Hi Lancer21,

Problem is the Kinsei engine will drastically reduce the range, as shown by the A6M8 compared to all the other Sakae powered Zeros, plus the fact that it has a diameter of 1,22m compared to 1,15m for Sakae would mean they will have to increase fuselage diameter if they still want the MGs to be in the cowling, which leads to a weight penalty etc.

Is there an accepted (or at least reasonable) set of performance figures for the A6M8 one could use to extrapolate A6M1 performance with the Kasei engine?

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

There are a couple online sets of specs for the A6M8 that seem consistent, but no idea to what, if any extent, they are quoting each other:
 
The Warthunder link is the best, thanks BB1984.

HoHun, I was basing my data on the japanese wiki article on A6M variants here, which is pretty much the same as the Warthunder link (except the WT has some very interesting drawings and additional data etc.)

So yeah, it looks like the range was halved by putting in the Kinsei on A6M8 from the previous versions. From what i can gather the OTL A6M2 had a maximum radius of 600nm in 1941/42, but all else being equal if you put a 1070HP Kinsei-46 (seems this is the variant considered) on it it will drop to about 300nm? I guess it depends on the fuel consumption of the Kinsei-46 vs Sakae-21. They may perhaps squeeze 400nm out of it by adopting later mods, like increasing the wing tanks from 380 to 420 litres as on A6M3, and by fitting those outboard 45 litre small tanks. But how about things like speed?
 
Come to think about it, Nakajima might've been the best company to make a next-gen fighter to replace the Zero. They were designing the J1N for the role of long-range fighter, that at the end was bought as a recon, and later re-purposed as a night fighter. Under 480 manufactured from mid-1942 to late 1944. They also made the C6N, a fine recon machine, again made in small numbers - under 470. Some were converted in fighters. Nakajima was also making Zero for the Navy (doh).
I'd suggest that Nakajima makes a long-range fighter around the Ha-41 engine for late 1941. Move to Ha 109 from 1942, and to Homare by early 1944. Phase-out the production of the Zero by early 1943, at least what is poduced at Nakajima's factory devoted to the Navy aircraft (other factory was making Army aircraft). The J1N was with self-sealing tanks, so our brave new fighter has to have those, too.

The D4Y (with radial engine from the start) needs to be manufactured in greater numbers, so more can be spared for recon job, and also to replace the Vals by a faster rate. Judy also needs self-sealing tanks.
 
Hi there Tomo,

Sorry i haven't come to play here lately, have some RL things to deal with, but as a bit of a distraction i was going over the IJNAF and IJAAF alternate birds last night. So indeed Nakajima working on an single engine interceptor instead of the J1N is a much better use of their design resources. Incidentally when the J2M troubles became apparent Nakajima offered a variant of the Ki-44 as J2N for the Navy, so your idea has good merit, either a Ki-44 derivative or a clean sheet design flying in 1941/42 would again free Mitsubishi to work on the A7M.

The C6N was a good bird, but actually the Ki-46 (which the IJNAF did use) was faster (refering to the Ki-46-III version with Ha-112-II engine), so why not just build more of those for the navy? Ok it can't land on a carrier but since the C6N was never used on CVs anyway, and this thread implies a bit of hindsight, just go for more Ki-46s, again freeing Nakajima's designers to work on something more useful.

Not sure if i mentioned it before, but also cancelling that totally useless G5N would free Nakajima to design and fly the B6N in 1941, one year early (powered by the 1500HP Kasei or Ha-109). Perhaps the first units might be ready by late 1942, at a time when the B6N would be almost as fast as the F4F, the main USN fighter, it would be much harder to catch (at least for a while) compared to the slow and vulnerable B5N.
 
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Hi there Tomo,

Sorry i haven't come to play here lately, have some RL things to deal with, but as a bit of a distraction i was going over the IJNAF and IJAAF alternate birds last night. So indeed Nakajima working on an single engine interceptor instead of the J1N is a much better use of their design resources. Incidentally when the J2M troubles became apparent Nakajima offered a variant of the Ki-44 as J2N for the Navy, so your idea has good merit, either a Ki-44 derivative or a clean sheet design flying in 1941/42 would again free Mitsubishi to work on the A7M.

Hopefully the things will work out for you :)
IMO - Nakajima might've design a CV-capable long-range fighter sized & shaped like the future Ki-84 or Ki-100, or indeed a big-wing Ki-44? Folding wings, butterfly flaps, self-sealing fuel tanks and back armor from the get-go (as in the J1N), two cannons + 2-4 LMGs for the start.
For the Mitsubishi - make a no-nonsense fighter around the Ha 104 with water-alcohol injection, sorta Japanese Sea Fury? We know that Ha 104 made a lot of power even with 87 oct fuel - the big engines running on low boost have a lot of appeal for the Japanese. If/when the Ha-43 materializes, up-engine the fighter by all means.

BTW - both of these should've been able to double as dive-bombers ASAP.

The C6N was a good bird, but actually the Ki-46 (which the IJNAF did use) was faster ( refering to the Ki-46_III version with ha-112-III engine), so why not juts build more of those for the navy? Ok it can't land on a carrier but since the C6N was never used on CVs anyway, and this thread implies a bit of hindsight, just go for more Ki-46s, again freeing Nakajima's designers to work on something more useful.

IJN and IJA were not friends :) But indeed, the Ki-46 was very good in what it did.
Carrier-borne recon job can be undertaken by a LR fighter outfitted with cameras, as well as by D4Y outfitted with cameras.

BTW and IMO - the earlier P1Y Ginga instead of the G4M? The G4M was the appearance and size of a transport A/C (it was used as one, too), while the P1Y was a much smaller and sleeker job, gaining 70-80 km/h even vs. the fastest G4M versions. Both carried the same (small) bomb load over great distances.

Not sure if i mentioned it before, but also cancelling that totally useless G5N would free Nakajima to design and fly the B6N in 1941, one year early (powered by the 1500HP Kasei or Ha-109). Perhaps the first units might be ready by late 1942, at a time when the B6N would be almost as fast as the F4F, the main USN fighter, it would be much harder to catch (at least for a while) compared to the slow and vulnerable B5N.

Yes, realistically the G5N was a waste of limited resources, even if they managed to make a meaningful number of them - it can't reach USA, impractical for tactical duties, the existing 2-engined bombers (or the ones in the pipeline) can tackle anything in China or Indochina.
B5N needs to be replaced ASAP, whether by an earlier B6N, or by Japanese forgetting their favorite tool - torpedo bomber - and going all-in with dive bombers and fighter-bombers. Having to fly at low altitude, straight and level in the teeth of many, many hundreds of 20mm and 40mm AA guns is not conductive to the health of crews or aircraft they flew... But then, a dive bomber flying at 15000 ft is just where the VT-fused ammo for the 5in gun awaits; granted, it is 1944 for the VT fuse to enter the stage.

OTOH, one cannot help but give a lot of credit to the Japanese aircraft designers, engineers and technicians for the sheer number and variety of relatively trouble-free aircraft they made in short years of 1940-45 (well, not that short for the people on the receiving end of the atrocities). Granted, it didn't help out with economies of the scale required for the all-out war the ww2 was.
 
Agree about the P1Y, even the version with Kasei engines was practically as fast as the F4F. It is also as fast as the J1N, so a night fighter version of it is perfectly reasonable (like the germans did with Ju-88).

However the G4M requirement stipulated a tail cannon, so i was looking at the Ki-67, it's smaller than the G4M and it's 50-60kph faster than the fastest G4M3, with practically same horsepower (2x1900HP Ha-104 vs 2x 1850HP Kasei). So if they still want a tail cannon, they could still make as smaller, faster G4M along the lines of the Ki-67, among other things the G4M was designed for crew comfort and extreme range (so no protected tanks until G4M3), but what's the point of flying your crew in comfort out to 700-800nm only to be massacred at the objective (because your plane is slow and has no protected tanks)?

So at the very least, all the large, valuable and expensive planes like G3M, H6K etc must have protected tanks by 1941, even if the smaller single engined ones still don't.

Sea Fury, now that's something i kinda just realized, the A7M is the closest thing the japanese had to it, except it's larger, especially span! Also looks like the Centaurus is pretty much the same size as the Ha-104, capacity, diameter, weight, everything. So here's the japanese Sea Fury right here, a somewhat smaller A7M (especially a smaller wing is crucial) powered by a Ha-104/MK10 engine! The latest Ha-214 engine was giving 2400HP with MW boost. Never mind matching the Sea Fury speed, or even the F4U-4, if they could make this ATL A7M a roughly 400mph fighter and match the MW boosted F-4U-1s it will still be massive boost for IJNAF.

Same goes for whatever Nakajima will design in this ATL, if they could get a roughly 400mph Shiden-kai equivalent as a land based interceptor (powered by my ATL 18 cylinder 48 litre Mamoru, starting at 1800-1900HP, but late war Ha-219 was doing 2450HP), this will also be a nasty opponent for everything but the latest F4U-4, P-47M/N etc.
 
Regarding the Ki-84 speed, indeed the american figures are too high, iirc in japanese wiki it says the speed of a fully rated Ki-84 was 640-650kph. The lower figure of 624-631 kph might be because the engine was derated (similar to what the germans had to do).

Same discrepance i found for the N1K2-J, iirc the highest figure i saw was 644kph, though i think i also saw 620kph. The usual figure as you know is given as just 595kph, which i always found inexplicably low, but if the engine was derated that makes sense. On the other hand, due to the war situation (poor fuel, poor metals/building quality), how many japanese fighters would have performed to their full potential, especially the 2000HP ones?
Could the differences have been due to the Allies using higher-octane fuel for the testing?
 
Hi Doc,

Regarding the Ki-84 speed, indeed the american figures are too high, iirc in japanese wiki it says the speed of a fully rated Ki-84 was 640-650kph. The lower figure of 624-631 kph might be because the engine was derated (similar to what the germans had to do).

Same discrepance i found for the N1K2-J, iirc the highest figure i saw was 644kph, though i think i also saw 620kph. The usual figure as you know is given as just 595kph, which i always found inexplicably low, but if the engine was derated that makes sense. On the other hand, due to the war situation (poor fuel, poor metals/building quality), how many japanese fighters would have performed to their full potential, especially the 2000HP ones?
Could the differences have been due to the Allies using higher-octane fuel for the testing?

At least with regard to the Ki-84, there's no indication that it was ever tested for performance by the Allies, and the reported speed data is clearly marked as calculated estimate based on minimal data in the original intelligence data sheets:


Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
Why did the Japanese need the FV-190 with its small combat radius? The Ki-43 could take off from Taiwan, fly to the Philippines, conduct 40 minutes of combat operations and return to Taiwan.
In 1943, on Guadalcanal, the Americans compared the Ki-43 II Kai with their aircraft and admitted that the Ki-43 was equal to the Aerocobra in speed at low and medium altitudes, and superior at higher altitudes.
But the main thing is that the Ki-43 is an escort fighter that provided bombers with support along the entire route, so it needs high dynamics and maneuverability to quickly react to an enemy attack. And until 1944, the Japanese did not experience any problems in battles with the Allies with the Ki-43. The Ki-43 ensured the effective operation of Japanese bombers until the end of the war.
I do not know of any German aircraft that even came close to the Ki-43.
The Japanese learned hit-and-run tactics early on and their planes were suitable for this, it's just that both the Zero and the Ki-43 had priority tasks for which they were designed.
If the Germans had used the Ki-43 in BB instead of the BF-109, England would not have stood a chance.
 
Japanese Fw 190, had they made it, would've been powered by the Japanese engines. These were much lighter than the BMW 801, with a bit less power (bar the Homare and the Ha 42), and were not guzzling the fuel like the BMW 801 did. So the fuel mileage, on the account of lower weight and lower consumption, is improved by a good deal. There is no great science in adding the drop tanks on a fighter, same as it was not for the Zero, Mustang or the Oscar. Or indeed for the Fw 190.
Fw 190 airframe adds several things to the table that Japanese sometimes lacked. Rate of roll was probably best in the world, dive abilities were much better than what the Ki-43 had, drag was smaller than on the Ki-84 due to the smaller wing of the 190, while the wing was not as diminutive as what the Ki-44 had (helps with wing loading and the internal volume for firepower and/or extra fuel). Protection suite was a complete package, again to the contrary of what the Ki-43 had.

In 1943, on Guadalcanal, the Americans compared the Ki-43 II Kai with their aircraft and admitted that the Ki-43 was equal to the Aerocobra in speed at low and medium altitudes, and superior at higher altitudes.
Being better than the 2nd, if not 3rd tier Allied fighter is not some accolade.

The Ki-43 ensured the effective operation of Japanese bombers until the end of the war.

Source?

I do not know of any German aircraft that even came close to the Ki-43.

Bf 109, Fw 190.

If the Germans had used the Ki-43 in BB instead of the BF-109, England would not have stood a chance.

I pay the Ki-43, and raise the Spitfire XI.
(hopefully I've gotten the poker slang right)
 
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The Japanese Fw 190, if it had been made, would have been equipped with Japanese engines. They were much lighter than the BMW 801, with slightly less power (except for the Homare and Ha 42), and did not waste fuel like the BMW 801. Thus, the fuel mileage due to the lower weight and lower consumption was greatly improved.
/// Sorry, but not three times :) And adding tanks to this overloaded airframe will definitely kill the dynamics and climb rate ///

There is no great science in adding landing tanks to fighters, as there was for the Zero, Mustang or Oscar. Or for the Fw 190.

The Fw 190 airframe adds a few things that the Japanese sometimes lacked. The roll rate was probably the best in the world,
/// There is no data on the Ki-43's roll, but according to the testimony of American pilots who flew it, it was higher than that of American machines, and the video shows that it was very high ///
the ability to dive was much better than that of the Ki-43,
///Well, in comparative tests they dived to 780 km/h, only on the way out they had to control the machine very carefully so as not to fold the wings///
the drag was less than that of the Ki-84, thanks to the smaller wing 190
/// The need for a long range and flight time, I repeat ///
, while the wing was not as small as that of the Ki-44
/// The Ki-44 was the best fighter in the Pacific until the appearance of the P-51 B/S. Unfortunately, the Ki-44 was the same as the Mustang, only slightly worse in everything,
and could not oppose the Mustang in anything. The Ki-43 could at least try to save itself thanks to maneuverability, and the Ki-44 was instantly obsolete.
From the memoirs of Japanese pilots. The Ki-44 was ruined by a large bomber engine, where the large diameter was not compensated by power ///
(helping with wing loading and internal volume for firepower and/or additional fuel).
/// The Ki-44 had no problems with this ///
The protection kit was a complete package, again unlike what the Ki-43 had.
/// What do you not like about the Ki-43's protection? At least its armor plate was not penetrated by 0.5" machine gun bullets///

biber550 said:
In 1943, on Guadalcanal, the Americans compared the Ki-43 II Kai with their aircraft and found that the Ki-43 was equal to the Aerocobra in speed at low and medium altitudes and superior at high altitudes.
Being better than a Tier 2, if not Tier 3 Allied fighter is no reward.
///At that time, only the P-38 was faster for the Americans ///

biber550 said:
The Ki-43 provided effective work for Japanese bombers until the end of the war.

Source?
/// Ishimura, Asi Ki-43, Richard Bushell, Ki-43, Pitti, Sunrise and Sunset and a number of others, including sources in Japanese ///

biber550 said:
I do not know of any German aircraft that even came close b to Ki-43.

Bf 109, Fw 190.
/// The Japanese tested them, conducted comparative tests, noted the strengths, for example, the advanced electrical equipment of the FW-190, but these were machines for another war and were not suitable for the Pacific and China ///

biber550 said:
If the Germans had used the Ki-43 in BB instead of the BF-109, England would have had no chance.

I shout Ki-43 and raise Spitfire XI.
(I hope I understood the poker slang correctly)
/// We liked the Spitfire, it was a tough opponent, it was clear that when designing it, the designers implemented the same principles as in the Ki-43. But it had a significant drawback - a meager flight time, so in the battle with the Spitfire we did not try to outdo it in a duel, it was enough to stall for time without letting ourselves be shot down, and the Spitfire was forced to return to base, and you had a choice, either to also calmly withdraw from the battle, or to take advantage of the situation and attack it, when it was limited in both maneuver and time. Memories of Japanese pilots in Burma.///
 
I did the RAAF Advanced Airpower course in 2013 and a JSDAF Major told me the reason the Japanese planes were light was because they lacked the metallurgy to make more powerful engines. They were unable to ramp up the boost, compression, revs and fit fancy stuff like nitrous on a wide scale because the engine metallurgy couldn't stand the stress.

As for what they could have done. Unlike USN and RN practice IJN air groups were an integral part of a ship's crew, not a separate entity to be sent to any carrier. This meant that if a carrier wasn't damaged but it's CAG took a lot of losses the ship was out of action until the CAG could be reconstituted. After Coral Sea both carriers missed out on Midway despite only 1 being damaged, IJN practice meant that they couldn't re-constitute a CAG from survivors of both carriers and any other sqns that might be available to equip the undamaged ship.

Separating CAGs from carriers would give the IJN a lot more flexibility in employing their carriers and maybe reduce the drain that their extremely long pilot training programme put on their operations. The danger is that by being able to quickly re-create CAGs from various sqns they'll just grind up their prewar trained cadre in the first year of WW2, so they'd have to manage that carefully.
 
I did the RAAF Advanced Airpower course in 2013 and a JSDAF Major told me the reason the Japanese planes were light was because they lacked the metallurgy to make more powerful engines. They were unable to ramp up the boost, compression, revs and fit fancy stuff like nitrous on a wide scale because the engine metallurgy couldn't stand the stress.

As for what they could have done. Unlike USN and RN practice IJN air groups were an integral part of a ship's crew, not a separate entity to be sent to any carrier. This meant that if a carrier wasn't damaged but it's CAG took a lot of losses the ship was out of action until the CAG could be reconstituted. After Coral Sea both carriers missed out on Midway despite only 1 being damaged, IJN practice meant that they couldn't re-constitute a CAG from survivors of both carriers and any other sqns that might be available to equip the undamaged ship.

Separating CAGs from carriers would give the IJN a lot more flexibility in employing their carriers and maybe reduce the drain that their extremely long pilot training programme put on their operations. The danger is that by being able to quickly re-create CAGs from various sqns they'll just grind up their prewar trained cadre in the first year of WW2, so they'd have to manage that carefully.
Except that understanding of IJN air group organisation is not entirely correct. There was a discussion about this on the Combined Fleet website 12-18 months ago kicked off by this about air group changes after Operation C in the Indian Ocean.

On Senshi Sosho page 191, beginning of the last paragraph, it’s stated that (my translation):
“On the 14th of April, the 5th Aircraft Carrier Division replenished and renewed aircraft from the 1st and 2nd Aircraft Carrier Divisions returning to the homeland, and on the same day, at 1237, separated from the Task Force off Singapore and headed for Mako with 3 destroyers”
From
which emerged this:-

Indeed, administrative organization put aviation branch firmly within the TOE of the parent aircraft carrier. However, each aircrew was under IJN Air HQ management, so could be transferred to another ship- or land-based air group when necessary.
So the stories about "IJN could not transfer air crews from "A" CV to "B" CV" are incorrect. There was plenty of transfers and planned transfers in 1941-42. Aircraft were transferred as well, of course.

You can find the entire discussion here.

By 1944 the IJN carrier groups had been entirely reorganised, such that an individual air group was attached to a carrier division of three ships, being spread more or less equally across the three ships.

At Philippine Sea in June 1944:-
Carrier Division 1 - Shokaku, Zuikaku & Taiho + 601st Air Group
Carrier Division 2 - Junyo, Hiyo & Ryuho + 652nd Air Group
Carrier Division 3 - Chitose, Chiyoda & Zuiho + 653rd Air Group.
 
The Japanese did everything very rationally and even perfectionistically. But not the scale of the enemy. They were a little behind in everything, both in quantity and quality and in the equipment of the theater of operations and in the quality of ground personnel and in the quality of pilots. In engines, in onboard equipment, in radio electronics. And this was simply a consequence of total superiority.
The Japanese had one hope, having inflicted heavy losses on the enemy fleet, to conclude a successful peace. After a rather reckless attack on Pearl Harbor, this was impossible.
 
I did the RAAF Advanced Airpower course in 2013 and a JSDAF Major told me the reason the Japanese planes were light was because they lacked the metallurgy to make more powerful engines. They were unable to ramp up the boost, compression, revs and fit fancy stuff like nitrous on a wide scale because the engine metallurgy couldn't stand the stress.

As for what they could have done. Unlike USN and RN practice IJN air groups were an integral part of a ship's crew, not a separate entity to be sent to any carrier. This meant that if a carrier wasn't damaged but it's CAG took a lot of losses the ship was out of action until the CAG could be reconstituted. After Coral Sea both carriers missed out on Midway despite only 1 being damaged, IJN practice meant that they couldn't re-constitute a CAG from survivors of both carriers and any other sqns that might be available to equip the undamaged ship.

Separating CAGs from carriers would give the IJN a lot more flexibility in employing their carriers and maybe reduce the drain that their extremely long pilot training programme put on their operations. The danger is that by being able to quickly re-create CAGs from various sqns they'll just grind up their prewar trained cadre in the first year of WW2, so they'd have to manage that carefully.
It seems now possible to work with Japanese sources, and not only with what was given to their enemies? According to the crew cards, even during the attack on Pearl Harbor, there were crews from other air groups on the aircraft carriers. Especially torpedo bombers, which were in short supply.
 
I was typing out the reply to the post #51 here, but, after this claim, why bother.
Believe me, what I wrote is the result of long research, somewhere since 1988, when I was lucky enough to talk to a person who flew on the Ki-43 and some other Japanese machines. By profession I am an aeronautical engineer, designer of light aircraft, pilot. Since then I have tried to collect as much information as possible on the Ki-43 and other Japanese aircraft, but the Ki-43 especially. Therefore, believe me, these are not just words.
 
I'm not talking about individual aircrew, crews and aircraft, but entire squadrons at various stages of their raise-train-sustain cycle. The squadrons on the small carriers and on land could form partial or complete CAGs to swap out those depleted by battle/ operations. The depleted squadrons could then be taken off the line to absorb replacements and restart the raise-train-sustain cycle.
 
I'm not talking about individual aircrew, crews and aircraft, but entire squadrons at various stages of their raise-train-sustain cycle. The squadrons on the small carriers and on land could form partial or complete CAGs to swap out those depleted by battle/ operations. The depleted squadrons could then be taken off the line to absorb replacements and restart the raise-train-sustain cycle.
I don't know the organization of Japanese naval aviation that well, I was more interested in the army one. I only know that all naval pilots underwent a single training course, regardless of where they would later serve, on shore or on aircraft carriers. Also, there were no special training for a specific aircraft carrier.
 
I don't know the organization of Japanese naval aviation that well, I was more interested in the army one. I only know that all naval pilots underwent a single training course, regardless of where they would later serve, on shore or on aircraft carriers. Also, there were no special training for a specific aircraft carrier.

With so many squadrons on strength and colonial possessions to police there is a constant churn of squadrons converting to new aircraft, refitting after operations and the like. If CAGs are separate from the carriers these cycles can be coordinated with the carrier refit/maintenance cycles. In wartime the CAGs on light carriers undertaking secondary duties can form cadres for new CAGS for fleet carriers after battles.
 
Except that understanding of IJN air group organisation is not entirely correct. There was a discussion about this on the Combined Fleet website 12-18 months ago kicked off by this about air group changes after Operation C in the Indian Ocean.

On Senshi Sosho page 191, beginning of the last paragraph, it’s stated that (my translation):
“On the 14th of April, the 5th Aircraft Carrier Division replenished and renewed aircraft from the 1st and 2nd Aircraft Carrier Divisions returning to the homeland, and on the same day, at 1237, separated from the Task Force off Singapore and headed for Mako with 3 destroyers”
From
which emerged this:-

Indeed, administrative organization put aviation branch firmly within the TOE of the parent aircraft carrier. However, each aircrew was under IJN Air HQ management, so could be transferred to another ship- or land-based air group when necessary.
So the stories about "IJN could not transfer air crews from "A" CV to "B" CV" are incorrect. There was plenty of transfers and planned transfers in 1941-42. Aircraft were transferred as well, of course.

You can find the entire discussion here.

By 1944 the IJN carrier groups had been entirely reorganised, such that an individual air group was attached to a carrier division of three ships, being spread more or less equally across the three ships.

At Philippine Sea in June 1944:-
Carrier Division 1 - Shokaku, Zuikaku & Taiho + 601st Air Group
Carrier Division 2 - Junyo, Hiyo & Ryuho + 652nd Air Group
Carrier Division 3 - Chitose, Chiyoda & Zuiho + 653rd Air Group.
Thanks for the very interesting link, and it's good to see that recently at least people are beginning to move away from the flawed and quite stereotypical "but IJN didn't mover carrier airgroups/aircraft around" argument that is repeated at nauseaum whenever such discussions come about. There was certainly movement when they thought the situation warrants it, apart from the MO example shown there was another such example earlier in the war (January or February i think), also the example of the cobbled together Junyo airgroup for AL, and this just listing pre-Midway examples.

After Midway probably this was even more prevalent, for example before Eastern Solomons the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo received aircraft/pilots from the other carriers remaining at home (Junyo, Zuiho and the new Hiyo) to fill up their airgroups.
 
Thanks for the very interesting link, and it's good to see that recently at least people are beginning to move away from the flawed and quite stereotypical "but IJN didn't mover carrier airgroups/aircraft around" argument that is repeated at nauseaum whenever such discussions come about. There was certainly movement when they thought the situation warrants it, apart from the MO example shown there was another such example earlier in the war (January or February i think), also the example of the cobbled together Junyo airgroup for AL, and this just listing pre-Midway examples.

After Midway probably this was even more prevalent, for example before Eastern Solomons the Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo received aircraft/pilots from the other carriers remaining at home (Junyo, Zuiho and the new Hiyo) to fill up their airgroups.

Moving individual aircrew and aircraft around is not the same as managing CAGs as units built up from subordinate units.

Moving aircrew (and aircraft) is like moving crew members between single warships, but moving a fighter/bomber/TB squadron is like moving an entire warship into a flotilla or Task Group, and moving a CAG is like moving a flotilla or Task Group into a Fleet or Task Force.

That the IJN did their aircrew/aircraft transfers/movements piecemeal in the operational area is exactly the problem.
 
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