LowObservable said:
Also, his focus was on quantity rather than rate.
Which is completely irrelevant since production rates are the direct implication of his analytical model.
Much in the same way that faster device speeds are an implication of Moore's Law rather than the law itself.
And it's that implication that has been empirically validated by practically every study on fighter costs over the last 75 years.
The nice thing about these analytical models and the studies that re-affirm them is that are much stronger
than the feeble anecdotes deployed in an attempt to explain them away.
LowObservable said:
In the latter case, it's less a matter of rate itself as the match between what the facilities were designed to do and the actual rate (see B-2). However, the picture gets confused as we move down the supply chain, where the supplier is producing similar or identical components for multiple aircraft.
Okay take mission systems: a dominant cost of modern fighters. They are in turn dependent on foundry
processes (e.g. MMICs, FPAs) where you don't have the same T/R module or even the same MMIC shared between aircraft.
Which means the buy rate only impacts that particular fighter.
The level of fungibility you imply does not really exist for modern fighters; what you'll find is that
when mission systems' vendors say two systems "share commonality" the reality is that they
share a common architecture.
LowObservable said:
That said, much of the recurring unit cost remains relatively unaffected by rate, so the cut of a few units should not have a major effect on system price.
I don't think you understand power laws.