Something that I've wondered is if the Army units that were garrisoned the Falklands from April were the same ones that were slated to garrison the islands in the original planning? These same units that were 'poorly trained conscripts' in May could have been well trained and specifically equipped troops 6 month later.
 
Another huge factor will be timing and time.

With the April invasion the British were against the clock to get the war finished by mid-late June, ie the southern winter. This is why everything was so rushed, and the right ships were not deployed etc, I've even recently learned that HMS Exeter didn't have a full Sea Dart magazine when she sailed south.

From my reading, and I won't die in a ditch over it if it's wrong, was that the Argentines wanted to invade in late 1982 early 83 after about a year's planning and preparation. This makes sense, IIUC they would have taken delivery of all of the Super Etendards and Exocets among other things.

However, this gives the British more time to prepare a response before June (winter) 1983. Sure, a naval Task Force will sail in quick time and even likely retake South Georgia. The main invasion force could take more time to gather and prepare; the most appropriate ships could be rotated out of their current assignment, for example all 3 1022 radar equipped Type 42s could be in the CBG as well as all 4 Type 22s. Harrier GR3s could be modified for LGBs and and Shrike ARMs and 2 Sea King AEWs were ready in 11 weeks.

The problem is that 15+ weeks instead of 10 might be long enough to halt the hostilities before the counter-invasion occurs.
 
Something that I've wondered is if the Army units that were garrisoned the Falklands from April were the same ones that were slated to garrison the islands in the original planning? These same units that were 'poorly trained conscripts' in May could have been well trained and specifically equipped troops 6 month later.
It has to be noted that the Junta took the military threat from Chile far more seriously then they ever took the UK. Which helps to explain why the professionals were along the border and why the Argentine reaction verged on panic , when the Brits responded.
They simply refused to believe that the British would do anything asides from rollover.
 
Last edited:
It has to be noted that the Junta took the military threat from Chile far more seriously then they ever took the UK. Which helps to explain why the professionals were along the border and why the Argentine reaction verged on panic , when the Brits responded.
They simply refused to believe that the British would do anything asides from roll overnight .

Even though the Junta believed the British wouldn't retaliate they still planned to garrison the islands and would have identified units. The fact that these were conscripts may not be a big deal depending on the conscription scheme. Australian scheme in the Vietnam era was a 2 year stint that fully integrated the conscripts within the Regular units, so there was no difference between regulars and conscripts.

On other hand there are other schemes that have shorter terms and separate conscripted units. Such units need a focused training program to get them up to a high standard. I wonder if the April invasion cut short a training program that would have created quality garrison units by late 1982.
 
Back
Top Bottom