Lockheed Martin AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW)

[bring_it_on]

Same thing that happened to Skybolt. It’s still canceled.

What are the odds that heads will be rolling, metaphorically speaking, in the senior USAF ranks if this happens?

Why would heads roll? They took a calculated risk which they are allowed to under the Mid tier acquisition track they are on. They backed the program, and are still backing it through completion. A MTA rapid prototyping program does not automatically qualify to become a program of record. These programs should be allowed to fail, or succeed and still not go anywhere based on decisions that the service makes after they have been green lighted to proceed into a 3-5 year rapid prototyping program. Heads would need to roll only if the analytical reasoning behind the current decision is deeply flawed. Interestingly, the service acquisition head said on a recent defense and aero podcast that they service will make the final production decision on the ARRW during the FY-25 budget process. So as minute as it is, they might still decide to buy a limited quantity, but as things stand it seems that they want to direct their hypersonic dollars into HACM. The AF has actually asked for $150 MM in FY-2024 funding to complete ARRW. They committed to a MTA and to develop fieldable prototypes and have not changed that approach.

 

[GeorgeA]

Same thing that happened to Skybolt. It’s still canceled.

What are the odds that heads will be rolling, metaphorically speaking, in the senior USAF ranks if this happens?

Zero. The SecAF was skeptical about the program even before he took office. The only way to save this program was for the testing to go perfectly, and it didn't. There isn't a natural constituency/"rice bowl" for this in the service or the Congress, so no one in the bureaucracy will be sticking their necks out to save it.

 

[bring_it_on]

Same thing that happened to Skybolt. It’s still canceled.

What are the odds that heads will be rolling, metaphorically speaking, in the senior USAF ranks if this happens?

Zero. The SecAF was skeptical about the program even before he took office. The only way to save this program was for the testing to go perfectly, and it didn't. There isn't a natural constituency/"rice bowl" for this in the service or the Congress, so no one in the bureaucracy will be sticking their necks out to save it.

It is beyond the SecAF. Air Force as a service has not committed a very large chunk of its budget to hypersonic programs and for good reasons since it is balancing its portfolio of platforms and weapons and has a few other more pressing priorities. I think the service will back programs once they can demonstrate affordable hypersonic capability with some moving target strike capability (I realize this is a bit of a chicken/egg problem). That may come by the end of the decade via a seeker integration on HACM. If that is done at even 60% the cost of a $8-10 MM ARRW, the service will back it into production. But we are far from that and the option with ARRW was to field a small number of very expensive systems that are still going to need 2-3 years to complete full development and transition into a stable service acquisition program. There seems to be a huge mismatch in some corners in terms of what folks think the AF should be emphasizing here vs all other competing priorities like fielding 72 fighters a year, building PGM inventory, and upgrading the current fleet..not to mention funding and fielding two legs of the triad. The AF seems to be comfortable taking a leading role on scramjet programs within the DOD both for cruise missile sized systems and larger systems aimed at aero vehicles. Given finite budgets, and the fact that the service is not funded to levels needed for it to modernize at the pace it needs to, this sounds like a sound investment strategy and a fairly calculated risk.

 

[Forest Green]

Air Force cracks open door on hypersonic ARRW, weeks after indicating it was shut - Breaking Defense

Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall told lawmakers Thursday that the service will make a decision on buying the hypersonic weapon after its prototyping phase concludes, a position seemingly at odds with testimony previously provided by the service’s acquisition lead.

breakingdefense.com

 

[CWilkinson]

Forest Green, interesting this April 27 Breaking Defense story came out after Navigational Warning released April 23 for May 2-4 for the Pacific Test Range...image form Dr Marco Langbroek twitter page found here.

https://twitter.com/x/status/1651600797594009601

View: https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1651600797594009601

 

[TomcatViP]

Do I am the only one that see there a grayout zone that looks a coffin?!

 

[NMaude]

Do I am the only one that see there a grayout zone that looks a coffin?!

Only if the spent stage lands on you.

 

[TomcatViP]

Probably more that if booster doesn't fire, you know where the program falls.

 

[Desertfox]

I believe ARRW was a quick and dirty design to get into the hypersonics game with a simple option in case the more advanced designs failed. HACM has apparently proved promising enough that ARRW is no longer needed, and that is perfectly fine.

 

[Josh_TN]

I think that’s roughly true. HACM likely has a lot of advantages in cost, potential rate of production, launch weight, and platform integration. Additionally I think it will be a lot easier to host a terminal guidance mode on a missile who’s top speed is only Mach 5-6 as opposed to huge speeds boost/gliders have to initially endure. HACM can likely use seeker and airframe tech that’s not much more exotic than BVR AAMs and ABM interceptors.

 

[bring_it_on]

I believe ARRW was a quick and dirty design to get into the hypersonics game with a simple option in case the more advanced designs failed. HACM has apparently proved promising enough that ARRW is no longer needed, and that is perfectly fine.

That is not true unless several technically well informed/qualified, and possibly even uniformed officers have been false in their statements that they are complementary capabilities. ARRW travels faster, farther, and will be available years sooner. It was born out of the same body of AFRL-DARPA collaboration that was initiated around the same time as the parent program of which HACM was born.

You can paint the narrative that HACM is more refined, and easier to field vs the somewhat troubled ARRW. That narrative will work until the HACM design actually goes into development (it just recently completed a design review) and enters testing and has a stellar flight test program (a dozen or so flight tests given its air-breathing?). That is years away. That level of maturity is probably unrealistic till the very tail end of the decade. ARRW on the other hand, can enter production inside a couple of years, probably before HACM even enters flight testing. This obviously assumes the ARRW test program is a success. Assuming a year to 18 months delay, it would be able to enter production in FY-2025 if it completes its flight testing and demonstrates performance and envelop to specs over the next year.

The AF used a similar argument to cancel HCSW (remember that?) and pursue the more risky ARRW because something better, smaller, and cheaper was just around the corner. How's that working out? Hypersonic weapon development revival is relatively new. The AF wanted to to be the first service to field this capability. It will now be the last. Fielding this requires budgetary and political commitment. While budgetary backing is lacking vs some other priorities, the AF will do a lot of harm if it ditches this because of test failures short of there being catastrophic design flaws that essentially necessitate a 2-3 year design fix (putting it at par with HACM timelines).

 

[bring_it_on]

Forest Green, interesting this April 27 Breaking Defense story came out after Navigational Warning released April 23 for May 2-4 for the Pacific Test Range...i

These things don't really have anything to do with one another. The AF clarified even earlier that the room for ARRW was open. The first time a high ranking official said this was Andrew Hunter in the Defense and Aero podcast with Vago Muradian a few weeks ago.

 

[donnage99]

I believe ARRW was a quick and dirty design to get into the hypersonics game with a simple option in case the more advanced designs failed. HACM has apparently proved promising enough that ARRW is no longer needed, and that is perfectly fine.

That is not true unless several technically well informed/qualified, and possibly even uniformed officers have been false in their statements that they are complementary capabilities. ARRW travels faster, farther, and will be available years sooner. It was born out of the same body of AFRL-DARPA collaboration that was initiated around the same time as the parent program of which HACM was born.

You can paint the narrative that HACM is more refined, and easier to field vs the somewhat troubled ARRW. That narrative will work until the HACM design actually goes into development (it just recently completed a design review) and enters testing and has a stellar flight test program (a dozen or so flight tests given its air-breathing?). That is years away. That level of maturity is probably unrealistic till the very tail end of the decade. ARRW on the other hand, can enter production inside a couple of years, probably before HACM even enters flight testing. This obviously assumes the ARRW test program is a success. Assuming a year to 18 months delay, it would be able to enter production in FY-2025 if it completes its flight testing and demonstrates performance and envelop to specs over the next year.

range difference is somewhat moot if HACM with its smaller and lighter profile can be carried by stealthy assets that can be much closer to the fight.

Strategically speaking, what critical mission would ARRW fill? what country's air defense can be so invulnerable to current offensive assets that warrantee a rushed but less capable hypersonic system right away rather than focus on funding HACM which is the true game changer especially that both army and navy can somewhat fill in the empty shoe for the time being with their own versions?

I really think had the program gone very smoothly, air force would not opt to buy enough of these expensive units to have strategic impact that justify its development in the first place. The whole thing just seems like a political move to please congress to begin with.

 

[bring_it_on]

range difference is somewhat moot if HACM with its smaller and lighter profile can be carried by stealthy assets that can be much closer to the fight.

That is debatable. We don't know how light, or small HACM is likely to be. The threshold platform for HACM is the F-15EX. Hardly small, or stealthy platform that can get close to the fight.

Strategically speaking, what critical mission would ARRW fill?

I don't know but I assume the Air Force would since they spent nearly a decade developing the underlying technology and then created a MTA program to field operational capability. At some point, it must have nailed down on a mission and need that this weapon satisfied.

I really think had the program gone very smoothly, air force would not opt to buy enough of these expensive units to have strategic impact that justify its development in the first place. The whole thing just seems like a political move to please congress to begin with.

The "political" move would have been to play nice and put $$ into a tri-service program as was the DOD plan. The AF decided to take a fairly significant amount of risk, ditch HCSW (shared industrial investment with Army & Navy), and back a technology and capability that it had organically developed with its research lab collaborating with DARPA. They did it because it was superior in terms of performance relevant to the mission. I believe Mike White went on record to describe the AF's move as bold and to support the notion that ARRW is a much higher performance system to HCSW.

This was an air-force decision that the current SecAF opposed from day-1 of his term . It would be very much a political and budgetary decision to axe it if it satisfies testing. I fail to see how selecting the ARRW, at the expense of HCSW was a politically accommodating move by the AF when keeping HCSW and putting ARRW on ice would have been far better and aligned with other DOD and Congressional investments at the time. I get the argument the AF is making which is essentially a budgetary argument against a token ARRW inventory. HACM will probably get them a larger inventory and it could very well end up costing half the amount as ARRW. But the other arguments like one making the other redundant goes against what the AF has said about these capabilities for close to a decade now.

I find it extremely surprising how the narrative that "HACM is the safer bet" has kind of taken off as the ARRW has had its ups and downs in testing (pun intended). The weapon hasn't even completed its CDR yet and folks seem to think its a low risk program vs something that has issues but is in active flight testing with actual hardware available for testing and leave behind capability. I guess we see something very similar (optimism) with digital engineering and NGAD..when by all accounts the first E series program of the air-force is looking at a three year delay. We all just seem to be more optimistic about the next best thing..

 

[Josh_TN]

I don’t think HACM is safer or completely overlaps the mission of ARRW. But I do think both programs use high speed to solve a dilemma the USAF has with regards to anti access and/or high priority targets: response time to suddenly detected mobile targets.

The issue with ARRW is that it is large and expensive enough that it’s fast response time really isn’t that useful - how often are you going to have a B-52 aloft and armed with these such that they can react to a suddenly appearing target? And how many targets can be engaged? While I think there was a mission and a goal for ARRW, the protracted development time combined with relative success of the HAWC program dramatically narrowed the use case and the window of time in which ARRW would be the only viable rapid response weapon. DoD is gearing up to crank out HACM like it was a standard SOW not a bespoke solution and the F-15 is going to be the initial platform, which will make vastly more availability for carriage and use than AGM-183. The Raytheon demonstrator was apparently very much pushed to be close to a prototype design to derisk. If you assume they can keep to their schedule (a big ask for any weapons program I know) there is only a window of a couple of years where ARRW is operational and HACM is not, and only with a very limited availability in terms of both missiles and platforms.

So I think it is fair to say that ARRW is a victim of HAWCs success (and it’s own development schedule slips) even though they do not map exactly to each other in capability and there is a defined mission for ARRW.

 

[bring_it_on]

The issue with ARRW is that it is large and expensive enough that it’s fast response time really isn’t that useful - how often are you going to have a B-52 aloft and armed with these such that they can react to a suddenly appearing target? And how many targets can be engaged?

Those are all legitimate questions that MUST have been satisfactorily answered when the service decide to pump a billion or so dollars into a formal development program approved by the senior most uniformed and civilian leaders in the service and backed by its research labs, the DOD wide hypersonic czar at the time, and of course the service's own munitions directorate. Heck, at one point the service even green-lit the HCSW effort which would have resulted in an even larger weapon. Also worth noting that the TBG parent investment goes back nearly a decade, and while the USAF has not funded it, other DOD agencies have funded follow on TBG work including ground launched and seeker integration.

So I think it is fair to say that ARRW is a victim of HAWCs success

I don't think that can or should be the case. ARRW is an operational prototype for a weapon in development. HAWC is an S&T program that led to the creation of an operational prototyping program that will not enter production (best case) till at least five years after a similar potential milestone for ARRW. That HAWC had a couple of successful tests gave the AF's political establishment enough ammo to punt hypersonic investments (where it really matters = procurement) outside of the FYDP.

I agree with that given the budgetary decisions but every other argument seems after the fact and them trying to justify their decision. They simply lack the funding to buy a token inventory of hypersonic weapons when they've steadily increased inventory level requirements for real and useful weapons like JASSM-ER from 7K in 2020 to 12k+ based on the current budget. The previous civilian service leadership was honest when HCSW was cancelled. They said that they would have liked to keep it and ARRW since it was a lower risk option with shared DOD investment, but they couldn't and chose the higher performing ARRW. A similar reason can easily be applied by Hunter and Kendall. There is little money in the munitions portfolio to facilitize and sustain a low rate hypersonic program. There isn't much room outside of the FYDP either but they don't have to say that since they can basically punt that to their successors a few years down the road.

 

[donnage99]

I don't know but I assume the Air Force would since they spent nearly a decade developing the underlying technology and then created a MTA program to field operational capability. At some point, it must have nailed down on a mission and need that this weapon satisfied.

The "political" move would have been to play nice and put $$ into a tri-service program as was the DOD plan. The AF decided to take a fairly significant amount of risk, ditch HCSW (shared industrial investment with Army & Navy), and back a technology and capability that it had organically developed with its research lab collaborating with DARPA. They did it because it was superior in terms of performance relevant to the mission. I believe Mike White went on record to describe the AF's move as bold and to support the notion that ARRW is a much higher performance system to HCSW.

I agree with the idea that air force (not exclusive branch here) typically bet and map out weapon procurements on very optimistic projection of nonexisting or immature technology.

Rarely anything is black and white or solely for one reason or motivation. I think there's significant political reason involved but the air force is also overconfident in how mature the technology is and mapped out a very unrealistic timeframe and testing objectives for ARRW. when all came crashing down the real mission is too niche to justify throwing more money at it.

 

[bring_it_on]

Rarely anything is black and white or solely for one reason or motivation. I think there's significant political reason involved but the air force is also overconfident in how mature the technology is and mapped out a very unrealistic timeframe and testing objectives for ARRW. when all came crashing down the real mission is too niche to justify throwing more money at it.

This may well be the case. But what are you basing this on? Even with the delays, the program will still conclude within the top end of the MTA time-frame which is a perfect case of "fly before you buy". A billion or so bought them that risk draw-down. Alternate would have been to transition an S&T program (TBG) into a POR whereas here they will, if successful, transition an operational prototyping effort, with fielded capability, into a POR. I get the argument that there simply isn't money to pump into this production program at this time (the same applies to HACM 3-4 year out BTW), but to pin this on performance and lack of need is ridiculous and would require some great substantiation as to how it was useful just 3 years ago but isn't now and what alternatives have been exercised to meet that need. The service has not made that case, either in Congressional testimony or any other public forum. We can't since we lack the data. All we know was that the moment FK was sworn in, he was opposed to this program and I seriously doubt that in his early days he did some detailed operational analysis and derived that conclusion as opposed to just the program not aligning with his direction for the AF budget.

They are doing exactly what they can do - remove FY-2024 funding because the test program has not concluded. They can't make a case going forward because they haven't grounded their argument in facts and analysis and Congress will see through that. This will come back if the program succeeds and overcomes challenges and the service will then have to make a detailed case on why it isn't moving into production. The only argument that can be substantiated, with what we presently know from open source, is a budget based argument. I am not opposed to it, but the current administration frames that as them optimizing with their OMB provided topline whereas the previous leadership framed that as a desire to get more because of the importance of these and other capabilities. That's more of a stylistic difference but the picture doesn't really change. There is no money to stand up a token production capability when they are looking at four year MYP's for hot production lines with other more mature weapons like Stormbreaker, SiAW etc waiting in the pipeline for ramp up later this decade.

 

[MihoshiK]

So apparently this is deader than a dodo.

US Air Force drops Lockheed hypersonic missile after failed tests

The service's acquisition chief made the comments a day after Secretary Frank Kendall told lawmakers the latest ARRW test failed.

www.defensenews.com

" “While the Air Force does not currently intend to pursue follow-on procurement of ARRW once the prototyping program concludes, there is inherent benefit to completing the all-up round test flights to garner the learning and test data that will help inform future hypersonic programs,” Hunter wrote."

 

[bring_it_on]

The AF has since clarified, including in budgetary testimony, that this relates to FY-2024 procurement, and that any decision regarding FY-25 procurement will happen once testing is concluded and they analyze the value of pursuing production beyond any leave behind capability from the OTA effort.

 

[Forest Green]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1686371269380542464

View: https://twitter.com/Marco_Langbroek/status/1686371269380542464?s=20

 

[NMaude]

Lets hope this test goes off without any hiccups.

 

[Forest Green]

I'm sure it will.

 

[NMaude]

Defence Updates has put out a video about the latest AGM-183A test:

The US Air Force on August 19 conducted its latest test of a prototype hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon or ARRW.This was the first test attempt since an unfortunate failed test in March this year.The US Air Force said in a statement that a B-52H Stratofortress released a fully operational prototype ARRW, known as an ‘all-up round’, off the coast of Southern California.

The service stated that the test was meant for collecting data that it hopes will help it develop future weapons that can travel at greater than Mach 5. The service declined to comment on its particular goals and stopped short of confirming or denying whether it thought the test was successful.

In this video, Defense Updates analyzes why the US military testing ARRW that was previously acknowledged to be a failure ?

I checked on the AGM-183's wiki page and the USAF hasn't yet stated whether or not the test was successful.

 

[Ronny]

In short, it failed yet again or only successful in basic meaningless stuff like: “successful dropped from airplane” or “successful ignite”

 

[Scott Kenny]

ARRW is a rocket, right? Not a Scramjet? What is so hard about getting a rocket to drop and ignite off a B-52?

 

[Moose]

Hypersonic separation of the glide vehicle is probably the hardest part, but the most common AGM-183 failure cited in the past has been failure to ignite. Considering the depth of experience the team has with solid motors, I'd say its likely a software issue rather than hardware. Or its one hell of an igniter design flaw.

 

[bobbymike]

I went to my local hobby shop and sent these to the USAF.

 

[Ronny]

ARRW is a rocket, right? Not a Scramjet? What is so hard about getting a rocket to drop and ignite off a B-52?

Ironic enough, the scramjet HAWC actually a lot more successful, HAWC success 4 out of 5 times while ARRW failed all except for a singular booster test

 

[sferrin]

When has that ever stopped them?

View attachment 696433
View attachment 696434
View attachment 696435
View attachment 696436
View attachment 696437

Put another log on the fire:

 

[Forest Green]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1721921453136716286

View: https://twitter.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1721921453136716286?s=20

 

[sferrin]

I'll believe it when I see it at this point. I would be delighted to be wrong.

 

[bring_it_on]

Currently, Lockheed Martin is partnering with the U.S. Air Force to conduct the All-Up-Round (AUR) flight test series for ARRW and has completed multiple successful missions which are designed to systematically validate the missile’s operational end-to-end capability at hypersonic speeds – from aircraft release to target impact.

Hypersonics: Rocket Science Meets Critical Capability

Hypersonic missiles continue to be an enticing effort for the U.S. Government.

www.lockheedmartin.com

 

[sferrin]

Hypersonics: Rocket Science Meets Critical Capability

Hypersonic missiles continue to be an enticing effort for the U.S. Government.

www.lockheedmartin.com

Has anything happened since the August 19th failure or are they just repackaging old information here?

 

[bring_it_on]

Has anything happened since the August 19th failure or are they just repackaging old information here?

I have not read any AF statement on the August tests results. They conducted the programs last flight test a few days ago.

 

[Forest Green]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1725132460525064461

View: https://twitter.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1725132460525064461?s=20

https://twitter.com/x/status/1725137237963133039

View: https://twitter.com/AirPowerNEW1/status/1725137237963133039?s=20

 

[kqcke for you]

I take 600 please

 

[Josh_TN]

I take 600 please

More likely it doesn’t get purchased. Even if it were picked up, it seems more likely it would be in dozens, not hundreds.

 

[NMaude]

Defence Updates has just put out a new video about the ARRW:

The Pentagon is not giving up on Air-launched Rapid Response Weapons or ARRW yet.

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said the service was waiting on the conclusion of all-up-round tests for the hypersonic Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon before officials make a procurement decision.

This comes approximately a month following the testimony of acquisition chief Andrew Hunter, wherein he appeared to convey to lawmakers in written testimony that the service had no intentions of purchasing it after the prototyping phase concludes.

This is an interesting development.

In this video, Defense Updates analyzes why ARRW is still in the reckoning for serial production ?

 

[flateric]

Do we really need these narrative vids, full of ads, with 'news' from the web dated April when ARRW actually went to limbo with zero funding in the next FY? Scott, it's fcuking dead.