Implementing new tech always has risks but the benefits out weight the risks. I agree, especially with the trouble they had with the EM weapons elevators. EMALS and the AARG seemed to be not as bad as the elevators. All will get hashed out in the end. As an example of working as advertised, when we ran aground in the SF Bay after returning from our '82-'83 WestPac aboard CVN-65, they had to scram all eight reactors (due to reactor cooling inlet silting/clogging) and switched to emergency generator power (all four gens came online simultaneously), only a flicker of the lights during the transition, very impressive!
Gerald R. Ford Class CVN
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- Start date
The DOT&E 2022 report now out, Ford IOT&E is scheduled to last through to 4QFY24
a few highlights/quotes
Sortie Generation Rate - The reliability of CVN 78 catapults, arresting gear, and jet blast deflectors (JBDs) continues to have an adverse effect on sortie generation and flight operations efficiency
EMALS - During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), EMALS achieved a reliability of 614 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF) during 1,841 catapult launches (where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF, EMALS showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (460 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, EMALS reliability appeared to regress and slowed CQ.
AAG - During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), AAG achieved a reliability of 460 MCBOMF during 1,841 aircraft recoveries (where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF, AAG showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (115 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, AAG reliability appeared to regress and slowed CQ.
JBDs - During early developmental testing, reliability concerns were identified with the Electro Mechanical Actuators (EMA) that are used to raise and lower the JBDs on the Ford class. Several modifications were implemented on CVN 78 during the PIA to improve reliability. During the August 2022 CQ, the ship experienced EMA failures on all four JBDs, which caused the ship to cancel the remainder of CQ and return early.// During the September CQ, JBD performance did not adversely affect flight operations.
AWE - The Navy conducted a partial ammunition onload in April 2022 and a full ammunition onload in September 2022. DOT&E observed the September ammunition onload; data are still being analyzed. Observation of the lower stage AWE performance was very promising as the ordnance was transferred from the hangar bay to the magazines more efficiently than on a Nimitz-class carrier. Through the first 19,767 elevator dispatches, 109 individual elevator failures were reported.
DBR - Through June 2022, DBR demonstrated a reliability of 100 hours mean time between operational mission failures, which does not meet the minimum threshold of 339 hours mean time between operational mission failures. DBR was operationally available 94% of the time, compared to the 98% requirement.
The top three DOT&E recommendations
1. Continue to improve reliability for EMALS, AAG, JBDs, DBR, and AWE.
2. Execute planned sortie generation and self defense tests, as outlined in the Revision E TEMP and the IOT&E Test Plan.
3. Address combat system deficiencies identified in the classified USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Self Defense Interim Assessment report, dated April 2022.
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d p.166
a few highlights/quotes
Sortie Generation Rate - The reliability of CVN 78 catapults, arresting gear, and jet blast deflectors (JBDs) continues to have an adverse effect on sortie generation and flight operations efficiency
EMALS - During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), EMALS achieved a reliability of 614 mean cycles between operational mission failures (MCBOMF) during 1,841 catapult launches (where a cycle is the launch of one aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 4,166 MCBOMF, EMALS showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (460 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, EMALS reliability appeared to regress and slowed CQ.
AAG - During testing from March through June 2022 (after the PIA), AAG achieved a reliability of 460 MCBOMF during 1,841 aircraft recoveries (where a cycle is the recovery of a single aircraft). While this reliability is well below the requirement of 16,500 MCBOMF, AAG showed slight improvement in reliability from FY21 (115 MCBOMF throughout 1,758 catapults). However, during the first underway of IOT&E in September 2022, AAG reliability appeared to regress and slowed CQ.
JBDs - During early developmental testing, reliability concerns were identified with the Electro Mechanical Actuators (EMA) that are used to raise and lower the JBDs on the Ford class. Several modifications were implemented on CVN 78 during the PIA to improve reliability. During the August 2022 CQ, the ship experienced EMA failures on all four JBDs, which caused the ship to cancel the remainder of CQ and return early.// During the September CQ, JBD performance did not adversely affect flight operations.
AWE - The Navy conducted a partial ammunition onload in April 2022 and a full ammunition onload in September 2022. DOT&E observed the September ammunition onload; data are still being analyzed. Observation of the lower stage AWE performance was very promising as the ordnance was transferred from the hangar bay to the magazines more efficiently than on a Nimitz-class carrier. Through the first 19,767 elevator dispatches, 109 individual elevator failures were reported.
DBR - Through June 2022, DBR demonstrated a reliability of 100 hours mean time between operational mission failures, which does not meet the minimum threshold of 339 hours mean time between operational mission failures. DBR was operationally available 94% of the time, compared to the 98% requirement.
The top three DOT&E recommendations
1. Continue to improve reliability for EMALS, AAG, JBDs, DBR, and AWE.
2. Execute planned sortie generation and self defense tests, as outlined in the Revision E TEMP and the IOT&E Test Plan.
3. Address combat system deficiencies identified in the classified USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) Self Defense Interim Assessment report, dated April 2022.
https://www.dote.osd.mil/Portals/97/pub/reports/FY2022/FY22DOTEAnnualReport.pdf?ver=UBO7t2O1FkRuvrB-nJDZ-g%3d%3d p.166
Navy: USS Gerald R. Ford Set to Deploy in May, Kennedy Deployment Schedule Unaffected by Delivery Change - USNI News
NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. – First-in-class USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) is set to deploy the first week of May following the completion of a series of certification exercises, service officials said on Tuesday. Ford returned on Sunday from its composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) that served as...
news.usni.org
Kat Tsun
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I'm going to blame the War on Terror for taking money that would be spent on spreading technology insertions across three or four ships and compressing it into a single ship. Money that would have been spent building a supercarrier for a few months longer got funneled into GWOT instead.
The good news is that even if it will result in one or two complete lemons, that's probably better than having twice as many semi-functional ships with broken technology insertion gear, if the USN is only going to have anywhere between 9-12 carriers in the future.
Gerald Ford can take up the role of training carrier for landing new pilots.
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Shore testing wouldn't have helped very much, considering the new systems had plenty of it, and it didn't help very much.
The initial plan by the USN was something like building George H.W. Bush with the Ford's composite island and SPY-3/SPY-4 Dual Band Radar; the Ford with a singular EMALS, A1B reactors, and three steam cats; the CVN-79/John F. Kennedy with the new elevators, another EMALS (if it worked), and CVN-80/Enterprise with the AWEs. There may have been another ship or two in there with additional changes. Whatever worked would go through to the next design and whatever didn't would be discarded. It was supposed to gradual and incremental over the course of about 30 years to develop the ultimate product improved Nimitz.
In other words, like how the rest of the Nimitz family was done.
Instead, it was rapidly done over the course of about three because spreading the costs over multiple ship classes, back when the US Navy wasn't sure if it was going to get 7 or 8 carriers this budget plan, was too risky.
There are a lot of reasons it happened the way it did, but GWOT probably ate a lot of taxpayer money, money that could better been argued to have gone to the Navy's much-needed industrial base rejuvenation, into rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan instead in the early 00's. This ultimately meant monies that could have been argued by DOD or DON to go for building new warships in a less hasty manner were instead spent on other things.
Even if the US Navy wasn't in a arms race with the PRC (which doesn't kick off until 2012 anyway), it would probably have been able to spread the technology risk across multiple classes instead of a single one. Whether that's good or bad is impossible to say, but at least the broken parts of Gerald Ford are known now, and not becoming individual warship quirks instead.
The initial plan by the USN was something like building George H.W. Bush with the Ford's composite island and SPY-3/SPY-4 Dual Band Radar; the Ford with a singular EMALS, A1B reactors, and three steam cats; the CVN-79/John F. Kennedy with the new elevators, another EMALS (if it worked), and CVN-80/Enterprise with the AWEs. There may have been another ship or two in there with additional changes. Whatever worked would go through to the next design and whatever didn't would be discarded. It was supposed to gradual and incremental over the course of about 30 years to develop the ultimate product improved Nimitz.
In other words, like how the rest of the Nimitz family was done.
Instead, it was rapidly done over the course of about three because spreading the costs over multiple ship classes, back when the US Navy wasn't sure if it was going to get 7 or 8 carriers this budget plan, was too risky.
There are a lot of reasons it happened the way it did, but GWOT probably ate a lot of taxpayer money, money that could better been argued to have gone to the Navy's much-needed industrial base rejuvenation, into rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan instead in the early 00's. This ultimately meant monies that could have been argued by DOD or DON to go for building new warships in a less hasty manner were instead spent on other things.
Even if the US Navy wasn't in a arms race with the PRC (which doesn't kick off until 2012 anyway), it would probably have been able to spread the technology risk across multiple classes instead of a single one. Whether that's good or bad is impossible to say, but at least the broken parts of Gerald Ford are known now, and not becoming individual warship quirks instead.
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From my understanding the decision to not implement the technology gradually over several ships came down to Donald Rumsfeld. He demanded they do everything on the first ship. As I understand it, similar thinking from him also led to the LCS program. He wanted "transformational" projects and thus did stuff like promote LCS and put as much new technology as possible on to the first Ford-class ship.
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Gerald Ford doesn't have "issues". It's more that it literally doesn't work, and probably never will, because a large portion of its design is unfinished and it seems increasingly less likely the USN will get the money to finish it. If you spread it across the ships, you will have elevators that are non-functional, or a catapult that's always down, but at least the older systems function.
The most likely outcome of Ford is that the USN will declare systems, ones which do not function as needed and aren't combat ready, to be "functional". In reality, it will be a 30% functional, 30% half-reliable, 30% down but repairable, and 10% broken. This will be written as between 60-70% functional, despite lacking spare parts, man-hours, or depot availability to repair the broken systems. This already occurs in aviation units, and within the surface escort fleet it isn't rare, but it will now become routine in the carrier fleet. Submarines will probably hit that unfortunate stride, if they don't already, in the coming years.
If it ever comes to test that readiness rate, it will be a rather rude awakening, both for the Congress and the American people, but not exactly surprising for the Navy. This is mostly a result of the "Transformation" era and its focus on high risk high technology programs over lower risk but likely higher cost programs.
This is important because the Ford, and its next two or so ships in class, will likely be lemons. It's rather like the F-35B and early -A's, which rushed half-finished prototypes out the door, resulting in a large portion of the final fleet being irreparably broken. F-35C might actually avoid this, if only because it was several years late, but I don't know when the last major structural work on F-35 occurred (I've read there are bulkhead issues in the -Bs but the latest -A blocks are fine). If the USN had a 5-year center instead of a 3 year-center on the carrier construction, it would have been able to avoid this, but the ships are essentially being built back-to-back which leaves limited time to make changes for new classes. Changes have to start coming before the ship is laid down, and the next two Fords have already been laid down, although Enterprise might escape some of the lemonitis.
By putting technology in gradually, you're testing it in a operational environment without compromising the first few ships in production completely. Gerald Ford is just an interesting case study in how overly risky design choices can doom entire portions of an armed force. This is very important for a military which is backed by a shaky-at-best industrial base.
The point of the gradual integration was that the "difficult problems" could be covered by older systems in the ships, while the USN contemplates integration a ship ahead. As it stands the future USN carrier fleet will likely be three lemons (CVN-78, -79, -80) and whatever comes next (CVN-81 and beyond).
It isn't doomsday or anything, the USN's shipbuilding plans had less than 10 carriers (sometimes) in the late 2000's, but it's pretty embarrassing to harp on about a big scale up, and end up no better off than you were with a cheaper and less ambitious shipbuilding plan. It just means that at the end of the day, the Ford class ships are going to be really glad they have a lot of now-surplus capacity built in, because they certainly will never hit their full potential in either air wing size or sortie rates.
The most likely outcome of Ford is that the USN will declare systems, ones which do not function as needed and aren't combat ready, to be "functional". In reality, it will be a 30% functional, 30% half-reliable, 30% down but repairable, and 10% broken. This will be written as between 60-70% functional, despite lacking spare parts, man-hours, or depot availability to repair the broken systems. This already occurs in aviation units, and within the surface escort fleet it isn't rare, but it will now become routine in the carrier fleet. Submarines will probably hit that unfortunate stride, if they don't already, in the coming years.
If it ever comes to test that readiness rate, it will be a rather rude awakening, both for the Congress and the American people, but not exactly surprising for the Navy. This is mostly a result of the "Transformation" era and its focus on high risk high technology programs over lower risk but likely higher cost programs.
This is important because the Ford, and its next two or so ships in class, will likely be lemons. It's rather like the F-35B and early -A's, which rushed half-finished prototypes out the door, resulting in a large portion of the final fleet being irreparably broken. F-35C might actually avoid this, if only because it was several years late, but I don't know when the last major structural work on F-35 occurred (I've read there are bulkhead issues in the -Bs but the latest -A blocks are fine). If the USN had a 5-year center instead of a 3 year-center on the carrier construction, it would have been able to avoid this, but the ships are essentially being built back-to-back which leaves limited time to make changes for new classes. Changes have to start coming before the ship is laid down, and the next two Fords have already been laid down, although Enterprise might escape some of the lemonitis.
By putting technology in gradually, you're testing it in a operational environment without compromising the first few ships in production completely. Gerald Ford is just an interesting case study in how overly risky design choices can doom entire portions of an armed force. This is very important for a military which is backed by a shaky-at-best industrial base.
The point of the gradual integration was that the "difficult problems" could be covered by older systems in the ships, while the USN contemplates integration a ship ahead. As it stands the future USN carrier fleet will likely be three lemons (CVN-78, -79, -80) and whatever comes next (CVN-81 and beyond).
It isn't doomsday or anything, the USN's shipbuilding plans had less than 10 carriers (sometimes) in the late 2000's, but it's pretty embarrassing to harp on about a big scale up, and end up no better off than you were with a cheaper and less ambitious shipbuilding plan. It just means that at the end of the day, the Ford class ships are going to be really glad they have a lot of now-surplus capacity built in, because they certainly will never hit their full potential in either air wing size or sortie rates.
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Ford does "work." Maybe not at the reliability rates the Navy wanted but I see no reason it cannot perform it's basic combat mission to at least the level of the Nimitz class. Even the GAO lists the 12 new technologies in the Ford class as "mature," with the remaining concerns almost entirely about reliability. Reliability that is continuously improving, but is still not up to the original goals.
All this combines to present a picture of a carrier that does work, even if one not fully mature yet. It is going on an honest to god six-month regular carrier deployment in a month. It can do its job, but it is perhaps not up to the full 33% greater sortie rate goal quite yet.
All this combines to present a picture of a carrier that does work, even if one not fully mature yet. It is going on an honest to god six-month regular carrier deployment in a month. It can do its job, but it is perhaps not up to the full 33% greater sortie rate goal quite yet.
Firefinder
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The Biggest issue the Ford Currently have is the same issues as all "Transformative" things have.
Its so fucking different from the normal that till the next model of it comes in the JFK its basically a training carrier.
Reason being that it doesn't properly fix with the rest of the Carrier fleet cause its capabilities are so much better.
Since we generally do have a carrier sitting back being a Glorified trainer, hell that was CVN65 general job for her last decade, the navy devide it be more effective to have the newest toy be that so the force can be trained up on that gear. So when the next comes out you have trained cardra of people you can put in as the plank owners alliw the JFK to stand up even faster.
All the other "problems" are basic bitch issues all new designs have.
And the Ford is the closest we got to a new carrier design since the MID 1950S WITH THE FORESTALL.
And 90 percent of them got fixed in 3 years. The rest have been issues that you needed to have the ship work a bit and got to resurface in new fun ways in JFK cause each ship is different and flexs in new ways.
With the biggest reason the Ford hasn't deployed is that there haven't been any need for her to. Nothing has happened in the last decade that a Nimitz hasn't already been nearby for that also needed back up in us scrambling the Ford out as well.
So the navy actually doing the smart thing in getting everyone use to the new carrier class.
Handy since I need to emphasize that new ship classes with new TTPs are always a bitch intergrate with a force that made up of older designs.
Like really how the Ford deck works is far different then the 10 Nimitz decks work. That going to cause all types of training issues til there a few more Fords out.
So the Question becomes this.
With the Above and the Starting lack in needing to Rush things.
Why rush and get shit fuck up when their no reason too.
Its so fucking different from the normal that till the next model of it comes in the JFK its basically a training carrier.
Reason being that it doesn't properly fix with the rest of the Carrier fleet cause its capabilities are so much better.
Since we generally do have a carrier sitting back being a Glorified trainer, hell that was CVN65 general job for her last decade, the navy devide it be more effective to have the newest toy be that so the force can be trained up on that gear. So when the next comes out you have trained cardra of people you can put in as the plank owners alliw the JFK to stand up even faster.
All the other "problems" are basic bitch issues all new designs have.
And the Ford is the closest we got to a new carrier design since the MID 1950S WITH THE FORESTALL.
And 90 percent of them got fixed in 3 years. The rest have been issues that you needed to have the ship work a bit and got to resurface in new fun ways in JFK cause each ship is different and flexs in new ways.
With the biggest reason the Ford hasn't deployed is that there haven't been any need for her to. Nothing has happened in the last decade that a Nimitz hasn't already been nearby for that also needed back up in us scrambling the Ford out as well.
So the navy actually doing the smart thing in getting everyone use to the new carrier class.
Handy since I need to emphasize that new ship classes with new TTPs are always a bitch intergrate with a force that made up of older designs.
Like really how the Ford deck works is far different then the 10 Nimitz decks work. That going to cause all types of training issues til there a few more Fords out.
So the Question becomes this.
With the Above and the Starting lack in needing to Rush things.
Why rush and get shit fuck up when their no reason too.
I agree with Firefinder, when CV-59 was put into service it was new and had teething pains, when CVN-65 was put into service (my old ship and 8 reactors) again the same thing. In regards to CVN-78 and you do not take the risks then we never advance our technology, there are always risks when pushing the technology envelope. If we did not push and invest in LO tech, we would not have the F-117, B-2/B-21, F-22, F-35 and the list goes on. We the US get beat up all the time from the rest of the world as an example, damned if we do, damned if we don't but in the end everyone else apparently follows our lead when it comes to military technology. CVN-78 is the first of an evolution, just like it's predecessors. As an example, Seymour Cray created and evolved the supercomputer and look what we have today.
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USS Gerald R. Ford Has Finally Set Sail On Its First Full Deployment
The Navy's newest aircraft carrier is set to conduct operations in European waters, at least initially, for its first operational cruise.
www.thedrive.com
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- Entirely new power plant
- Entirely new island
- Entirely new electronics suite
- Entirely new catapults
- Entirely new landing equipment
- New weapons elevators
- Measures to reduce the RCS
Need I go on? When you try and combine that much new tech onto a hull, the result will be botched at first, and need ironing outs.
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There's not many combat-coded F-35C squadrons in the fleet yet and they're biased to carriers based in the Pacific. Ford's CVW-8 will get Lightnings down the road. Kennedy is going to the Pacific and will likely deploy with them first.
Actually, Ford was not designed to carry the F-35C from the outset. In fact, Kennedy was initially not supposed to get that capability until after her first overhaul. Part of the delay in Kennedy’s construction was to go back and add the capability to carry F-35Cs at launch. I believe there was Congressional language requiring that modification to Kennedy a couple of years ago. Ford will be back fitted to carry F-35C sometime in the future.
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You also forgot the redesign hull to remove the port Listing that the Nimitz had need a waiver to operated with since the 1970s...
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The class.
The entire class from Nimitz to the Bush has like a 5 percent list, that gots worse the newer the vessel got. Which the crews had to use the Damcon Voids to balance it out or play games with the fuel loading.
They couldn't fix cause it needed an complete re-balancing of everything that which have resulted in a new class in all the ways.
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From what I’ve been told, Nimitz and Ford share the exact same hull
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Hull shape maybe but the design is uttery different.
Needs to be just for the lack of the steam piping for the Cats let alone every other difference it has, like the Bridge tower.
Also they do look pretty different when you compare dry dock pictures, which is something I feel should be classified but you can find good images of it on Google images so...
Anyway I will post images of the two tomorrow when in my PC and not phone.
Also everyone I talk too and read of states that the Ford class does not have the Nimitz class list.
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all you have to do is look at them. They are very different.
Report of the Board of Inspection and Survey - INSURV ANNUAL REPORT for 2022
March 1, 2023
Released June 2, 2023
Re INSURV report on Ford trials, not great reading.
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23832925/examination-of-navy-vessels-annual-insurv-report.pdf
March 1, 2023
Released June 2, 2023
Re INSURV report on Ford trials, not great reading.
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23832925/examination-of-navy-vessels-annual-insurv-report.pdf
In fact the Nimitz class are not a homogeneous class of 10 ships.
Nimitz, Eisenhower and Vinson, the first three to complete form one group. The next 5 another. And finally the Reagan and Bush are different again. The latter pair introduced a different bulbous bow shape akin to that used on the Ford.
Stennis model
Reagan model
The Ford’s hull was redesigned to eliminate a list apparent in the Nimitz class unless asymmetric loading of liquids was undertaken.
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General Atomics to provide launch systems for next Ford-class aircraft carrier | Shephard
General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) will provide production, manufacturing, engineering, programme management, logistics support and information assurance as well as launch and arrestor system shipsets for the USS Doris Miller.
www.shephardmedia.com
GAO Weapon Systems Annual Assessment report June 2023
Development cost $7.1 billion - Procurement cost of the 4 carriers $49.3 billion, Total program cost $56.9 billion ('23 dollars)
Of concern besides near $4 billion jump in cost is that they still having to make design/build changes to EMALS and AAG which have not seen reported previously, will Ford and Kennedy be upgraded to new standard.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106059.pdf - p.141
Development cost $7.1 billion - Procurement cost of the 4 carriers $49.3 billion, Total program cost $56.9 billion ('23 dollars)
Of concern besides near $4 billion jump in cost is that they still having to make design/build changes to EMALS and AAG which have not seen reported previously, will Ford and Kennedy be upgraded to new standard.
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106059.pdf - p.141
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The US has 11 carriers in service. At any time, 1/3 of them are at sea. Another 1/3 is in the shipyards, refitting after their last long deployment. The final 1/3 is doing workups after their shipyard time, getting ready to go out for a long deployment.
That means 4 carriers at sea, and 4 more available to surge in a crisis, at the cost of lower readiness when first surged and some very ugly refit planning when the 8 carriers all come back to port.
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The area on the port aft quarter of the Ford, where the ESSM launcher is. Does anyone know why that wasn't made as flight deck area instead of being a level lower? (decks go down into a ship, level go up above the decks)
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All submariners consider Carriers to be the juiciest of high value targets to go chase.
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At least Tomcat sized is my guess. Probably bigger. In the thread on the NGAD the Lockheed proposal was said to be Sukhoi sized or a bit bigger.
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INSURV is a four letter word.
My first sub got tagged for one, we had just won the Battle E and had gotten the highest possible ratings on the Operational Reactor Safeguards Examination. One of the failures was for using the wrong type of ball-lock pin, when the pin we needed did not exist in the supply system and the pin we used was listed as an acceptable substitute.
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Thanks Scott Kenny, the FA-XX is going to be a big fighter if it is going to be the same size as the F-14 carrying all the weaponry internally, it sort of reminds me of the size of the Lockheed NATF proposal.
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That's not anywhere near as much time as you think it is. Detailed design work on a brand new ship class takes years. And making major alterations would have delayed the ships keel laying by no less than 5 years. Replacing things like the elevators, EMALS and the AAG are not minor changes. Hundreds, if not thousands, of compartments would have to be redesigned to accommodate the changes. Which means basically starting over from scratch.
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Especially tring to replace the EMALs.
You going to have to run and design around the Steam pipes to carry the steam from the bottom of the ship at the reactor to the top of the ship.
Hell you likely are going to need to redesign the reactor themselves to ensure that they provide enough steam to run both the Turbines and the Cats cause the Cats drain steam pressure like no ones business.
Like one of the older carrier steam piping and generation management was so bad that they power to the turbines while launching a few aircraft.
Forcing them to rebuild the entire carrier guts to get it to work properly.
You going to have to run and design around the Steam pipes to carry the steam from the bottom of the ship at the reactor to the top of the ship.
Hell you likely are going to need to redesign the reactor themselves to ensure that they provide enough steam to run both the Turbines and the Cats cause the Cats drain steam pressure like no ones business.
Like one of the older carrier steam piping and generation management was so bad that they power to the turbines while launching a few aircraft.
Forcing them to rebuild the entire carrier guts to get it to work properly.
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