We decided to start over at the crack of dawn on Monday, July 13. Thus, the F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter was born between July 13 and mid October — in a 90-day fire drill. Our team looked at every possible configuration of the aircraft we could imagine. We formed separate tri-company teams in Burbank to do preliminary design for each candidate aircraft and to estimate its weight, combat performance, and other characteristics. We absolutely refused to compromise in the area of low observability. Any candidate design which was not really stealthy was immediately dropped. We worked six- and seven-day weeks. Tempers often flared, but the work went on.
The options and decisions seemed endless. We debated such things as whether to go with two big tails or four smaller tails, or different engine air inlets, or different wings, or different internal weapons bays with different kinds of weapons bay doors. We worried over weight estimates and drag estimates. However, one thing did not change: The designs always included LO engine nozzles with pitch thrust vectoring. Our team continued to work intensely with General Electric and Pratt & Whitney to make this happen. Heppe was one of the great aeronautical engineers of his generation, and, at 64, he demonstrated that one more time during that intense summer of 1987. He had been at Lockheed since 1947, after completing postgraduate work at the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena. He understood both supersonic aerodynamics and stealth in great depth. He personally made all the major decisions. The rest of us supported him and Cantrell intensely.
It was a summer of imagination, invention, and engineering achievement. By Oct. 15, we believed we had converged on the best aircraft design we could conceive. It had the lightest weight and the best operational fighter performance. We froze the external geometry—known in the aircraft business as freezing the lines—and launched the very talented Lockheed-Boeing-General Dynamics YF-22A prototype design engineering team. Our technical course to winning was set. However, three years of intense systems engineering and detailed design engineering of the F-22 production aircraft were still ahead. And, the results of the great 90-day fire drill were not perfect. It was in April 1988, that Edsel “Ed” Glasgow, our Chief Flight Sciences Engineer and one of the true fathers of the F-22, told me that our prototype aircraft would not supercruise. He said that the supersonic aerodynamic drag at Mach 1.5 was too high. Shocked, I snapped at him, “Don’t tell me our damned problems; tell us how to fix them.” The next day he did.