Iranian F-14A
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Anyone have a 3-view of the T-46 Eaglet that was seleceted to replace the T-37?
JAZZ said:Other NGT submissions (as in 1981) include General Dynamics M-210, Gulf Stream, Rockwell Nova (as already posted). I also include a Fairchild design concept looking like a mini A-10.
Another competition of interest was VTX for a navy trainer to operate from aircraft carriers.
Mole said:Does anyone know of a good source for the story of the trials and tribulations of the NGT program and the ultimate demise of Fairchild Republic?
robunos said:Try 'The Thunder Factory', Joshua Stoff, Arms and Armour, 1990, ISBN 1-85409-040-2.
Mark Nankivil said:There's an excellent article in Wings/Airpower on the T-46 and the demise of Republic. I happen to have that sort of unearthed so will look up the issue and post that info.
Enjoy the Day! Mark
In 1979, the T-37 Tweet primary aircraft trainer had been in the US Air Force inventory for 22 years. Serious operational deficiencies and the looming obsolescence of the T-37 fleet provided the impetus for the Next Generation Trainer (NGT) program. The operational deficiencies were numerous and included: lack of cabin pressurization; lack of fuel efficiency; limited range; limited weather capability; performance limitations in the traffic pattern; outdated instrument displays; excessive engine noise; and a limited ejection capability. Moreover, the aircraft was almost at the end of its life cycle.
NGT and Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) represented an attempt to reduce student pilot attrition by eliminating the questionable students before they wasted valuable resources. After the Department of Defense granted approval for NGT in June of 1979, the Air Force’s Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) solicited proposals from companies to replace the T-37. The procurement plan established a projected buy of approximately 650 aircraft: 483 for Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT), 38 for Undergraduate Navigator Training (UNT), 43 for Accelerated Copilot Enrichment (ACE), and 86 for Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training (ENJJPT). The projected production of 3,557 aviators each month based on an individual aircraft utilization rate of 60 hours of flying dictated the procurement figures. By October 1981, five companies (Cessna, Ensign, Fairchild Republic, Gulfstream American, and Rockwell) had demonstrated interest and the request for proposal (RFP) was released in October 1981. On 2 July 1982, Secretary of the Air Force Verne Orr announced that Fairchild Republic and Garrett Turbine Engine Company would team as contractors. The NGT would be designated the T-46A. Compared to the T-37, the T-46A would have increased performance, improved maintainability, reduced fuel consumption, lower operating costs, and improved capability to operate in adverse weather. If the design for the T-46A as proposed by Fairchild Republic performed as expected, it would have met or exceeded all of the required performance standards set out in the proposal.
In September 1986, Secretary of the Air Force Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr. intimated that the contract for the T-46A should not be renewed and the program should die a slow death. Secretary Aldridge confirmed the need for Congress to not appropriate funds for the contract and then allow the contract officers to negotiate an appropriate settlement with Fairchild Republic and Garrett. This move essentially killed the program. Why did such a promising program get terminated within 4 years of beginning? There were multiple causes for the failure.
During the contract negotiations, the Air Force demanded overlapping both development and production of the aircraft. This was a very aggressive stance for the procurement of both a completely new aircraft and a new engine design. The AF decided to accept 26 aircraft before flight testing was even completed. The Air Force also massaged the production schedule to keep the program within expected funding limits. One trick employed by the Air Force was moving some of the costs of the program (engine testing and simulator development) out from underneath the T-46A “umbrella.” At the beginning of the contract, there was no commercially available engine that could be used for the T-46A. Therefore, the Garrett Turbine Company had to develop an engine within 33 months, a feat that the Garrett people felt they could accomplish. However, Garrett included time for testing after production had already begun. The evidence shows that both Garrett and Fairchild Republic may have used this contract to shore up ailing corporations in a vain attempt to save them both. After contract award in July 1982, many observers suspected that Fairchild-Republic agreed to this aggressive strategy because the company’s A-10 aircraft was nearing the end of production and the Republic SF-340 was also having major production problems.
Republic made a major mistake in early 1985, when the T-46A was unveiled. By all appearances, a beautiful aircraft rolled out on 11
February 1985, but the Air Force staff was “horrified” to discover the aircraft lacked over 1,200 internal components and some skin sections were fabricated out of fiberglass and made to look like finished sheet metal. The discovery of this trickery soured relations between the company and the Air Force. Secretary of Defense Weinberger invoked a rarely used contractor review to ascertain what was wrong at Fairchild Republic.
In 1985, a Contractor Operations Review (COR) team went to the Fairchild Republic plant in Farmingdale, NY to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of Fairchild’s management systems and their ability to meet contractual requirements. The review identified 279 findings in the eight functional areas reviewed. In response to the COR, Fairchild implemented actions to correct the items reported and identified 7 underlying causes:
In spite of the company’s problems, the T-46A aircraft initially met or exceeded expectations, but Fairchild could not meet its contractual obligations. In FY87, Congress did not appropriate funds for the NGT program, and the T-46A program ceased to exist.
- High turnover rate of senior management and organizational changes
- Reduced reinvestment levels in recent years in plant facilities, equipment, and centralized capabilities.
- Deteriorated employee morale and dedication in recent years
- Inadequate emphasis on quality, safety, and schedule in some products and systems
- Failure at most levels in the work force to meet productivity targets.
- Optimism in forecasting, particularly in new program proposals, causing overruns and schedule delays from the onset.
- Failure to follow management development and succession plans.
NGT was saddled with conflicting requirements: side-by-side, pressurized, zero-zero seats, expanded pilot population (which meant a big cockpit and canopy) plus high-bypass engines that wouldn't blow out in a stall and spin (big inlet lips). Hence the tadpole-like, utterly appalling T-46.
Maybe it was just some understandable spite for having lost the competition, but he said the T-46 should have never won and that the decision was political, to save Fairchild. Ironically Fairchild went under anyway, a few years later.
In light of the T-46's problems and eventual cancellation, I'd say this person's assessment was correct. I would also argue that the USAF requirements for NGT probably missed the mark on meeting the real warfighter needs, in light of the way the replacement effort (JPATS) ended up. The eventual Tweet replacement, the T-6 Texan II, is much simpler than the needlessly-complex T-46.
Fairchild is hoping that its FRC 225 Full Spectrum Trainer, shown at Paris in mockup form, has a chance with the RAF. Developed from the US Air Force T-46A, the 225FST "is quite closely compatible with RAF requirements. The twin-engine configuration is a plus mark versus the RAF's single-engine requirement". Fairchild would set up international production for the RAF: "If they have the T-46 or FST, and our Navy has Hawk, then we have a good trade balance and a more common pilot philosophy."
Bazinga said:Really? I have a single seat version pic of that. This FRC-225 def looks like a two seater.
Triton said:The model was manufactured by Toys and Models Corporation and is therefore unofficial.