Whilst it's true that Hitler always harboured an aversion to poison gas as a result of his experiences during the Great War, there is also evidence to suggest that he was also averse to its use because he feared Allied use of the same weapons.
We need to remember the two groups of poison gases: the 'classic' or 'conventional' gases of the Great War, asphyxiating agents and blistering agents such as Mustard Gas, and improved versions developed between the wars, of which both sides had large stockpiles and manufacturing capacity; and nerve gases, such as tabun and sarin, of which the Nazis had a monopoly.
The Germans were keenly aware that the Allies could out-produce the Germans in 'conventional' gases. However, nerve gas production in any significant quantity wasn't available until 1943.
Interestingly, in May 1943, after the Stalingrad collapse, Hitler summoned Albert Speer and his chemical warfare specialist, Otto Ambros, to a meeting at his Wolf's Lair HQ to discuss using poison gas against the Soviets. Ambros pointed out that the Allies could out-produce Germany in conventional gas, which was a given. But Hitler said that while that may be true of the conventional gases, he was given to understand that Germany had a monopoly on the new, far more deadly, nerve gases. Ambros replied that he believed that the Allies had also developed those gases, given, among other things, that the essentials of tabun and sarin had appeared in technical journals many years earlier. Hitler terminated the meeting.
There were other signals that the Allies knew about nerve gas. Nazi scientists found it highly significant that references to compounds related to nerve gas ceased to be mentioned in US scientific journals shortly after war began. They were right that this was due to censorship; but they were wrong about nerve gas. The US censorship was to protect the secrecy of DDT development.
Consequently, there is strong evidence that it was a deterrent effect that prevented the Nazis using poison gas. In any case, by the latter stages of the war, even when Hitler started to think seriously about using gas, there weren't the aircraft to deliver it, and Speer claimed that he, Karl Brandt (head of chemical warfare defence) and General Kennes (Assistant Chief of the General Staff) had agreed between them to sabotage any Hitler order by delaying supplies and the like.
Finally, Hitler's aversion to gas didn't stop the use of Zyklon-B, did it?
We need to remember the two groups of poison gases: the 'classic' or 'conventional' gases of the Great War, asphyxiating agents and blistering agents such as Mustard Gas, and improved versions developed between the wars, of which both sides had large stockpiles and manufacturing capacity; and nerve gases, such as tabun and sarin, of which the Nazis had a monopoly.
The Germans were keenly aware that the Allies could out-produce the Germans in 'conventional' gases. However, nerve gas production in any significant quantity wasn't available until 1943.
Interestingly, in May 1943, after the Stalingrad collapse, Hitler summoned Albert Speer and his chemical warfare specialist, Otto Ambros, to a meeting at his Wolf's Lair HQ to discuss using poison gas against the Soviets. Ambros pointed out that the Allies could out-produce Germany in conventional gas, which was a given. But Hitler said that while that may be true of the conventional gases, he was given to understand that Germany had a monopoly on the new, far more deadly, nerve gases. Ambros replied that he believed that the Allies had also developed those gases, given, among other things, that the essentials of tabun and sarin had appeared in technical journals many years earlier. Hitler terminated the meeting.
There were other signals that the Allies knew about nerve gas. Nazi scientists found it highly significant that references to compounds related to nerve gas ceased to be mentioned in US scientific journals shortly after war began. They were right that this was due to censorship; but they were wrong about nerve gas. The US censorship was to protect the secrecy of DDT development.
Consequently, there is strong evidence that it was a deterrent effect that prevented the Nazis using poison gas. In any case, by the latter stages of the war, even when Hitler started to think seriously about using gas, there weren't the aircraft to deliver it, and Speer claimed that he, Karl Brandt (head of chemical warfare defence) and General Kennes (Assistant Chief of the General Staff) had agreed between them to sabotage any Hitler order by delaying supplies and the like.
Finally, Hitler's aversion to gas didn't stop the use of Zyklon-B, did it?