People have a bad habit of inflating the lethality and danger of missile weapons.
They have even worse habit to dismiss the lethality and danger of missile weapons.
When those missiles were new and the planes were old (Vietnam, 1973), it didn't change much.
The IAF was still doing attack runs the entirety of the Yom Kippur War. SA-6 didn't stop them it just made them slow down a bit.
Yes, because air defense assumed to be the second echelon behind the fighter aircraft, not the sole defense.
That isn't what you're saying, though, unless you mean to append a qualification to your statements I guess. I would say this is obvious, in theory, though reality never really conforms to theories.
But this is rarely how it works out in practice. Air forces usually tend to liquidate one or the other on contact. It's the exception, not the rule, that air forces fight for protracted periods of air parity. Falklands, Iran-Iraq, and the Great Patriotic War are the only places that come to mind where this was truly shown. One of these is because OCA was never done, one is because OCA was generally beyond the capability of either side, and the last one may be because other considerations outstripped OCA. Most other wars involving large usage of aviation since the beginning of WW2 and the rise of strategic bombing tended to be rather one-sided affairs.
In some cases, such as the South African intervention in Angola, air power was neutralized with extremely long range howitzers, although you could argue this is merely another form of airpower's most fundamental aspect, rapid delivery of weapons at extreme ranges with high accuracy, in another guise.
In general I think protracted air duels says more about the state of the two sides in their experience and understanding of the fundamentals. The Soviets never achieved the same level of air supremacy as the Americans and British did, despite fighting the same diminishing enemy, and absolutely had the capacity to engage them.
Whether that's due to some bottleneck on the Soviet side or the Germans having preferentially allocated close air support to their Ostfront troops, is probably up for debate. OTOH the Soviets had a respectable strategic bombing force so it's plausible that a relative inexperience or naivety in air planning may have been the issue. Certainly the Germans would be far more guilty of this than anyone as they might be the first and last air force to think that close air support integration is the raison-d'etre of airplanes.
Supposedly, some big Soviet general of the air forces visited Helsiniki after the war and was astonished to find that it had survived due to blackout, and the bulk of strategic bombing raids simply missed the city, but that may be apocryphal.
Regardless, there hasn't been a case where SAMs have negated airpower to the same extent as airpower has killed itself. Not 1973, not Vietnam, not Falklands, which might be the single top three of surface to air missile wars where the SAMs were decently good at killing stuff on a statistical level.
Anyway yes it's true that air forces have higher primacy than SAMs. But it's equally true that air forces can operate and fully defend themselves without any SAMs or AAA. The inverse cannot be said, which is why I don't think killing planes is something SAMs are meant to do.
An ARM or or flares or chaff. None of which the Argies had, but they are rather useful for evading guided missiles of any stripe.
Most SAM's could discriminate chaff, infrared guidance is usually used only on MANPAD's, and ARM's aren't panacea either.
This is why low altitude missiles like Stinger are probably the most dangerous threats for aviation honestly. No warning. You just see a puff of smoke, and if you don't catch it visually (or you're lucky enough to have a computer MAWS), you might soon be dead without ever realizing it.
The US Air Force in 1991 flew directly over SA-2 sites
Yeah, yeah, over legacy missile systems, not even of the latest models.
Should I remind you how F-117 was downed by S-125 in Serbia?
Yes. At low altitude. From short range. Against a pilot not expecting to be attacked.
The perfect SAM engagement? Possibly. It says everything about SAMs and their lethality to aircraft.
Had the F-117 been equipped with JDAMs and flying at high altitude nothing would have had happened. This was true for the B-2s.
You might be doubling its capability but the performance is still rubbish per missiles fired.
Since the missiles are much cheaper than planes and pilots, the results are still that missile wins.
Missiles have a rate of kill rate of around 0.01-0.03 on the best of days, based on Vietnam experience. So the exchange is either equivalent or weighted slightly in favor of the aircraft most of the time. Sometimes it's weighed slightly in favor of the SAM but this is very rare, and regardless it has never stopped an air attack.
Anti-tank guns have stopped tank attacks, though, so it isn't clear what the purpose of high altitude SAMs really is. They are not some anti-plane defense, clearly, because they have never performed this adequately. All they do is tend to do is make air planners annoyed, take very little effort in avoiding them, and never really manage to stop them. Neither permanently nor temporarily.
There has never been an aircraft equivalent of Kursk where an air force has been so fully destabilized by a mass raid on some protected bastion covered by AAA and SAMs (the aerial equivalent of mines and AT guns, at least that outdated models of aircraft survivability might have you believe), that it simply never recovers, and I'm not sure that it is possible anyway. SAMs seem to be simply too expensive in their economic exchanges to be able to sustain that.
The analogy between SAMs and shore defense batteries is far more apt I think. Much like battleships, planes have won pretty much every time. Maybe the Cenepa War, like Wake Island, is more or less the only time SAMs have kept airplanes away.
The much vaunted 1973 performance was not a particularly rough time for air forces, it merely increased losses somewhat fractionally, I believe the Israeli losses went from something like 1-2 airframes damaged per 100 sorties to closer to 3-4.
Considering that SAM's efficiently precluded Israel planes from doing their job,
They didn't. This is rather well documented.
Israeli pilots were conducting strike sorties literally every day of the war against the Egyptians' frontline forces. The SA-6 didn't stop them. They simply stopped hitting the SA-6s because the tank forces moved so far ahead.
I also should point that if plane run from missile, then it essentially abort its mission, and therefore missile won.
If the fear for the planes would force the enemy to hold its air force on ground, the losses would be zero, and thus theoretically SAM's would have zero efficiency.
That's...not true. SAMs would have infinite efficiency if they could keep planes grounded by merely existing because they would win air supremacy for you without ever doing anything. But they don't.
SAMs are not effective if they never fire. This much is true. SAMs are equally not effective, unless they can inflict substantial enough losses on an air force to cause it to stop attacking. This much is also true. Either they are bad at killing planes, which is literally true, or their job is something besides killing planes.
So far the only thing that stops air forces from attacking is other air forces. What role SAMs play is highly questionable but they seem to be not very good without an air force. Whether the money that goes to SAMs would be better put into more planes is an extremely tendentious argument, but what shape the SAM takes is also highly debatable. It is clear without a functional air force that SAMs are nothing more than a nuisance at best, and the only thing that the USAF feared in the 1960's was the PVO Strany's fleet of interceptors and the high costs of super high altitude bombers like XB-70.
Conversely SR-71, a very similar aircraft to XB-70, was never successfully engaged by SA-5 or SA-2 despite being fired on by both, to the extent that it was ever stopped or had to abort its mission. I think in one instance a plane was damaged by Libyan SAMs, but it still took its pictures AIUI, so it was irrelevant.
S-400 is probably fine for defending single targets, such as airfields or strategic command posts, against particular forms of attack. Ballistic missiles come to mind. SAMs have an extremely good track record of destroying munitions, however brief it has been (both Tor and Iron Dome are notable killers of PGM), after all, which makes sense: bombs and rockets don't move much.
But SAMs are not an immutable shield against air attack. They do not keep planes from operating in their zones of operation. Planes often penetrate and bomb things within the SAM's missile range, attracting their ire to little effect, that can be demonstrated, or they are merely lit up by tracking radars and the SAM operators do not fire.
When they do fire they often miss, due to factors beyond the missile operator or missile designer's control, and generally relating to actions taken by a pilot.
The most effective place to be when firing a surface to air missile is at an airplane that is not expecting to be attacked, at as short a range a possible to minimize potential detection of the launch, and with as little potential warning (do not radiate microwave emitter at 3 AM).
The most important factors for a successful surface-to-air missile shot are warning to the enemy pilot, the potential evasive manvuers an enemy pilot can take (this means if he's flying high enough, he can dodge your missile completely), and being aware of his presence in the first place. To some extent this mirrors the ideal air to air engagement: be aware of your enemy, be able to surprise him, and do so quickly. But SAMs have the struggle bus because the truck that carries them can't fly, so they're often attacking things that are moving at near supersonic speeds and might even be aware of their presence, at least in the classical "bastion" manner.
Future SAMs most important features will be low probability of detection (in all aspects, both during and after missile launch, and during transit of the TEL and radar vehicle), low speed to target, and difficulty in identification of launch sites.
This bodes poorly for the viability of high visibility targets like MIM-104C or S-300P in air combat, against manned aircraft, that maneuver extremely capably in atmosphere.
On the other the future seems quite bright for anti-PGM systems like Tor or Vityaz and PAC-3 and S-400 which can intercept munitions deployed by aircraft. Even if you don't kill the plane, you can stop it from hitting what it's aiming at.
While SAMs are hardly useless, but they don't do what you seem to be saying they do. They do not kill planes. They merely stop things from being bombed. These are two different things. The only thing that kills planes is another plane. Preferably it kills them on the ground. A SAM might cause a plane to abort, it might even kill one plane out of a flight, but they're going to come back tomorrow and do it again.
To put it another way: the attrition rate for SAMs is far too low for it to be an effective plane killer. It does something else. B-52s may have flew low because they were scared of SA-5, or maybe they didn't as they seemed to do well enough against SA-2 in Vietnam over Hanoi, but SA-5 never stopped an SR-71 and it seems about as likely to stop a XB-70 with a bomb load full of SRAMs or some other INS guided high offset weapon. Which is what you initially implied by saying that the USAF's moving from XB-70 high altitude bombers to B-52D low altitude attack was. That's a common, but flawed, historical conception. There's a picture on this very forum showing the engagement times and ranges that a SA-2 would have against a non-maneuvering SR-71 with no ECM.
Surely even if a large engagement window (which does cut both ways, but SAMs rarely have the benefit since they are looking up and planes are looking down) starts with a sedate crew, they would rapidly be awoken by beeps, boops, and whistles meant to catch their attention. Unless they weren't, in which case I suppose it's curtains. Which is why low altitude flight is so dangerous.
This seems to be the real purpose of SAMs: virtual attrition on air planners who need to assume that munitions are not going to arrive on target, either because bombers have aborted due to evading missile launches, or because the munition itself was killed mid-flight, or because the B-52D carrying the atom bomb was slapped out of the sky by a SA-2 was it was lining up the bombsight. That last one statistically would happen but it would hardly be the biggest killer. Swatting planes is just a nice bonus, at the end of the day.
Anyway...
Which is sort of what the Argies were trying to do when they tried to attack Invincible with Exocet and iron bombs, but in a sort of mopey way that has a lot in the way of cajones but not much in brains.
Sea Dart was a rather mediocre SAM against crossing targets trying to penetrate a defense zone, and I think a two-axis attack on Invincible would have succeeded provided the axes were around 60-70 degrees or so and involved 3-4 missiles, and a flight of A-4s for each axis. This would put Invincible and her close escorts in an unenviable position of being abeam one pair of rockets and astern the other. I doubt such a plan would work without divine intervention given the sheer density of warships and rather paltry number of rockets fired (maybe Andromeda or something is hit) but it would be far more sensible and have a greater chance than "basically zero" of hitting Invincible proper.
It would require half again or double the number of aircraft being available though.