Getting UK projects earlier

[Hood]

As far as 'behind' in commercial aviation - we were very much tied to military aircraft (bomber) production, and it had been agreed that the U.S. would produce the transport aircraft during the war, so we were on the back-foot immediately after the war. Still did not prevent Comet taking the world by storm when launched (shame about the square windows!).

Such an agreement did not exist, it was simply a post-war invention to cover certain tracks and failures. The truth was that in the darkest days of 1940 MAP under Beaverbrook killed everything but the few key types to win the war, this lessened a bit when the invasion danger receded. The focus of production had to be on military aircraft.

We also had no modern civilian aircraft to build! The USA had the Constellation and CW-20 just coming into development as the war began and were pressed into use as a troop carrier, the DC-3 was tough and adaptable. So naturally the USA had the all the ingredients ready for military transport. The UK had nothing but Dragon Rapides and the Flamingo was turned down by the RAF as a transport in 1940, the FC.1 and S.32 were wooden mock-ups with years of development needed to realise them. Pretty hard for us to build transports that didn't exist.

But its also clear by 1943 the manufacturers were already planning post-war airliners and the Brabazon Committee fed on that interest and drove the interest in different ways to hit the ground running, the Viking flying even before the war had ended and Tudor not far behind and Yorks already flying. By 1950 there were far more British civilian projects than US. Sadly most of them were non-starters or crippled in some way.

It's been interesting reading all the Brabazon retrospectives in the aviation magazines recently. Some blame the government, some blame the industry. Its clear that blame lies on both. In reality how could an aircraft industry that was a decade or more behind the US in airliner design and how could a newly formed airline industry (carrying a lot of historical baggage from Imperial Airways) with no market data since 1939 have come up with 100% winning answers? It just wasn't possible.

 

[zen]

Frankly there should have been only two production V-Bombers, but I stress the term production here.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

There was the Mile M.52 which was well down the road in development and would have flown before Bells X.1 - Just think,
Like the nuclear data GIVEN to the U.S. prior to Manhattan being set up, we also shared info with the Americans on the M.52. They had been experiencing severe control issues prior to the 'gift' of design data!

Now I don’t want to side track the thread into the normal nausea on the M52 there is an important illustration on competing project timelines which is very pertinent;-

The M52 contract was placed on the 29 December 1943 and it defined a first flight date of September 1944. The photo (Credit M Nathan) on the left is the first prototype as of Nov 1945;- yes 23months and it’s one fuselage frame loaded into the jig. The project was cancelled on 15 February 1946.

The Bell X1 contract was placed on the 16 March 1945 and it defined a first flight date of early 1946. The photo on the right is the first prototype as of the end 1945, 9months and it’s a nearly complete airframe, ie approx the two photos are taken on a very similar date. The X1 first flew on the 19 January 1946.

While it true that had the U.K. achieved the US development timescale, then the first to supersonic flight may have been the M52.....but it didn’t. Given the photographic evidence I very doubt the anecdotal claims of a near complete M52 prototype/s at the time of cancellation. As of late 45, It would certainly never have beaten the X1 to Mach 1.

One has to ask why were Miles so slow compared to Bell?* (And I firmly don’t believe it’s anything to do with the anecdotal claims regarding any significant technology transfer, especially that any made its way to Bell. There’s no supporting documentary evidence, in fact what is written down at the time suggests it didn’t happen. )

I’ve often wonder how many of the subsequent “we waz robbed” claims originated to spare the blushes of a poor timescale performance.

* period documents talk of an acute shortage of design staff and of Mile’s late war poor performance at timely delivering projects ie the M33 Monitor.... itself very late and with significant design deficiencies. Ultimately a lot of this came down to how FG called the priorities within his company, Miles Aircraft ... he got it wrong hence would naturally be rather embarrassed.

 

[alertken]

Tks ZT. (will not hi-jack for more nausea...but, conspirators forget...that from VJ Day we had no Formed Force enemy. M.52 was funded on MAP/Ben Lockspeiser's Aircraft Research budget, which with consummate skill he was able to retain, modestly, and put it to avenues which might have civil application (laminar flow, jet engines, swept wings...) which would not include supersonics. So he had to chop a bullet with a reheated turbofan which no-one wanted to use. Criticism of him for his reason/excuse (danger for the intrepid pilot) misses his real problem. Cancellation would be an embarrassment:
- for the originating Minister...now a Senior Cabinet Member, and:
- the designer, also handling the Feeder Type from...the Brabazon Recommendations.
So he insulated them.

If I had been Ally Uncle Joe, when X-1 loudly was touted as the next good thing, I would note continued work on Intercontinental B-36 and would gently enquire of US President...WIHIH?

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Alertken - I would add that Lockspeiser had the supersonic angle covered with contract SB.66562 placed on De Havilland on the 13th December 1945. This was for the DH108 which had originally been designed against OR 207 (E18/45) of January 1945. Although this was for a Mach 0.9 aircraft it was common knowledge that DH was going to have a crack at getting it above Mach 1, so this aspect would be PV;- good for saving HMG pennies and side stepping the blame if anyone got hurt.

DH started detail design work in July as a PV project. It first flew on 18th May 46. So this is a Bell equivalent development timeline and well beyond what Miles was able to achieve.

However when it comes to doing things quickly all that glitters may not be golden. In some respects you could even argue Lockspeiser got it right;- the DH108 did just about make mach1 but it was a bit mucky.

 

[Hood]

At the risk of adding to derailment; the whole M.52 saga was weird.
It was odd how Miles was assigned the project in the first place. Yes they had innovative ideas, yes they had built more pure experimental types in recent years and had spare design capacity, but they were dabbling in small wooden aircraft and weren't even tooled up to tackle such a job. Its unclear whether it was a consolation prize for the rejection of the 'X' series of large airliners or not.
Miles did a good job considering all this, but they were excluded from the Supersonics Committee which seems odd since that was the main forum for sharing research into the various technical problems.

In my view, its more than likely that the whole programme was devised in 1943 in response to information on German developments in high speed flight, jets, rockets and ramjets as an insurance policy to have something comparable if the Germans suddenly looked like playing a trump card. So Miles got an important job to keep them happy and if it failed, or if the urgency never materialised, it could be dropped without having disrupted the work of a major firm.
Post-war it was inevitable the insurance policy would be discarded to save money. As Zoo Tycoon says, DH.108 was on the stocks and used a lot of existing parts and technology (Vampire/Goblin).
Also, Miles, Whittle and Power Jets were all on MAP's naughty list of rogues... that can't have helped matters.

The US transfer is another fiction, like the airliners it was convenient to blame the US. Yes there was technology transfer but the dates don't really tie in for the claim to stand up.

 

[uk 75]

The UK 's only real analogue as a medium sized power is France. Germany and Japan were restricted by postwar treaties but had much more powerful economies. Italy similarly was restricted by it wartime legacy.
Measuring UK performance against France it becomes clear how far UK capabilities have declined since 1960 and those of France have increased.
From its nuclear deterrent and aircraft carrier to its space launching capability to its nationally designed and built fighter/strike aircraft.. France can boast independent capabilities eroded in the UK since 1960.

 

[zen]

The UK 's only real analogue as a medium sized power is France. Germany and Japan were restricted by postwar treaties but had much more powerful economies. Italy similarly was restricted by it wartime legacy.
Measuring UK performance against France it becomes clear how far UK capabilities have declined since 1960 and those of France have increased.
From its nuclear deterrent and aircraft carrier to its space launching capability to its nationally designed and built fighter/strike aircraft.. France can boast independent capabilities eroded in the UK since 1960.

Which is perhaps a bit of an anglocentric way of viewing things.

What this board and it's French participants show is that France also had to cut back and made a mess of multiple areas. Often cutting back, cancelling or having to completely rethink what it could do.

If France has succeeded in retaining certain domestic capabilities, it has come at a price. Sometimes in foreign relations, and sometimes a permanent commitment to paying more for what meets their needs or having to take something that does well in export but is a severe compromise to their perception of what they need.

 

[kaiserd]

France, with a bit of hit and miss along the way, scaled its requirements to what it could do itself or at least semi-independently.
The UK initially (approx. until the late 60’s, maybe? - a hard cut-off point in this regard is hard to identify) had their ambitions out of wrack with what they could actually afford (or achieve technically without undue risk).
They then scaled their ambitions and their capacities better when working hand in hand with international partners (primarily European partners but also the US).
Both approaches had and have pluses and minuses; as a broad generalisation it could be argued that France had to pay proportionally more for going it alone and sometimes ended up with equipment marginally less capable and with more focused on what export customers might want. The UK ended up, at least some of the time, with proportionally cheaper US or Anglo-European equipment that in some instances was superior for the UK’s requirements than their French equivalents.
But I think it is critical to emphasise that, despite reports to the contrary comments above, the UK military and civilian aviation industry both survived and in relative terms prospered; it just evolved to a different model than had historically been in place.
Similarly the French aviation industry survived and relatively speaking prospered but as a somewhat different model.
What is self-deceptive is to pretend “UK only” approach wouldn’t have ended up with more expensive and/ or less capable equipment, and objectively worse outcomes for those required to use this equipment and the UK as a whole.
So, for example, the UK could have ended up with a UK equivalent of a proto-Gripen rather than the Eurofighter Typhoon. And we see contributors to this site advocating the theoretical adoption of an aircraft notably inferior re: the UK’s actual requirements being presented as/ being seen to be some kind of “win” or better outcome.

 

[SleeperService2]

And we see contributors to this site advocating the theoretical adoption of an aircraft notably inferior re: the UK’s actual requirements being presented as/ being seen to be some kind of “win” or better outcome.

To be fair it's common for the military to end up with something rather less capable than they first asked for, so some who advocate similar are just showing the ups and downs of procurement. Certainly in the UK 'transparency' regarding government spending is non-existent and much that is common knowledge in France is still secret in the UK for years to come. When files finally get released it becomes apparent far too often that individuals have behaved appallingly and hidden behind 'National Interest'.
When visiting some of my French relatives some years ago I saw a Leclerc tank display. Among other things I remember the joint venture with the UAE was highly promoted as enabling both parties to get a better tank for their money. The representatives were quite open about the fact that some compromises had been made, the filter system was designed and made for desert use - lighter filters fitted in Europe but can be switched rapidly if needed. It cost a little more per vehicle but saved a lot of money compared to crash development of another setup when the need arose.

 

[Hood]

In some ways Britain and France came to similar conclusions. What I would call the 'supersonic splurge' of the early/mid-1950s came to an abrupt end around 1957. All the exotics like rocket and ramjets (which sadly Britain never got on an aircraft) were dropped and pure jets won out. VTOL were considered a purely national enterprise for both nations (W.Ger and Italy co-operated), perhaps unsurprising given this area was seen as the future with large potentialities for sales.

France was already on the road to a nationalised and centralised aircraft industry when the geographical bureaus were reformed in the late 1940s. That process continued on reasonably logical lines and the groups concentrated on different types of aircraft. The lone wolf was Dassault which carved out an important niche. None of the independents in Britain prospered. Had Blackburn, Fairey or Handley Page been selling hundreds of aircraft and rolling in more export profits than BAC and HSA then they might have survived.

But both Britain and France saw the merits of international collaboration. Neither could afford all its ambitions on its own. Despite all the focus we put on the Plowden Report of 1965 and the numerous anecdotes about working with the French, France arguably embraced international collaboration sooner and more wider. They had Alpha Jet and Transall with West Germany (plus missiles like HOT) and Jaguar, Concorde, AFVG, Puma, Gazelle and Lynx with Britain, Airbus of course was a genuine cross-European collaboration. France never got interested in MRCA (France never attempted to replace the Canberra/Vautour class, they went for multi-role fighters instead) but only in MRCA and Eurofighter did Britain have more than one collaborative partner, Airbus for the Brits was a strange in-out affair, ELDO was seen as something to be endured and discarded. The UK grew increasingly closer to its idol, the USA.

The first collaborations taught both nations a lot; Britain saw them as more hassle than they were worth but stuck with them for top-end military aircraft and crawled back to Airbus once its 3-11 dreams has died. In the US McDonnell Douglas was the main collaborator (Harrier II, T-45) but this could be seen more as a HSA/BAe tie-up than a national policy. Not until the 1970s did Britain succeed in wider collaborations (Italy with EH101 for example), but selling knock-down 1-11 and Islander kits to Romania and Vipers to Yugoslavia was never anything more than short-termist dealings. France took the other approach, high-end military types became national programmes (with export tie ups later on) but it did pursue further helicopter collaboration with Germany and Europe (NH90, Tiger) that Britain avoided and France had US collaborations on airliners (Mercure 2) and turbofan technology, missiles became largely all collaborative products from the 1970s onwards.
The 2010 Lancaster House talks looked like a new Anglo-French collaboration like the white-hot 1960s. That hubris barely lasted a decade with nothing to show for it. Today BAE Systems is arguably as American as it is British and beyond some niche wing expertise, turbofans and missiles have very little to offer to tempt new collaborations beyond 'rent-a-designer' schemes.

For Britain collaboration was a means to an end; getting something good at (hopefully) less capital outlay and if industry had to be flexible or get a raw deal then so be it to save the pennies. For the French it was always the end goal; getting something good and getting the best deal for the industry too. Germany and Italy had the same mindset.

The final point to counteract the usual Anglo-centric moans; if the French were so bad at collaboration as we claimed, then they surely would never have so many nations queuing to sign up to do deals with them?

 

[alertken]

#4 Hood: "odd" selection of Miles. D.Wood's Proj.Canx.,P.29 has MAP Cripps (RSC) doing so due to their “enterprising designs (solving) fantastic problems”.

RSC was so Left he was denied the Labour Whip all through the War and relied on support at grass roots, for which as MAP he would visit sites and address the "hands", whether the boss cared or not. Lady Isobel normally was with him. One account has her visiting Woodley, 10/43, entranced by Blossom, Mrs. FG.Miles. In an industry of stale males she was...not. Pilot, draughts(wo)man...(insert here your fave Female Superhero). Seeing X-craft 3-views et al, did she say to her husband what can we do with these splendid people?

Ben Lockspeiser,D/Scientific Res (Chair,MAP Supersonic Cttee) must have decided to keep his boss off his own back by assigning them the W2/700 flying test bed, which he knew he needed, was less painful (& less visible) than a blended wing Brabazon Type, and which was within his/RSC's own gift, in an Approved Budget, so no need for a Paper to other Ministers or Marshals. The received mindset in RAE/MAP/Air Ministry was that Miles were v.good “at biffing out small cardboard (a/c,hadn’t) produced (subsonic) let alone supersonic ones” (22xM.33 Monitor TT f/f 4/44: metal fuselage/tail, cardboard wing). MoS/DCARD M.Morgan in R.Turnill/A.Reed, Farnborough, Story of RAE, Hale, 80, P.108.

 

[Hood]

The version I have read puts Air Marshal Ralph Sorley as Controller of R&D at MAP as the man who favoured Miles for the job and who smoothed things over between Miles and Lockspeiser.
It's clear that as early as the third meeting of the Supersonic Committee on 23rd July 1943 that Miles was the company in contention for the job.

Whatever the merits Bristol was favoured for Brabazon Type 1 and Miles for the supersonic aircraft. I don't think it was necessarily the case that those selections were linked by the transatlantic airliner decision, but rather that MAP was tired of all the numerous competing mid-war specifications and tenders and decided to steer some of the bigger jobs themselves. This was the height of war planning after all.

 

[Nick Sumner]

The UK 's only real analogue as a medium sized power is France. Germany and Japan were restricted by postwar treaties but had much more powerful economies. Italy similarly was restricted by it wartime legacy.
Measuring UK performance against France it becomes clear how far UK capabilities have declined since 1960 and those of France have increased.
From its nuclear deterrent and aircraft carrier to its space launching capability to its nationally designed and built fighter/strike aircraft.. France can boast independent capabilities eroded in the UK since 1960.

I would say the UK had no analogues. The Japanese and Germans had their debts forgiven by American fiat. The French had substantial gold and foreign currency reserves (even after German pillage) to cover short term financial problems. At end WW2 France was like a homeowner with equity in the house. If financial difficulties came along, there's a way to cover it. Britain was more like a homeowner with a mortgage, no savings and living pay-cheque to pay-cheque. Britain was also overspending on a huge imperial commitment and New Jerusalem and fiscally incompetent governments of all political stripes.

 

[uk 75]

I tend to whinge about the UK not being so hot but how about a half full glass of images. Just to cheer me up on a wet evening indoors.

 

[alertken]

#51 Hood. I thought I was the only contrarian here. As a Franco-sceptic, on project collaboration, I take your points onboard. Purpose of debate is to admit new ideas. Can we perhaps both be right? Let's try.

Let's push WW2-centric individuals out of this - so Brits to ignore Anglophobe CDG and M. & S. Dassault, France to rise above ancient prejudices v. rosbifs. Ah, so. Let's agree the first Anglo-French one, Concorde, was a successful project, which would have been cancelled along the way of cost drift if either of us had gone it alone. (Doesn't matter for this discussion that nobody paid money to buy, or, for most of its life, to operate it free of subsidy). Let's take the first round of collaborations as apprentice templates: so, Martel was disappointing, Jaguar M and Lynx/Aeronavale, mistakes. We're overlooking AFVG because we're airbrushing Marcel out.

France's collaborations in that 1960s/70s period included great successes - with Dornier on Alphajet and Atlantic, VFW on Transall, MBB on helis; the GW programmes. From these first, French-led programmes, new FRG-Aero then took equality in R&D/Prog.Mngt. in what became Joint Companies: Arianespace, Airbus SE, Astrium, Cassidian, Eurocopter, Euromissile...and the only one still with Brits - MBDA. They are clearly all better in every way than earlier solo entities, and better than if any one shareholder had tried to dominate. By mid-80s FRG-Aero could hold its ground in any tussle over decision-making, because the only way to go was seen by all to be which way is in the best interests of the project.

If...UK (and Italy) could have foreseen that outcome, then, maybe, both would have joined those cross-border Companies. Then, maybe, no wasteful duplication, NH.90: EH101, Rafale: Typhoon. BAES might still be in Airbus SE, so in today's incarnation of Astrium/Cassidian, and (ex-Westland, maybe ex-Agusta) in (ex-Eurocopter).

That would have been good.

Not too late?

 

[Hood]

#51 Hood. I thought I was the only contrarian here. As a Franco-sceptic, on project collaboration, I take your points onboard. Purpose of debate is to admit new ideas. Can we perhaps both be right? Let's try.

I would not say I was a contrarian, but I do think that having an Anglo-centric view does tend to obscure things, so I was thinking outside the box.

You have very much hit the nail on the head that France and West Germany managed to string together a whole series of collaborations and joint companies. It does seem that the common denominator between the experience of Britain and West Germany is that company beginning with D..., i.e. in projects they are not involved in things go smoother.

Britain seems to have had an odd view. In the MoA files lines like "not sure if Italy is really interested in the project but instead is concerned soley with industrial aspects" crop up. Britain tries to muscle in late to get a reasonable workshare and wonders why the Germans and French get so upset. Its as if the British the collaborations were purely about sharing the cost and the end product with industrial aspects far down the priority list. For France and Germany they were hungry for work to keep their businesses going and they had the same outlook. Britain bumbles in, expects to pay a little and get good rewards out of it.
For example, we moan that the French never really brought into the Lynx or Jaguar programmes, but BAC got a Jaguar production line and Westland built Gazelle and Puma kits (they never moaned about building Sikorsky knock-offs) - something the French conceded, they could easily have pressed harder for us to buy from them directly.

Trying to look at from the other viewpoint, it may be that France and Germany so often tried to put off Britain was that for them the British were acted like they were the European aerospace superpower but at the same time projected weakness. It must have seemed rather odd to them to find an MoA civil servant squabbling over a workshare on Alphajet when at the time Farnborough was lined with more aviation goodies than France and Germany could dream of. Flight was packed with models of supersonic swing-wing advanced trainers for AST.362 and yet they come knocking on Breguet's door "can we play with your toys Monsieur?" Joining Airbus then drawing up competitors and boasting we could do it alone and beat America, even when we couldn't. Or offering the Blue Streak to ELDO as long as nobody asks for any money. It must have seemed odd in Bonn and Paris; to them collaboration was a necessity and yet must have seemed a luxury to us.

 

[Nick Sumner]

alertken, I could be mis-reading your comment in #56, but was Marcel Dassault anglophobe?

Also, in your #52, I can't work out who RSC is. Obviously not Randolph Spencer Churchill, but who?

 

[red admiral]

Its as if the British the collaborations were purely about sharing the cost and the end product with industrial aspects far down the priority list.

That was the main driver though. Reducing near term costs. But no real need for technology, and unable to take into account any value from additional sales.

Things changed a bit with Typhoon as BAE lobbied Heseltine et al on the industrial aspects.

 

[alertken]

NS #58. Yes. R. Stafford Cripps, MAP

 

[marauder2048]

Aside from Tony Benn, did any of the UK Aviation ministers have an aviation/technical background?

The general impression of post-War France is that it was far more meritocratic/technocratic
in its leadership since the French ruling class and the French class system in general
had largely been damaged/discredited by defeat in WW2.

 

[Nick Sumner]

alertken, Stafford Cripps, of course! Thank you.

 

[JohnR]

I've often wondered the effect on the UK aerospace industry if there hadn't been the metal fatigue issue with the Comet, which would allow the development of the Comet 5 and if the VC7 had .proceeded to production.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The only reason the P.1121 wasn't ordered in the late 1950s is that the RAF didn't want it. It almost certainly could have been delivered on the same schedule as the F-105, or not far behind it, had the RAF wanted it. I would also suggest that it is not an ideal analogue to the F-105, that aircraft had an internal weapons bay. Instead it has an interesting parallel in the North American F-100B/F-107. Not only was it similarly sized with primarily external ordnance carriage but both came from highly experienced fighter manufacturers and both were offered to their respective home customers as both interceptors and strike aircraft without garnering much interest - NAA getting a prototype order for the F-107, apparently as an encouragement to Republic to get on with the F-105.

Neither was the A-5 Vigilante a direct analogue to the TSR-2, had it of been TSR-2 development would have been much easier. The sustained low altitude performance and associated nav-attack system requirements being notably more demanding in TSR-2, a specific outcome being that the same computer (NAA Autonetics VERDAN) used in the Vigilante was inadequate for the TSR-2 requirement. TSR-2 is much closer to the early SOR.183/TFX studies than the A-5, and ran on a very similar timeline.

Throughout the 1950s 2TAF, MEAF and FEAF were largely equipped with Bomber Command and Fighter Command hand-me-downs, notably Canberras, Venoms and Hunters as those types were replaced by more advanced types such as the V-bombers and Hunters then Lightnings. The RAF development programme was focussed on generating new types for Bomber Command and Fighter Command. One might view OR.328 (1955-56), adapting the thin wing Javelin to the 1,000nm range low-level light bomber role, as a naive but well meaning attempt at rationalising the number of types in development or as the requirement to replace the Canberra not really being taken seriously. Either way, I think it is notable that major efforts to produce specialised new design aircraft for the various RAF overseas forces didn't really get going until strategic bomber (e.g. OR.330) and interceptor (e.g. OR.329) development efforts wound down in 1956/57. The resulting GOR.339 to replace Canberras and V-bombers in the theatre bombing and reconnaissance role drove the design of a highly specialised airframe whilst NBMR.3/OR.356 hobbled what could have produced a highly flexible airframe with what turned out to be a niche V/STOL requirement.

By contrast, the Luftwaffe decided in 1957 that they needed a truly multirole tactical fighter and ordered the F-104G in 1958 to fill that role, subsequently followed by much of Western Europe with the notable exception of France that was completing prototypes of the multirole Mirage IIIE in 1960. In the US McNamara imposed the heavier, twin seat but still multirole and non V/STOL F-4C on the USAF. The F-4 magically became suitable for both the RN (Sea Vixen replacement) and the RAF (Hunter FGA.10/FR.10 replacement) despite not meeting requirements that had previously been considered essential, CAP endurance from British Carriers and V/STOL respectively.

The UK was clearly capable of directing significant resources at military aircraft development and had a world class technology base across almost all aspects of military aircraft systems (airframes, engines, mission systems etc.) with access to US licenses for the few areas where it didn't have that technology base (e.g. inertial navigation systems), in some cases the UK technology base would significantly improve through the 1960s (e.g. airborne computers). Furthermore, in the P.1121 an appropriate airframe for a multirole tactical fighter almost existed in 1956/7. In 1960-62 Vickers VG proposals to AW.406/OR.346 contain within them the potential for a very credible multirole VG type, with parallels to the USN VFAX studies of 1964-67 (e.g. Vought V-484), these ultimately fed into AFVG. All the ingredients were there for a very credible UK multirole tactical fighter.

 

[zen]

IF.....if Type 583 or Type 585 had been developed as VG multi-role aircraft.
They would fitted with the navigation systems actually developed for Jaguar or F4K. Both products of UK industry despite licences.

So in performance terms, such AH aircraft would as a system be no worse than the F4K and considering the aerodynamics somewhat better for Strike and Attack missions.

When looking at Fighter equipment, the FMICW set would deliver equal or superior performance to the F4K systems. Similarly the UK options for domestic AAM are no worse and in some areas superior to various marks of Sparrow.
Fact is UK industry did develop Skyflash, around UK technologies in seekers and warheads.

The conclusion must be, that it is only the decision process that results in F4K, Tornado and Jaguar. Not industrial capacity or capability.

 

[Hood]

Aside from Tony Benn, did any of the UK Aviation ministers have an aviation/technical background?

The general impression of post-War France is that it was far more meritocratic/technocratic
in its leadership since the French ruling class and the French class system in general
had largely been damaged/discredited by defeat in WW2.

Tony Benn was two-faced, the fact Filton was in his constituency meant that he was pro-Concorde but weirdly was anti-interventionalist when it came to the aircraft industry, he more or less called them leaches publicly but as long as the Whitehall funds trickled away on Concorde he seemed happy. He was though obsessed with technology and therefore dabbled in the more esoteric high-tech stuff that in the end was a flop (e.g. Magnox reactors). He quite happily killed off Beagle.

To answer your question:

Ministers of Supply
George Strauss - from a political (Tory) family, a metal merchant (in 1939 he was expelled from the Labour Party for seven months for supporting the 'Popular Front' movement of Stafford Cripps), before becoming Minister he had been parliamentary secretary at the Ministry of Transport. He was the first (early) advocate of rationalising the industry in 1950.

Duncan Sandys - in the TA since 1937, served in a HAA battery in Norway, wounded. Went into politics, during his tenure as Minister of Works was chairman of a War Cabinet Committee for defence against German flying bombs and rockets, where he frequently clashed with R. V. Jones.

Selwyn Lloyd - extensive WW2 service, rose to Deputy Chief of Staff of Second Army, involved in planning sea transport to the Normandy beachhead, his post as Minister of Supply was his second ministerial position, went on to become Minister of Defence, he began the planning on defence expenditure and what became the unified MoD a decade later.

Reginald Maudling - Churchill made him a junior Minister at the Ministry of Civil Aviation in 1951 but this was his only brush with aviation

Aubrey Jones - served in the Intelligence Corps during WW2 including Section V of SIS, but before being Minister of Supply had been Minister of Fuel and Power.

Ministers of Aviation

Duncan Sandys - that man again!

Peter Thornycroft - another artilleryman, Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of War Transport during the 1945 Conservative caretaker government, after his stint at the MoA became Minister of Defence and oversaw the creation of the MoD.

Julian Amery - another special services man, liaison to the Albanian resistance and later served in China, he was Secretary of State for Air before his promotion to Minister.

Roy Jenkins - another intelligence man in the war, Wilson's hatchet man for the aircraft cancellations of 1964-65

Frederick Mulley - varied political posts, later was Minister of Disarmament and Minister of Transport (when he refused to be seen behind the wheel of a car!).

John Stonehouse - served in the RAF during 1944-45, an economist, Parliamentary Secretary at the MoA in 1964, the last Minister for 2 months in1967, was involved in BOAC's order for Boeing 707s but he had recommended they should buy the Super VC-10 instead. He was also spying for Czech military intelligence since 1962...

Ministers of Technology

Frank Cousins - miner and unionist.

Tony Benn - RAF pilot but left the RAF in August 1945 (was a pilot for 6 months).

Geoffrey Ripon - no aviation background

John Davies - served with Combined Operations during the war, a businessman and Director General of the CBI (Confederation of British Industry) and brought in by Heath to give his Cabinet some businesslike outlook.

Ministers of (War) Transport and Ministers of Civil Aviation

Frederick James Leathers (The Lord Leathers) - industrialist with coal and shipping interests

Alfred Barnes - artist before entering politics

John Scott Maclay (1st Viscount Muirshiel) - had led the Merchant Shipping Mission in the USA during WW2

Alan Lennox-Boyd - served in the Navy

Ministers of Transport and Civil Aviation

Alan Lennox-Boyd - same post renamed

John Boyd-Carpenter - lawyer and staff officer in the war

Harold Watkinson - engineering background and engineering journalist before the war, served in the Navy, later became Minister of Defence.
[At this point MoA takes over all aviation]


So out of all these Ministers we have one pilot (only 6 months duty as such). The majority were wartime spooks (or in Stonehouse's case an active spook for the opposition), staff officers, sailors or artillerymen. The Ministers of Transport had more business backgrounds but the civil aviation remit was rather tagged on to the larger transport brief and most were small fry politically but the Ministry of Aviation had some big hitters. The MinTech Ministers were a mixed bunch, one might say eccentric.

 

[SleeperService2]

Aside from Tony Benn, did any of the UK Aviation ministers have an aviation/technical background?

The general impression of post-War France is that it was far more meritocratic/technocratic
in its leadership since the French ruling class and the French class system in general
had largely been damaged/discredited by defeat in WW2.

It goes back to the Revolution in fact, even under Napoleon ability was a huge factor in appointments. The relationship between the French Civil Service, with it's legendary entrance examination which MUST be passed by any civil servant, and government is also different to the UK. French politicians say what they want, Civil Service gives them options, they decide what to do. Once started it is very hard for a change in government to derail a large project, this can be both good and bad.

In the UK civil servants have been blamed publicly many times for a politician's ill-advised, and usually expensive and disastrous, brain child. Even today that's pretty unthinkable in France, it shouldn't happen anywhere.

I've often wondered the effect on the UK aerospace industry if there hadn't been the metal fatigue issue with the Comet, which would allow the development of the Comet 5 and if the VC7 had .proceeded to production.

Some time ago I came across a programme about the Comet history. The metal fatigue issue has turned out to be rather more involved than many realise. Although poor metal was a factor in at least one disaster the main issue turned out to be a pitot sensor that had been added to the fuselage to detect differential pressure across the cabin structure after the first loss suggested this could be a factor. It was mounted level with the top of two windows and mid-way between them. Fine on the prototype but on production aircraft it had to be moved slightly to the rear. Every crash after showed a crack from the rear mounting point of said pitot to the nearest point of the window frame. As the engineer presenter said the resulting failure of the window would cause a chain effect to the next and almost instant airframe failure. It was this cascade failure that meant the windows were redesigned and the sensor was later removed as it was irrelevant to the real original weakness, IIRC that was down to QC at the metal plant and a gap in the manufacturer's diligence.

Following that and Hood #66 post I doubt that the issue would have remained hidden for long, where ever it surfaced the response would have been poorly co-ordinated by people unqualified for their post AND unwilling to take advice as that would make them look weak. In contrast Boeing were very quick to take advantage of Britain's systemic weakness and Juan Tripp at Pan Am was nobody's fool either. That 707 barrel roll was genius demonstrating utter confidence in the plane's strength. It was and is a textbook example of visionary leadership taking calculated risks against the poorly informed but lucky taking gambles they don't fully understand. We now make wings and engines, Boeing dominate the world market. Brains will always win against luck eventually.

EDIT: Thanks to @Zoo Tycoon 's gentle correction and link I find that I had been misinformed for which I apologise. As soon as I find the programme again I'll post a warning.

 

[uk 75]

There are some excellent and detailed contributions to this thread, which I am finding very informative.
I still tend to blame politicians, officialdom and business plus the voters for creating a toxic brew in Britain which is not so intense anywhere else.
The P1121 is perhaps a good example of what I mean. Between Ministers, the RAF and Hawkers it should have been possible to do what has been suggested above. I suspect every French taxpayer knew what a Mirage was but I doubt if many British taxpayers could name an RAF plane other than a Spitfire or a Lancaster.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Some time ago I came across a programme about the Comet history. The metal fatigue issue has turned out to be rather more involved than many realise. Although poor metal was a factor in at least one disaster the main issue turned out to be a pitot sensor that had been added to the fuselage to detect differential pressure across the cabin structure after the first loss suggested this could be a factor. It was mounted level with the top of two windows and mid-way between them. Fine on the prototype but on production aircraft it had to be moved slightly to the rear. Every crash after showed a crack from the rear mounting point of said pitot to the nearest point of the window frame. As the engineer presenter said the resulting failure of the window would cause a chain effect to the next and almost instant airframe failure. It was this cascade failure that meant the windows were redesigned and the sensor was later removed as it was irrelevant to the real original weakness, IIRC that was down to QC at the metal plant and a gap in the manufacturer's diligence.

Ah sorry no;- its well documented and not as you described here. In essence DH simply didn’t understand the fatigue process as described by Miners Rule. Other U.K. companies did ie the AW Apollo had min radius in its company design manuals, but there was no sharing of best practices. As part of Comets original qualification (pre accidents) a fuselage test specimen was proof pressure tested, then burst pressure, then pressure cycled 16000 times and finally burst pressure tested again. What DH didn’t appreciate was the first burst pressure test work hardening the aluminium structure and as this was not carried out on the production aircraft, the pressure cycling ability demonstrated by the test was invalid. The whole fuselage was riddled with features which would fail even if the windows did not. The fatigue water tank test failed from a window corner whereas one of the accident aircraft failed from the ADF cut out.

Please read the accident investigation enquiry;-

https://reports.aviation-safety.net/1954/19540408-2_COMT_G-ALYY.pdf

 

[zen]

DH was rushed, Government or strictly the politicians wanted as early a product as possible and were applying huge pressure to produce results.

Even DH was wanting to go slower on this.
I'm saying that a slower sureer process might resulted in safer Comets. But it's at least a possibility.

 

[SleeperService2]

DH was rushed, Government or strictly the politicians wanted as early a product as possible and were applying huge pressure to produce results.

Even DH was wanting to go slower on this.
I'm saying that a slower sureer process might resulted in safer Comets. But it's at least a possibility.

Read the report, I thought similar but no longer do.