The problem with road and train mobile missiles is likely security and cost
If this were the case, why does the US transport nuclear warheads in normal semi-trailers now?
Pantex no longer uses White Trains. It uses semi-trailer trucks with nuclear warheads in the back or it uses normal cargo trains. It's transported in the same manner as any other form of cargo. This is cheaper, it is vastly more effective than "security" that cannot shoot protesters, and it is less likely to be intercepted by malicious or nefarious subversive parties because it is neither public nor noticeable from any other form of cargo.
The driver is armed with a carbine, or a handgun, which is all the security you really need on America's highways and truck stops.
My point is that if you replace the Pantex trucks with just a 53-foot container that resembles externally a normal semi-trailer, but is staffed by a couple Airmen with a Grease Gun and a laptop between them, and carries a Midgetman, you could deploy a few hundred of these on America's highways. No security needed. If someone finds one missile, well they found one missile, so what? Just arrest them for tampering with government property and try them for espionage.
The purpose is that there are no overt security measures beyond protecting the vehicle from hijacking, maybe, because overt security measures invite electronic eyes to oogle you. Such anti-hijacking measures would be a pair of fit young men in the cab and a rifle, shotgun, or submachine gun in the door. Less to keep the enemy from finding out your dastardly plan (it would hardly be a secret after a couple years, everyone in the U.S. would know any random truck or train could be carrying nuclear missiles), and more to keep some car thieves from blowing up their neighborhood by trying to cut open a nuclear missile to get the copper, and igniting the solid fuel motor by accident.
If you don't want to be observed, but are being observed continuously, you simply don't make yourself noticeable and act like you're supposed to be there.
more than any perceived need to separate military targets from civilian. That and the fact that the US already has the majority of its warheads on hidden mobile launchers.
This is a rather bizarre statement, because it's wrong, and obviously so. The majority of US strategic warheads are deployed on the Minuteman III force. The US deploys 450 Minutemen IIIs with three warheads each. It deploys, barely, over half as many Tridents. It has 1,365 strategic warheads between the 76 B-52Hs, 450 LGM-30s, and ~280 UGM-133s. Nuclear force deployments are no longer obscure and haven't been secret for decades, neither to amateurs nor to experts, and the US is the least likely to be cheating since sticking to the treaties is in its best interest: it's the one writing them!
The Trident force typically deploys with fewer than three or four warheads on a missile, and several have a single warhead for the hard target optimized (read: old, outdated, and unreliable) W-76-1. The majority of the US's 14 SSBNs are not on patrol at any one time either. I think they actually rotate the warheads around the ships, with incoming ships swapping warheads with the outgoing ones, which is part of the job the USN's Missile Technician rating.
Neither Russia nor China are known to deploy their missiles in such fashion either.
I don't know what you mean by this. Both Russia and China have SSBNs.
As I said too, the
Molodets launch complex was disguised externally as a passenger train, for purposes of evading tracking by ground observers and satellite detection. The USSR was very much aware it was under an electronic eye of a world superpower, except unlike most superpowers these days, it actually took measures to deal with this. Sometimes.
RT-23 ran on passenger routes and was withdrawn not because it was ineffective, but because it lacked spare parts, while the Topol-M was already doing the same job better in terms of accuracy and availability of spare parts.
The “nuclear sponge” strategy is I think something applied retroactively to the existing infrastructure rather a posture specifically adopt by the US. I don’t think it presumes that civilian targets won’t be hit so much as it assumes some of the silos will survive or alternatively they will absorb a disproportionate amount of warheads-one or the other.
Except the USSR never targeted US silos, it targeted US cities, and it wasn't interested in targeting silos because it didn't believe it was important.
All US silos will survive, and they will absorb zero warheads, which makes the US obsession with their hardiness...odd, to say the least. The Soviet Union did not consider American focus on defending its silos to be of serious concern (it did not believe that ABM systems were particularly effective in defending against mass raids due to the discrimination problem) and it did not consider the SDI system to be particularly threatening in its "counter-value" emphasis, but more importantly it considered the lack of a deployment of an ABM system around D.C. to be indicative that the US had almost equally little faith in such a concept.
Russia has maintained both of these viewpoints, as evidenced by its further development of the Vanguard hyperglider (a Soviet system designed to evade the X-ray laser satellite and Brilliant Pebble ABM satellite) and the relative lack of development of the Gorgon ABM complex.
So what is purpose of having 1,400 land-based silo missiles if it was not to ensure that silos could die along with the cities then? Quite simply, it was to ensure that the Soviet strategic missile force would survive contact with SAC, be able to launch peri-attack or post-attack, and retain sufficient heavyweight ICBMs survive their initial ascent through nuclear detonations, ash clouds, and X-ray scattering/ionization caused by SRAM/ALCM/gravity bomb/Minuteman/Trident/Polaris to make it through the US orbital defense grid and obliterate New York City, Los Angeles, and D.C., and a few other major cities.
The USSR never had launch-on-warning, it lacked the technical capacity to deploy a globe-spanning satellite complex (Almaz was an attempt to develop a MOL-style orbital reconnaissance system, to detect new US silo developments, but was eventually discarded as the USSR realized it could simply look at map atlas and hit cities I suppose), so it required a massive stockpile to ensure sufficient missile strength survived a strategic exchange. Approximately 20 or so missiles of the complex R-36M2 would be required to vaporize both US coastal megacities to a state of uninhabitability, give or take a few, and the USSR had about 200-300 of them and the -UTTh, both with 10 warheads between 550-1000 kilotons.
The deployment of Perimetr automatic launch complex in 1984 is sufficient to demonstrate the sort of constraints the Soviets were working under, though. Much like the Americans' Emergency Rocket Communication System, but far more than just a command launch system, Perimetr is what helps the MOD make rational decisions regarding attack postures given the 4 to 7 minutes warning time they would have had before a missile impact in Moscow.
The fact that the Strategic Rocket Forces feel that approximately 70 silo based missiles and approximately 150 road based missiles is enough to defeat the US in a nuclear exchange (for the land forces anyway) is why it's generally believed that Russia has developed, at least partly successfully, the functional rudiments of a launch-on-warning system. It also (likely, correctly) believes that detecting and destroying a mobile missile unit before it launches is easier said than done. Desert Storm probably had a lot to do with this, as even with the JSTARS the USAF was unable to stop the Hussenite Scuds. The greater quantity of silo-based missiles is because of the dispersion of the silo fields among the Topol-Ms due to the threat of F-35 and Small Diameter Bomb/Conventional Trident on the Dombarovskiy missile forces.
All this was not because the USSR planned to fight a war after only being provoked, but rather because the USSR and the MOD were not stupid and that they knew that it was impossible to always catch the enemy with his pants down. Preferably it would be a surprise, "bolt from the blue" attack on American cities that kills the few hundred millions on the East and West coasts that power the US economy and war machine, but the US could easily do the same if it so desired, and so the missile forces needed to be large enough to make targeting them very tough.
The broad strokes plan got a wrench thrown it in by the rapid pace of US hard target accuracy capability, and by the late 1980's it was a dubious proposition with the deployment of Trident and the Ohios and their superior accuracy methods of gravimetric sensors and highly accurate gyroscopes, but by then the USSR was going to be fielding a true launch-on-warning system in the 1990's or 2000's and was programmed in. We know what happened next. Said launch-on-warning system was completed, likely adequately, by Russia.
However, this was the actual Soviet planning methodology, and we know this because it's not a secret anymore.
The assumption was that Soviet civil defense would be robust enough to ensure that pockets of civilization continued to exist throughout the USSR (both pockets and civilization are relative here, Moscow and Leningrad would be gone, as would most other major cities), that the NATO backbone (America) would be so thoroughly economically and demographically damaged to be out of the fight in the long run (perhaps for the entire duration of the post-attack war), and that the surviving Red Army troops in nuclear protected posture in Eastern Europe would be adequate to bulldoze the surviving NATO forces.
It was a pretty heady time, but not as heady as American bureaucrats inventing weird strategies based on the American idea that armies are civilized enough to keep a strategic nuclear war limited to the peripheries of polite society in the fields and mesas far from city centers. The USSR was the underdog in the fight and was aiming for the throat, not the ankle, because it knew where America's true strengths were: its finance economy. To defeat that would require destroying the biggest cities in the world, which is what the USSR planned to do, and likely what Russia still plans for.
As I said, the explicit targeting of materiel to the exclusion of more productive elements of the war economy is a uniquely American idea. The Soviets explicitly targeted capital/finance centers and population itself, to the exclusion of the more offensive/explicitly military materiel elements, which were the real lynch pins of the US war economy. This is where the US was simultaneously strongest (in its ability to passively exert influence) and weakest (in its vulnerability), as proven in WW2 when the USA won the war with its money and its productive urban factories, not with its meager pre-war ground army and Cavalry combat cars.
The Soviets and USA were simply too evenly matched in the military realm writ large for direct targeting of military forces, strategic or otherwise, by strategic weapons to meaningfully change the COFM.
Mobile only makes sense to me if it's underground inside a secured site moving between redundant silos.
Such a Rube Goldberg machine would make targeting trivial, as Iran shows. Just hit the "silos"/launch rails, entry doors, air vents, and let the garrison suffocate. You could probably do it with a couple F-15Es.
Dispersion in the face of lethality is the only meaningful way to survive. Being unlikely to be acknowledged as a target, i.e. blending in with civilian traffic, is a widely accepted and recognized method of avoiding being targeted. Naval ships do it all the time with carriers and destroyers pretending to be cargo ships or cruise ships using deceptive lightning and emissions practices, and moving in civil traffic lanes at civil speeds. They do this out of necessity, of course.
For some reason armies and air forces are averse to this, at least for now. Maybe armies will start shifting away from specific, high visibility, readily tracked and targeted platforms, and more towards general purpose platforms derived from/identical to common civilian equipment. I know the Swedish Army uses the Mercedes Sprinter work van as a transport for some motorized infantry units, but it's army green, and not particularly well camouflaged for that reason.
tl;dr It would be quite forward thinking to deploy a missile force disguised as civilian cargo trucks and passenger trains, but so far only the Soviet Union has bothered doing anything comparable to this. It has been successfully demonstrated on smaller scales by dozens of Asian militia and military groups for the past, well, forever more or less, and has likely been successful more than it hasn't.
There's no particular reason to dismiss mobile missiles, merely to think about them as insurgents or guerrilla nuclear forces, and simply map the difficulty America had in targeting guerrillas and insurgents hiding in the civilian population in Afghanistan and Iraq (or Vietnam or Korea, for that matter) "surgically" onto an adversary attempting to target a nuclear missile force hiding among the civilian shipping trains/trucks and passenger trains in America, which possesses the most expansive railroad system and expansive highway/gravel road system in the world. Plenty of room to hide.
It's not as if a strategic nuclear exchange would bother sparing Amtraks or tractor-trailers, after all. Those would be tertiary targets, after major cities' downtown commerce centers as primary and suburban sprawl secondarily, whereas missile silos and bomber bases might not even make the list to begin with.
That this hasn't been considered (who knows, perhaps it has) is mostly because Sentinel is meant to replace aging components (main stack solid rocket boosters, mainly) of the relatively decrepit (compared to Russia and China) land-based strategic missile force of the USAF. It's not intended to offer any greater capability than Minuteman, but rather to offer a functional level of reliability under combat conditions, which the USAF probably sorely lacks. This is why it's progressing so rapidly.