Don't mess with nuclear Russia, Putin says

[donnage99]

Imagine how anxiety inducing it would be if the US made a habit of telling the world: "Don't interfere with our interests, and stay in line behind us cuz we still got some damn good nukes."

For a period of time in history (cold war, but before the korean war), that was exactly our foreign policy - talk big, talk scary, and talk nukes. Soviet Union called it bluff, which it was. So we switched foreign policy - fighting Soviet by using other countries as battlefield, AKA Vietnam and Korea.

 

[kcran567]

Imagine how anxiety inducing it would be if the US made a habit of telling the world: "Don't interfere with our interests, and stay in line behind us cuz we still got some damn good nukes."

For a period of time in history (cold war, but before the korean war), that was exactly our foreign policy - talk big, talk scary, and talk nukes. Soviet Union called it bluff, which it was. So we switched foreign policy - fighting Soviet by using other countries as battlefield, AKA Vietnam and Korea.

Yes, exactly. Curtis LeMay?

 

[Rickshaw]

"Thank God, I think no one is thinking of unleashing a large-scale conflict with Russia. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers."

...could just be reassuring the ignorant and paranoid who expect anther Great Patriotic War and do not understand Mutually Assured Destruction.

One of the big post-Cold War revelations (to me at least) was just how *little* the Soviet leadership and Soviet strategic planners subscribed
to the US promulgated theory of deterrents and MAD.

All one has to do to win a nuclear war is be willing to take more pain than the other guy. Here's something to think about: who do you think would be willing to accept more pain, Putin, the Chinese government, or your average US politician? I'd wager either of those countries could nuke Hawaii, tell us to sit on our hands or New York gets it and the politicians, after much hand wringing, "nuance", and general cowardice, would do nothing. Maybe somebody would fire off a harsh memo.

You know, they said the same things about Jack Kennedy before the Cuban Missile Crisis. It's amazingly easy to write off politicians who haven't had to make the big decision, before they've made it. I don't doubt some in your government are like that but I also suspect they may well prove you very wrong if the shyte should ever have need to come into contact with the air circulation device.

The uncertainity is expressly designed into the US system. I understand that no US President has ever wargamed his own role in any of the nuclear war scenarios which were undertaken during the Cold War for a reason - they don't want to let slip what their possible decision might prove to be in real life. I do not doubt all US Presidents have thought long and hard on it. I'd hope they had although, the comments by Reagan after his having watched "The Day After" in his diary indicate a rather naive mindset as to what the real likely outcome would be in a nuclear war.

My real fear is the brinkmanship which seems to have become, until Obama, ingrained in US foreign policy decision making. Just as in 1914, there appears to have been a certain degree of rigidity based upon the use of force, rather than the possibility of diplomacy as an alternative and the frequent comments I read here about the present administration's decision making, such as yours indicates that you'd prefer all too often that if people didn't respect your nation, they would have good reason to fear it.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Now, mate this with the fusion reactor, and imagine the possibilities: a mass driver located somewhere in the Rockies so powerful that it can hurl a thousand-ton rock so far into the sky that it takes, say, 12 hours to fall back down. BAM! Someone decides to nuke Hawaii, we don't nuke 'em back. We simply start dropping rock on them and don't stop until the GoPro vids that pop up on YouTube get old and boring.

No need for fusion and flinging very big rocks up into orbit and then down. Just weaponise Quicklaunch (SHARP) and each $500m gun can fire a 500 kg payload into orbit and then down unto whomever five times a day. Say build 100 of these guns and locate them in Lake Michigan (if its America building the guns) and you can drop 250 tonnes of orbital velocity steel (to keep it cheap) per day on anyone in the world.

 

[Orionblamblam]

There are advantages in scale. A Vulcan might be able to put steel downrange as fast as a 16-inch naval gun, but sometimes having the big gun is handy. Putting a number of small rounds on target every day may well have value, but if you are talking about responding to someone having nuked the Holy City of Honolulu, you want a response that is difficult to distinguish from an act of an angry god.

A small gun such as you suggest could trash a city. Centauri-style orbital bombardment could *erase* a city. Even the underground bunkers would be tossed into the stratosphere as a fine dust.

 

[kcran567]

As far as erasing a whole city, how about erasing a whole nation at once with a guided asteroid/ meteor type object.

NASA and ESA have experimented with landing on asteroid size objects. Using laser or thrusters to steer might it be possible to lob giant object at enemy nation thus destroying nation (and possible global effects).


Bonus is there is plausible deniability, "It was an act of God". "Horrible natural disaster of cosmic proportions".


If China or Russia at some point were able to do such a thing in order to end perceived American hegemony.
Or even a well funded terrorist?

 

[Abraham Gubler]

There are advantages in scale. A Vulcan might be able to put steel downrange as fast as a 16-inch naval gun, but sometimes having the big gun is handy. Putting a number of small rounds on target every day may well have value, but if you are talking about responding to someone having nuked the Holy City of Honolulu, you want a response that is difficult to distinguish from an act of an angry god.

A small gun such as you suggest could trash a city. Centauri-style orbital bombardment could *erase* a city. Even the underground bunkers would be tossed into the stratosphere as a fine dust.

Well you can always upsize Quicklaunch. The propellant is just Hydrogen so it’s not a limitation to scale. The biggest constraint is depth, either the depth of the mine needed if underground or the depth of the seabed if water based. My previous post about basing in Lake Michigan was wrong as the 450kg Quicklaunch requires a water depth of 520m to elevate the barrel. 6,000m would be the realistic maximum possible depth for either an underground (deepest mines) or sea based (depth of the abyssal plains) space gun. Which would mean at the 30 degree barrel elevation a maximum barrel length of 12,000m. Which upsizing the Quicklaunch would mean a calibre of 1,650mm and a payload of 4,900 kg. Now 5 tonnes is still not the same league as 1,000 tonnes but it is doable with today’s technology.

Five tonnes (Tall Boy) coming down at Mach 10 and from an array of 100 guns located in the Rocky Mountains (if it was America building them) at a high rate of fire (20 rounds per day with an active barrel cooling system is not impossible) and that is a lot of pain and agony on the other end. 10,000 tonnes of Mach 10 bombs per day or near simultaneous impact of 500 tonnes of Mach 10 bombs anywhere in the world is pretty much an unstoppable conventional force.

 

[sferrin]

Also, speaking of indirect effects, some more recent studies were suggesting that a regional nuclear exchange (i.e. Pakistan vs. India) could lead to several years of global crop failures. Even mild nuclear 'winter' type effects may have serious consequences for civilisations (especially civilisation which has grown soft on a agricultural revolution which has produced such surpluses that we don't feel we have to store food).

Any evidence to support this? For example did we experience these effects when the US and USSR were heavily into atmospheric testing with multimegaton nukes?

 

[Orionblamblam]

Any evidence to support this? For example did we experience these effects when the US and USSR were heavily into atmospheric testing with multimegaton nukes?

While I tend to be dubious of some of the more apocalyptic claims of environmental disastrionfetishism, the fact is that while the US and USSR set off thousands of aboveground nukes, even the Soviets were smart enough to do so in places that wouldn't catch fire. Deserts, tundra and Pacific island don't burn like cities, refineries, forests, Obamacare documentation storage depots, etc.

 

[Avimimus]

Also, speaking of indirect effects, some more recent studies were suggesting that a regional nuclear exchange (i.e. Pakistan vs. India) could lead to several years of global crop failures. Even mild nuclear 'winter' type effects may have serious consequences for civilisations (especially civilisation which has grown soft on a agricultural revolution which has produced such surpluses that we don't feel we have to store food).

Any evidence to support this? For example did we experience these effects when the US and USSR were heavily into atmospheric testing with multimegaton nukes?

It has been a few years since I read in depth on the subject, but here are a couple of papers:

http://www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/6/11745/2006/acpd-6-11745-2006.html

http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/acp-7-2003-2007.html

The fact that India and Pakistan are nearer the equator and have some very dense urban areas is part of the consideration. Time of year also seems to be important.

Note, that we are not necessarily talking about a full scale nuclear winter - something more along the lines of mount Pinatubo's effects amplified several fold - maybe a 20% decrease in global crop outputs over a five year period. Just enough to bring about global famines and disruption of trade.

 

[sferrin]

Any evidence to support this? For example did we experience these effects when the US and USSR were heavily into atmospheric testing with multimegaton nukes?

While I tend to be dubious of some of the more apocalyptic claims of environmental disastrionfetishism, the fact is that while the US and USSR set off thousands of aboveground nukes, even the Soviets were smart enough to do so in places that wouldn't catch fire. Deserts, tundra and Pacific island don't burn like cities, refineries, forests, Obamacare documentation storage depots, etc.

Good point. Was just thinking about all the smoke, dust, etc. from 9/11 and that was just two buildings. On the other hand all the firebombing and 2 nuked cities in WWII didn't seem to do anything of note to the climate.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Was just thinking about all the smoke, dust, etc. from 9/11 and that was just two buildings.

And the effects on the climate due to 9/11 were measurable. Not the smoke from the buildings, but the *lack* of contrails due to the airlines being shut down.

On the other hand all the firebombing and 2 nuked cities in WWII didn't seem to do anything of note to the climate.

As memory serves, there have been studies that have shown links between WWII and climate change. Remember that the preceding decade was a time of the climate going kinda bonkers *without* human intervention of note (well, crappy agricultural practices that turned American topsoil into airborne dust was kind of an issue), so when you are throwing artificial chaos on top of natural chaos the result is... chaos, and kinda hard to figure the one from the other.

Also: a decent sized Asian nuclear war would result in smoke and fire on the scale of WWII... but over the course of an afternoon, not half a dozen years.

 

[bobbymike]

I like AG's idea!!

But as a matter of President Bobbymike's policy;

1) Let about a week pass
2) Announce the results of the GBSD AoA is to build 420 new Peacekeeper II carrying a to be build 2Mt warhead and able to carry 10 warheads
3) Announce we are going to build 12 SSBN(X)'s with 20 to 24 missiles with an advanced Trident E6 SLBM
4) Now we are going to build 200 NGB's all nuclear capable
5) Double funding to our nuke labs
6) Brand new warhead production lines and testing

 

[Abraham Gubler]

I like AG's idea!!

But as a matter of President Bobbymike's policy;

1) Let about a week pass
2) Announce the results of the GBSD AoA is to build 420 new Peacekeeper II carrying a to be build 2Mt warhead and able to carry 10 warheads
3) Announce we are going to build 12 SSBN(X)'s with 20 to 24 missiles with an advanced Trident E6 SLBM
4) Now we are going to build 200 NGB's all nuclear capable
5) Double funding to our nuke labs
6) Brand new warhead production lines and testing

This is perhaps a bit backward looking: MXs, Tridents, etc. What about ‘Rods from God’, ‘Star Wars’, SBIRS Low, etc.

The big problem for Russia trying the nuclear brinkmanship card is the USA has the technological and financial lead on Russia to quite reasonably establish a fail-safe first strike system. Even one using conventional warheads. The only wiggle room Russia has is the USA seeing it as not a serious threat and the appeasing inclination of the current American political leadership. But within the bounds of possibility is an American government launching a rapid, secret(ish) program to field a large scale, stealthy global ISR-strike system backed up by a first rate BMD system. Then America can pull the carpet out from under Russia by calling their bluff and destroying or threatening to destroy their nuclear arsenal and infrastructure.

 

[Grey Havoc]

14:23: Italy's La Repubblica newspaper reports that President Putin told the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, that: "If I want to, I can take Kiev in two weeks". Mr Putin made the remark when Mr Barroso asked him about Russian military incursions in Ukraine, the paper reports

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29010985

 

[Orionblamblam]

"If I want to, I can take Kiev in two weeks".

Many years ago, I used to work at a K-Mart. One day they hired a new guy, fresh from service in the USMC and from Desert Storm. Seemed a little "off." A week or two in, he said, sorta nonchalantly, to myself and another employee that if he wanted to he could wander on down to the sporting goods department, bust into the gun case, load up on rifles and shotguns and go on a shooting spree, killing many and able to hold off the cops for hours. Was this claim true? Maybe. Did it increase our respect for him? Nope. Was he fired by the end of his shift? Oh, yes, with police escort.

Seemed relevant.

 

[marauder2048]

"Thank God, I think no one is thinking of unleashing a large-scale conflict with Russia. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers."

...could just be reassuring the ignorant and paranoid who expect anther Great Patriotic War and do not understand Mutually Assured Destruction.

One of the big post-Cold War revelations (to me at least) was just how *little* the Soviet leadership and Soviet strategic planners subscribed
to the US promulgated theory of deterrents and MAD.

Do you have some references for this? It'd be fascinating to read more about.


I've heard that many Soviet commanders (military, not political) were pretty weary and feared the prospects of conventional warfare after 1945 (whereas, a lot fewer Americans had seen service or the effects of fighting a defensive war).

The late Gen. William Odom's "The Collapse of the Soviet Military" was my earliest introduction to the topic. It's a dense, scholarly work but the opening chapters do a good job of summarizing the competing Western views of Soviet nuclear strategy and then attempts to reconcile them with Soviet archival sources and interviews.

Not only did the Soviet's not buy into deterrents or MAD, they also didn't really subscribe to Western notions of strategic stability or parity.

 

[bobbymike]

"Thank God, I think no one is thinking of unleashing a large-scale conflict with Russia. I want to remind you that Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers."

...could just be reassuring the ignorant and paranoid who expect anther Great Patriotic War and do not understand Mutually Assured Destruction.

One of the big post-Cold War revelations (to me at least) was just how *little* the Soviet leadership and Soviet strategic planners subscribed
to the US promulgated theory of deterrents and MAD.

Do you have some references for this? It'd be fascinating to read more about.


I've heard that many Soviet commanders (military, not political) were pretty weary and feared the prospects of conventional warfare after 1945 (whereas, a lot fewer Americans had seen service or the effects of fighting a defensive war).

The late Gen. William Odom's "The Collapse of the Soviet Military" was my earliest introduction to the topic. It's a dense, scholarly work but the opening chapters do a good job of summarizing the competing Western views of Soviet nuclear strategy and then attempts to reconcile them with Soviet archival sources and interviews.

Not only did the Soviet's not buy into deterrents or MAD, they also didn't really subscribe to Western notions of strategic stability or parity.

I read in the 80's I believe, it might have been Weinberger or someone like Richard Perle, who discussed the Reagan build up but was commenting on how we got behind the Soviets in the numbers and size of nukes. Basically, Brezhnev looked at 'parity' as a gift from the US and was never going to be satisfied with parity. Soviet intent was military superiority especially in strategic forces.

 

[Avimimus]

"If I want to, I can take Kiev in two weeks".

Many years ago, I used to work at a K-Mart. One day they hired a new guy, fresh from service in the USMC and from Desert Storm. Seemed a little "off." A week or two in, he said, sorta nonchalantly, to myself and another employee that if he wanted to he could wander on down to the sporting goods department, bust into the gun case, load up on rifles and shotguns and go on a shooting spree, killing many and able to hold off the cops for hours. Was this claim true? Maybe. Did it increase our respect for him? Nope. Was he fired by the end of his shift? Oh, yes, with police escort.

Seemed relevant.

Your story made me think of an interesting question - namely nuclear proliferation. There was a lobbying effort (including some Washington journalists) to get Ukraine to rebuild its nuclear arsenal in preparation for this conflict (which was anticipated years ago). Would this have been a good idea?





Certainly, Russia would be forced into a somewhat more cautious approach if there were large numbers of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine.


On the other hand, the government in Kiev has difficulty policing, gaining legitimacy in all areas, maintaining control of public facilities, and restraining militias allied to it. So, you have a situation where central control of a nuclear arsenal could easily be lost amid the confusion and violence. The level of (somtimes bizarre) rhetoric on both sides and the fact the militia leaders on both sides of the conflict have bragged about not taking prisoners doesn't had much confidence.


So it is a really interesting test case regarding whether nuclear proliferation is a good idea or not.

 

[Avimimus]

The late Gen. William Odom's "The Collapse of the Soviet Military" was my earliest introduction to the topic. It's a dense, scholarly work but the opening chapters do a good job of summarizing the competing Western views of Soviet nuclear strategy and then attempts to reconcile them with Soviet archival sources and interviews.

Not only did the Soviet's not buy into deterrents or MAD, they also didn't really subscribe to Western notions of strategic stability or parity.

I read in the 80's I believe, it might have been Weinberger or someone like Richard Perle, who discussed the Reagan build up but was commenting on how we got behind the Soviets in the numbers and size of nukes. Basically, Brezhnev looked at 'parity' as a gift from the US and was never going to be satisfied with parity. Soviet intent was military superiority especially in strategic forces.

That is only true if you look at the alarmist picture that developed in the 1980s. Throughout the entire Cold War prior to that the United States had a rather large superiority in strategic nuclear weapons. The Soviets were desperate to cover up this fact as they feared an all out nuclear war would be initiated by the Americans if the U.S. realised the advantage it had. Not having experienced parity makes it hard to endorse parity.

So, I'd be cautious about generalising from a 5 year period of policy to the attitudes or fears experienced by most individuals.

 

[Avimimus]

Combined ICBM, SLBM and Air-dropped strategic warheads by year...

 

[perttime]

"If I want to, I can take Kiev in two weeks".

"Russia" says that the sentence was taken out of context, and they are willing to publish a recording of the phone call.

I'm waiting for it with great interest.

 

[bobbymike]

Combined ICBM, SLBM and Air-dropped strategic warheads by year...

I should have been more specific with the concern with Soviet ICBM's growing numbers and accuracies (USSR surpassed the US in ICBM's in 1968) and the growing first strike threat, because the type of strategic warhead and its basing for warfighting is relevant. How many US air dropped weapons would never leave CONUS, how many SLBM warheads would be destroyed at the dock? There was real concern the SS-18 alone could wipe out most of the ICBM's, B-52's at air bases and SSBN's in port leaving the US with only 'counter value' targets but leaving the Soviet's a mssive force for follow on strikes at US cities.

Would the US go 'counter value' with SLBM's if Russia took out their ICBM's? ICBM's have always been the greatest concern for both sides as, until the D5, they were the only forces capable of a counter force first strike.

 

[F-14D]

All one has to do to win a nuclear war is be willing to take more pain than the other guy. Here's something to think about: who do you think would be willing to accept more pain, Putin, the Chinese government, or your average US politician? I'd wager either of those countries could nuke Hawaii, tell us to sit on our hands or New York gets it and the politicians, after much hand wringing, "nuance", and general cowardice, would do nothing. Maybe somebody would fire off a harsh memo.

Sure, that's the logic that led the Narns to victory at Ragesh III. But we all know what happened after that...

Any US President who allowed such an attack to go un-answered would not be President for long.

Imagine Shadow Battlecrabs with USAF insignia going after whoever nuked Hawaii. Morden for President 2016!

The question is not so much a direct attack on Hawaii, one would hope that any President's response would be more than a statement that the attackers were on the wrong side of history.

The problem facing said President would be somehting like this: "Are you willing to trade Los Angles for Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc" ?

 

[marauder2048]

Combined ICBM, SLBM and Air-dropped strategic warheads by year...

Which conveniently ignores the fungibility/transferability of "warheads" from sub-strategic systems to strategic systems. The very high throw weight of Soviet ICBMs made fractionalization with smaller warheads a very real and very destabilizing possibility.

 

[Avimimus]

I by no means would suggest that high throw weight ICBMs are not troubling, nor would I suggest that the rapid build up of Soviet ICBM forces in the 1970s was not something to fear.

Anyway, here is some more detail... which should help put the missile gap into perspective (especially when you realise how threatening SLBMs are).


According to this data it would appear that the U.S. had more strategic warheads to throw at Russia except for a small period at the end of the Cold War (1989-1993), with the Soviet superiority being about 117%.


There are also other factors left out - for instance the accuracy of weapons, or the number of delivery vehicles (an issue for bomber dropped weapons in particular). Furthermore, tactical weapons are not shown on that graph.

In reality the SLBMs and ICBMs are more important weapons than the bomber delivered warheads - so the graphs are misleading. But it is interesting to imagine what it'd be like to be a Soviet citizen looking at these numbers... how it would feel to not know the future...

 

[F-14D]

Combined ICBM, SLBM and Air-dropped strategic warheads by year...

I should have been more specific with the concern with Soviet ICBM's growing numbers and accuracies (USSR surpassed the US in ICBM's in 1968) and the growing first strike threat, because the type of strategic warhead and its basing for warfighting is relevant. How many US air dropped weapons would never leave CONUS, how many SLBM warheads would be destroyed at the dock? There was real concern the SS-18 alone could wipe out most of the ICBM's, B-52's at air bases and SSBN's in port leaving the US with only 'counter value' targets but leaving the Soviet's a mssive force for follow on strikes at US cities.

Would the US go 'counter value' with SLBM's if Russia took out their ICBM's? ICBM's have always been the greatest concern for both sides as, until the D5, they were the only forces capable of a counter force first strike.

The subject of SLBMs destroyed at the dock keeps popping up in various forums, and there seems to be some misunderstanding about them. The number of SLBMs in the strike calculus is based on the number of subs at sea. It is assumed that any subs at the docks, undergoing maintenance, etc. will most likely be lost, or at best not available for any kind of "early" action. At least in the past, that was one of the factors that sized the boomer fleet: if you want x number of available warheads at any given time you must have y number of submarines, sufficient so that the deployed percentage gives you your planning number. The rest are "offline", even if they're in perfect working order, either at the dock or in storage (I'm ignoring for the moment missile subs in transit that are not in the patrol area). For treaty purposes, the total number of warheads/launchers are counted, but what's actually expected to be available is less. This is already factored in, or at least it was in the past.

Of course, this is true for the other two legs of the triad to a certain extent. While arguably the most vulnerable, the land based ICBM fleet probably has the largest percentage of warhead availability. Bombers are somewhat problematic. The B-1 allegedly no longer has any nuclear capability. B-52s have been continuously updated, but how survivable they are against a peer threat is an open question. The B-2, of course, is stealthy, but apparently hasn't been updated that much since delivery. More importantly, the availability of full capability units is reportedly appalling.

 

[bobbymike]

Combined ICBM, SLBM and Air-dropped strategic warheads by year...

I should have been more specific with the concern with Soviet ICBM's growing numbers and accuracies (USSR surpassed the US in ICBM's in 1968) and the growing first strike threat, because the type of strategic warhead and its basing for warfighting is relevant. How many US air dropped weapons would never leave CONUS, how many SLBM warheads would be destroyed at the dock? There was real concern the SS-18 alone could wipe out most of the ICBM's, B-52's at air bases and SSBN's in port leaving the US with only 'counter value' targets but leaving the Soviet's a mssive force for follow on strikes at US cities.

Would the US go 'counter value' with SLBM's if Russia took out their ICBM's? ICBM's have always been the greatest concern for both sides as, until the D5, they were the only forces capable of a counter force first strike.

The subject of SLBMs destroyed at the dock keeps popping up in various forums, and there seems to be some misunderstanding about them. The number of SLBMs in the strike calculus is based on the number of subs at sea. It is assumed that any subs at the docks, undergoing maintenance, etc. will most likely be lost, or at best not available for any kind of "early" action. At least in the past, that was one of the factors that sized the boomer fleet: if you want x number of available warheads at any given time you must have y number of submarines, sufficient so that the deployed percentage gives you your planning number. The rest are "offline", even if they're in perfect working order, either at the dock or in storage (I'm ignoring for the moment missile subs in transit that are not in the patrol area). For treaty purposes, the total number of warheads/launchers are counted, but what's actually expected to be available is less. This is already factored in, or at least it was in the past.

Of course, this is true for the other two legs of the triad to a certain extent. While arguably the most vulnerable, the land based ICBM fleet probably has the largest percentage of warhead availability. Bombers are somewhat problematic. The B-1 allegedly no longer has any nuclear capability. B-52s have been continuously updated, but how survivable they are against a peer threat is an open question. The B-2, of course, is stealthy, but apparently hasn't been updated that much since delivery. More importantly, the availability of full capability units is reportedly appalling.

F-14D - thanks for the input but the original 'back and forth' was around Soviet and US perceptions in the early 80's no B-1's, no B-2's, no D5's and no Peacekeepers. A time fraught with worry about a Soviet first strike using its' massive ICBM force to decapitate our ICBM's, SSBNs in port, bombers on the airstrip and C&C facilities leaving us with only a 'counter value' strategy.

IMHO discussing all possible contingencies of response and counter-response is probably not for this thread with entire library sections devoted to nuclear strategy.

To sum up my original point which would be more readily translate to; The nuclear build-up in the 80's was a positive occurrence that ultimately led to constructive arms control engagement and a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons use. I would add, again IMHO, a renewal of the Triad, especially announcing the GBSD AoA will be a new ICBM with multi-ton payload would also be a good response to Soviet.......I mean Russian pronouncements today.

 

[Abraham Gubler]

Sure, that's the logic that led the Narns to victory at Ragesh III. But we all know what happened after that...

Actually we don’t. At first I thought this was some reference to Indian history but then I recall Scott’s mention of Babylon 5. I may know what it is but not any of the details.

The problem facing said President would be somehting like this: "Are you willing to trade Los Angles for Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc" ?

But that isn’t the equation. The answer is if you nuke LA we nuke all of China and you’re all dead. So the question is reversed and is Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc worth the eradication of the entire Chinese nation? Since the 1950s that has been the fundamental element of nuclear warfare. The ability to inflict unbearable casualties as a response to a nuclear attack of any scale.

 

[Orionblamblam]

Gentlemen: The thing to keep in mind is, if Putin decides to conquer Ukraine or invade Poland or steamroll Mongolia or kidnap Kate Upton, THIS is what the world will have to face:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wnsdc7cTPuU

A sobering vision of tomorrow.

 

[bobbymike]

Gentlemen: The thing to keep in mind is, if Putin decides to conquer Ukraine or invade Poland or steamroll Mongolia or kidnap Kate Upton, THIS is what the world will have to face:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wnsdc7cTPuU

A sobering vision of tomorrow.

With nukes

 

[sferrin]

But that isn’t the equation. The answer is if you nuke LA we nuke all of China and you’re all dead. So the question is reversed and is Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc worth the eradication of the entire Chinese nation? Since the 1950s that has been the fundamental element of nuclear warfare. The ability to inflict unbearable casualties as a response to a nuclear attack of any scale.

Thing is it all comes down to credibility. Does China/Russia believe you'd actually follow through. Basically it's a game of chicken on a larger scale. I don't think the present administration has it. Both China and Russia are currently showing the world they don't care about public opinion. They're going to do what they feel is best.

 

[F-14D]

F-14D - thanks for the input but the original 'back and forth' was around Soviet and US perceptions in the early 80's no B-1's, no B-2's, no D5's and no Peacekeepers. A time fraught with worry about a Soviet first strike using its' massive ICBM force to decapitate our ICBM's, SSBNs in port, bombers on the airstrip and C&C facilities leaving us with only a 'counter value' strategy.

IMHO discussing all possible contingencies of response and counter-response is probably not for this thread with entire library sections devoted to nuclear strategy.

To sum up my original point which would be more readily translate to; The nuclear build-up in the 80's was a positive occurrence that ultimately led to constructive arms control engagement and a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons use. I would add, again IMHO, a renewal of the Triad, especially announcing the GBSD AoA will be a new ICBM with multi-ton payload would also be a good response to Soviet.......I mean Russian pronouncements today.

Sorry, but with the title of this topic and especially the first post, I didn't see this as an "'80s only" thing. What I was trying to bring to the table is that when we talk about the numbers of warheads lost because the sub was in port, that has already been factored in when the planning was done, so the loss of their availability did not weaken the US' response capability.

 

[Grey Havoc]

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/us-ukraine-crisis-exercises-idUSKBN0GX23Q20140902

Oh, what can go wrong?

 

[F-14D]

But that isn’t the equation. The answer is if you nuke LA we nuke all of China and you’re all dead. So the question is reversed and is Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc worth the eradication of the entire Chinese nation? Since the 1950s that has been the fundamental element of nuclear warfare. The ability to inflict unbearable casualties as a response to a nuclear attack of any scale.

Thing is it all comes down to credibility. Does China/Russia believe you'd actually follow through. Basically it's a game of chicken on a larger scale. I don't think the present administration has it. Both China and Russia are currently showing the world they don't care about public opinion. They're going to do what they feel is best.

I'm with sferrin on this. I don't think the question would be are you willing to risk all (or at least a large part of China (using this example) to take Taiwan. What the question will be is if China attacked Taiwan using only non-nuclear forces, would the US come to Taiwan's aid if the threat was that by doing so, LA would get nuked? The implicit corollary to that is that the invading country would be willing to accept the consequences.

It is about credibility. How far would the US be willing to go to stand with an ally or treaty partner? The answer (or perceived answer) to that question underpins a lot of the geopolitical relationships in the region. If it is thought that the US would not actually respond sufficiently, countries in a given area have to rethink their relationships with their big neighbor in that area vs. their support for an ally 6,000+ miles away.

They have to live with a nation whose foreign minister publicly stated in response to other Asian nations complaints about his country's behavior, “China is a big country,and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact.” Their actions at Scarborough Shoal and elsewhere shows they intend to operate with this attitude.

The relevance to the discussion at hand is that all of these same issues would apply in a similar scenario regarding Russia.

 

[bobbymike]

F-14D - thanks for the input but the original 'back and forth' was around Soviet and US perceptions in the early 80's no B-1's, no B-2's, no D5's and no Peacekeepers. A time fraught with worry about a Soviet first strike using its' massive ICBM force to decapitate our ICBM's, SSBNs in port, bombers on the airstrip and C&C facilities leaving us with only a 'counter value' strategy.

IMHO discussing all possible contingencies of response and counter-response is probably not for this thread with entire library sections devoted to nuclear strategy.

To sum up my original point which would be more readily translate to; The nuclear build-up in the 80's was a positive occurrence that ultimately led to constructive arms control engagement and a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons use. I would add, again IMHO, a renewal of the Triad, especially announcing the GBSD AoA will be a new ICBM with multi-ton payload would also be a good response to Soviet.......I mean Russian pronouncements today.

Sorry, but with the title of this topic and especially the first post, I didn't see this as an "'80s only" thing. What I was trying to bring to the table is that when we talk about the numbers of warheads lost because the sub was in port, that has already been factored in when the planning was done, so the loss of their availability did not weaken the US' response capability.

No the thread is not 'an 80's only thing' but my specific commentary was, with regard to the last US strategic build-up. Yes the loss of SSBN's in port would have been factored into the SIOP but still would have left the US, in theory, with only counter-value weapons after a Soviet first strike.

 

[Triton]

The United States doesn't have the same trading and economic relationship with the Russian Federation as it does with the People's Republic of China. If the People's Republic of China were to re-acquire the "renegade province" of Taiwan, would the United States wish to jeopardize its trading and economic relationship with the People's Republic of China? Would the People's Republic of China ever have to resort to the threat of military power?

 

[VH]

The United States doesn't have the same trading and economic relationship with the Russian Federation as it does with the People's Republic of China. If the People's Republic of China were to re-acquire the "renegade province" of Taiwan, would the United States wish to jeopardize its trading and economic relationship with the People's Republic of China? Would the People's Republic of China ever have to resort to the threat of military power?

Answer: Yes. The Chinese window of opportunity to make big power moves closes every day.

 

[sublight_]

But that isn’t the equation. The answer is if you nuke LA we nuke all of China and you’re all dead. So the question is reversed and is Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, etc worth the eradication of the entire Chinese nation? Since the 1950s that has been the fundamental element of nuclear warfare. The ability to inflict unbearable casualties as a response to a nuclear attack of any scale.

Thing is it all comes down to credibility. Does China/Russia believe you'd actually follow through. Basically it's a game of chicken on a larger scale. I don't think the present administration has it. Both China and Russia are currently showing the world they don't care about public opinion. They're going to do what they feel is best.

I would not completely count the current administration out. The interesting thing about the current administration is that they refuse to adopt the policy of making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. As in they support a first strike with nukes if they feel it has to be done. According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review:

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review established the Administration’s goal to set conditions that would allow the United States to safely adopt a policy of making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons. Although we cannot adopt such a policy today, the new guidance re-iterates the intention to work towards that goal over time.

 

[F-14D]

F-14D - thanks for the input but the original 'back and forth' was around Soviet and US perceptions in the early 80's no B-1's, no B-2's, no D5's and no Peacekeepers. A time fraught with worry about a Soviet first strike using its' massive ICBM force to decapitate our ICBM's, SSBNs in port, bombers on the airstrip and C&C facilities leaving us with only a 'counter value' strategy.

IMHO discussing all possible contingencies of response and counter-response is probably not for this thread with entire library sections devoted to nuclear strategy.

To sum up my original point which would be more readily translate to; The nuclear build-up in the 80's was a positive occurrence that ultimately led to constructive arms control engagement and a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons use. I would add, again IMHO, a renewal of the Triad, especially announcing the GBSD AoA will be a new ICBM with multi-ton payload would also be a good response to Soviet.......I mean Russian pronouncements today.

Sorry, but with the title of this topic and especially the first post, I didn't see this as an "'80s only" thing. What I was trying to bring to the table is that when we talk about the numbers of warheads lost because the sub was in port, that has already been factored in when the planning was done, so the loss of their availability did not weaken the US' response capability.

No the thread is not 'an 80's only thing' but my specific commentary was, with regard to the last US strategic build-up. Yes the loss of SSBN's in port would have been factored into the SIOP but still would have left the US, in theory, with only counter-value weapons after a Soviet first strike.

I wasn't trying to be snarky, I was apparently misinterpreting what you meant about the e original back and forth, taking it to mean the beginning of the thread and not your posts.

That said, I still maintain that the loss of those warheads on subs in port will not change our strategy or force us into a different policy because for all intent and purposes, those warheads don't "exist" in our strategy for responding to a first strike. . What "exists" would be the deployed operational weapons at the given moment. Whether the others were destroyed or not destroyed would not be significant in the immediate because in any case they wouldn't be available when needed.

Let's say the strategy was based on 168 SLBMs being available (assume no malfunctions and no Trident boat was attacked before it could launch). If you assume that you could have half your boats on patrol at any time, that would indicate a requirement for a total of 14 boats and 336 missiles. In this case I'm ignoring missiles undergoing maintenance, and I'm also ignoring missiles transferred from a sub going into overhaul to one going on patrol. If everyone of those docked subs was destroyed it wouldn't make a difference to the immediate operations because the 168 you need are still at sea and available. You could still execute the exact same strategy you could before they were attacked.

Now as time went on, things would change for the surviving units, and the implications thereof, but that seems to be outside the scope of what we're discussing here.