Interestingly much of what I have seen in this actually gives Bell FLRAA, Sikorsky FARA, and Boeing continues to sell AH-64 and CH-47 at there current rate. With Sikorsky having a number of UH-60 on the books to sell and the after market updates for another ~40 years, everyone in the industry is in business for at least another couple of decades. Bell with a handful of H-1 for the Czech Republic and the last few MV-22 for the USMC, are the most at risk. But I can see how one can read
@H_K 's point in the article.
That's what keeps floating around, but it always seems to be based on a "feeling". Part of it may be that so far Valor has pretty much outclassed Defiant, whereas it appears that the fact that an earlier version of what will grow into Raider-X has been flying for some time and although it doesn't seem to have met all of its goals., for now that seems to be worth more than something that hasn't flown as a complete aircraft at all.
I'm more concerned that the program manager in August said that a VTOL that meets Army specs might not be able to be built. Specifically a VTOL that has a max sustained speed of at least 180 knots r (and given what you have to pay to get that I personally think they should ask for more), specified performance (payload, range, endurance) with 3,000 shp driving a ≤40' diameter rotor with a gross weight of ≤14,000 lbs may be beyond the technology available.
A fair point. I think the perceptions of success (flight program with "minimal" issue) for Bell V-280 and Sikorsky Raider, are a major source of this "feeling". To my knowledge the SB>1 remains incomplete with the initial test plan. Down select for FLRAA is to occur mid year 2022.
I think everyone (especially AW&ST) was surprised at a program manager saying in public that the Army was trying to defy the laws of physics. That no doubt caused some choice language to be floated amongst leadership and vendors alike. The US Army efforts toward a manned reconnaissance rotorcraft have been, by any count, an abysmal failure. Mostly because they have failed to get the DoD to comprehend the necessity for such a platform. Nor that what the Army does not conduct reconnaissance in the same manner as that done by other services. Nor do I think they have adequately outlined that UAV cannot land next to the supported ground commander and talk over a map about what is "over the next hill", especially when communications means for the UAV are inoperable.
I suspect that if the FARA program does survive, it will be a political decision to maintain one of the vendors, vice the Army having demonstrated adequately the necessity of the program.