LGM-35A Sentinel - Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) program

[RyanC]

So basically, USAF wants to replace Minuteman III with another ICBM....that still uses the same silo and C3I network from Minuteman; going into the ground by 2030 at least. :


Just in time for laser defenses to be deployed operationally. B)

 

[sferrin]

So basically, USAF wants to replace Minuteman III with another ICBM....that still uses the same silo and C3I network from Minuteman; going into the ground by 2030 at least. :


Just in time for laser defenses to be deployed operationally. B)

FWIW, we do know something at least as big a Peacekeeper will fit in them.

 

[RyanC]

The latest "nuclear revival" stats have me scratching my head to be honest:

SSBN(X) to replace Ohios
SLBM(X)? to fit in SSBN(X)? -- not explicitly stated but it's somewhat implied.
GBSD (aka ICBM(x) to replace Minuteman III)
B61 Life Extension (yet again) for LRS-B and legacy bombers
ALCM(X) for LRS-B and legacy bombers
LRS-B aka B-3

Plus the USAF and USN are already looking at F-X (USAF) and FA-XX (USN) for sixth generation fighters.

Seeing as how Burke Flight III was slaughtered to pay for SSBN(X) taking up 60% of the USN's shipbuilding budget for the next 20 years, and the history of 2/3 of all the primes surviving in the big aerospace business for horrible cost overruns (LockMart and NoGrum), I'm not optimistic on the other programs maintaining their neat programmed budgetary spaces. :-[

If it was up to me, I'd consolidate the nuclear forces into:

Ballistic Life Extension Program (BLEP) to extend Trident and Minuteman life to 2030.

SRAM III for tactical and strategic platforms to replace B61 and ALCM-N.

Accuracy is enough now with cruise missiles that we can use conventional cruises in a SIOP role to take down radar sites (JASSM-ER could fill that role nicely if it was hardened somewhat for a nuclear environment).

The big new manned aircraft program would be:

Joint Strike Aircraft -- similar in size to a A-5 Vigilante; procured for both the USN and USAF -- 78,000 lb MTOW; supercruise built in along with some signature reduction; internal bomb bay, etc.

 

[bobbymike]

STRATCOM CINC Gen Kowalski says the differences between the GBSD and MMIII is range, payload and accuracy. So it appears we are talking about a larger missile or maybe something with a higher energetic solid propellant IMHO.

 

[marauder2048]

STRATCOM CINC Gen Kowalski says the differences between the GBSD and MMIII is range, payload and accuracy. So it appears we are talking about a larger missile or maybe something with a higher energetic solid propellant IMHO.

Under New START, there is no longer a restriction on throw weight which opens things up a bit.

 

[Triton]

I was wondering when we were going to get around to replacing the LGM-30G Minuteman-III missiles. Hopefully, the United States Air Force intends to also upgrade the computers in the silos and retires the 8-inch (200 mm) floppy disk.

I was disappointed that the MGM-134A Midgetman was cancelled in 1992. It seems to me that we should have had mobility to some of our land-based nuclear deterrent due to the vulnerability of missile silos to attack. I wonder if the United States could have constructed something similar to the Club-K Container Missile System inside ISO shipping containers.

Perhaps the timing is right for modernization of our land-based nuclear deterrent with increased tensions with the People's Republic of China and Cold War 2.0 with the Russian Federation.

 

[marauder2048]

I was wondering when we were going to get around to replacing the LGM-30G Minuteman-III missiles. Hopefully, the United States Air Force intends to also upgrade the computers in the silos and retires the 8-inch (200 mm) floppy disk.

I was disappointed that the MGM-134A Midgetman was cancelled in 1992. It seems to me that we should have had mobility to some of our land-based nuclear deterrent due to the vulnerability of missile silos to attack. I wonder if the United States could have constructed something similar to the Club-K Container Missile System inside ISO shipping containers.

Perhaps the timing is right for modernization of our land-based nuclear deterrent with increased tensions with the People's Republic of China and Cold War 2.0 with the Russian Federation.

The end of the ABM treaty and the advent of Hit-to-kill interceptors radically changes the vulnerability equation of silos; we can defend
the silos with as many interceptors as we wish and a nuclear weapons release authorization is not required to begin launching interceptors.

Most mobility schemes end up looking an awful lot like Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) because of the security, reliability and "public interface" issues of continuously mobile schemes.

The ISO shipping container scheme, like other concealment schemes, quickly runs afoul of treaty (e.g. New START) verification requirements.

 

[sferrin]

I was wondering when we were going to get around to replacing the LGM-30G Minuteman-III missiles. Hopefully, the United States Air Force intends to also upgrade the computers in the silos and retires the 8-inch (200 mm) floppy disk.

I was disappointed that the MGM-134A Midgetman was cancelled in 1992. It seems to me that we should have had mobility to some of our land-based nuclear deterrent due to the vulnerability of missile silos to attack. I wonder if the United States could have constructed something similar to the Club-K Container Missile System inside ISO shipping containers.

Perhaps the timing is right for modernization of our land-based nuclear deterrent with increased tensions with the People's Republic of China and Cold War 2.0 with the Russian Federation.

The end of the ABM treaty and the advent of Hit-to-kill interceptors radically changes the vulnerability equation of silos; we can defend
the silos with as many interceptors as we wish and a nuclear weapons release authorization is not required to begin launching interceptors.

Most mobility schemes end up looking an awful lot like Multiple Protective Shelters (MPS) because of the security, reliability and "public interface" issues of continuously mobile schemes.

The ISO shipping container scheme, like other concealment schemes, quickly runs afoul of treaty (e.g. New START) verification requirements.

I personally liked the idea of co-locating a LoADS interceptor and it's radar with each MX missile. At a stroke it doubled the number of RVs the other side would have to expend to be sure of a kill. And they've been looking at Terminal defense against ICBMs with KKVs for some time now. HEDI was the first (that I know of).

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/ait.htm

 

[Triton]

Thanks marauder2048 and sferrin for the information.

 

[Jemiba]

Is it just me, or does the graphic artist of this poster/advert really seem to have been
influenced by another artist ?
But it's not a bad idea at all, presenting this theme to a wider public in an adequate way !

 

[marauder2048]

Is it just me, or does the graphic artist of this poster/advert really seem to have been
influenced by another artist ?
But it's not a bad idea at all, presenting this theme to a wider public in an adequate way !

It really does have that breezy feel to it doesn't it? I just felt the Army was trying to highlight its bitchin' workforce

 

[phrenzy]

Will this include new pen aids and other survivable measures or is it just a new missile system?

Considering that the Chinese think they can hit a moving ship with a ballistic reentry vehicle you'd have to think that a future US system will have a pretty impressive CEP.

I wonder if some of the long overdue warhead upgrades will be done at the same time. I wonder how long major powers can manage to confidently maintain a stockpile without any task testing. This missile system could be fielding warheads 50 years after the last US test, surely at some point things ate going to get a little dicey as to reliability and new designs. I know they have pretty clever people and pretty super computers to deal with these problems but there has to be a limit to what you can do with simulations.

 

[marauder2048]

Will this include new pen aids and other survivable measures or is it just a new missile system?

Considering that the Chinese think they can hit a moving ship with a ballistic reentry vehicle you'd have to think that a future US system will have a pretty impressive CEP.

I wonder if some of the long overdue warhead upgrades will be done at the same time. I wonder how long major powers can manage to confidently maintain a stockpile without any task testing. This missile system could be fielding warheads 50 years after the last US test, surely at some point things ate going to get a little dicey as to reliability and new designs. I know they have pretty clever people and pretty super computers to deal with these problems but there has to be a limit to what you can do with simulations.

The USAF has expressed interest in using the MaRV the Navy was/is developing for Conventional Trident which IIRC, has an objective CEP of 10m(!). I don't believe that particular MaRV was intended to be an evader so the point about penaids is highly relevant and was brought up during the Senate ratification process for New START.

 

[bobbymike]

Will this include new pen aids and other survivable measures or is it just a new missile system?

Considering that the Chinese think they can hit a moving ship with a ballistic reentry vehicle you'd have to think that a future US system will have a pretty impressive CEP.

I wonder if some of the long overdue warhead upgrades will be done at the same time. I wonder how long major powers can manage to confidently maintain a stockpile without any task testing. This missile system could be fielding warheads 50 years after the last US test, surely at some point things ate going to get a little dicey as to reliability and new designs. I know they have pretty clever people and pretty super computers to deal with these problems but there has to be a limit to what you can do with simulations.

The USAF has expressed interest in using the MaRV the Navy was/is developing for Conventional Trident which IIRC, has an objective CEP of 10m(!). I don't believe that particular MaRV was intended to be an evader so the point about penaids is highly relevant and was brought up during the Senate ratification process for New START.

The head of the Navy's strategic systems program talked about the Mk5 RV as having an accuracy that the aim point is inside the non-explosive crater. A new ICBM should definitely be this accurate.

 

[marauder2048]

The head of the Navy's strategic systems program talked about the Mk5 RV as having an accuracy that the aim point is inside the non-explosive crater. A new ICBM should definitely be this accurate.

Is that the baseline, ballistic only Mk5 RV? I ask because the estimated impact crater size for that class of RV is approximately 10m in radius.

 

[bobbymike]

The head of the Navy's strategic systems program talked about the Mk5 RV as having an accuracy that the aim point is inside the non-explosive crater. A new ICBM should definitely be this accurate.

Is that the baseline, ballistic only Mk5 RV? I ask because the estimated impact crater size for that class of RV is approximately 10m in radius.

From the CRS Report on Prompt Global Strike

Reentry Vehicle Research
In FY2003, the Navy requested funding for research on a new type of guided reentry vehicle that
could significantly improve the accuracy of the Trident II (D-5) missiles. This program, known as
the enhanced effectiveness (E2) initiative, included an initial funding request of $30 million, a
three-year study, and a full-scale flight test in early 2007.29 Congress rejected the initial funding
request in FY2003 and FY2004, but Lockheed Martin Corporation, the contractor pursuing the
study, continued with a low level of research into this system.

The E2 reentry vehicle would have integrated the existing inertial measurement unit (IMU)
guidance system (the system currently used to guide long-range ballistic missiles) with global
positioning system (GPS) technologies so that the reentry vehicle could receive guidance updates
during its flight.30 A standard MK4 reentry vehicle, which is the reentry vehicle deployed on
many Trident SLBMs, would be modified with a flap-based steering system, allowing it to
maneuver when approaching its target to improve its accuracy and increase its angle of
penetration. This steering system, which the Navy referred to as a “backpack extension,” would
increase the size of the reentry vehicle, making it comparable in size to the MK5 reentry vehicle
that is also deployed on Trident missiles. The E2 warhead could possibly have provided Trident
missiles with the accuracy to strike within 10 meters of their intended, stationary targets. This
accuracy would not only improve the lethality of the nuclear warheads but it would also permit
the missiles to destroy some types of targets with conventional warheads.31
--------------------------------------------
Sorry it was a modified Mk4

 

[Triton]

How many launch failures are expected with the current Minuteman III and the new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)? How reliable are our ICBMs?

 

[bobbymike]

How many launch failures are expected with the current Minuteman III and the new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)? How reliable are our ICBMs?

The general consensus in the 80's was 90% launch rate or 10% failure. Now 25+ years later who knows. Part of the reason why we need a new missile that can be tested extensively with new modern more robust electronics and targeting/RV systems.

It worries me to this day that there has never been a launch from an operational silo in the US.

 

[Rickshaw]

It worries me to this day that there has never been a launch from an operational silo in the US.

Has any other nation carried out such a test?

Where? When?

 

[bobbymike]

It worries me to this day that there has never been a launch from an operational silo in the US.

Has any other nation carried out such a test?

My understanding is that USSR/Russia has launched quite a few from operational silos as well as from their mobile systems like the SS-27, SS-24 (rail) and Yars, which while obviously different still displays, IMHO, a much closer to operational test than pulling a missile from ND and taking it Vandy.

Russia fires missile from operational base

One such example
Published: 2004 Dec. 22

Russian Strategic Missile Forces, RVSN, launched its largest Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, ICBM from an operational base in the south of the country.

The R-36M-2 Voevoda missile, capable of carrying 10 warheads, blasted off from a silo facility of the 13th missile regiment deployed near the town of Dombarovka in Orenburg Region at the border with Kazakhstan at 11:30 Moscow Time on Wednesday, December 22, 2004.

 

[Rickshaw]

From what I've been able to gather about that test is that it appears to actually have been unusual, even for the Russians up till then to launch from an operational site. See here, to see what I mean.

I can think of several problems with doing so, for any ICBM power. One is that the sites usually aren't instrumented to allow tests to be fully assessed after the event (particularly if something goes wrong). Another is that it effectively will give away the capabilities of operational sites - useful intelligence to any potential adversary. Finally, firing an operational missile could have potentially dangerous destabilising effects on the delicate relationship between competing nuclear powers, particularly in times of heightened tension.

Firing from a different test site could fix most of those problems. Pulling a missile from an operational silo, transporting it to the test site and putting it into a test silo would allow testing of operational missiles for reliability, if that is your concern.

 

[bobbymike]

I can think of several problems with doing so, for any ICBM power. One is that the sites usually aren't instrumented to allow tests to be fully assessed after the event (particularly if something goes wrong). Do you have any specific information on what capabilities Russian operational silos have or is this just speculation? Maybe several silos per field are instrumented for testing that's me speculating.

Another is that it effectively will give away the capabilities of operational sites - useful intelligence to any potential adversary. Between, Humint, Elint, arms control treaties and other national technical means I think we have a pretty good idea. If we don't it would make moot every arms control treaty. Russia launches from its' mobile platforms that my understanding are also 'operationally capable' systems.

Finally, firing an operational missile could have potentially dangerous destabilising effects on the delicate relationship between competing nuclear powers, particularly in times of heightened tension. It might but a single missile launch probably not IMHO. For me when it comes to the Russians I would think the opposite, "Hey they're testing an ICBM from a test site to 'fool' us it's really a first strike" Any missile launch would concern me good thing my finger was never anywhere near the button ;D

 

[sferrin]

I keep waiting for them to launch an ICBM out of Hill AFB. Drivers on I-15 would get a hell of a show. ;D

 

[Rickshaw]

I can think of several problems with doing so, for any ICBM power. One is that the sites usually aren't instrumented to allow tests to be fully assessed after the event (particularly if something goes wrong).

Do you have any specific information on what capabilities Russian operational silos have or is this just speculation? Maybe several silos per field are instrumented for testing that's me speculating.

Adding sufficient test instrumentation to every missile field would be expensive and ultimately rather wasteful as it would largely stand idle most of the time. It's not as if they were every planning to regularly fire a missile from each missile field.

And no, I have no idea about how well instrumented Russian silos are but as the article I linked to made clear, in order to convert that one to a commercial launching facility they had to add quite a lot to it, to make it adequate.

Another is that it effectively will give away the capabilities of operational sites - useful intelligence to any potential adversary.

Between, Humint, Elint, arms control treaties and other national technical means I think we have a pretty good idea. If we don't it would make moot every arms control treaty. Russia launches from its' mobile platforms that my understanding are also 'operationally capable' systems.

It is the small details which can often be telling. Those small details wouldn't be present if the tests are conducted from one centralised location. As paranoid as the Soviets were, I think they'd have been unwilling to reveal more than they thought necessary to their potential adversaries.

Finally, firing an operational missile could have potentially dangerous destabilising effects on the delicate relationship between competing nuclear powers, particularly in times of heightened tension.

It might but a single missile launch probably not IMHO. For me when it comes to the Russians I would think the opposite, "Hey they're testing an ICBM from a test site to 'fool' us it's really a first strike" Any missile launch would concern me good thing my finger was never anywhere near the button ;D

Yes, I'm rather glad of that as well.

The thing is, it could be perceived as a good time at which to undertake a first strike - first giving warning of the single launch, so reactions would be slower, even if for a few seconds. Considering the hair-trigger both sides had, any advantage, any chance of destabilisation would need to be avoided. Dr. Strangelove and Failsafe aren't as far from the truth as we might prefer to believe.

 

[bobbymike]

It worries me to this day that there has never been a launch from an operational silo in the US.

Has any other nation carried out such a test?

Answer - Yes

 

[bobbymike]

GBSD RFI expected this fall

Boeing And Lockheed Martin Move Forward With ICBM Replacement

Posted: July 09, 2015


As the Air Force prepares to launch a competition to replace the Minuteman III, potential bidders Lockheed Martin and Boeing are participating in key research that will help shape the program's design.

Lockheed and Boeing detailed contributions to the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent system research in interviews this week. Along with Northrop Grumman, all the companies responded to the GBSD request for information in late March and are preparing for the draft request for proposals this fall.

The GBSD will recapitalize the infrastructure of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or the Minuteman III, including its entire flight system, weapons system and command-and-control infrastructure. The Air Force is looking to renovate the existing launch control centers and reach initial operational capability by 2027.

Boeing recently completed a basic phase of the concept design architecture guidance, which reviewed technologies and modes of replacing the current guidance system on the ICBM, as well as GBSD, said Ted Kerzie, Boeing's director of strategic missile systems futures, in an interview with Inside the Air Force on July 7.

Both the RFI and recent industry days indicate the Air Force will award multiple contacts during the technology maturation and risk reduction phase. The Air Force plan will likely consist of two to three contractors for the TMRR phase, one to two during the engineering phase and a single provider for production and deployment, Kerzie said.

As part of the Air Force's market research, Lockheed is assisting with the planning for the reentry systems for GBSD. The company has also responded to the Air Force's broad agency announcement, which explores potential modularity modernization and technologies that would assist the Air Force in determining GBSD guidance requirements, according to a July 6 interview with Everett Thomas, director of Air Force strategic programs at Lockheed. The company is also exploring modernization for countermeasures.

Lockheed is also able to share the latest technology in their Navy programs with their customer sets in the Air Force, Thomas said.

Any austerity in the current budget should not affect plans for the new GBSD, according to Jim Chilton, vice president and general manager at Boeing Strategic Missile and Defense Systems, who participated in the July 7 interview.

"I think the Air Force is prudently going through a deliberate process," he said. "I believe it will move forward."

While the RFI stipulates the program will retain the silo basing mode, the Air Force is looking at mobile options for the future, said Kerzie. -- Leigh Giangreco
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Any speculation? It appears from reading between the lines we will get a brand new MMIII, in terms of dimensions, etc. with new technology.

 

[Rickshaw]

It worries me to this day that there has never been a launch from an operational silo in the US.

Has any other nation carried out such a test?

Answer - Yes

When and where, please.

 

[bobbymike]

Asked this question of Pavel Podvig of Russian Forces website fame, his answer, "Yes quite a few [tests from operational silos]"

( http://russianforces.org/podvig/ )

 

[sferrin]

Asked this question of Pavel Podvig of Russian Forces website fame, his answer, "Yes quite a few [tests from operational silos]"

I don't see the big concern myself. They're all built the same (with more test equipment in the Vandenburg silos I'd imagine). If anything, the operational silos would be more reliable. I'd love to see them launch a Minuteman III out of Hill AFB (3 silos there for testing).

 

[Rickshaw]

Asked this question of Pavel Podvig of Russian Forces website fame, his answer, "Yes quite a few [tests from operational silos]"

Who? Never heard of him or the "Russian Forces website"...

Edit : See link in bobbymikes post

 

[bobbymike]

Asked this question of Pavel Podvig of Russian Forces website fame, his answer, "Yes quite a few [tests from operational silos]"

Who? Never heard of him or the "Russian Forces website"...

DO SOME RESEARCH. He is a VERY well known (often sought out by major media for opinions on Russia & their military) and knowledgeable expert who has literally written the book on Russian strategic forces.

http://www.amazon.com/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Podvig/dp/0262661810/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1436710277&sr=8-1&keywords=russian+nuclear+forces

 

[Rickshaw]

I'll think about purchasing this book, I think.

 

[bobbymike]

BUT YOU ARE ON THE INTERNET AREN'T YOU! You know about things called search engines don't you? You are here at SPF aren't you? You can Google can't you?

 

[Arjen]

Now would be a nice moment to lighten up.

 

[sferrin]

I've never seen nor heard of this man. I have no idea as to his credentials or his abilities. He is just another name to me.

So your default is to disparage the source rather than use that thing called "Google"? As Bobbymike pointed out, that guy's book is probably THE authority on Russian nuclear systems available to the public.

http://www.amazon.com/Russian-Strategic-Nuclear-Forces-Podvig/dp/0262661810/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1436789549&sr=1-1&keywords=russian+strategic+nuclear+forces

 

[Jemiba]

As bobbymike pointed out: Some research before posting is highly recommended, simply ignoring mentioned
sources/authors in a way, that seems to indicate lack of interest may well be regarded as trolling.
And for that, please read point 13 of the forum rules !

 

[Hot Breath]

BUT YOU ARE ON THE INTERNET AREN'T YOU! You know about things called search engines don't you? You are here at SPF aren't you? You can Google can't you?

You appear to get upset when I merely point I've never heard of this man. Do you want me to lie and say he's wonderful? No thanks.

I note the book is 10 years old. Surely there is something more recent on the topic? I also wonder at the tone I might find in such a book. Would it be rather slanted against the fUSSR/Russia?

 

[bobbymike]

Well, the book was published by the MIT Press, so you can be sure it's not a beach novel. Podvig is a highly respected Russian scholar with access to key sources and archives, so I doubt it's slanted or biased against Russia. I'm not sure why there is resistance to accepting this source as authoritative.

And Hot Breath seems to be posting AS Kadija Man and continues to disparage this source and this author for no apparent reason this is just trolling.

 

[sferrin]

Asked this question of Pavel Podvig of Russian Forces website fame, his answer, "Yes quite a few [tests from operational silos]"

Who? Never heard of him or the "Russian Forces website"...

Edit : See link in bobbymikes post

BUT YOU ARE ON THE INTERNET AREN'T YOU! You know about things called search engines don't you? You are here at SPF aren't you? You can Google can't you?

You appear to get upset when I merely point I've never heard of this man.

Whoopsie. Looks like you said that with the wrong account. :

From the Rules: "Only one login per user is allowed on the forum. Users creating duplicate logins may face temporary or permanent ban."

 

[bobbymike]

Sketching Minuteman IV

—Arie Church

July 30, 2015—The next generation ICBM will retain commonality with the Minuteman III to control costs wherever possible, Aerojet Rocketdyne Missile Systems Vice President Michael Bright told Air Force Magazine.

To avoid "breaking the bank," the government is looking to "maintain a lot of aspects" of the Minuteman III, said Bright. This includes everything from re-entry vehicles, upper stages, and fuel, to the current operating locations, launch control facilities, silos, and command and control—albeit, updated, he said in a July 29 interview.

Industry is also looking to cut long-term costs with technological improvements to improve the missile's shelf life "making sure you're not putting a lot of money back into maintaining these missiles," Bright said.

Unlike the Minuteman III, which required new propellant every 20 years, the new fuel ideally would last through ​the life of the missile, out to last at least 2070, he noted.

Over the last decade, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center has worked with Aerojet and likely competitor ATK to "develop new, modern stages" for the Minuteman III under the Propulsion Applications Program. As a result, "the industrial base right now is ready" to move with Minuteman III replacement, said Bright.

"We've developed new case material, new propellant material, we've fired the motors, and we're now at the point that we're ready to support the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent modernization," he added.

The Air Force completed its analysis of alternatives last year, and a request for proposals is expected in March 2016, followed by a competitive development contract in 2019 or 2020.

"We fully support that competition … it spurs innovation, it brings down cost, and it's just better for the whole aerospace industry," Bright said.

Whether Aerojet or ATK win, production will likely take from "mid-2025 through the end of the decade" to ramp up, just as Minuteman III ages out.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Was hoping for an all new missile a Peacekeeper II size class with new hyper-accurate MaRV and new 'physics' package.