Franco-British nuclear program

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 30

Not directly related to this was Blue Water. According to Wood in Project Cancelled it was cancelled in 1962 at a cost of £32 million because Thornycroft wanted to spend the money saved on TSR.2. Except that according to Gunston in The Illustrated Encyclopaedia of Rockets & Missiles (P. 31) the project was killed by the existence of the American Sergeant which did the same job in a system that weighing three times as much and costing five times as much.

The reference is on Page 151 of Project Cancelled.

Wood wrote that Thornycroft cancelled Blue Water in August 1962. He wrote that £20 million had been spent on the project and that the estimated £50 million that was saved was put into TSR.2 and Polaris.

However, he also wrote in Appendix 5 on Page 251 that the £32.1 million was spent on the weapon and that tallies with the information in the Flight Archive.

Also I find Gunston's statement that Seargeant cost five times more than Blue Water hard to believe. Five times the £50 million that was expected to be saved by cancelling Blue Water is £250 million which at the current exchange rate was $600 million an amount that would make a noticeable dent in the Balance of Payments.

Furthermore, we can't assume that it would have been in service on time or at the estimated cost. On the other hand if what Gunston wrote was true it would still be no more expensive than buying Sergeant and save a lot of Dollars even if the actual cost was five times the estimate.

Part of Post 5 in which @Archibald was replying to Post 4 by @zen

Close, but no cigar: eau bleue (can't be worse than Pluton)

The possibilities are endless - https://www.alternatehistory.com/wiki/doku.php?id=timelines:the_selene_project

So you think that the French would be prepared to buy Blue Water instead of Pluton? Would be a joint project with the British or would they buy British built systems?

Perhaps it's nickname in British and French service would have been Beau Geste because he stole the Blue Water.

I'd read that 120 Pluton systems were originally planned (e.g. on Page 21 of Gunston) before it was cut in stages to 36 and 30 although several times this number of missiles was produced to provide reloads. I had thought that the reduction was on cost grounds either because cost overruns on the system itself or to pay for cost overruns on MSBS and SSBS.

I deuce from your statement that the number of Plutons produced was only 25% of the number planned because it was merde if you'll pardon my French.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The POD can be either 1946 or 1957 - both moments when the USA blocked GB access to their nuclear tech.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US–UK_Mutual_Defence_Agreement So July 3, 1958: GB, go screw yourself, the H-bomb and everything else is ours, not yours.

OTL Had Great Britain not played very smart with their 1957 H-bomb testings, bluffing included, the Americans may not have changed their attitude. And considering how hard afterwards did France tried to steal US nuclear secrets through the British (and they did tried every single trick they could think off - but the 1958 agreement had planned every single contingency in truly brutally efficient US fashion) I bet you that, indeed, France and Great Britain would end in (nuclear) bed.

Right from the very moment the US would told the UK, 1958 "hell no, we don't go, McMahon 1946 agreement is stronger than ever, go f***k yourself with your pathetic H-bombs bluff.

Between May 1958 (when De Gaulle returned) and 1964 (October 1, 1964: the day the first Mirage IVA squadron stood alert in my future birth town of Mont de Marsan) France was painfully aware how hard and expensive would the Force de Frappe be. Whatever trick that could cut into the bill or accelerate the schedule, was worth trying. And so they tried truly everything to snatch US-UK little nuclear secrets, all the way from re-entry vehicles to Blue Streak via ELDO (the temptation was veeeeery strong to return Europa to its IRBM status for Force de Frappe !) H-bombs, and countless other stuff.
De Gaulle famously bargained EEC entry against UK nuclear stuff, to poor MacMillan utter dismay. That poor MacMillan truly ended between a rock (JFK and his NATO MLF) and De Gaulle (we will allow you British into the EEC... against some atomic secrets).

Everybody knows MacMillan went to Nassau in December 1962 to meet JFK - but only days before he met De Gaulle at Rambouillet castle near Paris. By the end of the month he was a bit baffled, to say the least - although he had salvaged Polaris for GB without NATO nor dual keys, and that was paramount.

The Americans made the same offer to De Gaulle, same month - but he was so enraged he told them to go to hell, and same for MacMillan dream of EEC membership.

Force de Frappe with Blue Streak, now that would have been something. Even if, TBH, Blue Streak LOX made it obsolete as a very unresponsive IRBM: took 15 minute to refill the damn thing.

Also Europa as a two-stage FOBS: get ride of that pesky and unworkable German Astris stage 3; tweak the French Coralie stage 2 as an orbital nuclear weapon carrier. Launch the thing from Hammaguir, Woomera or Kourou.

For what it's worth I think 1957 is the most likely of the two options because it's in the aftermath of the Suez War.

My interpretation of it is that it taught the French in general and De Gaulle in particular that the Americans would only support France when it suited them so that France had to make itself as independent as possible with as much freedom of action as possible. Hence the development of an independent SNF, leaving NATO in 1966, maximising French influence in the would be EU and developing as much military equipment as possible "in house".

My interpretation is that the British in general and MacMillan also learned that Americans would only support the UK when it suited them but decided that instead of being as independent as possible they should do the opposite and co-operate with the Americans as much as possible so that the "tail would wag the dog". E.g. assigning the British SNF to NATO allowed the British to have some say over where the Americans aimed their nuclear weapons.

So the British have to come to the conclusion that the "Special Relationship" means doing exactly what the USA tells the UK to do and they'd be better off trying to develop an "Entente Cordiale Marque Deux" with the French. This was partly because they thought it would be a partnership of equals. By population ratio between the USA and UK is currently about 5:1 while the French and British populations are about equal. However, a certain retired general with a big nose might have other ideas.

It's also when the French start spending serious sums of money on their own SNF which means that the UK can save serious sums of money by sharing R&D costs with the French.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 11 which was how @Archibald thought how it could happen.

Closer co-operation with the French isn't going to stop the TSR.2, HS.681 and P.1154 happening.

Although the money that I'm hoping will be saved by more collaborative projects with the French and not cancelling Beau Geste will be enough to save TSR.2 from cancellation.

Derek Wood's Scenario 1957 included Dassault and Fairey developing a joint aircraft from the FD.2 and Mirage III which would replace the Hunter in the RAF in 1962. I think they might be able to do better than that and have it built instead of the Hunter FGA.9 and FR.10. The agreement would include who exports the aircraft to who with the UK getting the Commonwealth, the Middle East (less Israel) and Latin America, while France gets Europe and the Rest of the World.

With the exception of Concorde one thing you didn't mention in the post was civil aviation. I think the British should turn the BAC.111, Big Trident and VC.10 into Proto-Airbus projects by making them joint projects with France and possibly West Germany to share the production costs and ensure bigger launch orders because the French and German Governments would make their state airlines buy them. Although the British aerospace industry would be building a percentage of each aircraft instead of all of one this would be offset increased sales.

Do you think the AA would have bought VC.10s fitted as tankers instead of the KC-135Fs? If they had it would have been easier to replace losses because the production line might have been open past 1970 and they could have done what the RAF did and buy "low mileage" aircraft from the second-hand market and convert them to tankers.

I don't see the RAF being forced to buy the Atlantic instead of the Nimrod. They'll want a LRMP aircraft developed from the Big Trident. On the other hand it might be possible to make the Big Trident based LRMP aircraft a joint project with the French and Germans especially if being based on an airliner which I expect to be "selling like hot cakes" significantly reduces the cost of the airframe and engines. It will give the Orion a run for its money on the export market. The equivalent of the Atlantic 2 developed by the French to replace the Atlantic 1 might be in service sooner and be built in larger numbers.

If closer co-operation with the British does save money by reducing the R&D cost of the French SNF what do they spend it on? E.g. does the MN get more SSNs? E.g. make the Agosta class nuclear powered. Is more of Plan Bleu completed? In 1980 it was announced that two nuclear powered attack carriers would be built to replace Clemenceau and Foch but in the end only one was built. Could France have afforded to build PAN.2?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 31

I wonder if anyone has done any analysis on the R&D money spent on HTP motors, ramjets and other rockets?

For what they're worth my notes on Blue Steel Mk 1 from Wynn's RAF Strategic Deterrent Forces are that.

• In October 1958 the costs were £35 million for the R&D and £150,000 per missile excluding the warhead.
• In October 1960 the costs were £60 million for the R&D and £250,000 per missile excluding the warhead.
• On 17.05.61 the cots were £60 million R&D and £21 million for production and that £44 million of the total cost of £81 million had been spent or committed.

Costs were based on 48 Unit Equipment missiles (6 squadrons worth), 5 backing rounds and 4 proof rounds for a total of 57 missiles plus 16 training rounds. £21 million divided by 57 missiles equals £368 per missile if the £21 million doesn't include the cost of the warheads. However, if you divide the £21 million by 83 by including the training rounds the unit cost is £287,000.

However, in the end 5 squadrons were equipped with the missile instead of 6.

Rawlings (Page 195) says that delays and cost escalations led to the order being cut from 75 to 57 which would have been enough for 64 Unit Equipment missiles (8 squadrons worth) 7 backing rounds and 4 proof rounds. I'm guessing that 21 training rounds were planned at first.

Edit 21.06.22

This is the table from the earlier posts that only includes the costs of rockets and missiles, rocket motors, Avros 720 & 730 and the Saunders Roe aircraft.



My observations:

• £143.1 million was spent on Blue Streak, Blue Water and Skybolt.
• £12.3 million was spent on the Saro Princess and P.177.
• £8.5 million was spent on rocket motors including:
  • £5.75 million on the Spectre that powered the SR.53 & P.177
  • £0.65 million on the Screamer that powered the Avro 720.
• £3.05 million was spent on the Avro 720 and 730.

 

[Archibald]

Pluton missile... it was France own atempt at an Honest John replacement (we had these, like Germany and countless NATO members). It was to be France Pershing 1 or Blue Water, same era.
It was the Armée de Terre entry into the (tactical) nuclear business, just like the AN-52 for the Armée de l'Air on Jaguars and Mirage IIIE.
And it wasn't particularly bright nor sophisticated.
Yet it must have been good since it stuck in service until the end of Cold War.
They used an AMX-30 chassis for mobility (as if AMX-30 wasn't the smallest of the early generation Cold War tanks and had room to spare !) , but the whole system was a bit slow and cumbersome, it was also very short ranged (120 km) which caused all kind of hassles with our new German friends after De Gaulle and Adenauer buried the hatchet in the early 1960's (after three wars and countless million of death in a bit less than a century, 1870 was no world war yet still a bloodbath).
It was nearly replaced by Hades (charming names !) in the 1980's but Hades ended the exact same way as Peacekeeper: good, expensive, in limited service, then canned with the Peace dividends in the late 1990's.
Hades had enough range to jump above West Germany and nuke the avancing Soviets in East Germany... and then West Germany complained France would nuke their "brothers". So both Pluton and Hades were controversial in that regard.

"Entente Cordiale Marque Deux"

Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, mon cher. (nouvelle here in the sense of: renewed, or "round 2 - deuxième round !")

On the tactical nuke front it went this way
- Armée de l'Air: AN-52 free fall nuke, derived from the Mirage IVA strategic AN-11 / 21 /22 series. Clung to Jaguars and Mirage IIIE. They both tested it at Moruroa in the early 1970's
- Armée de Terre: Pluton missile on AMX-30 chassis
- Marine Nationale / Aéronavale: Super Etendards got AN-52s too, later ASMP.
The MN did it "on the cheap" as SLBM & boomers cost them an arm, a leg, and even a testicle.

Missile Pluton — Wikipédia

fr-m-wikipedia-org.translate.goog

Seems the Armée de Terre got screwed over range, as Jaguars and Mirage IIIE could carry AN-52s much farther.

For what it's worth I think 1957 is the most likely of the two options because it's in the aftermath of the Suez War.

The 4th Republic was agonizing and the British would have to discuss with a new government every six months. I kid you not: 1946-1958, 12 years, 25 governments.
Plus it would be like discussing with Jean Dujardin OSS117 "Who ? man, it's René Coty ! A visionary and a great stateman. He will make history."

A comic book by the talented Boucq has just been published. The plot marrates one of the many military coups related to the Algerian war in 1958 - and how De Gaulle used the french politicians and generals absolute stupidity to sweep the 4th Republic and size power in a (eeeeerhm) mostly legal way, from President René Coty and PM Pierre Pflimlin. It is a rather hilarious reading, if not completely apalling. Shame it won't be translated in english.

https://livre.fnac.com/a15762717/Nicolas-Juncker-Un-General-des-generaux

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 45

Pluton missile... it was France own attempt at an Honest John replacement (we had these, like Germany and countless NATO members). It was to be France Pershing 1 or Blue Water, same era.

The chapter about TSR.2 in Project Cancelled includes some illustrations of the aircraft with a Blue Water under each wing. Do you think Mirage IV could have been modified to carry it? I think some of the surviving aircraft were modified to carry the ASMP in the 1980s so there is a precedent for this.

I was also going to suggest that each of the 36 Mirage IVs in nine squadrons of 4 aircraft formed 1964-66 would carry a Blue Steel so that there was more chance of the weapon reaching the target. However, Mirage IV probably wasn't big enough to carry it and even if it was the French wouldn't want it because of its safety issues and because it would soon be obsolete.

Another Part of Post 45

"Entente Cordiale Marque Deux"

Nouvelle Entente Cordiale, mon cher. (nouvelle here in the sense of: renewed, or "round 2 - deuxième round !")

It was originally Entente Cordiale Deux i.e. Entente Cordiale Two as in the title of a film. Then I thought of Entente Cordiale Part Two which came out as Entente Cordiale, Deuxième Partie which was too cumbersome and toyed with Deuxième Entente Cordiale i.e. Second Entente Cordiale.

I settled on Entente Cordiale Marque Deux which was Google Translate's version of Entente Cordiale Mark Two because it was the closest to 1950s British English and I have that sort of sense of humour. The equivalent in modern British English would have been Entente Cordiale 2.0.

You should know the drill by now...

For what it's worth I think 1957 is the most likely of the two options because it's in the aftermath of the Suez War.

The 4th Republic was agonizing and the British would have to discuss with a new government every six months. I kid you not: 1946-1958, 12 years, 25 governments.

So you had adopted the Italian Model! And I don't mean Monica Bellucci! Although you did adopt Yves Montand.

I also thought the British Government wouldn't be interested in 1945 because they were trying to do everything themselves in spite of the economic situation. Which by-and-large the did until around 1960 when the R&D and production costs started to become prohibitive. Also it didn't help that defence spending fell from about 10% of GNP in the middle 1950s to about 7% by the middle 1960s as a result of the 1954 and 1957 Defence Reviews.

Result: less money to spend on equipment that had become more expensive to develop and produce.​

As I understand it the French Economy was in an even worse state than ours between 1945 and 1955 (it was only with hindsight that people realised if was the first third of Les Trente Glorieuses) so the French Government probably didn't have the the money to spend on a collaborative nuclear weapons programme with the British. Plus as you've already pointed out a lot of the money that the French were spending went on fighting the wars in Vietnam and Algeria.

Finally my understanding is that France didn't begin its nuclear weapons programme until 1958. (Please correct me if I'm wrong.) So there's no scope for an Anglo-French nuclear weapons programme until then.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Ignoring the sovereignty and independent deterrent concerns (Bevin: we want a bloody Tricolour on it!"), one technical problem might be the lack of access to US miniaturisation technology. That means physically bigger physics packages and larger bombs and re-entry vehicles. On the flip side, the UK had some interesting work on re-entry penaids and signature reduction that might improve French missile warheads in this regard.

I underlined that sentence because not for the first time I confused Ernest Bevin with Aneurin Bevan the man who said "Naked into the conference chamber" (which is often misquoted (including by me) as "Naked into the debating chamber") which he said at the 1957 Labour Party Conference.

Which appeals to my that sort of sense of humour because a few years later French women began to go topless on the beach.

 

[Archibald]

Blue Steel wouldn't fit in the belly recess. Now Blue Water... I'll check uts dimensions against those of ASMP. But kudos, you indeed re-invented Minerve.

 

[zen]

Blue Water used a shape changing nozzle to optimise shape for different thrust and grain of rocket fuel.
Tested at 17" diameter and at full 24". Supposedly it worked.

EE's Thunderbird was the original Red Rose that evolved into Blue Water.

Which suggests EE had a reasonable grasp of this.
Which is why they told Sandys to take a hike on MRBM. Despite Government funding the Luton factory and facilities.

And only DH Props came to D.Sandys rescue.
Which is part of why DH went from triumphant winner at the start of the 50's to bit part looser by the 60's.

 

[Hood]

If that's true I couldn't disagree with your statement more. How much of what one learns from a rocket-powered aircraft is transferrable to a small ballistic missile? As far as I know it's only the engine. Except that SR.53 & SR.177 used a DH. Spectre while Black Knight used an AS. Gamma. Different firms producing different engines.

It stands to reason that working on a small ballistic missile from 1951 to 1955 is a better way to learn about ballistic missiles than developing rocket-powered aircraft for 4 years and then starting work on a small ballistic missile. To use a phrase "It's not rocket science!" The irony is 100% intentional. Starting Black Knight 4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the first launch would have been advanced from 1958 to 1954 but it would have helped.

Well Saro gained a lot of insight into supersonic aerodynamics and structures. Don't forget design teams don't just appear in a vacuum, a lot of talent (stress engineers, aerodynamicists, draughtsmen etc.) will have been employed on the back of these contracts.
I need to check my copy of A Vertical Empire but doubtless Saro had another recruitment drive when they went into rockets. They didn't just pick up An Idiots Guide to Rocketry and start doodling, if they had it would have been a flop! Instead they designed some very successful and very cheap rockets - which implies experience rather than luck was at play. Some of it was home grown talent and some of it was hiring the right people at the right time.

Avro started work on the Type 720 in 1951 and it was cancelled in 1955. Work on Blue Steel began 1954-55. It stands to reason that working on a stand-off bomb 1951-54 would have been of more benefit to Blue Steel than the work done on the Avro 720. Starting Blue Steel 3-4 years earlier doesn't automatically mean the weapon would enter service 3-4 years earlier but it would help. On the other hand this was Avro's first missile project and the extra time would have allowed it to do some basic research before starting on the project proper. I also think that Avro and its subcontractors would have been better off not doing the Avro 730 and instead using the resources expended on that project to help to make Blue Steel Mk 1 to work.

OR.1132 for a stand-off missile wasn't issued until September 1954, Group Captain Emile Vielle didn't get his brainwave for an inertial-guidance package for a missile until 1950 and didn't talk the Americans into joint trials until later that year - the trials happened during 1951. At that time the Air Staff wanted a guided bomb, not until early 1954 did an RAE study for an inertial-guided cruise missile convince the Air Staff they needed such a weapon. So starting anything before 1954 seems highly unlikely.

As Chris Gibson outlines in Vulcan's Hammer, Avro's management cocked-up the development of Blue Steel which led to years of delay. Some of it wasn't their fault but they were in uncharted territory in developing missiles. Unlike Saro they couldn't, or weren't able to, adapt quick enough.

The so-called "messing about" with helicopters included the production of a paltry 432 aircraft of the Scout, Skeeter and Wasp families.

My reference to messing about is tongue in cheek, not literal. Saro again brought in its expertise, they were Cierva folks over at Weston-super-Mare and knew what they were doing. Could/should Saro have been left alone to make money out of these products rather than letting Westland gobble up everything rotary? That's a whole new what-if.

I haven't found exact figures for the SRN.5 & 6 family of hovercraft but the number appears to be at least several score. (Does anyone know how many were built?)

14 N5s were built and Bell built 6 more. N6 production can be guaged here: https://web.archive.org/web/20091001220026/http://www.hovercraft-museum.org/craft.html
(my bookshelves cry out for a good book on British hovercraft).

Also I find Gunston's statement that Seargeant cost five times more than Blue Water hard to believe. Five times the £50 million that was expected to be saved by cancelling Blue Water is £250 million which at the current exchange rate was $600 million an amount that would make a noticeable dent in the Balance of Payments.

Furthermore, we can't assume that it would have been in service on time or at the estimated cost. On the other hand if what Gunston wrote was true it would still be no more expensive than buying Sergeant and save a lot of Dollars even if the actual cost was five times the estimate.

Sergeant had the massive advantage of not being a plywood mockup in 1962 - it was already in service and so it was a no-brainer for West Germany to buy it plus they already had nuclear warhead access protocols with the US. Turkey also went in favour of Sergeant for the same reason but never actually got theirs. Without any other export market the idea was dead. And notably the UK didn't buy Sergeant, it waited for the MGM-52 Lance in the 1970s. This coincides with when Pluton became operational so its possible for this AU Britain brought Pluton instead.

Derek Wood's Scenario 1957 included Dassault and Fairey developing a joint aircraft from the FD.2 and Mirage III which would replace the Hunter in the RAF in 1962.

Wood was too naïve concerning Monsieur Dassault's motivations and too distracted by the fact both looked similar (I think he subscribed to the myth that Dassault simply copied the FD.2). The FD.2 was a research aircraft anyway so required total redesign. Did Fairey/RAE know more about deltas than Dassault/ONERA? Probably not.

I think the British should turn the BAC.111, Big Trident and VC.10 into Proto-Airbus projects by making them joint projects with France and possibly West Germany to share the production costs and ensure bigger launch orders because the French and German Governments would make their state airlines buy them.

Well setting up Airbus was a massive political bargaining shop. The French had their own widebody designs, Germany wanted whatever production it could get hold of. It was bad enough having BAC and HSA trying to squabble over whose design should get built without having Dassault, Breguet, Nord, Sud, MBB, VFW-Fokker all shouting to get their own designs heard too.
Too many cooks and not enough broth - Airbus had to happen to achieve critical mass but the small players got steamrollered and France and West Germany weren't in business to build bits of VC.10s or BAC 2-11s any more than they wanted to build bits of Boeing 707s or 747s.
And actually who can blame them - any analyst looking at lacklustre British commercial aircraft sales would conclude they might do better with their own fresh sheet design to lure in the punters.

 

[Archibald]

France didn't begin its nuclear weapons programme until 1958. (Please correct me if I'm wrong.)

TBH, the 4th Republic planted the seeds after the Suez debacle (so December 1956 and the entire year 1957 plus a little bit of 1958) - but with or without De Gaulle they would have reaped nothing past 1958: per lack of stability and a strongman drive, really.
4th Republic instability with nuclear weapon and the horror and morale morass and resources drain of the Algerian war on top of it would be a rather horrible mix.
Could go wrong in many, many ways. Already nearly went wrong for De Gaulle, imagine for the weak 4th Republic. The Algerian war was a civil war ticking bomb.
Note that even with De Gaulle safely at the controls three years later - in 1961 one of the four "Gerboise" early atomic bombs (think it was the third) found itself in Algeria late April 1961 as the "putsch of the generals" was boiling up (or was it the "week of barricades" ? can't remember). The prospect of rebel generals getting their hands on a Gerboise nuke was scary enough even De Gaulle nearly shit his pants. The nuke was heavily escorted, protected and then hastily detonated at 1 kt, one-tenth the planned yield.

 

[Archibald]

Few people remember it, but the Algerian bush war nearly resulted in either a military coup or a civil war for France. Civil war was a much more serious threat TBH, as the Generals luckily enough were a bunch of idiotic morons, no chance for a dictator to get out of the morasse.
But civil war ? the risk was real. Fundamentally, with Algeria "french" since 1830, 130 years was plenty enough for a large percentage of french people to consider the "department" as French as, say, Britanny or Corsica or Creuse. Plus the 2 million (future) pieds noirs colonists there, and their harkis friends.
By 1958 when De Gaulle returned to power Algerian independance was hardly an evidence for anybody in France. Except perhaps for De Gaulle.
Yet in 1959 he dropped that ambiguous sentence to the "pieds noirs" "Je vous ais compris" "I understood you" - yet independance and thus their exile was already a go.
But to the harkis, pieds-noirs, OAS and the French military having lost 25 000 KIA, it was just impossible to admit Algeria would be independant in say, two-three years, 1962. And thus the military putshes and coup went on, and OAS attacks, and riots. And Petit-Clamart.

Yet by 1964 nobody cared anymore about Algeria among France public opinion. It was a thing of the past already.

 

[zen]

How about September 1956....British-French Union.

 

[Hood]

To follow the HTP route, some info from Norman Friedman's British Submarines in the Cold War Era.

In 1945-46 the idea was to use two Walter turbines, a 2,500bhp turbine based on captured examples and a larger 7,500/6,250bhp Type 18X based on the planned larger German turbines that were never built. These would be doubled up to give 15,000shp.

The British captured the two HTP production units at Bad Lauterberg and moved them back to the UK. It was estimated each operational submarine would require 150 tons per patrol, so a flotilla of 10 in wartime making 8 patrols each would use 12,000 tons annually - which was the output of four Bad Lauterberg units. HTP cost £120 per ton so one years fuel for ten submarines would cost £1.4M. Given the lack of alternatives that cost was accepted.

In late 1947 Barrow only had 85 tons, the MoS had promised 300-400 tons! The Walter turbine had not even left Germany at that time and the test works at Barrow hadn't been completed due to a shortage of cement and steel.
By September 1949 the cost was £250 per ton to make plus £100 per ton to store. A submarine would require £625,000 of fuel per year and the production plant would cost £2.5M to build. Special tankers were also needed (only HMS Spalbeck existed then).

When the two 'E's were approved the cost included £2.7M for fuel and storage and £1M for production plant (the two subs were estimated at £1.6M). The fuel need was 4,500 tons per year 1951-53 and 6,000 tons annually thereafter. At that time in the UK there was only 412 tons of storage with 900 tons planned at Portland (though considered unsuitable) and a further two storage sites of 1,000 tons each were wanted.

The high costs were beginning to make the Admirals baulk, they began looking at high-capacity battery subs and even oxygen. But by 1952 production costs had fallen (in fact they thought it might fall to a fifth and actually work out cheaper than high-capacity batteries). Work in 1952 shifted to HTP-fed closed-cycle diesels for economy and greater endurance and Ricardo began trials using a General Motors 1-71, Rolls-Royce then modified an ASR III diesel. They wanted to install it aboard HMS Scotsman for trials but in 1955 the Sea Lords deemed it might interfere with Vickers' work on the nuclear submarine programme and the conversion was cancelled. HTP was out, nuclear was in.

Mountbatten then quickly put it back on the agenda in 1956 married with the Albacore hull (plus on the table was the Strike Submarine - basically a modified Porpoise with Regulus II. Yet the logistics remained troublesome. HTP was £130 per ton (it was thought the Treasury would actually assess that nuclear was cheaper). It was being used in torpedoes and £14M worth was earmarked for FAA aircraft plus the RAF was had their own growing needs. Both the Albacore and Strike Submarine projects were axed in favour of concentrating on the nuclear programme.

Now for the nuclear tale.
The Admiralty Chemical Advisory Panel in 1947 notes the possibility of a nuclear-powered submarine.
By 1950 thoughts turned to a reactor using unenriched uranium with a graphite moderator and gas coolant. This was impractical as the gas circulation and graphite moderator were too weak to withstand combat shocks.
The Atomic Energy Research Establishment had enough spare resources for one project - allocated to the submarine reactor. They had in mind a high-temperature thermal reactor using enriched uranium. The Admiralty agreed and estimated R&D cost for the reactor and heat exchanger was £2M. The fuel would cost £600,000 but would give an endurance of 100 days at 25kts and be recoverable for further use in other parts of the atomic programme. In contrast HTP for 100 days use even at the widely optimistic £100 per ton would cost £12M and oxygen instead of HTP would cost £2M.

In 1950 enriched uranium stocks were forecast to be plentiful, around 1952 everything went into bombs and left the submarines nothing so the programme was halted. In March 1954 the AEA thought they might have some spare for the prototype plant. By then the US had a land prototype running, the UK asked for details but rebuffed. In June 1954 the Naval Section was formed at Harwell. By June 1955 their work allowed plans to start for a 15-20,000shp plant. At this time USS Nautilus was complete.

In February 1956 the Treasury approves the land-based prototype and the submarine. In January 1956 the prototype reactor contract was let. Vickers Nuclear Engineering Co. was formed by Vickers, Foster-Wheeler and Rolls-Royce. Dounreay was selected as the prototype site and it was hoped to be installed in 1958.

Efforts to get access to US naval reactor technology began in mid-1955, with some favourable response even from Eisenhower and in February 1956 Macmillan was told they were happy to amend the US/UK Military Co-operation Agreement to cover naval reactors once the election was over.
The EinC wanted the information but there were doubts how applicable the information would be to the Admiralty project, Friedman takes this as an indication the Harwell design at this stage was liquid metal-cooled. Plus they feared locking the reactors into US/UK secrecy would prevent commercial ship applications (seen as a big money spinner then but another chimera). Then Suez blew up the effort, not until February 1957 was the damage repaired.
By then the Admiralty seemed desperate for information on all reactors including water-cooled which Friedman suggests was a sign that the design was not going well.

In May 1957 Rickover offers a complete reactor or submarine. They were torn between accepting and throwing national effort under the bus or resisting (as they had with Terrier). The prototype submarine was put into the 1957-58 Programme at a cost of £28M, the Treasury baulked but Mountbatten got USS Nautilus to visit the UK and the future was clear once it cleaned up in Exercises 'Strikeback' and 'Rum Tub'. Then a split occurred between the submarine plant and a scaled-down Calder Hall type design for commercial ships, but this was patched up. Britain wanted a firm-to-firm deal with the US, Rickover said "no".

By late January 1958 the US was offering the Westinghouse S3W fitted to the Skate-class but the Admiralty wanted the more powerful S5W being fitted to the Skipjack-class. It was also easier to fit the S5W to Dreadnought. Rickover grudgingly agreed on the condition that further access to other US reactors was blocked. This went into the Anglo-American bilateral agreement of 1958 which also gave the weapons access. Rickover also attempted to impose a condition on officer selection but this was rejected.

Admiral Burke took this template and ran with it - in 1959 the Dutch negotiated a similar reactor deal but wanted a smaller reactor and the S5W proved too expensive, Canada was offered the Skipjack, Italy began their programme which led to the Marconi design, presumably under the same bilateral basis. Friedman says it's unclear whether France was offered a bilateral deal at this time.

Rolls-Royce and Associates was formed to build the powerplant in cooperation with Westinghouse, who built the rear hull section (from British steel) for Dreadnought. The original prototype 15,000shp plant was therefore abandoned.
The succeeding Valiant-class were in effect what Dreadnought would have been apart from having a US reactor (Core A). The planned 20,000shp production plant was to use the Dounreay core based off lessons learnt from Core A. The Admiralty Board approved the project in October 1960 but UKAEA seems to have been unwilling to fund a naval programme and it was hoped Rolls-Royce would dip into its own pockets to help. This became Core B fitted to the Swiftsure-class (this class was too soon to get the PWR2 then under development).

So the details on the 1954-58 Harwell/Admiralty effort are pretty skimpy. It may have begun as a liquid-metal cooled reactor but clearly had run into design issues by 1957 and perhaps had been changed to a PWR at that time. Dreadnought had been approved so its clear the Admiralty felt sure they would have a reactor for it - but they may have been simply reassured enough to suppose a US reactor would be available whatever happened.

If France did receive an offer in 1959 and reject it, that is understandable. Clearly there was two camps in Britain for and against getting a US reactor. They wanted the know-how but the didn't necessarily want to be locked into building a US design and giving up all commercial and industrial opportunities.

 

[zen]

So....In an AH scenario...
The '47 decision in favour of nuclear over HTP is taken and funds now allocated towards that.

This would make opting for US source a more difficult proposition.
'52 delay due to production of fuel bottleneck.
'54 resuscitation. Interim years result in more refinement and testing at component levels and subsystems.

the domestic effort resolves around Pressurised Water Reactor earlier and is in decent progress by 1956-57.

 

[PMN1]

What does focus on solids for missiles and nuclear for submarines do for satellite launch vehicle development in Europe?

 

[Archibald]

Wow. Never realized GB had invested so much into the HTP submarine program. In a sense, and just like today for Australia (eeeeeerhm) it was AIP vs nuclear (Attack vs Barracuda).

France too was offered Skipjacks but in the early 1960's, think 1962. Sketchy details as usual, but the Americans were trying everything to derail De Gaulle FDF effort, including baiting the french with nuclear tech and secrets only to slam the door only months later. TBH, JFK administration was torn apart by the two Deans (Archeson and Rusk, not D. Martin !) and their Europeanist faction. Their motto: if Europe wants nuclear deterrents, it's NATO dual keys Polaris - or nothing.
In that regard, both French and British independant nuclear strike forces were seens as expensive, dubious and even dangerous liabilities. MacMillan accepted a very honorable compromise (British control over Polaris in their own submarines) but De Gaulle staunchly refused both options - the Europeanist or the Nassau one. But it could have happened, had he been less a pighead.

Well had the 4th Republic survived without Algeria triggering a civil war (and that was no insignificant risk) France would probably have gone the way of Italy or Germany, that is - a NATO nuclear force under tight control. By 1957 it was taking that road, and only De Gaulle derailed it.

And now I'll check Blue Water versus ASMP and tell you whether you could have stuck your british missile under a Mirage IVA...

 

[Archibald]

ASMP

Air-sol moyenne portée - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Blue Water

Blue Water (missile) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hmmm, longer and nearly twice as heavy... smells bad, folks.

But wait, then there is... that. http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/tna-avia-65-1834-e45-1-p8-9.jpg

Shazam: 2000 pounds is 910 kg, when ASMP is 840 kg. 80 kg ? nothing a Mirage IVA can't handle.

 

[zen]

As a side issue. If France builds boilers and plant for a new aircraft carrier. RN can opt for it's own Clemenceau or with three shafts get 180,000shp ....enough for a much bigger carrier....

 

[Cjc]

Wow. Never realized GB had invested so much into the HTP submarine program. In a sense, and just like today for Australia (eeeeeerhm) it was AIP vs nuclear (Attack vs Barracuda).

France too was offered Skipjacks but in the early 1960's, think 1962. Sketchy details as usual, but the Americans were trying everything to derail De Gaulle FDF effort, including baiting the french with nuclear tech and secrets only to slam the door only months later. TBH, JFK administration was torn apart by the two Deans (Archeson and Rusk, not D. Martin !) and their Europeanist faction. Their motto: if Europe wants nuclear deterrents, it's NATO dual keys Polaris - or nothing.
In that regard, both French and British independant nuclear strike forces were seens as expensive, dubious and even dangerous liabilities. MacMillan accepted a very honorable compromise (British control over Polaris in their own submarines) but De Gaulle staunchly refused both options - the Europeanist or the Nassau one. But it could have happened, had he been less a pighead.

Well had the 4th Republic survived without Algeria triggering a civil war (and that was no insignificant risk) France would probably have gone the way of Italy or Germany, that is - a NATO nuclear force under tight control. By 1957 it was taking that road, and only De Gaulle derailed it.

And now I'll check Blue Water versus ASMP and tell you whether you could have stuck your british missile under a Mirage IVA...

What if de gaulle is assassinated in 62? Enough time to fix the Algerian situation, but also enough time for Europeanist and generally pro nato Pinay to change things.

 

[zen]

ASMP

Air-sol moyenne portée - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Blue Water

Blue Water (missile) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hmmm, longer and nearly twice as heavy... smells bad, folks.

But wait, then there is... that. http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/tna-avia-65-1834-e45-1-p8-9.jpg

Shazam: 2000 pounds is 910 kg, when ASMP is 840 kg. 80 kg ? nothing a Mirage IVA can't handle.

ASMP is ramjet driven.
Blue Water is variable thrust rocket.

 

[Archibald]

As a side issue. If France builds boilers and plant for a new aircraft carrier. RN can opt for it's own Clemenceau or with three shafts get 180,000shp ....enough for a much bigger carrier....

GO AHEAD

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xy-eMIXT4LM

MAKE MY DAY

 

[Archibald]

ASMP

Air-sol moyenne portée - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Blue Water

Blue Water (missile) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hmmm, longer and nearly twice as heavy... smells bad, folks.

But wait, then there is... that. http://nuclear-weapons.info/images/tna-avia-65-1834-e45-1-p8-9.jpg

Shazam: 2000 pounds is 910 kg, when ASMP is 840 kg. 80 kg ? nothing a Mirage IVA can't handle.

ASMP is ramjet driven.
Blue Water is variable thrust rocket.

Doesn't matter as long as it fits the Mirage IVA "qu'importe le flacon, pourvu qu'on ait l'ivresse" (roughly "what kind of bottle is not important, as long as we get drunk" - such a typical french proverb)

 

[Archibald]

A proverb by the aptly named Alfred de Mousseux... mousseux being a renowned French sparkling wine.

 

[zen]

Another thought...
Masalaca was a sort of French Talos/Bloodhound......

What happens is France either opts for Bloodhound or co-develops NIGS?

Yet more thoughts...

French sources of Uranium....

 

[alertken]

Battlefield Rockets/SRBMs. (Some following is from online History, US Joint Chiefs, Fairchild/Poole,JCOS VI).

BAC(GW) to MoA 16/3/62: export prospects for Blue Water: FRG with UK dual key warhead, or
"even fitting (it) with a French warhead" in R.Moore, Nuc Illusion, Nuc Reality,Palgrave,2010,P.132.

UK had a 1/56 US deal for liquid-fuel Corporal II SRBM (upgraded to Corporal IIb, in BAOR 10/61), then a '58 deal for solid-fuel battlefield rocket M31 Honest John, deployed in BAOR 9/60; France deployed 30 HJ in Baden late-59: all, W-7/W-31 warhead, dual key.

UK had a 23/3/57 US deal for an IRBM, soon defined as Thor. France enquired for a me too: Jupiter was offered 24/9/57, but parked, pending CDG, PM 1/6/58. He found Plans for dual key AW also for F-100D and Nike Hercules SAM in Baden. He funded Force de Frappe, Mirage IVA/ AN.11, but was very happy not to spend on, or divert scarce resources to tactical AW: he accepted dual-key for his Saceur-assigned Forces in Baden: not for AW on French soil, so declined Jupiter. Greece pondered, then rejected the Jupiter dual-key notion; Turkey/Italy accepted.

UK's Mutual Defense Agt. 4/8/58 gave access to US warhead design data; UK already had GW Collaboration Agts, so Aerojet motor and Honeywell INS licences. Now, light warheads, so 1957 Red Rose Feasibility Study became '58 ITP, Blue Water, to replace BAOR HJ and to be deployed out-of-NATO-Area, so one-key, without US Munitions Custodials.

UK 10/60 decided to not to deploy Land AW out-of-NATO Area (Moore/Illusion,P.131). So Blue Water would be solely for BAOR, so a pointless expense, diversion of GW and AW R&D resources...unless exports could help. Hence BAC's 16/3/62 puff. Otiose. FRG had US HJ+howitzers+Nike Hercules; why would it not take Sergeant? But France...ah!

UK PM Macmillan had applied to join the Club of Rome, 10/8/61. He had pondered an AW collaboration, as bride-dowry, but was advised little or less that UK was now building was of UK origin. But US data in Blue Water was...muddied and the Improved Kiloton Weapon Feasibility Study was intended to be pureBrit (ITP 6/62 as family genus WE177). That could be Blue Water warhead, or maybe fission AN.11 could be lightened? So he loudly dissed Sergeant as not a rocket, but a racket of US industry - deferred purchase terms, like washing machines. All nonsense, trying to stroke mon General, who took no interest, so UK chopped Blue Water 10/8/62.

In '63 CDG funded Pluton, deployed '73, operated -'93. He ejected all US AW from French soil and Baden by 30/6/66 (but continued to operate HJ, HE-armed, until Pluton was fully deployed). So..is there a Whiff here: Sergeant was followed by Vought Lance, in BAOR 9/77-6/92.

Whiff: UK/France SRBM initiated mid-62, WE177A as basis for its warhead (it was available as a gravity Bomb/NDB from 1968)?
Nobody else would have paid good money for it (US AW-inter-operation), but it could have led to more GW collaboration. Mac's SST and ELDO lures proved barren, ESRO did not: might an SRBM have advanced MBDA by almost half a century?

 

[Archibald]

As usual, COMAERO is a fantastic resource.

COMAERO - EUROSAE

LE COMITE POUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’AERONAUTIQUE Au cours de la période 1945-1995, l’aéronautique française a vécu une aventure passionnante. Réduite à peu de choses au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale, il lui fallait se reconstruire. C’est ce qu’elle a fait avec brio. Qu’il s’agisse des...

www.eurosae.com

That one has a ton of information related to Pluton. As said above - early development 1963, accelerated by the loss of NATO "Honest Johns" late 1966, IOC: 1974.

http://neweb-eurosae.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/R_Carpentier_Missiles_tactiques.pdf

At the end of the day the Pluton warhead was similar to the Jaguars and Mirage IIIE tactical nuke, itself derived from the Mirage IVA early free fall bombs - the AN- family: AN-11, AN-21, AN-22, AN-51 (Pluton), AN-52.

 

[zen]

Correction required.
Statement of US only AW highly dubious.
Heath requested disentangle US-UK nuclear weapon science for offering French collaboration as entry to EEC.
Scientists report back "not possible to disentangle UK only elements" conclusion can only be it is equally not possible to disentangle US elements.
Manhattan was collaborative effort. Merger of UK and US science and everything both sides had. From Rutherford to Curie to you "name the nuclear scientist".

Access post '58 was mutual revelation. Not one way.

 

[Archibald]

MacMillan situation in 1961-63 was quite cruel, really. Being stuck between JFK and De Gaulle - between MLF and FDF - was like seating on a bayonet.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I think the British should turn the BAC.111, Big Trident and VC.10 into Proto-Airbus projects by making them joint projects with France and possibly West Germany to share the production costs and ensure bigger launch orders because the French and German Governments would make their state airlines buy them. Although the British aerospace industry would be building a percentage of each aircraft instead of all of one this would be offset increased sales.

According to BAC’s George Edwards Bio in the case of the VC10 that came a lot closers to reality than is widely recognised. Indeed the events of one meeting in Paris in about 1960 had a disproportionate impact on what Toulouse is today.

At government level George was encouraged to work with our French friends, so a meeting was arranged between four French companies and himself. Ouest no showed, Dassault made a quick unfriendly speech then left, Nord didn’t say a word and Sud was represented by a lovely, warm, intelligent, friendly gent that welcomed cooperation. George recorded it was an easy decision.

Sud were a bit short of design work so he gave them a contract for the design work of new fuselage barrels required for the Super VC10. This was delivered on time, cost and quality. Although these barrels were built in the U.K. there were proposals for French manufacture.

This liaison was the foundation for the Concorde. As a result the French communicated in English, then discovered they could talk to the Germans, Airbus became possible/was born and Toulouse rose as the aviation capital of Europe.

 

[Hood]

By 1966 Hawker Siddeley, Nord and Breguet were cooperating on the HBN100 but notably it was Sud who became French lead on A300 with Hawker Siddeley as UK lead and putting up a lot of its own money to secure the wing work and the two of them coming up with the smaller 250-seat A300B (later B1).
So in the long run Sir Arnold Alexander Hall outdid George Edwards efforts towards an Airbus and it shows I think how everyone was flexible to some degree to the opportunities on offer.

 

[zen]

Would be interesting to see such a Euro-VC10 effort and it's successors.

 

[Archibald]

Would be interesting to see such a Euro-VC10 effort and it's successors.

Yep, could be a logical high-end to the Caravelle. Although the VC-7 would have had better chances at least from the point of view of time.
Minor trivia: when designing the Caravelle, the french borrowed the Comet (IV ?) cockpit.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Minor trivia: when designing the Caravelle, the french borrowed the Comet (IV ?) cockpit.

And quite a few other bits, for instance the Main Landing Gear configuration is pretty similar. I was once told a few guys from Hatfield accepted offers to move south to the sunny weather.

 

[Archibald]

It is just like the Clems and Audacious sharing BS-5 catapults. It wasn't official, but it happened.

 

[zen]

So the details on the 1954-58 Harwell/Admiralty effort are pretty skimpy. It may have begun as a liquid-metal cooled reactor but clearly had run into design issues by 1957 and perhaps had been changed to a PWR at that time.

This is intriguing. A liquid metal reactor is possible, but they have their own set of issues.

 

[Archibald]

One thing is sure: Rickover hated the guts of liquid metal reactors from day one, and ensured it would never happen again, ever.
(funnily enough in french A. Rickover sounds like "haricot vert" : green bean. There are countless variants of this joke: Harry Cover, A. Rickover, and on.)

 

[zen]

Considering the only service submarines using liquid metal reactors, were the Soviet Alfa class and no more such reactors built. Suggests they are more trouble than they are worth save for squeezing high performance into a compact hull.

That said as we can see, such was once envisioned for the RN as an alternative to the HTP Walter submarine.

Could we have seen a British Alfa type SSN?

 

[Yellow Palace]

Considering the only service submarines using liquid metal reactors, were the Soviet Alfa class and no more such reactors built. Suggests they are more trouble than they are worth save for squeezing high performance into a compact hull.

That's not quite true: the SEAWOLF (SSN-575) was built with a liquid metal cooled reactor. It was replaced with a PWR in a 1958 to 1960 major refit, and the plant disposed of in deep water after being defuelled. SEAWOLF's reactor accounts for more than one-third of the total radioactive waste disposed of at sea by the United States.

Although, given that Switzerland is well ahead of the US in that dubious league table, I'm not sure how informative that is.

 

[Archibald]

Switzerland ? I smell a stupid autocorrect here...