starviking said:
Interesting viewpoint, though the public bragging about knowing Kim's location at around the 5:40 mark, then the flippant remark that their revelation will get someone killed is sickening (and also possibly aids Kim's future security).
I was taken aback by
that part of the conversation as well, but having followed their work for a while my impression is that since their process of discovery is informal, conversational and open source, that tone carries over to presentation as well. Their subject matter is distressing and it might be that when the mechanics of doing anything constructive at all about the situation are both unavoidable and nonetheless potentially dire some form of desensitization or glossing over happens. By this I don't of course seek to excuse or condone any adverse human rights implications and sincerely hope "Arms Control Wonk" will avoid any moral relativism in this regard in the future.
Now, here's a link from another conversation ("Nuclear Weapons NEWS ONLY") that I'd like to expand upon, regarding NK's missile development:
sferrin said:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-russia/north-korea-preparing-long-range-missile-test-ria-cites-russian-lawmaker-idUSKBN1CB21T
Such close relations as demonstrated
in this Reuters article (via sferrin) between NK and Russia, mutual trust even, should carry proportionate responsibility on the part of Putin's administration/"power vertical" in countering proliferation. Sadly, having become something of a rogue regime themselves, this signaling cannot be taken at face value and is probably a component of attempted reflexive control - in case of NK such contacts (and much less information exchanged) need not be public, after all.
Various factors of norks' recent headway will yet come to light, the interesting provenance of their rocket engines' most recent iteration being but one example. The overall capabilities (range) of their systems seem trained explicitly on the verge of US mainland yet remain somewhat ambiguous - this would be the "goldilocks zone" to goad US with a fig leaf of NK "not being entirely responsible" for bringing the situation to a head should something really untoward happen. Curious, given NK's stated priorities and the dire regime security implications (they really don't have a standalone concept of "national security", do they) of such tactics, wherein a form of regional deterrence would suffice or even be preferrable.
Meanwhile Russia remains remarkably blasé about Kim Jong-un having weaponry potentially putting Russia's land mass at far greater risk than that of the US. I'm sure Putin would like nothing more than the US becoming more bogged down in Korea (and/or Beijing becoming dependent on Moscow's "arbitration"). It remains to be seen whether the Trump administration (and Xi) will oblige and if so, how. Certainly Russia's western, southern and arctic military districts have taken clear precedence in the buildup of Russia's capabilities as demonstrated in the Zapad 2017 exercise and the more regular adjoining October maneuvers including, among other things, the whole of their strategic nuclear forces. Not perhaps incidentally, Kim Jong-un has become more bellicose toward the US pretty much concurrently.
Thus it would, IMHO, be instructive to look beyond the Kim dynasty's bellicosity, "juche" and idiosyncrasies and also view NK's recent actions as those of a client/vassal state and its wider geopolitical ramifications, especially (but not limited) to Russia as a self-serving patron. If all of this goes very much beyond opportunistically aligned interests only, the strategic and tactical implications in forming a rational response and regaining the initiative cannot be understated.
tempsreel.nouvelobs.com
