French Space Rocket question

[TheKutKu]

These aren't particularly "new", I'm sure the people around here know about it and I've seen it mentionned occasionaly in various french sites , but it's quite little known now that I think of it.
The idea to use SLBM and IRBM stages for french orbital launchers didn't die in the early 70s and resurfaced in the 80s and 90s.
http://www.anciensonera.fr/sites/default/files/fichiers%20pdf/Bulletin_AAO_Hors-Serie-Espace.pdf not an unknown link on this site, I'm going to at least provide a translation of this unselectable text

WHEN FRANCE WANTED TO CONVERT ITS MISSILES INTO LAUNCHERS

For more than 40 years, the French space industry has been manufacturing ballistic missiles for nuclear deterrence, and has considered their possible conversion into space launchers. Although the idea has been attractive for reducing costs, none of these projects has materialized.

In the 1960s, the Pierres Précieuses program provided France with a space capability with the Diamant A launcher. This is the civilian result of a family of military demonstrators which allow the mastery of the technologies necessary for the much more discreet development of two families of missiles for nuclear deterrence: the ICBM (Strategic Ground-to-Ground Ballistic Missiles) which will be deployed on the Plateau d'Albion from 1971 to 1998 and the SLBM (Strategic Sea-to-Ground Ballistic Missiles) which will enter into service on nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SNLE) also from 1971. With these strategic missiles, France will now have a range of mass-produced solid propellant engines that it would be a shame not to take advantage of.

DIAMANT'S SUCCESSOR
In fact, this idea began to interest pique the engineers of SEREB (Société d'étude et de Réalisation des Engins Balistique) well before the first flight of Diamant A. From June to October 1964, its first stage Emeraude had indeed failed three times during its first flight tests. The reasoning is then as follows: if this Emerald stage with liquid propellants is not available in time, perhaps it will be necessary to replace it by a stage with solid propellant P10 (for 10 tons of propellant). Under development, this stage would be used both as the 1st stage of the SLBM M1 and as the 2nd stage of the ICBM S2. However, the Emeraude had a series of successes in 1965 and found itself as the 1st stage of the Diamant A when it placed the first French satellite, Asterix or A1, into orbit on November 26.

To follow on this first generation of experimental launchers, a Super Diamant was studied. This time, the Emerald stage could be replaced by the P16 first stage of the S2 missile. With improved upper stages, it would be possible to multiply the satellite mass by three, from 80 to 250 kg. However, the P16 is not the only one in the running and it is in competition with a new liquid propellant stage, the Amethyste. In May 1967, it is the later which is chosen by the CNES - which had just recovered the responsibility for the program managed before by the DMA (Ministerial Delegation for Armament) - for the launcher Diamant B.

It was not until 1975 that a missile stage appeared on a Diamant, with the P4 2nd stage of the M1, which gave its name to the Diamant BP4 series. This series would have only three launchers before stopping, for lack of small satellites to launch.

THE REPLACEMENT OF EUROPA
At the beginning of 1966, while Diamant was triumphing, the ELDO (European Launcher Development Organisation), which was developing the Europa launcher, was in deep crisis and SEREB proposed a national alternative to the European program in difficulty. This Hyper Diamant would be realized by placing the two improved upper stages of the Super Diamant on the two stages P16 and P10 of a S2 missile. From the new space center planned in French Guiana, this architecture would make it possible to place 100 kg in geostationary transfer orbit. The crisis would finally be resolved and the break up of the ELDO postponed, but the Hyper Diamant would remain in the pipeline in a tri-stage form, with the two stages P16 and P10 surmounted by a P4.

In July 1968, when the ELDO was again threatened, General De Gaulle accepted the idea of CNES to study alternatives to Europa 2 for the launch of the Franco-German Symphonie satellites. SEREB pushed its concept further with not only a launcher but a real family of modular launchers called Turquoise. It is a meccano using the P16 both as 1st and 2nd stage but also as lateral gas pedals. With a 3rd stage P4 and a perigee engine, it would be possible to place nearly 500 kg in geostationary transfer orbit, and by replacing this composite by a cryogenic stage one would even reach 800 kg.

After the fiasco of Europa, in 1971, this concept Turquoise would be finally forgotten to the benefit of Ariane, more evolutionary and easier to "sell" to the to the European partners. The satellites Symphonie satellites would be launched by the Americans (Delta rocket) who put as a condition the prohibition of any commercial use commercial use!


Model of Turquoise. It would be a modular orbital launcher based on missiles component in case of failure of the Europa Program.

THE RETURN OF SMALL SATELLITES

In 1989, fourteen years after the last Diamant BP4, the space industry had changed. The success of Ariane had propelled the Europeans and their industry to the forefront, but it had also opened access to space to private initiatives and a plethora of projects was announced. The miniaturization of electronics allowed a return of small scientific and military satellites to such an extent that a private firm started in 1988 the development of a small dedicated launcher, the Pegasus, the first new American launcher since the shuttle. In addition, France decided to acquire an optical spy satellite, Helios, which will be rapidly completed by small listening satellites. Missiles have also evolved, the S2 had been replaced by the S3, while the M2, the M20, the M4 and soon the M45 had replaced the M1.
M4 and soon the M45.

In 1989, Aerospatiale started a study on its own funds with the Société Européenne de Propulsion (SEP) and Arianespace for the development of a PLS (Petit Lanceur de Satellites, Small Satellite Launcher). The base idea is to reuse stages of the M4 at the end of their operational life to reduce costs thanks to already qualified material.

Nevertheless, a large stage is missing to ensure the takeoff and the Europeans must turn to the American technology, in this case the Castor 48 engines of Thiokol (which are also used as first stage for the European Maxus sounding rockets). A bundle of three Castor 4B would thus constitute the first stage P35, upon which would be stacked the two stages P20 and P8 stages of the M4. A small Italian IRIS powder stage (Italian Research Interim Stage), developed to launch small satellites from the Shuttle's payload bay, would provide precision orbital injection. '

A rehabilitation of the Diamant launch pad in Kourou is even envisaged. The target capability is 810 kg in sun-synchronous orbit' at 500 km altitude. A development in three years is proposed for 630 million francs at the time, but neither CNES nor the industrialists believe in the development of the small satellite market outside the United States and the PLS remains on the drawing boards.


In 1989, the PLS Study attempted to find a space use to the M4 missiles stages. But it highlighted the lack of large propulsive stage for a First stage

E4 and E5, MILITARY LAUNCHERS
In 1990, in the absence of an accessible commercial market, the Aerospatiale teams decided to continue their studies on the conversion of the M4 missiles at the end of their service life into a low-capacity launcher for the DGA (Délégation Générale pour l'Armement), the only potential customer considered as credible.

To realize this so-called E4 launcher, they propose to add to the two stages of the M4 a third stage of American origin, the Orion 50 of Hercules Aerospace, just qualified as the 2nd stage of the Pegasus winged launcher. Two options are available for the 4th stage: the E4P (P for powder) carries an Italian IRIS stage for power, while the E4L (L for liquid) offers a liquid propellant module for greater injection precision. From the Diamant launch pad in Kourou, the capacity in heliosynchronous orbit at 500 km would be 350 to 450 kg.

This logic is of interest to the DGA, which has asked Aerospatiale to include a preliminary design for a small E5 launcher in its study for the next generation of ICBM, the M5. Designed to make the most of the space available in the tubes of new-generation SSBN submarines, the M5 will also have a 20% wider diameter compared with the M4, and thus much more powerful stages, which makes it possible to consider a more powerful launcher that wouldn't need any foreign technology. The basic concept consists in adding the 2nd stage of the M4 (P8) on top of the two first stages of the M5 (501 and 502). The performances in SSO meet those of the PLS of 1989: 810 kg with an upper stage with powder (the 3rd stage of the M5), 550 kg with an injection module with liquid propellants.

The M5 missile (Left) and its potential space derivatives E5A and E5B. The fall of the USSR would result in budget cuts and only the M5 would be made under the name M51.

THE ANSWER IS ELSEWHERE
Interesting on paper, the E5 study highlights the limits of the concept. To make their detection more difficult, the missiles are designed for high short accelerations that would be dangerous for satellites. It is therefore out of the question to use standard MS stages: it is necessary to review their loading by using the same propellant as the Ariane 5 boosters. Moreover, the stages remain too small and offer few possibilities for evolution, except for the addition of lateral boosters. Finally, despite the simplification of all the electrical systems with existing equipment, such as the ring laser gyroscope units of the Tigre helicopter, the development bill remains dissuasive: 1.7 billion francs.

Two major events would change everything. First, in June 1990, the American phone manufacturer Motorola unveiled its Iridium project: 77 satellites of 315 kg in low orbit for mobile telephony. The reaction was not long in coming. In addition to competing projects (including Globalstar), Iridium generated the development of a multitude of small launchers around the world, attracted by the windfall that this new market promised to represent, and for which neither Ariane 4 nor the future Ariane 5, designed for geostationary orbit, were adapted. The other event was the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War: this led to a downscaling in the M5 program - which nevertheless gave rise to the M51 missile - but above all opened the door to new technical cooperation with former enemies. François Calaque, then director of launchers at Aerospatiale, took stock of the situation. What Europe needs is not a converted missile, but launchers to complement Ariane 5, and this is a matter of urgency! There are two avenues to follow: the development in Europe of a civilian solid propellant stage of at least 50 metric tons, and the establishment of cooperation with the Russians on an intermediate launcher. The first would take nearly 10 years to come to fruition, with the adoption by ESA of the P80 program in 2000 (the first stage of the future small Vega launcher). The second would lead François Calaque to create Starsem in 1996, bringing together Europeans and Russians (Arianespace, EADS, the Russian space agency and the Samara space center or TsSKB-Progress) to commercially exploit the Soyuz launcher, just in time to win half of the Globalstar launches.

Stefan Barensky

 

[TheKutKu]

Additional information

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/009457659390110I

Aérospatiale s'intéresse au marché des petits lanceurs

Architecte industriel et principal étagiste des programmes Ariane 4 et 5, Aérospatiale souhaite également être présente sur les lanceurs de plus petite taille, pour autant que le marché des petits satellites à placer en orbite basse, se concrétise au cours des prochaines années.

www.lesechos.fr

 

[Michel Van]

...a VEGA like launcher bevor VEGA

so far i know the story
it was French Army who opposed to 1960s Solid Diamant study
because they consider it as interference in their Solid Missile program.

That Diamant program ended do lack of small Sat is new to me
most stories say they cancelling the program do Budget reason because Ariane 1 Program.

 

[TheKutKu]

...a VEGA like launcher bevor VEGA

so far i know the story
it was French Army who opposed to 1960s Solid Diamant study
because they consider it as interference in their Solid Missile program.

That Diamant program ended do lack of small Sat is new to me
most stories say they cancelling the program do Budget reason because Ariane 1 Program.

While the budget reason is likely the main one, there were significant hopes for a successful commercialisation of the "Diamant B successor" in the early 70s and I think this has to be taken into account.

According to "L’aventure spatiale française" by Varnoteaux. There were up to 8 foreign orders of the Diamant BC by 1971 (BC being BP4’s direct , internationalised, precursors), 4 for Germany alone, with also Belgian, British, Indian, Argentinian, Chilean interests. Capcomespace also says that there were hopes for commercialisation in 1970.

These orders disappeared after the failure of BC. And interestingly in "L’espace, du rêve à la réalité" Le Fevre, it’s said that the failures of the last 2 Diamant B and the few number of launches almost caused Diamant BP4’s cancellation is 1973 (and Yves Sillard’s insistance was the main reason why it wasn’t cancelled), before some of the largest budget cuts.

You also have to remember that Diamant B had the misadventure of Vempa: The initial contracts planned for 4 Diamant B to test the Europa 2 upper kick stage, this contract was one of the main reason Diamant B happened in the first place but was suddenly cancelled in 1968, eventually they found satelites to launch on all the 6 planned Diamant B (including the Dial/Diamant-Allemagne launch in March 70), but for a time it seemed like the whole Diamant B was in jeopardy. Given that it makes sense why there would have been calls for cancellation after BC faied to catch foreign contracts even before the Giscardian budget cuts.

So my interpretation is that even before the 1974-75 budget cuts that killed Diamant and the french sounding rockets, BP4 was already something of a disappointment that was being downscaled due to the lack of customers.

 

[TheKutKu]

A new paper from a few months ago about the early history of ONERA's space activities. And the SATMOS launcher

For reference, ONERA and CNES had a bit of a rivalry in the early 60s, and the ONERA had many of its role taken over by the CNES. However the ONERA still made sounding rocket (for exemple, the launches of the Titus rocket in Argentina in 1966) and was developping Berenice, which had the largest civilian solid propellant engine outside of the USA at the time. And in 1963 they tried to "one-up" the CNES and SEREB with the SATMOS project (Satellite pour l’étude de l’ATMOSphère, meaning “Satellite for the study of the ATMOSphere”)


From " Les trente premières années du CNES : l'Agence française de l'espace, 1962-1992 "
"During a meeting of the "Comitee of scientific programs" of April 20 1963, ONERA presented a project of small satellite named SATMOS (. It would weight 3.5 kg and could be launched by a modified Bérénice rocket (named Bérénice II in other sources) on a 250x1800 km orbit. Its duration would be 78 days. The first launch could happen in 1964 from the Levant Island on the French Riviera, a full year before Diamant's planned date."

"The Comitee had a very guarded opinion on the usefulness of this rocket that would, keeping things in proportion, rival CNES's projects. French space policy could not depends on two different organisations, and the project was abandonned. On october 7, during a visit to the ONERA, the minister Gaston Palewski told the director of the ONERA to avoid any rivalry with the CNES, which he would comply to"


It has some documents on the SATMOS project I had never seen before!


For reference, here's the characteristics of Bérenice


Quoting the PDF

But what was Onera’s reason for pushing such a project? According to Roger Marguet, « it was an interim solution for
Diamant ». However, wasn’t the actual reason to show that Onera could be faster than SEREB? Indeed, Roger Marguet acknowledges: « Satmos met a strong hostility, including from SEREB which considered this as a competitor ». This was obvious. There was probably a second reason
explaining the demise of Satmos: « One should not forget how important the initial shot is. Yet, Onera’s proposal was a satellite of a few kilos, this was ridiculous for a first shot48 », eagerly admits Roger Marguet. Satmos would be sent onto an orbit with a 250 km perigee and a 1800 km apogee altitude. The project looked even more ridiculous compared to SEREB’s, which targets a 30 to 50 kg satellite inserted onto a 500  2200 km orbit.
Eventually, Onera’s project was considered so embarrassing that State Minister Palewski order its stop on October 7, 1963: « We have been requested to stop our project, while we were about to concretize it, maybe we could have orbited before Diamant! », tells Roger Marguet with some regret. However, later on, during an April 2000 interview, he adds: « I tell you frankly what I think about it now: it is better Satmos was not launch, because it would have been a very risky operation. Our rockets did not have the reliability needed for launching a payload of a few kilograms into orbit. Failure was not very far. Yet, a failure would be poorly looked upon », and would have probably lead to mockery on the international scene, hence the intervention of the State ministers.

On the plus side, this would have been the first and only orbital rocket to launch from western europe!

 

[cardonet]

A new paper from a few months ago about the early history of ONERA's space activities. And the SATMOS launcher

For reference, ONERA and CNES had a bit of a rivalry in the early 60s, and the ONERA had many of its role taken over by the CNES. However the ONERA still made sounding rocket (for exemple, the launches of the Titus rocket in Argentina in 1966) and was developping Berenice, which had the largest civilian solid propellant engine outside of the USA at the time. And in 1963 they tried to "one-up" the CNES and SEREB with the SATMOS project (Satellite pour l’étude de l’ATMOSphère, meaning “Satellite for the study of the ATMOSphere”)


From " Les trente premières années du CNES : l'Agence française de l'espace, 1962-1992 "
"During a meeting of the "Comitee of scientific programs" of April 20 1963, ONERA presented a project of small satellite named SATMOS (. It would weight 3.5 kg and could be launched by a modified Bérénice rocket (named Bérénice II in other sources) on a 250x1800 km orbit. Its duration would be 78 days. The first launch could happen in 1964 from the Levant Island on the French Riviera, a full year before Diamant's planned date."

"The Comitee had a very guarded opinion on the usefulness of this rocket that would, keeping things in proportion, rival CNES's projects. French space policy could not depends on two different organisations, and the project was abandonned. On october 7, during a visit to the ONERA, the minister Gaston Palewski told the director of the ONERA to avoid any rivalry with the CNES, which he would comply to"


It has some documents on the SATMOS project I had never seen before!

It seems that this version of Berenice (say Berenice II) kept the first two stages of the Berenice re-entry study vehicle. The difference in the length of the second stage is due to the addition of the attitude control system at the top of the second stage. Contrary to the Titus II project, which had to use two SEPR 739 grains on the first two stages, whereas on Berenice, the SEPR 740 second stage was shorter. Titus II never flew, but the ONERA's Tibere rocket used the double SEPR 739 formula for the first two stages.

The two upper stages of this Berenice II seem different. In particular, the fourth stage carries 48 kg of propellant while the Berenice I Melanie grain weighed only 22 kg.

As regards the attitude control systems developed by ONERA, the 1-D system called PASCAL was not tested until 1965 (for the Titus experiment) and the 3-D system called CASSIOPEE was tested in 1968 and then used for various astronomy experiments.

 

[Michel Van]

But what was Onera’s reason for pushing such a project? According to Roger Marguet, « it was an interim solution for
Diamant ». However, wasn’t the actual reason to show that Onera could be faster than SEREB? Indeed, Roger Marguet acknowledges: « Satmos met a strong hostility, including from SEREB which considered this as a competitor ». This was obvious. There was probably a second reason

It was a Life and death fight between ONERA and CNES who will be Official French Space Agency.
also Société d'étude et de réalisation d'engins balistiques (SEREB) against Société d'Études pour la Propulsion par Réaction (SEPR)
about lucrative contracts for rocket motors.

ONERA - SATMOS was easy, earlier and could send 3,5 kg satellite into orbit.
but it lack option to increase payload, like CNES Diamant A with 130 kg B with 190 kg and BP4 with 220 kg...

 

[Archibald]

How do you say grapefruit in french ? Pamplemousse.

 

[Archibald]

Ha ha in my TL I had ONERA mating an Agena on top of a Diamant Améthyste booster stage: the whole thing called DIAGONAL, because: DIamant AGena ONera Advanced Launcher. If I had knew their relationship was so acrimonious, maybe I should not have done that. It seems to be akin to cats and dogs hostilities...

 

[TheKutKu]

Some note about French rocketry nomenclature: it is rather straightforward and still in use nowadays including Vega-C.
P stands for poudre, as in powder: solid-fuel.
L stands for liquid(e) that is: everything neither solid nor hydrogen fuel.
H (duh) is hydrogen.
The number relates to propellant mass.

Which means the H1 / H2 stages mentioned there would be minuscule cryogenic stages, not much wider than Diamant's 5 ft / 60 inch.

AFAIK the narrowest and smallest LH2 stage ever was the Japanese H-1 of the early 1980's: as it stood on a Delta core. According to Capcomespace it carried 8800 kg of hydrolox for its LE-5 engine, and wasn't wider than Delta standard 8 ft core. http://www.capcomespace.net/dossiers/japon/lanceurs.htm

For the sake of comparison even early Centaur A on Atlas in 1962-66 were twice as heavy and 10 ft diameter from day one. Most of the similar stages elsewhere (USSR / India, China, ESA - CNES HM-7) are not smaller / lighter than this.

By French standards, the H-1 LE-5 stage 2 would have been called heir H8.8 or H9.

There are however lower bounds related to LOX/LH2 rocket stages: because hydrogen is so voluminous and cold.
Bottom line: I don't think a H1 or H2 stage made any sense. This would explain how they shifted to H6 / H7: merely six or seven tons of hydrolox. A touch smaller than the Japanese. But Diamant L-17 was 5 ft diameter, compared to Delta H-1 8 ft and Atlas / Titan 10 ft... that's probably why a shift to Europe, ELDO, Blue Streak / Europa was unavoidable for French LH2 stage studies. Same for the British RZ-20: they wouldn't shrink if for Black Arrow, Blue Streak was the only way.

And then you've got the british considering 3ft diameter LH2/LOX stages on top of Black Knight LOL.

 

[cardonet]

Some note about French rocketry nomenclature: it is rather straightforward and still in use nowadays including Vega-C.
P stands for poudre, as in powder: solid-fuel.
L stands for liquid(e) that is: everything neither solid nor hydrogen fuel.
H (duh) is hydrogen.
The number relates to propellant mass.

Which means the H1 / H2 stages mentioned there would be minuscule cryogenic stages, not much wider than Diamant's 5 ft / 60 inch.

And then you've got the british considering 3ft diameter LH2/LOX stages on top of Black Knight LOL.

In the recent nomenclature, the number following the letter actually refers to the propellant weight, but for the early SEPR H2 and H3 engines, H2 meant Hydrogen engine for 2nd stage, and H3, Hydrogen engine for 3rd stage.
I never found any information on the diameter of these 2nd and 3rd stages, but the diameter of the Diogene 2 3rd stage was 1.58 m (cf. Air et Cosmos n°136 and n°158).

Attached is a photo of the improved Diamant 3rd stage model presented at the 1963 Le Bourget show (Air et Cosmos n°42).

 

[Archibald]

Thanks for the precisions, Sir ! Indeed a couple of tons of hydrogen ain't much for any rocket... so they were closer from HM-4, that is, 4 metric tons of props ?

 

[cardonet]

Thanks for the precisions, Sir ! Indeed a couple of tons of hydrogen ain't much for any rocket... so they were closer from HM-4, that is, 4 metric tons of props ?

No, to avoid the confusion we have just discussed, after H2 and H3, the engines were designated HM followed by the thrust in tons: HM4 (4 t thrust), HM6 (6 t thrust), HM7 (7 t thrust).

 

[TheKutKu]

"Exemples of post-Diamant B pre-studies" (Developpement sans essai vol = development cost without in-flight tests; Unitaire sans aléas = Nominal unit cost; Allongé = Stretched, costs are in Millions of Francs )

View attachment 696363

I thought that sharing this without context wasn't very interesting so here's the corresponding chapter, I apologise for the use of Machine translation.

Continuation of studies on future launchers

In February 1968, the CNES distributed the report of the Program Advisory Committee (Causse report) to the concerned ministerial departments. From this examination, it emerges that France wishes the discontinuation of the LAS satellite (large astronomical satellite), but expresses its interest in an aeronautical satellite and a geostationary telecommunications satellite. In terms of launchers, its choice is in the cryogenic propulsion sector (H2/O2). Finally, in terms of institutions, France is in favor of a merger of the two European organisations. However, this policy was to be reconsidered following Britain's statement confirming its intention to withdraw from ELDO.

The CNES launchers group met on February 7, 28 and March 7, 1968, the first two meetings being devoted to the financial evaluation of the various sectors corresponding to the Europa III and Europa IV programs proposed in the Causse report. It identifies and evaluates possible combinations
which, after elimination of the most disadvantageous one, leaves in competition architectures whose most expensive in development are those which are the most economical per unit (operational launches). The cheapest and fastest solution would be to use only powder stages. However, the use of gunpowder would practically prohibit any European cooperation and offers few path for improvements. All the studies show that the introduction of hydrogen appears to be an advantageous technical progress per unit despite the development costs.

The French are still planning on using the Blue Streak for a few years, on the condition of obtaining serious delivery guarantees, since the risk that strong pressure from the United States would lead the United Kingdom to break its commitments wasn't negligible. 60 This is the reason why, while remaining within the European framework, the French are studying another sector whose performance would be equivalent to that of Europa II, with availability in 1970-1975. The disadvantage of this solution is that the date when this launcher would be operational would not come soon enough to launch Symphonie.61

The “medium launchers*” group at CNES is studying several possible configurations by combining solid propulsion and liquid propulsion, conventional or cryogenic, and is looking to see if there are configurations that could be developed without essential recourse to ELDO.63

This led to the definition of eleven launcher configurations corresponding to the Europa III and Europa IV programs.
In the case where the European programs keeps being based on the Blue Streak, the group gives a favourable opinion to the Causse report consisting of moving towards a Europa III program with a hydrogen stage of 15 tonnes of propellant, and proposes to continue comparative studies, while rejecting the Europa IV configuration. In the event that the use of the Blue Streak is already excluded from the Europa III stage, the group believes that France would be able to offer its partners a program based on the use of liquid propellants of the L70 type later matched with a Hydrogen upper stage.

To mitigate a potential English withdrawal, the group was given a new mandate in April 1968 with the double task of studying: 1) the configurations, (including those within framework of bilateral cooperation with Germany) enabling a satellite with a useful mass of 200 kg to be sent in geostationary orbit, without using Blue Streak, 2) the cost and time conditions under which Europa II could be completed in cooperation with Germany, assuming the purchase of Blue Streak from the English.

Four possible configurations are considered67. 66

1. Pursue Europa III by buying the Blue Streak from the English and limiting as much as possible participations from outside the French-German duo (quick, economical configurations, but no improvement possible);
2. Replace the Blue Streak with an equivalent French stage (long, costly configurations, but improvement possibilities)
3. Replace the Blue Streak with an existing 7xL17 Amethyste thruster clusters (project Catherine, quick configurations, but limited to 700 kg in geostationary orbit);
4. Use military solid boosters. This solution allows the launch of Symphony (if the Symphonie program was reduced to a national activity), but is impossible within the Franco-German bilateral framework. The possibilities of development can reach 1700 kg provided you have a propellant of 45 t of powder.
   
   

The Application Programs Committee, chaired by Marcel Boiteux, determines the elements to be proposed to the Minister before the ELDO Conference of Ministers on July 11 and 12, 1968 69 Pierre Contensou who presents the results of the work of the “launchers” group indicates that under different variants, the group chose as a priority the liquid boosters of the L70 type.

Regarding Symphonie, in the event of a launcher not using the Blue Streak, the group has defined three types of configurations:"

1. Use of a combination of solid boosters
2. Use of Eldo-A with Coralie and Astris, but replacement of the Blue Steak by a French LTP95 stage (improved version of the L70) with turbopump and pressurization at 6 bars instead of 24. The cost for 4 launches would be of 1 billion francs of which 420 million for development. In this case the development would take too long to launch Symphonie
3. Replacing the Blue Streak with a cluster of boosters with uprated upper stages. Solid boosters were ruled out. The "launcher group" eventually chose using a cluster of seven L17 Amethyste with a stretched Second stage and Perigee stage. The unit cost of L17 being estimated to 15 millions francs + 105 millions for the development, the total cost for 4 launches was to be 600 miillions
   
   -Aforementionned Chart goes here-
   
   

In December, the Committee examines a new report dedicatd, this time, to the improvements which could be made to the Diamant B. This report, which also mentions the French possibilities for developing an intermediate launcher of the Thor-Delta class, recommends for this class of intermediate launcher, the production of Turquoise B (or Hyper-Diamant) with solid propulsion

For the 1st stage, the 400 kN (M40) thrust motor developed by the LRBA would provide a payload gain of 50% for an orbit at 500 km. The introduction of a turbopump on the L.17 is an expensive modification, but is an important technological progress. The use of three Agate-type thrusters (P1.9 solid) as boosters on the 1st stage would result in a performance gain of around 15%, but would present technical difficulties.


For the 3rd stage, replacing the P2.2 with a P4 (Rita, Diamant BP's S2) would increase performance by around 10% and would allow the use of a larger diameter fairing (1.5 m). Reinforcement of the 3rd stage alone does not bring any significant improvement, but combined with an apogee stage it brings an appreciable advantage. The addition of an apogee stage to Diamant B, which increases the flexibility of use of the launcher, nevertheless causes a modification of the general design of the launch. For this apogee stage, a solid propellant would be inexpensive, whereas a reignitable liquid propellant would allow orbit corrections.

In the event of a more in-depth study, the group considers that it would be unreasonable to pursue a policy of perfecting the Diamant B and at the same time undertaking the development of an intermediate launcher. It is therefore a question of choosing between these two options, knowing that a rate of three shots per year for a Diamant B or Turquoise B type launcher seems to be a minimum.73

The development of an intermediate launcher appears justified, especially if the short-lived existence of Europa II based on the Blue Streak is taken into account. As for the development of Turquoise B, a natural extension of studies relating to the deterrent missile force, it would mark a trend towards the convergence of civil and military programs. Some were surprised by the conclusion of the launcher study group that Intermediate launchers would be comparable to and even slightly cheaper than the cost of the American Thor-Delta launchers, (despite being built in lesser numbers than the delta), the group was forced to re-examine and modify its first conclusions. It then concluded that the Turquoise B intermediate launcher would be slightly more expensive than the Thor-Delta

End of the chapter, next pages are about early-mid 1968 ELDO negociations
However some interesting not about launcher projects a few pages later which talks about 1969 Cnes budget negociations

"For launchers, the hypothesis of a cessation of ELDO in 1968-1969 was considered, with the construction of an intermediate launcher in smaller scale, close cooperation with a 40% French participation to the funding.
The technical configuration that was chosen after studies was one that reused the 2nd and 3rd stage of Diamant B with a new first stage in development LTP95. The development length of this option would force to launch Symphonie on american launchers", with the allowed budget for the launcher program going from 118 MF in 1967 to 210 MF in 1971.

*The "medium launcher" CNES study group was led by Contensou (ONERA) and included Sachot (CNES), Attali (SEREB), Bigot (CNES), Bortzmeyer (CNES), Corbeau (ELDO), Melin (SEREB), Lacaz (DMA/DTEn, military procurement agency) and Lazennec (LRBA)

This does seem to be Charley Attali's (Project director and co-designer of Diamant, important program manager of Jericho and Shavit), last job in France before he emigrated to Israel

----
Some interesting rockets there...
L70 as the predecessor of the LTP95/L140

A diamant BP with a M40 (Viking precedessor) powered Amethyste and VE 110 Agathe as side boosters and fourth stage! (4th stage which was also considered later as an indian-made stage for Diamant BC)

A weird Ariane-Diamant fusion with LTP95 S1 and Topaze/P0.64 as upper stage!

P45, I think that may be the largest Direction des Poudres/SNPE/St-Medard solid booster project of the 60s, I had seen P30, P40... I'd like to read more about these, but sources on the early development of french ballistic missiles are sparse...

 

[Archibald]

Criss crossing two different threads. I'm trying to pin down a "reasonable" diameter for those HM-6 powered stages.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/french-space-rocket-question.2975/

@CARDONET - In the recent nomenclature, the number following the letter actually refers to the propellant weight, but for the early SEPR H2 and H3 engines, H2 meant Hydrogen engine for 2nd stage, and H3, Hydrogen engine for 3rd stage.
I never found any information on the diameter of these 2nd and 3rd stages, but the diameter of the Diogene 2 3rd stage was 1.58 m (cf. Air et Cosmos n°136 and n°158).

Looking at B. Gire data, below... the hydrogen stages with HM-6, Diogene 2 and Vulcain H "columns"... they were mated to "P10" and "Coralie".



We know Coralie was 2 m diameter, because Blue Streak & Europa...

But "P10" ? it had a "903" engine, which bring us to this, below link... and the S.3 missiles were 1.5 m diameter (like Air&Cosmos said, d'oh: 1.58 m diameter, makes sense !)

"SSBS""903""P10" - Google Search

I'm trying to pin down a "reasonable" diameter for those HM-6 powered stages. Of course they could be "hammerhead-ed" that is, larger than the stages below them.
Case in point: Titan IV still had the classic 10 ft core, but the hammerhead fairing was 15 ft diameter. So - 50% more.
But, hammerhead or not, most LH2 stages are 3 m bare minimum diameter - except for the Japanese LE-5 which rode a Thor - Delta core, so 2.4 m in diameter, like them...

"Hammerheading" P10 1.58 m diameter, by 150% then 1.6 becomes 2.4 meters, hello LE-5 ! And Coralie was 2 m.

So IMHO, those early French LH2 stages should be vaguely similar to the Japanese one that came later (H-1 flew in 1986). Also hydrogen makes no compromise with diameter-vs-length ratios, because its dismal density. Bottom line: there are not many ways around weights and dimensions of small LH2 rocket stages.

 

[TheKutKu]

A new paper from a few months ago about the early history of ONERA's space activities. And the SATMOS launcher



On the plus side, this would have been the first and only orbital rocket to launch from western europe!

"We can see that stage 1 and 2 are identical (Stromboli blocks of different lengths), while Satmos stage 3 and 4 are shorter and wider than those of Berenice.
Satmos stage 3 appears to measure 390 mm in diameter. If the propellant used was Plastolite/Plastolane, which is likely, the block could be a Mathurin or Popeye cut to the right length.
The weight of the stage 4 block is given as 48 kg, compared with 22 kg for the Mélanie block from Bérénice. This stage seems to measure 320 mm in diameter (OPd 320?), but the thruster is certainly integrated into the stage and of smaller diameter."

Source of drawing: Starking on forum-conquete-spatiale.fr

 

[TheKutKu]

I never found any information on the diameter of these 2nd and 3rd stages,

In "Politique Industrielle de la France, L’ambition technologique: Naissance d’Ariane" P.149, Pierre Soufflet writes that the Diogene (not Diogene 2) Second stage is 1.500 m in diameter. No diameter information is given for the hydrogen third stage.

I am surprised to find this piece of information in this non-technical book, so I wouldn't blindly trust its accuracy.

The chapter gives a price tag of 237.2 Million Francs (equivalent to 1,899 Million 1994 Franc) For the sum of Hydrogen propulsion R&D in the 1960s in France

 

[Michel Van]

No diameter information is given for the hydrogen third stage.

achem achem it's 1580 mm or 1.58 meter
based on this picture

The chapter gives a price tag of 237.2 Million Francs (equivalent to 1,899 Million 1994 Franc)

little note here: the 237,2 Million OLD francs - equivalent to 1,899 Million NEW Francs.
In January 1960 the French franc was revalued, with 100 existing francs making one new franc

 

[Archibald]

achem achem it's 1580 mm or 1.58 meter
based on this picture

little note here: the 237,2 Million OLD francs - equivalent to 1,899 Million NEW Francs.
In January 1960 the French franc was revalued, with 100 existing francs making one new franc

And my mom, just turned 80 hence born in 1943, still counts in anciens franc - despite nouveau franc and euro.

 

[TheKutKu]

achem achem it's 1580 mm or 1.58 meter
based on this picture

little note here: the 237,2 Million OLD francs - equivalent to 1,899 Million NEW Francs.
In January 1960 the French franc was revalued, with 100 existing francs making one new franc

That's diogene 2, not diogene/diamant-hydrogene! Diogene had both Hydrogen S2(H2) and S3 (H3) , and the S3 was powered by a pressure-fed engine of 4x100 kg thrust.

Diogene-2's* S3 was the H3.5 (3.5 tons of hydro-lox) powered by the pump-fed HM6/4 of 6t/4t thrust (the difference between the two version laid in the turbopump)

*Diogene 1's too, which is different from Diamant-Hydrogene/Diogene and closer to Diogene 2.

----

I realize I slightly misquoted the book, it is 250 Million New Francs (MF) in the 60s, equivalent to 1,850 Million New Francs in 1994, This is coherent with inflation over the period.

I think you are mixing up commas and dots, both values are in New Francs, 250,000,000 New Francs in the mid 60s was, according to the book, equivalent to about 1,850,000,000 New Francs when this book was written (1994). Inflation was high at the time. The conversion are in the book.

250 Million New Francs throughout the 60s was equivalent to about 380-390 Million New Francs by 1973, when ariane was authorised, the cost of developpment of the HM7 being estimated to 370 Million New Francs at that date, and since Ariane stayed mostly on budget, the total cost of development of French/European Hydrolox engines and stage from the early 60s to 1979 (actually 1980, HM7 was not qualified yet when it first flew) is about 750 Million Francs 1973, or about €850 Millions today adjusted to that damn inflation.

The book details the budget cut that hit the French Hydrogen propulsion program in 1966-68 as part of army budget cuts (The army being initially interested in hydrogen propulsion for Diamant, before realising that it was not worth it), The program was significantly downsized in 1969 and 1970 and survived thanks to ELDO and CNES's contribution (8 and 5.9 MF respectively), as well as private investments, this enabled a continuity in French hydrogen propulsion that made L3S/Ariane possible, after that date, hydrogen propulsion work continued with the H20 and then Ariane.
----

The book has some interesting discussions about the P16/L17 choice for Diamant B (c. 1966-67)

Spoiler

Roger Chevalier (Director of SEREB 1967-70, VP of Aerospatiale and President of the FIA in the 80s)
-1966: Date of founding of the SETIS, a departement of SEREB whose goal was to establish space cooperation between European industrials. The SEREB, under DMA's (now DGA) authority was behind the four succeses of Diamant A. SEREB assumed that Diamant B would go to them, but circumstances would be otherwise: It kept the role of industrial architect for Diamant B, but CNES got the Prime contractorship (?). SEREB proposed for Diamant B to use the 16 tons SRB (P16) developped for the armies. This was, at first, only chosen for economic reasons, since this stage already existed. CNES prefered to develop a new liquid stage.There certainly was competition between, on the one side, the armies, the DMA and SEREB, and on the other, CNES. Every body knew, SEREB most of all, that if the P16 was not chosen, they would lose the prime contractorship. CNS thought they'd have greater responsibilities with the use of liquid stages.

André LEBEAU (director of CNES in 1995, first ESA program director)
I wish to go back to the P16/L17 choice. Contrary to a common impression from the outside, this choice was hotly debated within CNES. CNES was very divided, and, as far as I'm concerned, I was partisan of the P16, which could guarantee CNES, I think, a sustained light launcher capability with a production line limited to the 3rd stage and the fairing since the two other stages were from the armies. Other opinions were expressed for the opposite choice, no doubt to ensure a greater autonomy from the armies, and to keep the development of liquid propulsion with heavy launchers in mind. The choice of P16 would have led to a small launcher whose longevity would be ensured (which wasn't the case for Diamant B, precisely because the production of the L17 couldn't be sustained)




Gerard CHAUVALLON (Last director of ELDO, First director of Eurocopter)
There also was another reason, that we hadn't mastered yet at the time and which played in favour of the L17, the environment conditions, we thought that the level of vibrations and shocks [of solids] would be much higher compared to liquids.Pierre SOUFFLET (program director of SSBS/MSBS, first director of SEP)In February 1965, CNES (which did not lead the Diamant A program) started an offensive to switch from Liquid to Solid propulsion on Diamant A following the first 3 failures of the Emeraude (L12) stage, despite being supporters of Solid propulsion for ballistic missiles, we (SEREB) convinced the government to keep a liquid S1 on Diamant, mainly for time reasons, since a switch to solid propulsion made a 1965 launch impossible. I remember a great champion of liquid propulsion who didn't belong to CNES, he once told me "Solid propulsion for ballistic missiles are self-evident, but you are well aware that these programs are only possible thanks to the General de Gaulle, once he dies, we won't be doing new ballistic missiles, hence why we should make liquid ballistic vehicles, which will become the basis for orbital launchers)

Michel BIGNIER (Director of CNES in the early 70s, direct of Spacelab and Ariane within ESA in th 70s/80s)
About the rivalry between the CNES and the DMA: DMA was in charge of the development of the first four Diamant A, already in 1964, the General AUBINIERE (first director of CNES) decided that CNES should be in charge of launchers after 1967, once the Diamant A are launched, he reckoned that it was part of his mandate, he founded the Launch Directorate within CNES and gave it to Charles BIGOT (Second director of Arianespace). Between 1965 and 1970, both rivalry and cooperation defined relations between CNES and the DMA, but there never was a break-up. Cooperation continued since Coralie (2nd stage of Europa) was made in DMA facilities.

When Ariane 1 was officialy sanctioned, the ministers decided to make a joint comitee between the DMA and CNES led by both the CNES President and the Government representative to Ordnances. CNES never forgot what launchers owed to the army, without the armies' achievmenets between 1955 and 1970, CNES would certainly never have been able to make ariane.

Roger CHEVALIER
For SEREB and the ministry of Armies, the choice between liquid and solid propulsion was entirely up to budget and time. The choice of liquid propulsion for the first stage of Diamant A, which was the same as the basic methods developped by the armies, was necessary for its availability at the time. SEREB proposed P16 for the same reasons. (modifié)

An interesting information:
According to Louis Morallet (Advisor to Jean Charbonnel, Minister of Industry and Science) Hugues Aircraft tried to get their Hs-333 comsats launched on L3S in early 1973.

Generally the book depicts a launcher directorate CNES which was acutely aware and convinced of L3S and Ariane's competitiveness against the shuttle and launchers in the 80s already by 1973, but says that this enthusiasm was (obviously) not shared by the french government and ELDO/ESA. Nuances a bit the idea that Ariane 1 was purely a launcher for european space sovereignty.

The book has a CNES document dating from September 19 1972


A primary source for the study of a Early-LIIIS derived L30-H6-P0.7 launcher, H6 in this case being 2m diameter within an aeroshell, exists somewhere between the Obelix and the Z-launcher (the later being the same concept but with the finalised Ariane 1)

A page explaining some of the rationale behind LIIIS
early-LIIIS having a 2m diameter H6 was for cost cuting. The paper mentions studies of LIIIS with either a L17 (Amethyste), P16, Coralie or P17 (?) as second stage, before concluding that a L30-L35 is necessary, because other options either need an Aeroshell (L17/P16/P17 are thinner) or are underperforming (Coralie is the same diameter as H6, but too heavy). The studies are in the annex which isn't included.

 

[Michel Van]

On 2 meter diameter H6, either they use tool of Coralie stage or this H6 was consider as Upper stage for Europa rocket
in 1972 the ELDO program was still alive.

 

[TheKutKu]

Another, Front view of Diogene 2's model

 

[TheKutKu]

Some additional context for Diogene, from "Observation de la Terre optique et radar - La France et l'Europe pionnières 1960-2010"; IFHE, 2016

The DMA remains attentive to the specifications of military observation missions. In a note dated March 10, 1965, it is written that it is useless to consider a satellite if the spatial resolution obtained is less than 20 m. On the other hand, with a resolution of 15 m, it is possible to elucidate the objectives and, with 1 or 2 m, the views become of great operational interest. In addition, infrared could provide a useful complement, for example to distinguish an active scene element from a decoy, but its low resolution limits its interest. Two types of mission are possible: short duration (a few days) with capsule or radio transmission of images and long duration (several months to a year or more) with only radio transmission of images

The missions can be mapping (resolution of the order of 10 m), surveillance (resolution of the order of 10 m) or reconnaissance (resolution of the order of 1 m). Two types of shots are envisaged: photographic film or photosensitive layer analyzed point by point (television tube or mechanical device" studied by the Matra company) and recorded on a magnetic tape or electrostatic tape type memory.

The subject of the necessary launch capacity would long occupy the field of investigation of important satellite missions such as reconnaissance or cartography.
DIAMANT-B (five launches between 1970/73), and DIAMANT-BP4 (three launches in 1975) would follow DIAMANT-A but the more powerful projects, led by the LRBA and SEREB, based on available military achievements, were not not developed. The Europa sector of the European intergovernmental organization CECLES/ELDO gave, at the same time, a lot of trouble before failing and it was not intended for military use[The intergovernmental organization CECLES/ELDO cannot statutorily be used for military programs]

In May 1966, the Direction Technique des Engins (DTEn) issued a file on cartographic satellites and associated launchers. The goal is then to have a space system, for the precise location of the objectives at the beginning of 1979, that is to say when the very long-range surface-to-surface missile SSLP will be operational.
The planned launcher, named Diogenes-II, borrows the first two stages P40 and P10 from the SSLP*.
They are topped by an Onyx stage. This launcher cannot be available before 1976, it is proposed to use the Diogenes-I (P16+P10+ Onyx) from the end of 1971. In addition, Diogenes-I would also be used to test the SSLP re-entry bodies.
For the satellite segment described in the file, the planned stages are as follows:
- launch of a technological satellite with DIAMANT in 1970;
- two Diogenes-l launches with technological satellites in 1971-1972;
- launch of two technological satellites in 1973;
- launch of two experimental cartographic satellites with Diogenes-1 in 1974-1975;
- two Diogenes-2 launches with experimental cartographic satellites in 1975-1976;
-launch of four operational cartographic satellites-tionals in 1977-1978.

The cost is estimated at 1620 MF [2023$ 2,640M] including 980 MF for the launchers and 640 MF for the satellites.The VSOP photographic mission project was abandoned in 1967, due to lack of a launcher capable of launching a mass of several hundred kilograms [VSOP was around 500kg, source Espace & Temps 15], without even talking about the withdrawal of the Bimat process by Kodak and many other technological gaps (attitude sensors and inertial actuators) necessary for the precise stabilization of satellites in three-axis mode.
In the same year the Space Technical Service of the Machinery Directorate was dissolved and the DMA would remain on general studies, particularly on the piloting of satellites.

At the beginning of 1968, two new projects were proposed by the DTEn: SATRAPE and SULTAN. SATRAPE is a 400 kg satellite, in two versions, one for optical observation (LRBA) with development of photos on board and radio transmission of a photoelectric scan of the image on film, the other for listening to radars (feasibility study entrusted to Thomson-CSF in 1970).
SULTAN is a 75 kg navigation satellite based on a CNET geostationary telecommunications satellite project. But these projects will have no future.

Subsequently, in the LRBA document “Orbital observation” published in December 1970, the Obelix project is presented. The Obelix launcher has an L-33 first stage with an M-55 Viking engine (50-60 t thrust) initially developed for Europa-III, a P6/Rita-2 second stage and a P1.8 third stage. It can launch a 450 kg observation satellite in sun-synchronous orbit (350 km altitude, inclined at 96°) Concerning the mission, the document describes two possible levels of resolution for observation missions: medium, at 10 or 15 m (400mm focal length), and high, at 2 or at 2 or 3 m (2 m focal length). He reports that a model of automatic photographic film development has been produced, with satisfactory results. For image analysis, test models of flying spot and rotating mirror cathode ray tube flying spot" and rotating mirror systems. For the recoverable capsule, LRBA has drawn up a complete preliminary design. Two tilting procedures were studied on the LRBA flight simulator. The project will remain on the drawing board.

"Model and test device for piloting an observation satellite proposed by the LRBA.
On the left - Mock-up of a satellite platform with a functional chain for attitude control simulation.
On the right - Principle of the air bearing for the simulation of three-axis piloting (at small angles on two axes, without constraint on the 3rd)."

Additional pictures from Aviation magazine in 1971
"This mock-up of the LRBA observation satellite highlights its hexagonal structure, carrying 4 solar pannels; Mariner-style; and the recoverable capsule, here after separation; the second picture shows the prototype of a stabilised structure developed over the last years by the LRBA during this spysat program"

History of the French reconnaissance system

France currently has a vigorous earth observation industry, which captures a large part of the export market for reconnaissance satellites. It has not always been this way: contrary to the USA or t…

satelliteobservation.net

And this link also has two pictures; first is a 350 kg recoverable satellite, second is to be launched on Obelix.



And, slightly before in the book

Since the [Europa] launcher was not an option, the French Defense Ministry was asked by its engineers and industry to propose a satellite launcher more powerful than DIAMANT-B, based on the ballistic "building blocks" of the operational generation that had succeeded the "Pierres précieuses". The DTEn considered this solution, which could have led to a national capacity to launch a 400 kg satellite into polar orbit at an altitude of 600 km. In connection with the possible development of a satellite launcher, the DTEn sought to to define typical missions for military use of the Es- pace that such a launch vehicle could fulfill.

Engineer (Armement) Jean Henri Lacaze (Ariane 1 Industrial Architecture director, Hermes Technical Director) , who worked alongside Engineer General (Armement) Antonin Collet-Billon, DTEn director from 1974 to 1983, gives us a summary of his experience of military space development initiatives.

I was an engineer at DTEn from April 1966 to the end of 1969. 1969. The DTEn, depressed at the failure of its attempt to take over DIAMANT-B's direction , refocused on military on military satellites and their launches.
To this end, as with the DIAMANT-A, whose development cost had been extraordinarily low (100MF 1965), SEREB planned to reuse the stages of military missiles rather than EBBs (Pierre Precieuses). SEREB therefore derived from military stages a launcher project [first unimaginatively called HyperDIAMANT [...] then Turquoise to take its place in the Pierres Précieuses family. This launcher could have put a 400 kg satellite into polar orbit at 600 km, and 70 kg into geosynchronous orbit (440 kg and 80 kg respectively for the improved version. [...] Among the mission projects was SATellite de Renseignements Pour Aider la Penétration (SATRAPE) , a theme directly linked to the effectiveness of the deterrent force.
... To support our suggestions for military launchers, I was invited by Antonin Collet-Billon to present ideas for the military use of Space. and designed the SATRAPE-SULTAN duo. SATRAPE is a 400 kg satellite in highly inclined orbits at an altitude of 500 km, in two versions, one for optical observation, with on-board photo development and radio transmission of a scan of the image, and another for Radar Intelligence The optical optical version was based on an LRBA study.

The Satellite Unique Léger de Transmissions et d'Aide à la Navigation (SULTAN) was based on a CNET project for a geostationary telecommunications satellite (CNET subsequently preferred a much more powerful, and therefore heavier, satellite). satellite). Global surface navigation was based on two-satellite distance measurement satellites, and thus different from today's GPS system. The satellite was estimated to weigh 75 kg, 100 times less than today's largest geostationary satellites, but 50% larger than Intelsat I. [...]
These concepts were presented internally in January 1968, then in March to the Delegate for Armaments, and finally and finally to the General Staff, did not elicit any reaction [...].

"The launcher project based on the panoply of operational ballistic stages was not pursued. It seems it seems that every "military satellite launcher" project was always "rejected", financial considerations aside, because a potential failure could seriously threaten the credibility of the Nuclear detterence"

That's the gist of it, there's probably more to write about it, but this project didn't go very far, contrary to the SAMRO military observation satellite of the late 70s and early 80s, which was a much more serious program concurrent to the development of SPOT, a thread would probably be necessary for it.

*An aside about SSLP (Sol-Sol Longue Portée)...
In the early-mid 1960s, France was developping a nuclear triad (Mirage IV, SLBM, IRBM) that was, largely aimed toward european russia and within NATO, by the middle of the decade, there even was a certain skepticism in the armed forces for the enhancement of deterrence forces (the long decision time for the Pluton SRBM being an example of it); in 1966, The withdrawal from NATO's integrated command and the simultaneous chinese cultural revolution and Thermonuclear tests made it clear that France couldn't rest on its laurels and needed to continuously upgrade its Force de Frappe to target not just European russia, but also countries further away, these took form with General Ailleret's "Tout Azimut" deterrance doctrine.
In this particular case this spurred a rather short but intense development program of a French silo launched ICBM program called SSLP a program that would also be quickly forgotten (information about it are rather scarce... I'd like to know a good book on it)


The missile's requirement was to drop a 1 Megaton bomb at a target 8,000 to 12,000 km away; the Missile itself was Tri-stage made of a 2.5m diameter P-40; a P-16 (shared with S2/S3 IRBM) and a P-6 RITA 2 (shared with M2/M20 SLBM and S2 IRBM); total mass was quoted as 77 tons and a targeted CEP of 500m; service would begin in 1979 or 1980, with full operation in 1985.
Rivista aeronautica - Volume 47, Issues 9-1

World-wide space activities : national programs other than the United States and Soviet Union, international participation in the U.S. post-Apollo program, international cooperation in space science, applications and exploration, organization, and identification of major policy issues : report 1977



Brassey's Naval Annual Volume 80 1969

Forces aériennes stratégiques
histoire des deux premières composantes de la dissuasion nucléaire française; Serge Gadal

Flight International Volume 93

By 1968 already, it became clear that France couldn't afford this ICBM...
(Une politique de défense pour la France; François Valentin)
There's this direct link between the SSLP and Diogene II through the P40, although unlike what one of the source above speculates, Régent/Orion's P30 and the SSLP/Diogene P40 were likely not the same diameter.

And finally, an interesting picture of a "prototype two meter loading on a 40 tons-load truck in the early 60s" from Felix Torres "La Maitrise du feu", could it be linked to either the P30 or P40? hard to get an accurate diameter from this picture

 

[Archibald]

@TheKutKu I want to marry you LMAO. A goldmine for my TL. Need to digest all this ASAP. Awesome.

 

[Archibald]

What was the Onyx stage ? LH2 ?

 

[Archibald]

Ailleret wasn't a nobody. He was one of the four visionary strategists of post-WWII France: with Poirier, Beaufre, and Gallois. Four remarquable minds. I'm not surprised he pushed for a French ICBM.

Ailleret was killed in March 1968 when his military DC-6 transport slammed into a mountain in Réunion Island ( only a couple of miles from my stepfather home place, btw).

 

[Deleted member 4286]

Ailleret wasn't a nobody. He was one of the four visionary strategists of post-WWII France: with Poirier, Beaufre, and Gallois. Four remarquable minds. I'm not surprised he pushed for a French ICBM.

Ailleret was killed in March 1968 when his military DC-6 transport slammed into a mountain in Réunion Island ( only a couple of miles from my stepfather home place, btw).

Fom le Monde 1969

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Deleted member 4286]

You can also find precisions on what was foreseen on the French plans for the deterrent forces in the 70s by the President de Gaulle (in 67; 50 long range rockets SSLP and 7 to 8 SSBN) and Pompidou (1974; no SSLP, 5 to 6 SSBN and increase force of tactical nuclear short and medium range rockets).
To find that precisions look the database PERSEE (in French sadly) the article (Georges-Henri SOUTOU, 15 pages) : " La menace stratégique sur la France à l'ère nucléaire: les instructions personnelles et secrètes de 1967 et 1974".

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Archibald]

The 30 glorieuses economic boom were coming to an end. And limits to the military budget were being felt.

 

[TheKutKu]

What was the Onyx stage ? LH2 ?

Yes, look at the last page, Onyx is H3.5

View attachment 718853

Thanks for this article
"45 tons of Powder" So the P45 (seen last page, same date too. October 1968) was also linked to the SSLP, and probably of similar diameter as the P40. Wonder how far along their development went by the time of cancellation.


Nord already had development direction of large solid propulsive stages, so an expected choice
"Monde of 10 october '68"

NORD-AVIATION DÉVELOPPE UN GROS PROPULSEUR

Le Monde.fr - 1er site d’information sur l’actualité. Retrouvez ici une archive du 10 octobre 1968 sur le sujet NORD-AVIATION DÉVELOPPE UN GROS PROPULSEUR

www.lemonde.fr

I wonder if anyone has access to the mentioned article?

SSLP would have entered operation from 1980 to 1985, with a single 1MT warhead, and ? no decoy? Meanwhile M 4 was ready in 1987 with MIRVed (6x150kt) warheads and half the range, but as SLBM, not sure SSLP would have been worth it.

The 30 glorieuses economic boom were coming to an end. And limits to the military budget were being felt.

INSEE and Guisnel, Tertrais, "Le President et la bombe", peak Force de frappe funding was 1967 at 1.2% of GDP; that's 31% of military budget (INSEE data) or 6.15% of State Budget; at the time, that was almost half of the French state's total Social Spending (13%.. much lower than today). A lot of money, It'd be divided by 3 by the 80s (~0.4%)

 

[Deleted member 4286]

Yes, look at the last page, Onyx is H3.5


Thanks for this article
"45 tons of Powder" So the P45 (seen last page, same date too. October 1968) was also linked to the SSLP, and probably of similar diameter as the P40. Wonder how far along their development went by the time of cancellation.


Nord already had development direction of large solid propulsive stages, so an expected choice
"Monde of 10 october '68"

NORD-AVIATION DÉVELOPPE UN GROS PROPULSEUR

Le Monde.fr - 1er site d’information sur l’actualité. Retrouvez ici une archive du 10 octobre 1968 sur le sujet NORD-AVIATION DÉVELOPPE UN GROS PROPULSEUR

www.lemonde.fr

I wonder if anyone has access to the mentioned article?

SSLP would have entered operation from 1980 to 1985, with a single 1MT warhead, and ? no decoy? Meanwhile M 4 was ready in 1987 with MIRVed (6x150kt) warheads and half the range, but as SLBM, not sure SSLP would have been worth it.



INSEE and Guisnel, Tertrais, "Le President et la bombe", peak Force de frappe funding was 1967 at 1.2% of GDP; that's 31% of military budget (INSEE data) or 6.15% of State Budget; at the time, that was almost half of the French state's total Social Spending (13%.. much lower than today). A lot of money, It'd be divided by 3 by the 80s (~0.4%)

 

[Deleted member 4286]

View attachment 718854

The previous article about SSLP in 1968

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Deleted member 4286]

 

[Deleted member 4286]

About the French ballistic missiles 1955-1995 you can also find a very interesting document (Was it mentioned before here or in any other thread?); 300 pages in French.
look for "eurosae.com" on the net.

 

[Deleted member 4286]

https://www.eurosae.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Les_missiles_balistiques.pdf