JMR (Joint Multi-Role) & FVL (Future Vertical Lift) Programs

[yasotay]

Then, for the attack version, field of view is limited for the pilot to one side and for the gunner
to the other side and minimal frontal area seems not to matter anymore, too ?

With the contemporary electronic warfare self-protection suites attack helicopters are flying high to see and hit more and still be survivable. So some of the low profile for survivability design drivers for traditional attack helicopters are no longer as strong as keeping program cost down. With a F-35 style EODAS capability the field of view issue would certainly be solved.

Have to agree that current philosophies may need to be reconsidered. Senior officers talking about this indicate that the JMR won't be fielded until ~2034. Given Moores Law, who knows what the state of avionics, survivability equipment and visioinics will be. I would also remind everyone that the US Special Operation Aviation Regiment prefers heavily armed Blackhawks over dedicated attack helicopters. They more than anyone can get aircraft they desire.

 

[sferrin]

I would also remind everyone that the US Special Operation Aviation Regiment prefers heavily armed Blackhawks over dedicated attack helicopters. They more than anyone can get aircraft they desire.

They would have loved the S-67. :'(

 

[JFC Fuller]

With the contemporary electronic warfare self-protection suites attack helicopters are flying high to see and hit more and still be survivable. So some of the low profile for survivability design drivers for traditional attack helicopters are no longer as strong as keeping program cost down. With a F-35 style EODAS capability the field of view issue would certainly be solved.

It's more to do with a change on threat profile, Apaches were designed to operate against Soviet armoured formations with organic short and medium range air defence so being down low was the safest place to be. In Iraq and Afghanistan it was found that it was best to either be high (no credible AD threat) or very low to keep engagement windows down. EW systems won't do anything to an RPG or manually operated ZU-23-2.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It's more to do with a change on threat profile, Apaches were designed to operate against Soviet armoured formations with organic short and medium range air defence so being down low was the safest place to be. In Iraq and Afghanistan it was found that it was best to either be high (no credible AD threat) or very low to keep engagement windows down. EW systems won't do anything to an RPG or manually operated ZU-23-2.

The change in profile has little to do with a lowering of the threat as it was developed in the 1990s via improvements in technology and is designed to be survivable in the face of SHORADS and radar guided guns. Because EWSP is a catch all phrase which covers more than just ECM. It includes the all-important threat detection sensors automatically tied in with countermeasure systems.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The change in profile has little to do with a lowering of the threat as it was developed in the 1990s via improvements in technology and is designed to be survivable in the face of SHORADS and radar guided guns. Because EWSP is a catch all phrase which covers more than just ECM. It includes the all-important threat detection sensors automatically tied in with countermeasure systems.

It has everything to do with the lowering of the threat. There is still not a credible gunfire detection system in widespread use and aside from aggressive manoeuvre there is no countermeasure to RPGs even when they are picked up by IR threat detection systems. It is entirely possible, theoretically (though I would not want to be in a crew that tried it), to jam something like Pantsir or deploy counter-measures against IR missiles but gun/cannon rounds fired from the back of a Toyota Hilux or an RPG from inside a mud compound are going to stay on their trajectory irrespective of any fancy electronic or pyrotechnic wizardry. Hence, helicopters either stay very low to make targeting windows as small as possible or high where most small arms fire will either miss or cause little damage even if it does hit. The latter, as you rightly say, makes finding things easier.

 

[yasotay]

The "technology game" between guided weapons and countermeasures will continue unabated. I have to agree that if the countermeasures are more effective than the guided weapon (radar and IR missiles) there is no reason to fly down where the unguided (and usually volumous) weapons fire can be effective. However if the guided weapons regain the edge then the rotorcraft will have to come down low again until the countermeasures can regain effectiveness. Although I would doubt that NOE tactics will regain prominance, terrain flight at cruise speeds (higher) or maneuver speeds (lower) would likely be in vogue.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

It has everything to do with the lowering of the threat.

So you’re saying the DAS/EWSP (depending on your local lingo) fitted to the Westland Apache, ARH Tiger and other contemporary generation attack helicopters were simply because of the demise of the Soviet Union?

There is still not a credible gunfire detection system in widespread use and aside from aggressive manoeuvre there is no countermeasure to RPGs even when they are picked up by IR threat detection systems.

The defence against barrages of RPGs and 12.7mm HMG (and similar) is to fly high (a few thousand feet above ground level). While high the aircraft relies on the DAS/EWSP to give it initial protection from SHORADS. These DAS/EWSP have already proven themselves in multiple occasions defeating IR guided missiles. In the case of the more serious SHORADS like Pantsir part of the survivability onion is their own lethality. In the case of these attack helicopters they have MMW radars with fire and forget missiles which can potentially defeat something like an unmasked Pantsir before it can engage the helicopter. That is if it is operating with EMCON as one would expect it to be in the face of a western SEAD/DEAD system.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Although I would doubt that NOE tactics will regain prominance, terrain flight at cruise speeds (higher) or maneuver speeds (lower) would likely be in vogue.

Or they could leverage data links to use stand-off attack. Something like the original munitions set for NLOS-LS fired by helicopters from over the horizon. First the loitering ISR missile to determine where the enemy ground force is and maybe take out a key GBAD system or two and then the long range anti-tank missiles.

 

[Avimimus]

One of the other interesting factors is the relative shoot-down rate of Apaches vs. Kiowa in Iraq. If I recall correctly it is about equal. Part of it is how they're employed - but it isn't like the Kiowa pilots haven't been using their weapons plenty over the last decade. This is also fighting mainly small arms - something the Apache should have a significant advantage in dealing with.

It is also worth noting that about two-thirds of the casualties in these prolonged assymetric warfare environments are due to weather, pilot error and mechanical failure - not enemy fire.

In a combat environment with modern arms helicopters will have trouble getting close enough for armour to be important (e.g. to withstand ambushes form heavy machine guns). That said - armour and ejection seats are very attractive things to have. But I do see the logic.

 

[JFC Fuller]

So you’re saying the DAS/EWSP (depending on your local lingo) fitted to the Westland Apache, ARH Tiger and other contemporary generation attack helicopters were simply because of the demise of the Soviet Union?

That is not what I am saying and I never suggested that.

The defence against barrages of RPGs and 12.7mm HMG (and similar) is to fly high (a few thousand feet above ground level). While high the aircraft relies on the DAS/EWSP to give it initial protection from SHORADS. These DAS/EWSP have already proven themselves in multiple occasions defeating IR guided missiles. In the case of the more serious SHORADS like Pantsir part of the survivability onion is their own lethality. In the case of these attack helicopters they have MMW radars with fire and forget missiles which can potentially defeat something like an unmasked Pantsir before it can engage the helicopter. That is if it is operating with EMCON as one would expect it to be in the face of a western SEAD/DEAD system.

One approach is to fly high, the other is to fly low, fast and unpredictably; as I can assure you has been done in both Afghanistan and Iraq, especially the former where there are few power lines or other tall structures to get in the way. DAS have certainly proved themselves against early generation MANPADs, against something like Igla-S or the 57E6 series and EO targeted guns things become much more questionable though. Engaging an air defence battery is all well and good but if the helicopter can see the Pantsir then the Pantsir can almost certainly see the helicopter and currently a 56E6 out-ranges a Hellfire. Ultimately the current high level operations are a product of the very limited air defence threat in Afghanistan and Iraq; limited to small arms, RPGs and poorly used early generation MANPADs at most which make high flying practical and survivable. When focus shifts back to facing opponents with sophisticated mobile air defence capability (China takes mobile air defence in its ground forces very seriously; see PGZ-07 and Tor-M1) low level flying will become important again.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

That is not what I am saying and I never suggested that.

You did say repeatedly that high altitude tactics is something introduced by the low threat yet the fielding of integrated DAS and work on the tactics that can be enabled by them all began well before the OIF, OEF counter insurgency mission. Perhaps you are just confusing the use of high altitude tactics by American Apaches in OIF with the use of same by Brtish Apaches in OEF. The key difference being the American Apaches have only been getting integrated DAS from 2010 and started flying high (BTW which is about 3,000 feet) because of lack of threat in Iraq whereas the British Apaches with their integrated DAS from 2004 flew high in OEF in the face of the Taliban MANPADS threat while American Apaches were still flying NOE.

DAS have certainly proved themselves against early generation MANPADs, against something like Igla-S or the 57E6 series and EO targeted guns things become much more questionable though. Engaging an air defence battery is all well and good but if the helicopter can see the Pantsir then the Pantsir can almost certainly see the helicopter and currently a 56E6 out-ranges a Hellfire.

It’s not up to the Taliban’s arms supply networks to decide the effectiveness of the integrated DAS on contemporary and future attack helicopters. They are designed to defeat more than just old Iglas or 20 year old Stingers. As to engaging Pantsir the later relies on radar to outrange Hellfire and between the two there is only one platform that is going to get SEADed or DEADed if it sits around illuminating.

Ultimately the current high level operations are a product of the very limited air defence threat in Afghanistan and Iraq; limited to small arms, RPGs and poorly used early generation MANPADs at most which make high flying practical and survivable. When focus shifts back to facing opponents with sophisticated mobile air defence capability (China takes mobile air defence in its ground forces very seriously; see PGZ-07 and Tor-M1) low level flying will become important again.

Not really because the other element in allowing high altitude tactics for helicopters is the significant increase in sensor range from early Apaches to the later ones. Which allows for much greater standoff engagement. So they stay up high to see over terrain and knock off GBAD at the outer edge of their missile engagement range (which will be 16km with JAGM). Which is also the outer edge of the engagement range of SHORADS. Which since they aren’t lasers means long time of flight and with the integrated DAS giving early warning of the engagement provides the attack helicopter lots of opportunity to defeat the engagement.

If defensive aids suites were a panacea B-52s would still be penetrating defended airspace at 45-50,000ft.

The operational difference between the two examples makes this nothing more than a hollow comment. Bombers penetrate enemy air space. Attack helicopters in conventional ops fight the front line of the enemy force. While some attack helicopter units have a deep penetration mission they would never penetrate at high altitude because apart from the increased risk it would also defeat the surprise of their mission. High altitude tactics are viable in conventional ops because the improvement in survivability and engagement range is determined by the helicopter’s new capabilities not the enemy’s lack of them.

 

[JFC Fuller]

You did say repeatedly that high altitude tactics is something introduced by the low threat yet the fielding of integrated DAS and work on the tactics that can be enabled by them all began well before the OIF, OEF counter insurgency mission. Perhaps you are just confusing the use of high altitude tactics by American Apaches in OIF with the use of same by Brtish Apaches in OEF. The key difference being the American Apaches have only been getting integrated DAS from 2010 and started flying high (BTW which is about 3,000 feet) because of lack of threat in Iraq whereas the British Apaches with their integrated DAS from 2004 flew high in OEF in the face of the Taliban MANPADS threat while American Apaches were still flying NOE.

No I did not, I said higher altitude tactics are viable where there is not a credible AD system and useful where there is an unguided low altitude threat; for instance in Afghanistan and Iraq. I am not confusing anything, DAS is nice to have and very effective against early generation MANPADs used by poorly trained non-networked opponents, it's utility against an advanced low-medium altitude AD network is a very different proposition. British Apache's flew both mission types depending on the precise requirements of any particular mission and any associated threat reports.

It’s not up to the Taliban’s arms supply networks to decide the effectiveness of the integrated DAS on contemporary and future attack helicopters. They are designed to defeat more than just old Iglas or 20 year old Stingers. As to engaging Pantsir the later relies on radar to outrange Hellfire and between the two there is only one platform that is going to get SEADed or DEADed if it sits around illuminating.

Radar and EW is infinitely more complex than that. An emitting Apache is visible to passive RF sensors (Strela units had radar warning receivers in the 80s) and most AD systems now include EO sensors whilst the likes of Pantsir can and do use off-board sensing systems. Apache versus Pantsir is a very even fight and it is absurd to suggest otherwise.

Not really because the other element in allowing high altitude tactics for helicopters is the significant increase in sensor range from early Apaches to the later ones. Which allows for much greater standoff engagement. So they stay up high to see over terrain and knock off GBAD at the outer edge of their missile engagement range (which will be 16km with JAGM). Which is also the outer edge of the engagement range of SHORADS. Which since they aren’t lasers means long time of flight and with the integrated DAS giving early warning of the engagement provides the attack helicopter lots of opportunity to defeat the engagement.

Yes, really, just as Apaches have gained greater stand-off range so ground based air defence systems have gained greater ability to see and hit them at range; Pantsir systems and improved Tor systems being prime examples. Just as DAS and airborne sensors and munitions have improved so have the systems intended to defeat them.

The operational difference between the two examples makes this nothing more than a hollow comment. Bombers penetrate enemy air space. Attack helicopters in conventional ops fight the front line of the enemy force. While some attack helicopter units have a deep penetration mission they would never penetrate at high altitude because apart from the increased risk it would also defeat the surprise of their mission. High altitude tactics are viable in conventional ops because the improvement in survivability and engagement range is determined by the helicopter’s new capabilities not the enemy’s lack of them.

No it does not. Fly an Apache at medium to high altitude at a sophisticated ground based air-defence network and it is going to die just as a B-52 flying at high altitude over the Soviet Union in 1989 was going to die. Threats improve on both sides, both aggressor and defender. HeliDAS is a great piece of kit but it does not magically allow an Apache to hover in direct line of sight (radar or visual) of an advanced air defence network with impunity in the same way Praetorian does not allow a Typhoon to fly straight at a modern IADS.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Fly an Apache at medium to high altitude over a sophisticated ground based air-defence network and it is going to die just as a B-52 flying at high altitude over the Soviet Union in 1989 was going to die. Threats improve on both sides, both aggressor and defender.

So what part of my writing that in conventional ops high altitude tactics (~3,000 feet) are not to fly over the top of enemy forces but to use altitude to improve standoff engagement didn’t you understand? And as to you thinking that threats change on both sides I guess that’s why tactical implementation of warfare has remained completely static over the past 3,000 years?

Attack helicopters now have the capability to automatically detect and precisely localise missiles launched at them and automatically implement the appropriate countermeasure. In a JMR 2020s attack helicopter this could even include a high power DIRCM or a HPM to defeat the missile. What’s the countermeasure to this? Stealth anti-aircraft missiles or armoured ones?

 

[JFC Fuller]

So what part of my writing that in conventional ops high altitude tactics (~3,000 feet) are not to fly over the top of enemy forces but to use altitude to improve standoff engagement didn’t you understand? And as to you thinking that threats change on both sides I guess that’s why tactical implementation of warfare has remained completely static over the past 3,000 years?

Attack helicopters now have the capability to automatically detect and precisely localise missiles launched at them and automatically implement the appropriate countermeasure. In a JMR 2020s attack helicopter this could even include a high power DIRCM or a HPM to defeat the missile. What’s the countermeasure to this? Stealth anti-aircraft missiles or armoured ones?

The Apache still has to face the AD system, an AD system that is likely to outrange it. The abilities of defensive aid-suites are impressive but they rely on being superior to the threats they face, and those threats themselves evolve to defeat the defensive aids systems. Attack helicopters are now in the same technology game as fast jets, between evolving countermeasures and evolving threats. DIRCM and HPM will not be a Panacea either just as the first development of the RF jammer did not render radars obsolete and chaff did not render missiles obsolete. For instance, I know for a fact that a number of methods for defeating MAWS are being looked at including making the missile harder to detect. JMR will not enter service (assuming it does) until the 2030s based on the current DoD schedule, a lot can happen in that time but certainly neither DAS or IADS technology will stand still.

 

[Reaper]

Bell Helicopter unveiling V-280 Valor tiltrotor concept:

http://bellv280.com/

 

[yasotay]

So what part of my writing that in conventional ops high altitude tactics (~3,000 feet) are not to fly over the top of enemy forces but to use altitude to improve standoff engagement didn’t you understand? And as to you thinking that threats change on both sides I guess that’s why tactical implementation of warfare has remained completely static over the past 3,000 years?

Attack helicopters now have the capability to automatically detect and precisely localise missiles launched at them and automatically implement the appropriate countermeasure. In a JMR 2020s attack helicopter this could even include a high power DIRCM or a HPM to defeat the missile. What’s the countermeasure to this? Stealth anti-aircraft missiles or armoured ones?

Actually I think you both have made some good points. In all honesty a good commander is going to operate his aircraft in the smartest most survivable method that can accomplish the mission. Almost all efforts now are ‘combined arms’ mission. There are signal and cyber intelligence efforts on going and it is being conducted from the front line to rear area. By 2020, at least for the US most helicopter units will operate in conjunction with unmanned air vehicles, out looking for the air defense systems. Just like a fixed wing strike package the attack helicopter will rarely operate in a major battlespace by itself.
If there are TOR and Pantsir out there, I very much doubt the helicopter is going to be flying at altitude. I also doubt the helicopters are going to be out flying NOE in bad guy land if there are copious amounts of small arms. IF they have to fly through bad guy land they will likely do as the Israeli’s did in 2006 with their Blackhawks; fly as low and fast as they could make the helicopter fly to the very last moment, land and leave as quickly as they got there. The USAF CSAR missions in Kosovo operation (a high end integrated air defense network for sure) did the same to rescue an F-117 pilot. Attack aircraft will likely use running fire tactics to the extent they can to not be easy targets for light weapons.
If there are no high end AD systems to deal with and the MANPAD threat is known to be incapable of overcoming the aircraft survivability equipment by all means I would expect the helicopters to operate at altitude. Indeed in some cases they will fly well above the 3000 ft (above ground level) mentioned. They do this because at the higher altitudes the sound of the rotor system rarely can be heard on the ground. This is obviously dependent on the atmospheric conditions, but at night flying slowly at high altitude allows Apaches to operate with relative impunity.
From personal experience I can tell you that twenty two years ago I was flying as fast and as low as I could wary of the dread ZSU23-4, and Igla. Twenty years ago flying the same profile but without the dread nemesis, and after my wingman called an RPG zipping between the two helicopters, we immediately started flying missions at 2000 ft minimum altitude.


The Apache still has to face the AD system, an AD system that is likely to outrange it. The abilities of defensive aid-suites are impressive but they rely on being superior to the threats they face, and those threats themselves evolve to defeat the defensive aids systems. Attack helicopters are now in the same technology game as fast jets, between evolving countermeasures and evolving threats. DIRCM and HPM will not be a Panacea either just as the first development of the RF jammer did not render radars obsolete and chaff did not render missiles obsolete. For instance, I know for a fact that a number of methods for defeating MAWS are being looked at including making the missile harder to detect. JMR will not enter service (assuming it does) until the 2030s based on the current DoD schedule, a lot can happen in that time but certainly neither DAS or IADS technology will stand still.

 

[Triton]

Photos of the Sikorsky/Boeing JMR/FVL Medium concept from the AAAA convention posted by the American Helicopter Society (AHS) International on Facebook.

Source:
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10151516962220528.1073741829.80119815527&type=3

 

[Triton]

Photo of AVX windtunnel model and AVX booth from the AAAA convention posted by the American Helicopter Society (AHS) International on Facebook.

Source:
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.10151516962220528.1073741829.80119815527&type=3

 

[ouroboros]

For a split second, I thought the AVX wind tunnel model was something a bunch of rotorcraft guys thought up as an alternative to the Cormorant UAV. Nobody is working on a submersible/amphibious UAV rotorcraft to fit in trident tubes, right?...

 

[Jemiba]

Nobody is working on a submersible/amphibious UAV rotorcraft to fit in trident tubes, right?...

Nice idea and maybe landing it near the sub would be a little bit easier, but I think, launching
a lot more difficult.

 

[Avimimus]

Quick question: What is the cannon armament? All of the JMR contenders are shown with the same module mounted.

 

[yasotay]

Quick question: What is the cannon armament? All of the JMR contenders are shown with the same module mounted.

I suspect that the armament has not been defined yet. Likely be somewhere in the 20mm to 30mm range if they stay with traditional weapons. But 2030's... who knows could be photons and phasers.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

For a split second, I thought the AVX wind tunnel model was something a bunch of rotorcraft guys thought up as an alternative to the Cormorant UAV. Nobody is working on a submersible/amphibious UAV rotorcraft to fit in trident tubes, right?...

At one point DARPA was working on a UAV that turned into a submarine, but I don't believe it was a rotorcraft. Recovery was by some mechanical arm that extended out of a VLS tube, I think a 21 incher, and pulled it in.

 

[yasotay]

Then there was the American Helicopter Society Annual student design competition several years ago where they asked the students to design a small helicopter that fit into a refurbished missile tube. There were a couple of very innovative concepts that the college teams came up with.
Now back to the JMR stuff.
I note that the AVX team went with both doors and a ramp. Seems to this old helicopter guy that the crunchies (er... Infantry) would like having more ways off the bus, especially if they have things with wheels, like heavy mortar systems etc.

 

[Sea Skimmer]

It also facilitates carrying palletized break bulk stuff and just sliding it off, and sizeable parachute drops for resupply in hostile conditions. All the more so now that GPS guided parachute rigs sort of work, and could at least get very close to a typical FOB, if not necessarily inside the perimeter of a small one. This kind of capability apparently got a lot of attention on the CH-53K. Once you go to all the expense of making a high speed helicopter you really want to minimize use of sling loads anyway.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

The ramp will also help with loading the internal weapons bays of the attack version. Because a ramp is orientated fore and aft like the launched weapons (Hellfire, JAGM, 2.75"). You will just be able to drive a fork lift or something up the ramp lower the ordnance to the level of the retracted rail or tube and slide them forward and into place. With sideways access you will have to reach in to behind (or forward) of the retracted launcher from (each) of the side doors to slide them into place, or scrable around under the fuselage with the launchers lowered, or completely swap out the firing modules meaning a much heavier lift in and out anda requirement for twice the number of launchers. None of them simple or practical solutions.

 

[Triton]

From the Rotor & Wing magazine page on Facebook.

Features of the AVX Aircraft JMR concept in the attack configuration. Look for our story on JMR/Future Vertical Lift in the May issue.

Source:
https://www.facebook.com/rotorandwing?filter=3

 

[Triton]

Source:
https://angel.co/avx-aircraft-company

 

[John21]

Does anybody here thinks the AVX designs have any hope for procurement compared to other manufacturers in these times of budget austerity?

 

[Avimimus]

Is there any evidence that the designs of the other manufacturers would be cheaper?

 

[lantinian]

Which is the latest version considered?
The one with the integrated ducted fans into the fuselage or the one with the the ducted fans on pilons?

 

[Triton]

I believe that John21 is asking if it is too risky for the United States Army to go with the design of a startup helicopter company that has not built any aircraft. Despite the fact that it was started by ex-Bell employees.

 

[lantinian]

I am not sure how much of an advantage is that but the attack version of the V-280 seams to be capable of carring double the required weapons load via stores bellow the wing.


This is the only image I could find on page 11 of the media PDF available here
http://www.scribd.com/doc/135276053/20130409-FVL-AAAA-Media-Brief-Final#download


Could the extra weapons load simply be a side effect of having such large wing and the space to mount those weapons or is it indicative of its payload lifting ability?

 

[Triton]

Though I need to ask how committed is the United States Army to the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program to replace the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk, Boeing AH-64 Apache, and the Boeing CH-47 Chinook in light of budget cuts? Does it consider the FVL compound rotorcraft to be essential for the service's capabilities in the future?

Is this Bell V-280 Valor-based attack tilt-rotor concept intended to replace the Boeing AH-64 Apache? A similar concept to the Sikorsky S-70 Battle Hawk?

Will the US Army jump on board the European Heavy Transport Helicopter (HTH) program with the Boeing/Eurocopter replacement for the CH-47 Chinook?

 

[sferrin]

Does anybody here thinks the AVX designs have any hope for procurement compared to other manufacturers in these times of budget austerity?

No. And their actual proposal doesn't look like that but in the most basic details.

 

[lantinian]

Is this Bell V-280 Valor-based attack tilt-rotor concept intended to replace the Boeing AH-64 Apache?

Yes it is and it does look meaner than the gunships in Avatar, doesn't it? )

Bell markets it as double the range and double the payload vs a BlackHawk. I assumes this translates into much higher operational hover altitude for the same payload too

 

[yasotay]

I believe the AVX concept with the canards is the latest version. As to their likelyhood of getting a contract, they are probably a long shot compared to the big three. However if they do get selected I am sure that they will attract the interest of one of the larger defense companies willing to take on the task.
As to the US Army being willing to stay the course in finacially constrained times, well it is anyones guess. Recall though that both the H-60 and the H-64 requirements were developed in finacially restricted times as well and went through a long period of doubt as well. Indeed Sikorsky was a long shot for the UTTAS selection with few thinking they would be able to compete with the giant Boeing. There are strategic issues that resonate with the rotorcraft situation. It has been ~40 years since a combat rotorcraft was designed in the US. I can tell you that it is not a pick-up game that any old aero engineer can whip up. Also with all of the adventures the US has been involved in, the life expectancy of they current fleet is greatly deminished. While rebuild and new build current aircraft may work in the short run, in 2030 when the entire situation may be completely different, asking a Boeing airline aero engineer to make a combat rotorcraft is not any smarter than asking an heart specialist to conduct brain surgery.
As to tilt rotors... if you look at slide three of the Bell brief they quote a US Army study that says that tilt rotor is the best option for the future. Rather surprising to me as I always found the Army to be very wedded to their current version of the horse...

 

[F-14D]

I am not sure how much of an advantage is that but the attack version of the V-280 seams to be capable of carring double the required weapons load via stores bellow the wing.


This is the only image I could find on page 11 of the media PDF available here
http://www.scribd.com/doc/135276053/20130409-FVL-AAAA-Media-Brief-Final#download


Could the extra weapons load simply be a side effect of having such large wing and the space to mount those weapons or is it indicative of its payload lifting ability?

Probably both. If those are all Hellfires, then it looks like it's carrying a total of 24. The wing mounted weapons, though, could only be fired once the proprotors have rotated up sufficiently (not necessarily all the way to vertical) for clearance.

 

[Triton]

If the AVX Aircraft Company concept wins the FVL Medium contract, I wonder how long it will be before the company is acquired by another defense contractor?

 

[F-14D]

I believe that John21 is asking if it is too risky for the United States Army to go with the design of a startup helicopter company that has not built any aircraft. Despite the fact that it was started by ex-Bell employees.

The other risk is that no one has built an aircraft quite like that. There has been a lot of experience with Tilt-Rotor, a lot of flgiht time on the X3 demonstrator (although I'm not sure how adaptable that technology is to this application), and while X2 is pretty limited, they did at least get an aircraft in the air.

I suspect that AVX may be hoping that Army will fund one low risk design, which at this level woud be Tilt-Rotor, and one "far-out-but-high-return-if-it-works" concept. Even if they didn't win, it would establish the techology as viable and could open the door for other civil and military applications. They could be looking at the long game.