McDonnell Model 66 Air to Air Missile

[NMaude]

@pathology_doc, @T. A. Gardner, If you're looking for the groundbreaking MIT Radiation Laboratory 28 volume series in downloadable PDF versions here it is.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Would it be fair to consider that during the era in both terms of the X-4 Ruhrstal and Model 66, that the perceived threat was envisaged to be larger bomber formations, which as part of doctrine flew in ridged streams for navigation, mutual protection and bombing accuracy - hence making a stand-offish attack, "track it using a flare in the tail" wasn't just permissible for the era during and immediately Post-WWII, but a progressive stepping stone nonetheless, until technology meet envisaged demands?
Yes, sure, strategic bombers and bombing became more sophisticated, especially with the advent of atomic weapons.....

Regards
Pioneer

MCLOS was rapidly abandoned universally as unworkable for a SAM or AAM. The target in the 1943 - 1950 era was a high flying, subsonic, bomber assumed to be carrying a nuke but could be conventional too. The Russian view on this was stopping a WW-2 style 1000 bomber raid on a city. The US and British view was stopping nuclear bombers operating in small numbers both having largely given up the idea of mass raids when they could nuke a city with one or two planes.

If you look at the early US systems like JB-3 Tiamat, Ryan Firebird, or Sparrow, the US experimented with different guidance systems to include MCLOS, TV MCLOS, semi-active and active homing, onboard radar homing, and beam riding. They weren't sure what would work best so they tried as many options as they could dream up.

The usual assumption was the target would be at high to extremely high altitude and flying at up to about 600 mph and not radically maneuvering. AAM's didn't require a lot of maneuverability at the time, and it was accepted that you might have to fire several to take the target down. The US Navy wanted, in addition, very long-range capabilities for their missiles in this category. The USAF and US Army were satisfied with 30-ish mile ranges for SAM's because they assumed they could put the firing battery sufficiently far from the target. In AAM's the USAF was more concerned with the weight and size of their AAM's than range.

Jamming for the US and Britian was a serious concern, and both worked to make sure their systems were hard to jam. The Russians at this point hadn't really experienced heavy jamming so while a concern it wasn't a serious one for them. That would change later when they started getting the snot jammed out of their guidance systems.

 

[pathology_doc]

Merrill I. Skolnik and the books are Introduction to Radar Systems and Radar Handbook.

• Skolnik, Merrill I. Introduction to Radar Systems. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.
• Skolnik, Merrill I. Radar Handbook. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2008.

Now IIRC in the Radar Handbook (At least in the 1990 edition) chapter is a rather detailed chapter about radar guidance systems for AAMs and SAMs.

Thank you!

 

[pathology_doc]

@pathology_doc, @T. A. Gardner, If you're looking for the groundbreaking MIT Radiation Laboratory 28 volume series in downloadable PDF versions here it is.

God bless.

 

[NMaude]

God bless.

Thanks. One of these days I should find out if there's a place that does print order books and see if they can do hard-copy versions of each volume.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I paid $6.75 for my copy of that book back in 1982 in a second-hand store... (it's still penciled in on the front page).