Korea to Build Light Aircraft Carrier

[Archibald]

South Korean amphibious assault ship ROKS Dokdo sails alongside US Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard, March 27, 2014.

Is that a cryptic message, to say "South Korea carrier plans are headed the way of USS Bonhomme Richard" ? (bottom line: wrecked !)

 

[helmutkohl]

South Korea's new hardline on North Korea may mean the end of its plans to build its first aircraft carrier

A new emphasis on countering North Korea and other military modernization priorities may spell the end of plans to build South Korea's first flattop.

www.businessinsider.com

tbf..
while I like the idea of another Lightning Carrier somewhere in the world, especially one that also uses a twin island
I can't really see how useful it will be for South Korea, when the same resources could be used for other things that could be more useful for their defense needs

 

[Archibald]

As a matter of fact, North Korea is a much bigger, unstable, immediate threat to South Korea than China. Plus South Korea won't fight China alone. A carrier is not exactly necessary to fight North Korea.
The local country most threatened by China is Taiwan, for the reasons we all know.

 

[donnage99]

you need at least 3 carriers to justify any cost vs capability analysis. i rather have 4 extra destroyer/cruiser than a single carrier that operates 6 months out of a year.

 

[starviking]

you need at least 3 carriers to justify any cost vs capability analysis. i rather have 4 extra destroyer/cruiser than a single carrier that operates 6 months out of a year.

The UK seems to do well with 2, and France manages with one.

 

[Archibald]

Plus SK carrier project ain't a full blown one, rather a large LPH using F-35B capabilities (supersonic+stealth+AMRAAM+VSTOL) quite intelligently. A bit of an opportunistic move, similar to Japan - and USMC using F-35B brand new capabilities beyond the Harrier II.

 

[Grey Havoc]

CVX reportedly left out of South Korea's 2023 Defense Budget - Naval News

Dong-A Ilbo, a major South Korean newspaper, reported on August 26th that funding for CVX, the country’s aircraft carrier program, has been axed in the 2023 national defense budget.

www.navalnews.com

Not looking good for the CVX project. From late last month.

 

[BlackBat242]

on a related note. how much "runway" length does a rolling landing typically require? in comparison to an arrested landing?

Just a WAG, but probably the same or less than an arrested landing. The plane isn't moving forward very fast, plus you've got ship's speed compensating as well. IIRC, an arrested landing will burn up about 300' of deck or so.

This is a bit late, but...
Essex class:
Angled Deck = 520 ft (158.5 m)
Ramp to First Wire = 104 ft (31.7 m)
Wire to Wire = 32 ft (9.7 m) (96' total)
Wire Runout = 250 ft (76.2 m)
Port Elevator = 60 ft (18.3 m)
300 ft (97.5 m) from the last wire to the deck edge

NATOPS called for #4 wire to be a “no-pass” for the S-2, as a max-weight landing would cause a max pull-out, which meant that the aircraft would be off the end of the angle (aircraft length + max pull-out = 342’).

Midway 420ft from the last wire to the deck edge

Nimitz class: ~455ft from the last wire to the deck edge

Charles de Gaulle
Angled Deck length = 640 ft (195 m)
Ramp to First Wire = 150 ft (45.7 m)
Wire to Wire = 40 ft (12.2 m)
Wire Runout = ? ft (? m)
410 ft (125 m) from the last wire to the deck edge

 

[barrett]

さらに、SK 空母プロジェクトは本格的なプロジェクトではなく、F-35B の機能 (超音速 + ステルス + AMRAAM + VSTOL) を非常にインテリジェントに使用する大型の LPH です。日本と同様に少し日和見的な動きであり、米海兵隊はハリアー II を超えた F-35B の真新しい機能を使用しています。

そうではないと思います。日本の航空機飛石計画は中国への対抗策であり、韓国の空母計画は日本への対抗策であり、北朝鮮や中国への対抗策ではない。

 

[starviking]

さらに、SK 空母プロジェクトは本格的なプロジェクトではなく、F-35B の機能 (超音速 + ステルス + AMRAAM + VSTOL) を非常にインテリジェントに使用する大型の LPH です。日本と同様に少し日和見的な動きであり、米海兵隊はハリアー II を超えた F-35B の真新しい機能を使用しています。

そうではないと思います。日本の航空機飛石計画は中国への対抗策であり、韓国の空母計画は日本への対抗策であり、北朝鮮や中国への対抗策ではない。

Barrett-san,

Please try to use English, or translate into English using a translator like DeepL.

It means that your comments will get a wide audience, and approprate responses.

なるべく英語を使うか、DeepLなどの翻訳機で英語に翻訳してください。

そうすることで、あなたのコメントがより多くの人に届き、適切な反応を得ることができます。

 

[Grey Havoc]

https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/y9v30v

View: https://www.reddit.com/r/WarshipPorn/comments/y9v30v/model_of_hyundais_proposed_design_for_the_south/

 

[TomcatViP]

If I can understand the economic strategy (KF-21 is stronger with a Naval variant to outclass any present or future non-US competitor), I fail to see what's this will bring for Korea.
On the contrary, it will probably force them to re-assign a large budget around this Naval carrier. An Aircraft carrier doesn't sail alone. It needs support and escorts ships. So the estimated extra budget might be off by a wild margin.

Regarding North Korea, I fail to understand why a larger tanker aircraft fleet would not do the trick.
In the China expension contest, the Korean peninsula is already an unsinkable carrier. Why would they want to add a frail one?

Then, if Borame was a Taiwanese project, this would be logical.

 

[helmutkohl]

If I can understand the economic strategy (KF-21 is stronger with a Naval variant to outclass any present or future non-US competitor), I fail to see what's this will bring for Korea.
On the contrary, it will probably force them to re-assign a large budget around this Naval carrier. An Aircraft carrier doesn't sail alone. It needs support and escorts ships. So the estimated extra budget might be off by a wild margin.

Regarding North Korea, I fail to understand why a larger tanker aircraft fleet would not do the trick.
In the China expension contest, the Korean peninsula is already an unsinkable carrier. Why would they want to add a frail one?

Then, if Borame was a Taiwanese project, this would be logical.

right, I forgot to mention, that in that Korean language article..
it also mentioned that the Korean Navy also needs time to reconfigure its doctrine if they decide to get a heavy carrier.

 

[Hood]

it also mentioned that the Korean Navy also needs time to reconfigure its doctrine if they decide to get a heavy carrier.

Why would they? The North Korean Navy's objective seems to be to coastal defence and denial of the littoral and seem to be doing very well in that regard. They have very little in the way of ship-to-ship firepower and nothing in its surface fleet that equals the current South Korean Navy in capability (the KDX series especially).
The North Koreans don't appear to have a modern air force nor ever seemed to want to develop one despite the continual upgrading of the South Korean AF since the early 1990s, they have no long-range aerial strike platform either. Everything seems to be predisposed to ever greater variants of cruise and ballistic missiles and indeed NK might try and copy the Chinese efforts at an anti-carrier IRBM.

This looks a lot more like keeping up with China and Japan than it does about North Korea.
The carrier air wing lacks any ASW capability though, something I would have thought would have been of prime concern in those waters. 28 fighters and 2 AEW might just about give another layer of fleet protection, but its a fairly meagre force (is it a case of the carrier protecting the KDX fleet or vice versa? Hard to tell).

 

[CV12Hornet]

If I can understand the economic strategy (KF-21 is stronger with a Naval variant to outclass any present or future non-US competitor), I fail to see what's this will bring for Korea.
On the contrary, it will probably force them to re-assign a large budget around this Naval carrier. An Aircraft carrier doesn't sail alone. It needs support and escorts ships. So the estimated extra budget might be off by a wild margin.

Regarding North Korea, I fail to understand why a larger tanker aircraft fleet would not do the trick.
In the China expension contest, the Korean peninsula is already an unsinkable carrier. Why would they want to add a frail one?

Then, if Borame was a Taiwanese project, this would be logical.

it also mentioned that the Korean Navy also needs time to reconfigure its doctrine if they decide to get a heavy carrier.

Why would they? The North Korean Navy's objective seems to be to coastal defence and denial of the littoral and seem to be doing very well in that regard. They have very little in the way of ship-to-ship firepower and nothing in its surface fleet that equals the current South Korean Navy in capability (the KDX series especially).
The North Koreans don't appear to have a modern air force nor ever seemed to want to develop one despite the continual upgrading of the South Korean AF since the early 1990s, they have no long-range aerial strike platform either. Everything seems to be predisposed to ever greater variants of cruise and ballistic missiles and indeed NK might try and copy the Chinese efforts at an anti-carrier IRBM.

This looks a lot more like keeping up with China and Japan than it does about North Korea.
The carrier air wing lacks any ASW capability though, something I would have thought would have been of prime concern in those waters. 28 fighters and 2 AEW might just about give another layer of fleet protection, but its a fairly meagre force (is it a case of the carrier protecting the KDX fleet or vice versa? Hard to tell).

Per some Korean defense-watchers I know:

Vis-a-vis North Korea, the South Korean concept for naval air/carrier capabilities is that it provides a far more survivable platform than land-based fighters. The idea bruited by Dacis2 that carriers are less survivable because they can be taken out with less hits is, in my view, unsatisfactory analysis in this case, as it doesn't take into account adversarial capabilities on the ground. That is to say, North Korea simply does not have the capability, in my opinion, to systematically, efficiently, and quickly find and target a carrier group at sea. The assets required, including a satellite network, maritime reconnaissance craft, their own carrier-based reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, etc., simply don't exist. And even if a needle in the haystack event occurs (a Nork vessel somehow stumbles upon the battle group by dumb luck before being promptly blown up), NK is not known to have the ranged precision strike weapons to attempt to overwhelm the defenses of a moving carrier battle group and successfully strike the carrier itself. As far as NK is concerned, the carrier group, if it doesn't anchor itself close to NK shores, may as well be on the moon.

Further, Dacis2's argument that land-based fighter assets are more advantageous because facilities are easier to repair ignores very real scenarios where fighter/strike capabilities are needed right now, not weeks or days or even hours from now. If waiting were always a viable option, then one could argue that they don't need an air force at all, since they can simply wait for the USAF and USN to arrive. This is a case of reductio ad absurdum.

As far as carrier capabilities are concerned, what SK is looking for with regard to its fighters vs. NK is not just air-to-air, but strike, and specifically with 2,000lb. bunker buster ordnance. This is one of the key operational reasons why SK had a problem with F-35Bs for its carriers. Unlike the Japanese very light carriers, one of the primary tasks of the South Korean carrier is to precisely apply the heavy spank on land targets. This fundamental difference in philosophy and mission is one of the reasons why Korean and Japanese carrier programs have so radically diverged.

Returning to the issue of SLOC protection, the Korean case is different from, and more perilous than, the Japanese case, because of the issues previously mentioned: the most serious threat to its primary SLOC routes, which are the southern approaches through the East China Sea, is a natural geographical bottleneck that the PLAN can more realistically contemplate attempting to take control of. It would present the prospect of having to fight a much larger, technologically peer navy in the PLAN.

SK's ability to punch a hole in a prospective cordon has both a strategic and a tactical component. From a strategic basis, this dictates that South Korea must work in coalition with others, first and foremost the US and the USN. From a tactical basis, any fleet-to-fleet action in which only one side brings naval AEWC and fighter assets is going to look pretty daunting and scary for the side without. To be sure, the USN brings naval air capabilities to the table, but given the changing calculus of balance of forces, SK's ability to bring additional such capabilities would potentially be significant.

In this use case, the advantages of operating range, endurance, and sensor capabilities that a larger CATOBAR carrier provides will very much come into play. This is exactly why the Chinese PLAN is aggressively building out a large carrier fleet that is now transitioning to CATOBAR vessels, notwithstanding the opinions of random internet commenters that such assets are obsolete or not survivable. My own view is that our initial assumption ought to be that the PLAN and the ROKN know their own needs and the challenges they face better than most casual observers do.

Taking this logic further, there is increasing recognition in Korea that such a coalition of regional partners is not a one-way street. While in the past SK was overwhelmingly a net beneficiary of principles of Western bloc collective security, it is now increasingly expected to be a net provider of security for the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture, in line with its economic and military strength. This means the ability to project (naval) assets and capabilities beyond its immediate waters to aid fellow allies and partners. This, too, is a reason for the emphasis on strike capabilities, both land-attack and anti-ship, for its prospective carrier fleet, which is best provided by a large CATOBAR set-up.

So, to sum up: against North Korea, a carrier provides a platform for 75-110 strike sorties per day* on a platform that, while less survivable if attacked than airfields, would be extraordinarily difficult for the North Koreans to find; which can achieve strategic and operational surprise while doing so, unlike land-based aircraft; and which can put heavy weapons on hard targets. You guys mention yourselves the preponderance of cruise and ballistic missiles the North Koreans are building: those are of far more use against fixed targets like airfields than against a moving sea target like a carrier.

Against China, meanwhile, the idea is to break open a sea-based cordon against Chinese naval forces that can and probably will bring their own carriers, while also operating in conjunction with allies, most notably the United States Navy. In such a scenario the Koreans aren't going to be facing the full might of the PLAN, and demonstrating an ability to provide security for smaller partners becomes politically desirable.

As for ASW, don't assume that the listed air wing is final. It will include helicopters, and will most likely include ASW helicopters that are the primary means of conducting ASW at sea today. Further, escorts aren't really an issue, given Korea is already building up a powerful escort fleet. By the time the Block II Sejongs and KDDX-II destroyers are in the water, the Koreans are going to have more modern AAW combatants than any navy not the US or China, and this entirely independent of carrier development.

*Assuming similar sortie generation capabilities to the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers the Korean ship is planned to be the size of.

 

[kaiserd]

If I can understand the economic strategy (KF-21 is stronger with a Naval variant to outclass any present or future non-US competitor), I fail to see what's this will bring for Korea.
On the contrary, it will probably force them to re-assign a large budget around this Naval carrier. An Aircraft carrier doesn't sail alone. It needs support and escorts ships. So the estimated extra budget might be off by a wild margin.

Regarding North Korea, I fail to understand why a larger tanker aircraft fleet would not do the trick.
In the China expension contest, the Korean peninsula is already an unsinkable carrier. Why would they want to add a frail one?

Then, if Borame was a Taiwanese project, this would be logical.

it also mentioned that the Korean Navy also needs time to reconfigure its doctrine if they decide to get a heavy carrier.

Why would they? The North Korean Navy's objective seems to be to coastal defence and denial of the littoral and seem to be doing very well in that regard. They have very little in the way of ship-to-ship firepower and nothing in its surface fleet that equals the current South Korean Navy in capability (the KDX series especially).
The North Koreans don't appear to have a modern air force nor ever seemed to want to develop one despite the continual upgrading of the South Korean AF since the early 1990s, they have no long-range aerial strike platform either. Everything seems to be predisposed to ever greater variants of cruise and ballistic missiles and indeed NK might try and copy the Chinese efforts at an anti-carrier IRBM.

This looks a lot more like keeping up with China and Japan than it does about North Korea.
The carrier air wing lacks any ASW capability though, something I would have thought would have been of prime concern in those waters. 28 fighters and 2 AEW might just about give another layer of fleet protection, but its a fairly meagre force (is it a case of the carrier protecting the KDX fleet or vice versa? Hard to tell).

Per some Korean defense-watchers I know:

Vis-a-vis North Korea, the South Korean concept for naval air/carrier capabilities is that it provides a far more survivable platform than land-based fighters. The idea bruited by Dacis2 that carriers are less survivable because they can be taken out with less hits is, in my view, unsatisfactory analysis in this case, as it doesn't take into account adversarial capabilities on the ground. That is to say, North Korea simply does not have the capability, in my opinion, to systematically, efficiently, and quickly find and target a carrier group at sea. The assets required, including a satellite network, maritime reconnaissance craft, their own carrier-based reconnaissance and fighter aircraft, etc., simply don't exist. And even if a needle in the haystack event occurs (a Nork vessel somehow stumbles upon the battle group by dumb luck before being promptly blown up), NK is not known to have the ranged precision strike weapons to attempt to overwhelm the defenses of a moving carrier battle group and successfully strike the carrier itself. As far as NK is concerned, the carrier group, if it doesn't anchor itself close to NK shores, may as well be on the moon.

Further, Dacis2's argument that land-based fighter assets are more advantageous because facilities are easier to repair ignores very real scenarios where fighter/strike capabilities are needed right now, not weeks or days or even hours from now. If waiting were always a viable option, then one could argue that they don't need an air force at all, since they can simply wait for the USAF and USN to arrive. This is a case of reductio ad absurdum.

As far as carrier capabilities are concerned, what SK is looking for with regard to its fighters vs. NK is not just air-to-air, but strike, and specifically with 2,000lb. bunker buster ordnance. This is one of the key operational reasons why SK had a problem with F-35Bs for its carriers. Unlike the Japanese very light carriers, one of the primary tasks of the South Korean carrier is to precisely apply the heavy spank on land targets. This fundamental difference in philosophy and mission is one of the reasons why Korean and Japanese carrier programs have so radically diverged.

Returning to the issue of SLOC protection, the Korean case is different from, and more perilous than, the Japanese case, because of the issues previously mentioned: the most serious threat to its primary SLOC routes, which are the southern approaches through the East China Sea, is a natural geographical bottleneck that the PLAN can more realistically contemplate attempting to take control of. It would present the prospect of having to fight a much larger, technologically peer navy in the PLAN.

SK's ability to punch a hole in a prospective cordon has both a strategic and a tactical component. From a strategic basis, this dictates that South Korea must work in coalition with others, first and foremost the US and the USN. From a tactical basis, any fleet-to-fleet action in which only one side brings naval AEWC and fighter assets is going to look pretty daunting and scary for the side without. To be sure, the USN brings naval air capabilities to the table, but given the changing calculus of balance of forces, SK's ability to bring additional such capabilities would potentially be significant.

In this use case, the advantages of operating range, endurance, and sensor capabilities that a larger CATOBAR carrier provides will very much come into play. This is exactly why the Chinese PLAN is aggressively building out a large carrier fleet that is now transitioning to CATOBAR vessels, notwithstanding the opinions of random internet commenters that such assets are obsolete or not survivable. My own view is that our initial assumption ought to be that the PLAN and the ROKN know their own needs and the challenges they face better than most casual observers do.

Taking this logic further, there is increasing recognition in Korea that such a coalition of regional partners is not a one-way street. While in the past SK was overwhelmingly a net beneficiary of principles of Western bloc collective security, it is now increasingly expected to be a net provider of security for the emerging Indo-Pacific security architecture, in line with its economic and military strength. This means the ability to project (naval) assets and capabilities beyond its immediate waters to aid fellow allies and partners. This, too, is a reason for the emphasis on strike capabilities, both land-attack and anti-ship, for its prospective carrier fleet, which is best provided by a large CATOBAR set-up.

So, to sum up: against North Korea, a carrier provides a platform for 75-110 strike sorties per day* on a platform that, while less survivable if attacked than airfields, would be extraordinarily difficult for the North Koreans to find; which can achieve strategic and operational surprise while doing so, unlike land-based aircraft; and which can put heavy weapons on hard targets. You guys mention yourselves the preponderance of cruise and ballistic missiles the North Koreans are building: those are of far more use against fixed targets like airfields than against a moving sea target like a carrier.

Against China, meanwhile, the idea is to break open a sea-based cordon against Chinese naval forces that can and probably will bring their own carriers, while also operating in conjunction with allies, most notably the United States Navy. In such a scenario the Koreans aren't going to be facing the full might of the PLAN, and demonstrating an ability to provide security for smaller partners becomes politically desirable.

As for ASW, don't assume that the listed air wing is final. It will include helicopters, and will most likely include ASW helicopters that are the primary means of conducting ASW at sea today. Further, escorts aren't really an issue, given Korea is already building up a powerful escort fleet. By the time the Block II Sejongs and KDDX-II destroyers are in the water, the Koreans are going to have more modern AAW combatants than any navy not the US or China, and this entirely independent of carrier development.

*Assuming similar sortie generation capabilities to the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers the Korean ship is planned to be the size of.

You know what else is fixed and can’t make itself flexible and move around like an aircraft carrier.
Seoul and South Korea’s other major cities.
Plus all it’s military airfield and the vast majority of its military bases and civilian and military infrastructure.
South Korea would not be buying an aircraft carrier primarily as a counter to North Korea. Cruise missile armed subs and the like would provide a far more favourable (conventional) 2nd strike capability than a carrier would. A carrier a very expensive and relatively low- survivable way to provide a 2nd strike capability versus greater dispersal of land based aircraft in a South Korean context.
And what happens when that carrier out of service for refits, etc?
South Korean interest in a carrier clearly more tied up in/ triggered by rivalry re: the PRC and Japan.

 

[CV12Hornet]

You know what else is fixed and can’t make itself flexible and move around like an aircraft carrier.
Seoul and South Korea’s other major cities.
Plus all it’s military airfield and the vast majority of its military bases and civilian and military infrastructure.
South Korea would not be buying an aircraft carrier primarily as a counter to North Korea. Cruise missile armed subs and the like would provide a far more favourable (conventional) 2nd strike capability than a carrier would. A carrier a very expensive and relatively low- survivable way to provide a 2nd strike capability versus greater dispersal of land based aircraft in a South Korean context.
And what happens when that carrier out of service for refits, etc?
South Korean interest in a carrier clearly more tied up in/ triggered by rivalry re: the PRC and Japan.

They have cruise missile platforms already, this is in addition to the cruise missiles. Not that cruise missiles can keep up with the ordnance delivery of an aircraft carrier, anyway.

And again: the carrier is very survivable, because North Korea doesn't have even a fraction of the reconnaissance and targeting assets the Chinese do, and thus are highly unlikely to even be able to find a carrier at sea.

Yes... I did point out that their military airfields are fixed, yes? That's one of the reasons they're acquiring this capability in the first place. As for the rest of their fixed infrastructure... I'd say it's rather irrelevant to the carrier question?

But if you want to weight the China part of the equation more, go ahead, the carrier is definitely also in response to China.

 

[helmutkohl]

in a hypothetical attack on North Korea
where would the South Korean carrier fleet operate from?
Yellow Sea? - closest sea to Pyongyang, but half of it also is Chinese waters. The Chinese may or may not take action to help the North Koreans

Sea of Japan (or what the Koreans call the East sea) - this part is North Korea's mountainous side but there's a few major bases and a nuclear test site. however Japan is close by (but doubt they'd go against South Korea), and Russia as well. But there's a small area of that sea that is International Waters

East China Sea - a bit far from North Korea, and all of it is either Chinese or Japanese EEZ

 

[CV12Hornet]

in a hypothetical attack on North Korea
where would the South Korean carrier fleet operate from?
Yellow Sea? - closest sea to Pyongyang, but half of it also is Chinese waters. The Chinese may or may not take action to help the North Koreans

Sea of Japan (or what the Koreans call the East sea) - this part is North Korea's mountainous side but there's a few major bases and a nuclear test site. however Japan is close by (but doubt they'd go against South Korea), and Russia as well. But there's a small area of that sea that is International Waters

East China Sea - a bit far from North Korea, and all of it is either Chinese or Japanese EEZ

You seem to be counting the EEZ as territorial waters, which is not strictly accurate. Per Wiki:

However, it cannot prohibit passage or loitering above, on, or under the surface of the sea that is in compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of the UN Convention, within that portion of its exclusive economic zone beyond its territorial sea. Before the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, coastal nations arbitrarily extended their territorial waters in an effort to control activities which are now regulated by the exclusive economic zone, such as offshore oil exploration or fishing rights (see Cod Wars). Indeed, the exclusive economic zone is still popularly, though erroneously, called a coastal nation's territorial waters.

I seriously doubt Japan would raise much of a fuss at a Korean carrier skirting the edges of their EEZ. Which gives them plenty of room in the Sea of Japan, and assuming a combat radius for the KF-21 around that of the Super Hornet or Rafale M, the KF-21 should have more than enough range to range over all of North Korea while still standing off a good 200 miles from the North Korean coast.

 

[Maro.Kyo]

Total costs, including the research, development, and mass production is closer to 8 trillion won, or 6 billion USD

That is the KF-X program RDT&E budget, not the KF-21N. The article mentions $3.1 billion as the estimated total program cost for the navalized version.

Reason is because F-35B is too expensive, and there's some issues with the Air Force being reluctant to get the B version, so this is supposedly a way around these hurdles

There's an ongoing program to acquire 20 additional F-35As for the ROKAF, as an extension of the F-X program. This is officially separate from the naval fighter acquisition program from the carrier and one doesn't interrupt with the other.

Overall, the reporter of the article is not a reputable source. In fact he's quite famous for all the bullshit reports he've hame a past few years.

 

[Maro.Kyo]

On the contrary, it will probably force them to re-assign a large budget around this Naval carrier. An Aircraft carrier doesn't sail alone. It needs support and escorts ships. So the estimated extra budget might be off by a wild margin.

Current naval build-up plan already suffice for two full-fledged CBGs. Supply ship fleet is on a constant expansion as well although there's a need for further major expansion for the CBG to operate in open waters.

Then, if Borame was a Taiwanese project, this would be logical.

Can't disagree more. Carrier for Taiwan is even worse than one for Korea.

 

[Maro.Kyo]

You know what else is fixed and can’t make itself flexible and move around like an aircraft carrier.
Seoul and South Korea’s other major cities.
Plus all it’s military airfield and the vast majority of its military bases and civilian and military infrastructure.
South Korea would not be buying an aircraft carrier primarily as a counter to North Korea. Cruise missile armed subs and the like would provide a far more favourable (conventional) 2nd strike capability than a carrier would. A carrier a very expensive and relatively low- survivable way to provide a 2nd strike capability versus greater dispersal of land based aircraft in a South Korean context.

Comparing sea-launched cruise missiles to a carrier launched strike aircraft is, well, ill-advised, to say the least. Especially when said carrier could operate AEW assets.

in a hypothetical attack on North Korea
where would the South Korean carrier fleet operate from?
Yellow Sea? - closest sea to Pyongyang, but half of it also is Chinese waters. The Chinese may or may not take action to help the North Koreans

Sea of Japan (or what the Koreans call the East sea) - this part is North Korea's mountainous side but there's a few major bases and a nuclear test site. however Japan is close by (but doubt they'd go against South Korea), and Russia as well. But there's a small area of that sea that is International Waters

East China Sea - a bit far from North Korea, and all of it is either Chinese or Japanese EEZ

SoJ. Also there's no problem for a naval fleet to operate in foreign EEZ. It is by no means a territorial water.

Apparently the push for a mid-sized CATOBAR carrier also stems from its ability to use naval fixed-wing UCAVs (Group 5 UAS). To be frank though, going for KF-21N instead of F-35s would be a mistake imo.

 

[TomcatViP]

Taiwan having a carrier will de-facto expand Chinese zone of operation, hence diluting their advantage in firepower.

All about Chinese strategy over Taiwan is that overwhelming balance of force. If they do have to provide search and support to all their isolated outposts in the Chinese sea, it would be a big notch in this.

An Aircraft carrier today is also a direct support to submarine fleet by negating the use of long range Asw. Taiwan would need to secure supply routes, at least before the UN votes a resolution. So an Aircraft carrier would play here a significant role in denying them the comfort of a quick victory (think Kiev defense).

On the contrary, South Korea is backed by a standing UN resolutions. Supply routes will remain open even by the shear force from allied navies.

 

[kaiserd]

You know what else is fixed and can’t make itself flexible and move around like an aircraft carrier.
Seoul and South Korea’s other major cities.
Plus all it’s military airfield and the vast majority of its military bases and civilian and military infrastructure.
South Korea would not be buying an aircraft carrier primarily as a counter to North Korea. Cruise missile armed subs and the like would provide a far more favourable (conventional) 2nd strike capability than a carrier would. A carrier a very expensive and relatively low- survivable way to provide a 2nd strike capability versus greater dispersal of land based aircraft in a South Korean context.
And what happens when that carrier out of service for refits, etc?
South Korean interest in a carrier clearly more tied up in/ triggered by rivalry re: the PRC and Japan.

They have cruise missile platforms already, this is in addition to the cruise missiles. Not that cruise missiles can keep up with the ordnance delivery of an aircraft carrier, anyway.

And again: the carrier is very survivable, because North Korea doesn't have even a fraction of the reconnaissance and targeting assets the Chinese do, and thus are highly unlikely to even be able to find a carrier at sea.

Yes... I did point out that their military airfields are fixed, yes? That's one of the reasons they're acquiring this capability in the first place. As for the rest of their fixed infrastructure... I'd say it's rather irrelevant to the carrier question?

But if you want to weight the China part of the equation more, go ahead, the carrier is definitely also in response to China.

You appear to be almost completely missing the point.

A carrier may or may not be more survivable versus a North Korean attack than equivalent dispersed land based operations.

But what is the point of that if all of South Korea’s cities and other military infrastructure is less survivable versus that North Korean attack, and potentially made less survivable by the allocation of resources to that carrier and the necessary accompanying task force.
No South Koreans will be celebrating or particularly care if their carrier survives if millions of them are dead and their cities are in ruins.
And even if the South Korean military was to ignore that then what about its concerns for all it other military infrastructure that isn’t going to be floating around with that carrier; if a large proportion of the infrastructure is destroyed similarly why should they be especially grateful that the carrier survived?

And I’m not particularly arguing about South Korea having a carrier; if they think it is justified given their defence priorities that is up to them. But it won’t be for some spurious (or at least of limited value) 2nd strike role re: the North (which more survivable cruise-missile armed subs would be much better at anyway) and will instead be focused on a wider maritime role with the likes of the PRC and Japan in mind.

 

[TomcatViP]

Then, a carrier is all about force projection. It might be that South Korea is ready to play a bigger role within peace stabilzing coalitions.

That would then be a remarkable effort.

 

[CV12Hornet]

You appear to be almost completely missing the point.

A carrier may or may not be more survivable versus a North Korean attack than equivalent dispersed land based operations.

But what is the point of that if all of South Korea’s cities and other military infrastructure is less survivable versus that North Korean attack, and potentially made less survivable by the allocation of resources to that carrier and the necessary accompanying task force.
No South Koreans will be celebrating or particularly care if their carrier survives if millions of them are dead and their cities are in ruins.
And even if the South Korean military was to ignore that then what about its concerns for all it other military infrastructure that isn’t going to be floating around with that carrier; if a large proportion of the infrastructure is destroyed similarly why should they be especially grateful that the carrier survived?

And I’m not particularly arguing about South Korea having a carrier; if they think it is justified given their defence priorities that is up to them. But it won’t be for some spurious (or at least of limited value) 2nd strike role re: the North (which more survivable cruise-missile armed subs would be much better at anyway) and will instead be focused on a wider maritime role with the likes of the PRC and Japan in mind.

I was, indeed, missing your point.

That being said, I've always thought this concern was overblown. For all the bluster, the North Koreans don't have that much firepower at their disposal, and as recent events in Eastern Europe are showing it takes a lot of firepower, even precision firepower, to go to "millions dead and cities in ruins". Focusing their efforts on specific targets like, say, airfields, on the other hand, would likely net them more immediate operational benefits, and for all their issues I prefer not to assume people like the North Koreans are idiots that would disperse their limited long-range firepower on terror attacks against civilians.

That's not to say I would expect South Korea to escape with minimal civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, far from it. But "cities in ruins and millions dead" is, IMO, not realistic unless the North Koreans break out the nukes and they know that would invite retaliation in kind.

Then, a carrier is all about force projection. It might be that South Korea is ready to play a bigger role within peace stabilzing coalitions.

That would then be a remarkable effort.

Certainly a strong possibility! And part of the calculus in that is probably the South Koreans coming off as more palatable than the Japanese to the countries in the region.

 

[FighterJock]

Then, a carrier is all about force projection. It might be that South Korea is ready to play a bigger role within peace stabilzing coalitions.

That would then be a remarkable effort.

How big would a proper South Korean aircraft carrier be? I could probably see it being the same size as the UK Queen Elizabeth class.

 

[Manuducati]

Then, a carrier is all about force projection. It might be that South Korea is ready to play a bigger role within peace stabilzing coalitions.

That would then be a remarkable effort.

How big would a proper South Korean aircraft carrier be? I could probably see it being the same size as the UK Queen Elizabeth class.

More than 50,000 tons.

South Korea Eyeing Larger Aircraft Carrier for its CVX Program - Naval News

South Korea’s Ministry of Defense will soon begin working on preliminary policy research on the feasibility of building a 50,000-tons CVX aircraft carrier.

www.navalnews.com

 

[Archibald]

Holly cow ! We should enlist those brave South Koreans into PA-NG. Shame it is nuclear powered, so not possible... oh well, they should have picked the Rafale in 2002 instead of goddam F-15. Screw them (half joking).

 

[Ainen]

Then, a carrier is all about force projection. It might be that South Korea is ready to play a bigger role within peace stabilzing coalitions.

That would then be a remarkable effort.

Carrier is about having a navy, capable of sea superiority operations beyond the immediate availability of land-based air cover.
For US sea superiority is granted for so long, that secondary tasks took prevalence (as the main one isn't even in question). Sea is by default considered American.

For allied navies, however, this small detail flares up the moment they plan to do anything on their own.

 

[Maro.Kyo]

Taiwan having a carrier will de-facto expand Chinese zone of operation, hence diluting their advantage in firepower.

All about Chinese strategy over Taiwan is that overwhelming balance of force. If they do have to provide search and support to all their isolated outposts in the Chinese sea, it would be a big notch in this.

An Aircraft carrier today is also a direct support to submarine fleet by negating the use of long range Asw. Taiwan would need to secure supply routes, at least before the UN votes a resolution. So an Aircraft carrier would play here a significant role in denying them the comfort of a quick victory (think Kiev defense).

On the contrary, South Korea is backed by a standing UN resolutions. Supply routes will remain open even by the shear force from allied navies.

What can Taiwan do with it's carrier fleet in terms of "expanding Chinese zone of operation"? The main doctrine of the RoC armed forces is anti access of Chinese forces to the Taiwan island until the US support arrives. It's not like their fleet could just go on a picnic to far away seas. There's a reason US DoD officials as well as think tanks are constantly recommending Taiwan to focus on asymmetric A2/AD assets. If anything, a realistic RoCN carrier will mainly be a hedging asset that provides a 'maritime landing strip' that could move around the coast of Taiwan, that is harder to target/strike compared to a fixed airfield, especially by ballistic missiles.

Also, if a carrier is to act as a deterrence against enemy ASW assets, it is also necessary that the allied ASW assets work properly as needed. That is not the case for RoCN as of now, and will not be for quite a long time, even after when their indigenous submarine project comes to fruition; for that their surface fleet build up is on jeopardy and airborne ASW neglected, as it has been for far too long.

 

[TomcatViP]

What would be China without any maritime access? Less than half a China.
There is a reason why Chinese strategists are forward deploying Chinese armies into the East and South China sea or Philippine sea. Risking loosing their outpost will invariably draw down a disproportionate amount of ressources regarding what Taiwan would have to invest to achieve this.

Think at the surface interdiction campaign that the WWII German fleet successfully conducted for years despite the unfavorable balance of forces (in number of unit at sea).

 

[Maro.Kyo]

What would be China without any maritime access? Less than half a China.
There is a reason why Chinese strategists are forward deploying Chinese armies into the East and South China sea or Philippine sea. Risking loosing their outpost will invariably draw down a disproportionate amount of ressources regarding what Taiwan would have to invest to achieve this.

Think at the surface interdiction campaign that the WWII German fleet successfully conducted for years despite the unfavorable balance of forces (in number of unit at sea).

I do agree with all that, but what I don't agree with is "who" should be the one playing that role (of deterring regional maritime build-up by the PRC); that's the task of USN and its regional allies, and is not, will not and should not be what the RoCN should be focusing on. Like I've said, the number one priority of RoCN should be anti access of PLAN fleets to Taiwan and you'd agree with that as well. From this perspective I've argued that Carrier for RoCN doesn't make any sense. This also bears the question of who the "allies" should be. It is quite clear that Japan and Australia are part of it and the US wants India on board but so far wasn't really successful with its attempts to team up with them. It is also very apparent that the US wants SoKor to take part of the task mentioned above, but SoKor was rather hesitant due to various reasons. The carrier project and the enlargement of it could have further implications but we'll see.

 

[Maro.Kyo]

Looking good, I like the fact that they have gone for the twin island layout, obviously they looked closely at the Queen Elizabeth class carriers for design inspiration.

HHI(now HD HHI under HD KSOE) teamed up with Babcok(QE class) whereas DSME(now Hanwha Ocean, farewll Daewoo name) with Fincantierri(Trieste class). Since then, DSME/Hanwha went rather silent regarding CVX matters whereas HHI are still very eager to get their bid through, so we'll see how it goes. If CVX actually gets built, there will be some serious involvements from Babcock.

 

[FighterJock]

Good to see that there is British involvement in the South Korean carrier, let's wait and see what happens concerning the overall future of the CVX.

 

[Forest Green]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1689922710531604480

View: https://twitter.com/mason_8718/status/1689922710531604480?s=20

 

[Scott Kenny]

China is also the number one export market for Korea: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/kor . Both China and South Korea need each other long term to sustain their industries. The ROK will sooner decouple from the US than China, and the expansion of south korean military capabilities to allow it to operate independently from the US will lessen its reliance on US military and the US long term. For south koreans, north korea is an afterthought and the NK leadership doesn't want war anyways with the south.

? The Korean peninsula has had China, Mongols, and Japan march from one end to the other every 50-100 years for the last 1000+ years.

Korea does not want either China or Japan to be able to invade them ever again. They would much rather have an agreement with the US than with either Japan or China. Problem is, China doesn't want a US ally on their direct border, and that feeds into China keeping DPRK functional.

Now i'm curious on what kind of power projection can be made available from this carrier.

For a small carrier, you need AEW, ASW, CAP, and COD.

• 3-5x AEW, depending on whether you're running Hawkeyes or Merlin helicopters.
• 4-6x helicopters for ASW, plus 2 for plane guard (6-8x total)
• 8x fighters for CAP to keep 2x airborne 24/7
• 2x cargo haulers for COD.
• This doesn't include tankers, so add 2-3x more aircraft for that.

Call it 26 aircraft total.

This doesn't give you much strike capability, however.

you need at least 3 carriers to justify any cost vs capability analysis. i rather have 4 extra destroyer/cruiser than a single carrier that operates 6 months out of a year.

Combined Responses:

The UK seems to do well with 2, and France manages with one.

No, they don't.

They are incapable of keeping one carrier at sea 24/7.

Can't disagree more. Carrier for Taiwan is even worse than one for Korea.

A Taiwanese carrier would be a moving target compared to the airfields that China has targeted down to the inch.

I was, indeed, missing your point.

That being said, I've always thought this concern was overblown. For all the bluster, the North Koreans don't have that much firepower at their disposal, and as recent events in Eastern Europe are showing it takes a lot of firepower, even precision firepower, to go to "millions dead and cities in ruins". Focusing their efforts on specific targets like, say, airfields, on the other hand, would likely net them more immediate operational benefits, and for all their issues I prefer not to assume people like the North Koreans are idiots that would disperse their limited long-range firepower on terror attacks against civilians.

That's not to say I would expect South Korea to escape with minimal civilian casualties and infrastructure damage, far from it. But "cities in ruins and millions dead" is, IMO, not realistic unless the North Koreans break out the nukes and they know that would invite retaliation in kind.

You do know that there's enough artillery within range of Seoul that the output is measured in kilotons per second, right?

 

[helmutkohl]

They are incapable of keeping one carrier at sea 24/7.

Given the Royal Navy's difficulties with personnel numbers.. in retrospect.. I wonder if they should have just decided on one carrier so it would have enough planes/sailors. Or rather than two carrier groups, run one and keep the other as a reserve.

similarly, I wonder if the French Navy should have went with a conventional powerplant.

 

[FighterJock]

I think that the French Navy have chosen well in deciding the nuclear power plant for the next aircraft carrier, what would they chose for the conventional fuel if they had went for conventional since we live in supposedly environmentally friendly times?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I think that the French Navy have chosen well in deciding the nuclear power plant for the next aircraft carrier, what would they chose for the conventional fuel if they had went for conventional since we live in supposedly environmentally friendly times?

you need fewer crew for a conventional plant. Much fewer.