that authorizes the two nations' respective "nuclear warhead communities to collaborate on all aspects of nuclear deterrence including nuclear warhead design and manufacture." A document prepared for senior British department heads asserts that physical "movements under the MDA do not involve nuclear weapons or devices" and thus the accord does not violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The papers were released to the Nuclear Information Service -- a nonprofit group that supports nuclear disarmament. Peter Burt, research manager for the organization, in an interview said the agreement was hypocritical and hurt international nonproliferation efforts. "If Iran and North Korea had signed a similar agreement for the transfer of nuclear weapons technology, the U.K. and U.S. would be branding them pariah nations and screaming for the toughest of international sanctions to be imposed," Burt said.

Again, my understanding is that US labs are getting around restrictions at home on new warhead designs working in the UK.

Notice the highlighted section, of interest, arms control zealots compare the US/UK to Iran/North Korea :

 

[bobbymike]

Still want to put all your deterrence eggs into the SLBM basket?

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/sub-spotting-technology-threatens-nuclear-deterence

 

[sferrin]

Still want to put all your deterrence eggs into the SLBM basket?

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/sub-spotting-technology-threatens-nuclear-deterence

LOL, well that didn't take as long as I thought. And here I've been told it's unpossible.

 

[marauder2048]

Bridges, "too easy to repair"? Well, I suppose it all depends on how long you expect the war to last. Wasn't it a week, usually before nuclear release in most scenarios?

In reality, bridges and railways and roadways are difficult to repair, bridges particularly to the point where they can carry sufficient loads to make it worthwhile. Once destroyed, their replacements would need to be redestroyed and redestroyed again.

Please re-read what I wrote: Aside from river bridges railways and roadways are too easy to repair. Laying or repairing track or filling in craters in roadways to make them serviceable was very
doable given the large number of Warsaw Pact independent engineering battalions specifically tasked, equipped and trained for that assignment.

And lets not forget that the USSR, knowing it was about to start a war, could easily move a lot of equipment West before kickoff time. So even if one had the weapons to hit those choke points, they'd already be past them.

Except the massive redeployment westward would of course, alert NATO as to their plans, now wouldn't it?

I think you are attributing surveillance capabilities to NATO that it didn't have (in fairly limited numbers) until the late 80's.

 

[marauder2048]

Still want to put all your deterrence eggs into the SLBM basket?

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/sub-spotting-technology-threatens-nuclear-deterence

LOL, well that didn't take as long as I thought. And here I've been told it's unpossible.

Actually, I was struck by just how devoid of technical matters the original Holmes paper was but then I saw that Holmes was citing "Daily Beast" and suddenly the target audience made sense.

 

[sferrin]

Still want to put all your deterrence eggs into the SLBM basket?

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/sub-spotting-technology-threatens-nuclear-deterence

LOL, well that didn't take as long as I thought. And here I've been told it's unpossible.

Actually, I was struck by just how devoid of technical matters the original Holmes paper was but then I saw that Holmes was citing "Daily Beast" and suddenly the target audience made sense.

Actually the original source is from Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, not Daily Beast.

http://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194060

 

[sferrin]

Bridges, "too easy to repair"? Well, I suppose it all depends on how long you expect the war to last. Wasn't it a week, usually before nuclear release in most scenarios?

In reality, bridges and railways and roadways are difficult to repair, bridges particularly to the point where they can carry sufficient loads to make it worthwhile. Once destroyed, their replacements would need to be redestroyed and redestroyed again.

Please re-read what I wrote: Aside from river bridges railways and roadways are too easy to repair. Laying or repairing track or filling in craters in roadways to make them serviceable was very
doable given the large number of Warsaw Pact independent engineering battalions specifically tasked, equipped and trained for that assignment.

And lets not forget that the USSR, knowing it was about to start a war, could easily move a lot of equipment West before kickoff time. So even if one had the weapons to hit those choke points, they'd already be past them.

Except the massive redeployment westward would of course, alert NATO as to their plans, now wouldn't it?

I think you are attributing surveillance capabilities to NATO that it didn't have (in fairly limited numbers) until the late 80's.

Not to mention if there is "no first use" exactly what did Kman plan to do about all that armor headed west for an "exercise".

 

[marauder2048]

Still want to put all your deterrence eggs into the SLBM basket?

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/sub-spotting-technology-threatens-nuclear-deterence

LOL, well that didn't take as long as I thought. And here I've been told it's unpossible.

Actually, I was struck by just how devoid of technical matters the original Holmes paper was but then I saw that Holmes was citing "Daily Beast" and suddenly the target audience made sense.

Actually the original source is from Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, not Daily Beast.

http://tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1194060

Yep. That's the one I was referring to by James R. Holmes. Check out the references. Not exactly unclassified Submarine Technology Symposium papers; this year's classified agenda is especially
drool worthy.

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/three_reasons_why_the_us_needs_a_replacement_nuclear_cruise_missile_109521.html

 

[bobbymike]

http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/07/06/once_again_why_a_no-first-use_policy_is_a_bad_very_bad_idea_109520.html

 

[bobbymike]

Smith Supports Triad, But Wants Fewer ICBMs

—Otto Kreisher7/7/2016

​The top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee agrees there is a need for a nuclear deterrent force and believes the strategic triad “still makes sense,” though he said the nation cannot afford the $1 trillion estimated cost for modernizing all three legs of the triad. “If we save some money there, we could address some of the other threats,” Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said Wednesday. He listed ISIS terrorists as “the biggest threat.” Speaking to defense reporters in Washington, D.C., Smith said the strategic missile submarines are “the easiest to hide and the safest,” and he supports building the new B-21 Long-Range Strike Bomber because the current force is aging and bombers have been useful in conventional conflicts, such as Iraq. “I think we can do with less ICBMs,” which are “the least survivable,” he said. The Navy has begun developing a replacement for the Ohio-class strategic submarines. The Air Force has awarded Northrop Grumman a contract to build at least 100 long-range stealthy B-21s, and is planning a replacement for the 450 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. Smith rebutted the Republican arguments that the US needed to match Russia’s nuclear force modernization, calling that “Cold War” thinking.
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As I mentioned up the thread some will focus on LRSO elimination, others on reducing or getting rid of the GBSD and mark my words when the time comes SSBN(X) numbers will be "re-evaluated" in light of "budgetary" issues.

They keep saying $1 trillion for Triad modernization and leave out the "over the next 30 years". Over that same time total government spending will approach $200 trillion with entitlement spending comprising anywhere from $120 trillion to $130 trillion of the total. When the last time a politician said "The $120 trillion we are spending on entitlements over the next 30 years is unaffordable you know 120 TIMES what the Triad will cost"

 

[kaiserd]

Smith Supports Triad, But Wants Fewer ICBMs

—Otto Kreisher7/7/2016

​The top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee agrees there is a need for a nuclear deterrent force and believes the strategic triad “still makes sense,” though he said the nation cannot afford the $1 trillion estimated cost for modernizing all three legs of the triad. “If we save some money there, we could address some of the other threats,” Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) said Wednesday. He listed ISIS terrorists as “the biggest threat.” Speaking to defense reporters in Washington, D.C., Smith said the strategic missile submarines are “the easiest to hide and the safest,” and he supports building the new B-21 Long-Range Strike Bomber because the current force is aging and bombers have been useful in conventional conflicts, such as Iraq. “I think we can do with less ICBMs,” which are “the least survivable,” he said. The Navy has begun developing a replacement for the Ohio-class strategic submarines. The Air Force has awarded Northrop Grumman a contract to build at least 100 long-range stealthy B-21s, and is planning a replacement for the 450 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. Smith rebutted the Republican arguments that the US needed to match Russia’s nuclear force modernization, calling that “Cold War” thinking.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I mentioned up the thread some will focus on LRSO elimination, others on reducing or getting rid of the GBSD and mark my words when the time comes SSBN(X) numbers will be "re-evaluated" in light of "budgetary" issues.

They keep saying $1 trillion for Triad modernization and leave out the "over the next 30 years". Over that same time total government spending will approach $200 trillion with entitlement spending comprising anywhere from $120 trillion to $130 trillion of the total. When the last time a politician said "The $120 trillion we are spending on entitlements over the next 30 years is unaffordable you know 120 TIMES what the Triad will cost"

Without getting into the politics of it would query why the hatred of entitlements (support for the poorest and most vulnerable in society) that's gets spent in and boasts the wider economy specifically in the context of versus spending on gold-plating each element of the nuclear triad and which associated spending has less of an impact on the wider economy.

The triad (and nuclear weapons in general) ia necessary evil but it makes sense not to overspend on/ get over ambitious with plans for weapons that (hopefully) will never be used.

Having an effective survivable triad is the name of the game, and given no one in US politics is remotely willing to pay for anything beyond this minimal level it is the only game in town.
Renewal of US forces badly needed but will self evidently have to be carefully managed (with difficult decisions to be made) if this is to be afforded
No one in interested in or wishes to fund a new arms race with Russia; perhaps people with your position can convince the US middle-upper class to pay tax increases for the nuclear forces you want?