Defense against Hypersonic Glide Vehicles

Desertfox said:
Brilliant Pebbles will not work on a direct insertion HGV, they are also significantly more expensive than a nuclear-tipped interceptor and more strategically destabilizing as well.
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It depends how high the direct insertion goes. 100km is not a hard and fast boundary for space. Some satellites on elliptical orbits get as low as 70-80km. It's unlikely the LV won't get as high as that but if it doesn't then glide KKVs can be used. I'm also not seeing too many direct insertion HGVs about. The UR-100N is certainly not designed for direct insertion launches.

The cost with reusable launchers to put the KKVs in orbit will be significantly lower than with old non-reusable one and small fry when you consider the $6tr spent on Iraq and Afghanistan, which is actually more than it would cost with non-reusable launchers several times over.

Nuclear-tipped interceptors are also destabilising, especially long range ones, which could be mistaken for an attack by a 3rd party. They would also reduce the number of offensive warheads allowed under START. Would long-range ones even work unless they were glide interceptors too? Surely a defence against third rate powers (NK, Iran) is actually stabilising too and may even deter some from developing nukes.
 
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START is just about dead and buried for all intents and purposes, even by the most optimistic interpretation. So it is not really a factor in any present day strategic debate except insofar as to what lingering aftereffects it still has on strategic weapons & deployment.
 
Western allergy to anything nuke would make employment of a nuke tipped missile problematic. I think the old NIKE missiles were even subject to this. The warheads on NIKE/Spartan were actually pretty big (if I remember correctly). The Sprint warhead was kiloton level but even there I don't think it would be optimal for anti HGV application so you would probably want a new design.
 
quellish said:
Dilandu said:
There is NO fallout from altitude bursts. The fallout is a result of matter from surface being drawn into a fireball, irradiated, and them sucked upward into atmosphere with hot air current. But if fireball did not have contact with surface, the only matter in contact with fireball is the missile itself. Which is a Really Tiny Mass, that simply could not provide enough matter for irradiation - regardless of weather!
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Fallout is bomb material, fission products, and whatever else is around at the time of detonation. Detonate on the ground, lots of stuff around (which bomb material, etc. mixes with). Detonate in the air, less stuff around. But there is still fallout.
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Not to mention the little problem of EMP.
 
fredymac said:
Western allergy to anything nuke would make employment of a nuke tipped missile problematic. I think the old NIKE missiles were even subject to this. The warheads on NIKE/Spartan were actually pretty big (if I remember correctly). The Sprint warhead was kiloton level but even there I don't think it would be optimal for anti HGV application so you would probably want a new design.
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Spartan had a 5MT warhead. (That they kept around long after the missiles had been retired for some reason.)
Sprint 10kt.
But for shear quantity, 2,550 W31 nuclear warheads were built and deployed for the Nike Hercules force.
 
Thankfully the geo-political tables have turned and we no longer have administrations that choose to look the other way on this kind of thing. Hang em, shoot em, we need to protect our country from a rising authoritarian superpower.
 
There is something off about this case. The story contains this passage:

Court documents reviewed by Quartz refer to Sun possessing classified files related to several different air defense systems designed by Raytheon for the US military and sold to American allies and proxies around the world.
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Classified information can only be stored and processed on secure computers which are:

-prominently labeled to show they are classified
-kept in a GSA certified safe or inside a physically secured/restricted access work area
-used only inside a SCIF (EMI shielded)
-can only ever be connected to similarly restricted hardware (ie, you are prohibited from attaching anything like a thumb drive that isn't also handled under the same restrictions)
-can only ever be connected to a secure communication network (SIPRnet) or internal, DSS reviewed, isolated local network for attaching secure printers or servers, etc

Someone trying to walk out of a secured area carrying this thing should have immediately been stopped and written up. Putting classified files onto non classified computers also triggers a security incident. This level of violation should result in immediate suspension of security access until such time as DSS reviews and adjudicates the issue.
 
Forest Green said:
It depends how high the direct insertion goes. 100km is not a hard and fast boundary for space. Some satellites on elliptical orbits get as low as 70-80km. It's unlikely the LV won't get as high as that but if it doesn't then glide KKVs can be used. I'm also not seeing too many direct insertion HGVs about. The UR-100N is certainly not designed for direct insertion launches.

The cost with reusable launchers to put the KKVs in orbit will be significantly lower than with old non-reusable one and small fry when you consider the $6tr spent on Iraq and Afghanistan, which is actually more than it would cost with non-reusable launchers several times over.

Nuclear-tipped interceptors are also destabilising, especially long range ones, which could be mistaken for an attack by a 3rd party. They would also reduce the number of offensive warheads allowed under START. Would long-range ones even work unless they were glide interceptors too? Surely a defence against third rate powers (NK, Iran) is actually stabilising too and may even deter some from developing nukes.
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You'd be surprised at what a UR-100N can do...

Why would a nuclear-tipped interceptor be mistaken for an attack? You do realize we have deployed GBIs, right? There's no difference between the two.

You should read New START, nuclear interceptors (or any interceptor for that matter) do not fall under the treaty at all, i.e. the Russian A-135 system is not accountable under the treaty, as do all non-strategic nuclear systems.

GBI is a defence agaisnt a 3rd rate power (not that they could even field HGVs) and it is still destabilizing and has done nothing to deter North Korea from developing nukes. It was however, spurred China and Russia to develop all sorts of new weapons including HGVs. Which would lead me to argue that the best defense against HGVs was the ABM treaty (and to a lesser extent START II) but since those are gone and START III is probably still born... here we are.
 
fredymac said:
There is something off about this case. The story contains this passage:

Court documents reviewed by Quartz refer to Sun possessing classified files related to several different air defense systems designed by Raytheon for the US military and sold to American allies and proxies around the world.
Click to expand...

Classified information can only be stored and processed on secure computers which are:

-prominently labeled to show they are classified
-kept in a GSA certified safe or inside a physically secured/restricted access work area
-used only inside a SCIF (EMI shielded)
-can only ever be connected to similarly restricted hardware (ie, you are prohibited from attaching anything like a thumb drive that isn't also handled under the same restrictions)
-can only ever be connected to a secure communication network (SIPRnet) or internal, DSS reviewed, isolated local network for attaching secure printers or servers, etc

Someone trying to walk out of a secured area carrying this thing should have immediately been stopped and written up. Putting classified files onto non classified computers also triggers a security incident. This level of violation should result in immediate suspension of security access until such time as DSS reviews and adjudicates the issue.
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From reading the article it sounds like he was carrying his "unclassified" laptop which would not actually contain "classified" information but could contain all sorts of other export-controlled and ITAR restricted data.

He probably had possession of actual classified data, but it sound like that was separate from the laptop. Both however, are major security violations.
 
Desertfox said:
Which would lead me to argue that the best defense against HGVs was the ABM treaty (and to a lesser extent START II) but since those are gone and START III is probably still born... here we are.
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So when a nuclear warhead came over the pole were you planning on us waving a Treaty at it to knock it out of the air?
 
Waving a treaty will be just as useful as GBI is.

Best defense is not having to defend against them at all. Under START II (killed by the US leaving ABM) all land-based MIRVed ICBMs would have been removed, that means no UR-100Ns, no R-36M2s, no RS-24 YaRS, no Sarmat, and by extension no UR-100N/Sarmat means no Avangard. No Avangard, no need to defend against it. Conversely, the MM3s are already downloaded to 1 warhead so they wouldn't be affected, and the US HGV programs are non-strategic and therefore would not be covered by START II. So yes, leaving ABM was a blunder of strategic proportions.
 
Desertfox said:
Waving a treaty will be just as useful as GBI is.
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Really? How's an ABM treaty supposed to prevent a North Korean attack or accidental launch from landing in the US? Furthermore, what good is a Treaty when only one side abides by it?
 
sferrin said:
Desertfox said:
Waving a treaty will be just as useful as GBI is.
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Really? How's an ABM treaty supposed to prevent a North Korean attack or accidental launch from landing in the US? Furthermore, what good is a Treaty when only one side abides by it?
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If the edges of the paper are really sharp and you could get a man inside the DPRK regime....
 
GBI might stand a chance against a lone North Korean ICBM, now if that ICBM has decoys or is MIRVed or there's more than one... And against a Russian attack, well forget about it.

Take the 14 years and the billions of dollars dropped into missile defense and I'm sure you could have come up with a lot of better solutions to the problem. And frankly, deterrence worked great against the Soviet Union and would likely have worked just as well against North Korea, after all Kim Jung Un can't get fat of his people if he is dead.

As for treaties, the Soviet Union and Russia both have abided by all of the nuclear disarmament treaties with the exception of INF.
 
Actually, up to it's fall, the Soviet Union routinely cheated on every single nuclear treaty, not to mention every other arms control treaty including the ABM and Outer Space Treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention being another even more blatant example.
 
Desertfox said:
GBI might stand a chance against a lone North Korean ICBM, now if that ICBM has decoys or is MIRVed or there's more than one... And against a Russian attack, well forget about it.

Take the 14 years and the billions of dollars dropped into missile defense and I'm sure you could have come up with a lot of better solutions to the problem. And frankly, deterrence worked great against the Soviet Union and would likely have worked just as well against North Korea, after all Kim Jung Un can't get fat of his people if he is dead.

As for treaties, the Soviet Union and Russia both have abided by all of the nuclear disarmament treaties with the exception of INF.
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Your ability to ignore years of intercept testing is profound. The PAC3/AEGIS/THAAD/GBI interceptors are all applications of the same technology. The MKV (or now MOKV) program is specifically addressing MIRV'd ICBMS using MIRV'd interceptors. The single interceptor missiles already in place can deal with a lot more than "a lone North Korean ICBM".

Our ICBM's did nothing to deter North Korea but somehow missile defense is supposed to? Deterrence works IF dealing with rational actors. You apparently believe an inherited dictator who engages in bizarre acts of extreme retribution and has no qualms in letting famine take its toll in order to divert funds for nukes qualifies.

Missile defense is initially a supplement to MAD but has the promise of an alternative to it. Why you would prefer to have your very existence subject to consent by foreign governments is perplexing.
 
Oh I am very aware of the years of testing, I've been involved in some of them. But PAC3, AEGIS, and THAAD have never been tested against an ICBM, GBI's interceptors are limited in their capability, and MKV/MOKV/RKV have all been canceled. Eventually we will be able to deal with MIRVs but we are not there yet and missile defense countermeasures are easier to deploy than missile defenses themselves.

Has North Korea launched a nuclear missile at the US? No, so our ICBMs have served as a deterrence. Kim Jung Un might not care about his people, but he most certainly cares about himself. Nuking the US will not do any wonders to his life expectancy.

My existance is already subject to consent by foreign governments, the Russians (and Chinese to a lesser extent) still practice MAD. Our best options remain a stabilizing deterrence force and mutual disarmament, we made alot of progress on disarmament right up till ABM died.
 
Desertfox said:
From reading the article it sounds like he was carrying his "unclassified" laptop which would not actually contain "classified" information but could contain all sorts of other export-controlled and ITAR restricted data.

He probably had possession of actual classified data, but it sound like that was separate from the laptop. Both however, are major security violations.
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The actual court document linked from the Quartz article refers only to ITAR restricted data. The author of the news article has conflated ITAR-marked restricted material with true classified material.
 
So a proposed solution to track HGVs alot better is to introduce lower orbit satellites, Than I recall sokol eschelon shooting a laser beam at a japanese satellite from 1,500kms away. Than of course there are newer laser system projects in development for both ground and air. So do infrared satellites have any planned defenses against laser systems? Proud the Pentagon wants to do something about HGVs, but atleast so far it will give the U.S. an immediate heads up that a 1st strike nuclear weapon is about to commence when satellites start to go blind.
 
Desertfox said:
Oh I am very aware of the years of testing, I've been involved in some of them. But PAC3, AEGIS, and THAAD have never been tested against an ICBM, GBI's interceptors are limited in their capability, and MKV/MOKV/RKV have all been canceled. Eventually we will be able to deal with MIRVs but we are not there yet and missile defense countermeasures are easier to deploy than missile defenses themselves.

Has North Korea launched a nuclear missile at the US? No, so our ICBMs have served as a deterrence. Kim Jung Un might not care about his people, but he most certainly cares about himself. Nuking the US will not do any wonders to his life expectancy.

My existance is already subject to consent by foreign governments, the Russians (and Chinese to a lesser extent) still practice MAD. Our best options remain a stabilizing deterrence force and mutual disarmament, we made alot of progress on disarmament right up till ABM died.
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Only GBI was designed explicitly for ICBM defense. AEGIS will soon test itself against an ICBM using the SM3 Block II. A Block II upgrade will probably follow which opens up sea based ICBM defense and that will be a significant development.

In what way are GBI's limited? A mass attack could overwhelm it given the current single interceptor architecture but not in terms of kinetics. Sensor development is focusing on discrimination and will result in decoys as heavy and large as the real warhead which then makes them redundant.

MIRV'd interceptors were conceived in the 80's and always resurrect themselves because they are so conceptually advantageous. I don't know the reasoning why MOKV was cancelled but I have no doubt a replacement is in the works.

Deterence is what you do when you can't do anything else. But in the end, you want assurance independent of any external consideration that you have some means to counter an incoming nuke other than simply watching it hit and firing back.

Soon you can add North Korea to the list of countries whose consent you will need. And then Iran and eventually a lot more. With missile defense, you neither need their consent nor even their rationality.
 
fredymac said:
Desertfox said:
Oh I am very aware of the years of testing, I've been involved in some of them. But PAC3, AEGIS, and THAAD have never been tested against an ICBM, GBI's interceptors are limited in their capability, and MKV/MOKV/RKV have all been canceled. Eventually we will be able to deal with MIRVs but we are not there yet and missile defense countermeasures are easier to deploy than missile defenses themselves.

Has North Korea launched a nuclear missile at the US? No, so our ICBMs have served as a deterrence. Kim Jung Un might not care about his people, but he most certainly cares about himself. Nuking the US will not do any wonders to his life expectancy.

My existance is already subject to consent by foreign governments, the Russians (and Chinese to a lesser extent) still practice MAD. Our best options remain a stabilizing deterrence force and mutual disarmament, we made alot of progress on disarmament right up till ABM died.
Click to expand...


Only GBI was designed explicitly for ICBM defense. AEGIS will soon test itself against an ICBM using the SM3 Block II. A Block II upgrade will probably follow which opens up sea based ICBM defense and that will be a significant development.

In what way are GBI's limited? A mass attack could overwhelm it given the current single interceptor architecture but not in terms of kinetics. Sensor development is focusing on discrimination and will result in decoys as heavy and large as the real warhead which then makes them redundant.

MIRV'd interceptors were conceived in the 80's and always resurrect themselves because they are so conceptually advantageous. I don't know the reasoning why MOKV was cancelled but I have no doubt a replacement is in the works.

Deterence is what you do when you can't do anything else. But in the end, you want assurance independent of any external consideration that you have some means to counter an incoming nuke other than simply watching it hit and firing back.

Soon you can add North Korea to the list of countries whose consent you will need. And then Iran and eventually a lot more. With missile defense, you neither need their consent nor even their rationality.
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But the problem with these arguments is that that they ignore the facts for fantasies that may be comforting for some to believe.
For example comments above recognize that MIRV decoys can and will evolve to counter greater tracking/ discriminating capacity.
Yet the comments above appear to willfully miss understand the point about GBI or equivalent systems being relatively easily overwhelmed by sheers numbers at a fraction of the cost of the defensive system.
All to embrace the illusion of a defense that Russian & China opponents have already reacted to so to circumvent.
Missile defense pursued beyond a certain limited point is an illusion of safety that can never be; deterrence is a recognition of the reality that the US can never and will never truly be safe from a nuclear (or other weapons of mass destruction) armed opponent.
But there also need for recognition that if you are dealing with an "irrational" actor who can't be deterred by promise of massive retaliation then some ICBM-defeating missile defensive system is also likely to be irrelevant - the attack will likely be delivered by other conventional and "non-conventional" means (most of which would probably be cheaper and less easily tracked and monitored).
Hence a lot of money of spent for false security; indeed by concentrating resources on your ultimately ineffective white elephant you've probably made yourself less safe.
All to "regain" a pseudo-nostalgic sense of safety and invulnerability that predates the 7th of December 1941 but for people mostly born after WW2?
 
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kaiserd said:
But the problem with these arguments is that that they ignore the facts for fantasies that may be comforting for some to believe.
For example comments above recognize that MIRV decoys can and will evolve to counter greater tracking/ discriminating capacity.
Yet the comments above appear to willfully miss understand the point about GBI or equivalent systems being relatively easily overwhelmed by sheers numbers at a fraction of the cost of the defensive system.
All to embrace the illusion of a defense that Russian & China opponents have already reacted to so to circumvent.
Missile defense pursued beyond a certain limited point is an illusion of safety that can never be; deterrence is a recognition of the reality that the US can never and will never truly be safe from a nuclear (or other weapons of mass destruction) armed opponent.
But there also need for recognition that if you are dealing with an "irrational" actor who can't be deterred by promise of massive retaliation then some ICBM-defeating missile defensive system is also likely to be irrelevant - the attack will likely be delivered by other conventional and "non-conventional" means (most of which would probably be cheaper and less easily tracked and monitored).
Hence a lot of money of spent for false security; indeed by concentrating resources on your ultimately ineffective white elephant you've probably made yourself less safe.
All to "regain" a pseudo-nostalgic sense of safety and invulnerability that predates the 7th of December 1941 but for people mostly born after WW2?
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Looks like you "ignore" my posts as well as you support some US weapon programs.

I choose to believe that missile defense tests are as indicative of how they will work as smart bomb tests were just before Desert Storm.

Any decoy to be useful must weigh less and be smaller than a warhead. Once beyond this, you may as well add more warheads. Anything that can detect or infer mass results in this.

Once more with the projection on motives. It seems to be a part of you.
 
fredymac said:
kaiserd said:
But the problem with these arguments is that that they ignore the facts for fantasies that may be comforting for some to believe.
For example comments above recognize that MIRV decoys can and will evolve to counter greater tracking/ discriminating capacity.
Yet the comments above appear to willfully miss understand the point about GBI or equivalent systems being relatively easily overwhelmed by sheers numbers at a fraction of the cost of the defensive system.
All to embrace the illusion of a defense that Russian & China opponents have already reacted to so to circumvent.
Missile defense pursued beyond a certain limited point is an illusion of safety that can never be; deterrence is a recognition of the reality that the US can never and will never truly be safe from a nuclear (or other weapons of mass destruction) armed opponent.
But there also need for recognition that if you are dealing with an "irrational" actor who can't be deterred by promise of massive retaliation then some ICBM-defeating missile defensive system is also likely to be irrelevant - the attack will likely be delivered by other conventional and "non-conventional" means (most of which would probably be cheaper and less easily tracked and monitored).
Hence a lot of money of spent for false security; indeed by concentrating resources on your ultimately ineffective white elephant you've probably made yourself less safe.
All to "regain" a pseudo-nostalgic sense of safety and invulnerability that predates the 7th of December 1941 but for people mostly born after WW2?
Click to expand...


Looks like you "ignore" my posts as well as you support some US weapon programs.

I choose to believe that missile defense tests are as indicative of how they will work as smart bomb tests were just before Desert Storm.

Any decoy to be useful must weigh less and be smaller than a warhead. Once beyond this, you may as well add more warheads. Anything that can detect or infer mass results in this.

Once more with the projection on motives. It seems to be a part of you.
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And your willingness to engage with facts rather than what you wish was true is clearly limited.

Your Desert Storm comparison is bizarre and not in anyway relevant or apt; a real example of trying to compare apples and oranges.

Given the availability/ existence of a large number of MIRV capable ICBM to carry them, to be effective a decoy has to appear and behave like the real thing, plus be significantly cheaper than an actual warhead.
It doesn’t necessarily have to be smaller and have less mass.

And to shift the focus slightly at what projected point of confidence with a national missile defense system do you expect a US administration to actually “call the bluff” of say a North Korea. Or at what point would you be confident that both you and a North Korea type opponent would both accurately gauge this and accurately read each other’s likely actions in a potentially high-stress rapidly developing crisis?
50/50? 70/30? 90/10?
And throw in considering the vulnerability of your allies not under this missile defence screen and potentially vulnerable to other shorter range systems.

And at what point does a Russia-type peer opponent just field more numbers to overwhelm as well as fielding alternatives (hypersonics, cruise missiles, bombers and/ subs closer in to deny your missile defense system sufficient time, etc.) Or even switch to unconventional means of delivery up to and including means more commonly used by non-state players (in the back of a truck etc) but well within these states means if so minded.

Again the reality and numbers don’t add up re: your argument.
So the point of such a system (especially versus a peer opponent) is primarily psychological - to provide a false sense of safety to your citizens who don’t know better, no matter the cost (direct and opportunity costs)?
 
kaiserd said:
And your willingness to engage with facts rather than what you wish was true is clearly limited.

Your Desert Storm comparison is bizarre and not in anyway relevant or apt; a real example of trying to compare apples and oranges.

Given the availability/ existence of a large number of MIRV capable ICBM to carry them, to be effective a decoy has to appear and behave like the real thing, plus be significantly cheaper than an actual warhead.
It doesn’t necessarily have to be smaller and have less mass.

And to shift the focus slightly at what projected point of confidence with a national missile defense system do you expect a US administration to actually “call the bluff” of say a North Korea. Or at what point would you be confident that both you and a North Korea type opponent would both accurately gauge this and accurately read each other’s likely actions in a potentially high-stress rapidly developing crisis?
50/50? 70/30? 90/10?
And throw in considering the vulnerability of your allies not under this missile defence screen and potentially vulnerable to other shorter range systems.

And at what point does a Russia-type peer opponent just field more numbers to overwhelm as well as fielding alternatives (hypersonics, cruise missiles, bombers and/ subs closer in to deny your missile defense system sufficient time, etc.) Or even switch to unconventional means of delivery up to and including means more commonly used by non-state players (in the back of a truck etc) but well within these states means if so minded.

Again the reality and numbers don’t add up re: your argument.
So the point of such a system (especially versus a peer opponent) is primarily psychological - to provide a false sense of safety to your citizens who don’t know better, no matter the cost (direct and opportunity costs)?
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You make a grand stage announcement that you will henceforth ignore my posts and encourage others to do the same and yet here you are again.

My facts are based on actual tests. I can watch an interceptor lift off and travel thousands of miles and reduce a target to dust through direct collision. And they are doing this with clutter, debris, and decoys already being introduced into the tests. Or I can listen to people like you who say its impossible.

One of the more amusing aspects of Desert Storm was how the media was more in shock than Saddam Hussein. Even watching a bomb drop through an elevator shaft wasn't going to change their minds that US weapons were useless. Not just smart bombs either. Media hit pieces on the Apache, M1, and almost everything else made them out as hopelessly unreliable.

Being immune to North Korea type threats is worthwhile in my consideration. You apparently disagree. Hopefully, as technology progresses, missile defense technology will evolve and get better to the point of offering an alternative to mutual suicide against peers.

"Unconventional" delivery can't wage war. Only terrorism. A country hit by nuclear terror will have carte blanche to exact retribution so any host country for terrorists will have to do some hard thinking.

"Citizens who don't know better", is yet another revealing aspect to your thinking. I regard people who reject missile defense do so based on their overall political perspectives not because they are just too dumb
 
So no actual engagement with my points? Or the actual facts? But more attesting to your “faith” and decrying others for their lack of “faith”.

A super vague reference to “tests”. Which even If somewhat accurate doesn’t actually address any of my points.

A need to attack me and other nefarious others (primarily the suitably demonised “the Media”) for my/ their “lack of faith”,

And complete non-sequesters like “unconventional delivery can’t wage war”; off course they can.
In the extremely unlikely scenario of the US having an effective missile defence against peer nations then those nations would have to focus on alternative (including “unconventional”) methods for weapon delivery to maintain their deterrence of the US.
And the US would have forced them there.

Ironically I sympathise re: having a limited defence against a very limited ICBM threat of a North Korea-type. But I’m not seeing a lot of realism about the actual very limited additional “freedom of action” such a system actually provides. Because of the vulnerability of your allies and the unlikely scenario where a US administration decides that it’s actively going to take additional risks it otherwise would not have taken because it has this system and a North Korea type opponent helpfully deciding to play along.

“Citizens who don’t know better” is not a attack on these individuals; very few people actually pay attention to a lot of defence policy in any detail. Why should they; we all have busy complicated lives to live.
When people who do know better con these people with simple but comforting untruths and lies it is the con people that deserve the criticism.
And you now know better because contributors here have now informed you better.
And if you continue to peddle your “faith” based opinions rather than re-examine your opinions based on facts then you have decided on that course of action.
 
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kaiserd said:
So no actual engagement with my points? Or the actual facts? But more attesting to your “faith” and decrying others for their lack of “faith”.

A super vague reference to “tests”. Which even If somewhat accurate doesn’t actually address any of my points.

A need to attack me and other nefarious others (primarily the suitably demonised “the Media”) for my/ their “lack of faith”,

And complete non-sequesters like “unconventional delivery can’t wage war”; off course they can.
In the extremely unlikely scenario of the US having an effective missile defence against peer nations then those nations would have to focus on alternative (including “unconventional”) methods for weapon delivery to maintain their deterrence of the US.
And the US would have forced them there.

Ironically I sympathise re: having a limited defence against a very limited ICBM threat of a North Korea-type. But I’m not seeing a lot of realism about the actual very limited additional “freedom of action” such a system actually provides. Because of the vulnerability of your allies and the unlikely scenario where a US administration decides that it’s actively going to take additional risks it otherwise would not have taken because it has this system and a North Korea type opponent helpfully deciding to play along.

“Citizens who don’t know better” is not a attack on these individuals; very few people actually pay attention to a lot of defence policy in any detail. Why should they; we all have busy complicated lives to live.
When people who do know better con these people with simple but comforting untruths and lies it is the con people that deserve the criticism.
And you now know better because contributors here have now informed you better.
And if you continue to peddle your “faith” based opinions rather than re-examine your opinions based on facts then you have decided on that course of action.
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You have no points of engagement. Only a narrative and the demand to submit to it. Show me your evidence that negates the test videos of GBI intercepts. If you find this vague, just go to Youtube and type in Ground Based Interceptor into the search and you will be able to eliminate all your confusion. Show me your equivalent facts that disprove these results.

By "attacking" you mean accurately report your own declarations. Do you wish to state you did not say you were going to ignore any more posts by me? I referenced this because it provides a context for people to assess the integrity of all your other comments.

And now you conclude by convicting me of moral crimes. I just don't agree with you, I "con" people because I know in my heart of hearts that you are right. Wow. I "peddle my faith" rather than embrace your facts (which again consists of nothing but you proclaiming things without evidence). Unless Secret Projects becomes a "safe space" where people like me are just not allowed, you will be seeing continued criminality in the future.
 
A-135 in 1987 was visualized to handle 1-2 ICBMs and 35 Pershings. Now they have mobile systems like the S-500 to deal with 10 ICBM targets simultaneously. With new ground radars, new interceptor missiles, new defense network of satellites the A-235 or Russia's entire defense network will probably be visualized to handle even more hypersonic threats. Especially when switching the medium and short range interceptors to conventional warheads and only the long range to nuclear. I am also glad to hear that the Trump administration is putting in spending for our GMD.

To me I see it very possible for two countries to deal with either Iran or N Korea's nuclear arsenal. But what worries me lets just say that one of them decides to send a few ICBMs to Israel and Israel's Arrow-3 might not be able to handle a few, it can handle 1 but not more than one. Do not know how well their entire defense network is but lets say it is not sufficient enough. The next problem to worry about is something like the Samson Option and lets say that Samson Option sends 30 ICBMs to Russia. This activates the dead hand than everyone else is considered dead. I have my doubts that N Korea or Iran would use their full arsenal on the U.S. or Russia but will probably take advantage of creating a domino effect instead to achieve it if they realize how good their defenses are. So I have an agreement with freddymac on this one on the growing importance of missile defense.
 
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Desertfox said:
Oh I am very aware of the years of testing, I've been involved in some of them. But PAC3, AEGIS, and THAAD have never been tested against an ICBM, GBI's interceptors are limited in their capability, and MKV/MOKV/RKV have all been canceled. Eventually we will be able to deal with MIRVs but we are not there yet and missile defense countermeasures are easier to deploy than missile defenses themselves.

Has North Korea launched a nuclear missile at the US? No, so our ICBMs have served as a deterrence. Kim Jung Un might not care about his people, but he most certainly cares about himself. Nuking the US will not do any wonders to his life expectancy.

My existance is already subject to consent by foreign governments, the Russians (and Chinese to a lesser extent) still practice MAD. Our best options remain a stabilizing deterrence force and mutual disarmament, we made alot of progress on disarmament right up till ABM died.
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That would explain why Russia and China are so upset. Because ABMs don't work. Yeah, that's it.
 
You guys do understand that propaganda is a thing, for both sides? Yes we have video of GBI hitting targets, but how realistic where the tests? Were they going after a 1st gen North Korean RV or a 5th gen Russian RV with penaids? Are the videos for North Korean consumption (deterrence) or are they for US public consumption (funding)?

Why are Russia and China so upset? Are they truly concerned about GBI? Or is it all show to increase funding of their own projects? Is it GBI what concerns them or the follow ons (something like MKV or Brilliant Pebbles)?

Nobody likes spending money and when it comes to nuclear deterrence you have to be absolutely sure your missiles will get thru. The inverse is also true, for a missile defense system you have to be sure no missiles make it past. That's why Russia and China are upset, they have to spend money to make sure their nuclear deterrence is still viable, meanwhile we are spending tons of more money to make sure it doesn't. Lots of money being spent on a futile effort, since short of some major technological breakthrough, the attacker will always have the advantage.
 
sferrin said:
That would explain why Russia and China are so upset. Because ABMs don't work. Yeah, that's it.
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Specifically Russia is upsed because ABM facilities in Europe can be easily used at first strike ground attack platforms. Not that they will easily intercept few hundreds ICBMs with ease in case of big boogaloo.
 
Desertfox said:
You guys do understand that propaganda is a thing, for both sides? Yes we have video of GBI hitting targets, but how realistic where the tests? Were they going after a 1st gen North Korean RV or a 5th gen Russian RV with penaids? Are the videos for North Korean consumption (deterrence) or are they for US public consumption (funding)?

Why are Russia and China so upset? Are they truly concerned about GBI? Or is it all show to increase funding of their own projects? Is it GBI what concerns them or the follow ons (something like MKV or Brilliant Pebbles)?

Nobody likes spending money and when it comes to nuclear deterrence you have to be absolutely sure your missiles will get thru. The inverse is also true, for a missile defense system you have to be sure no missiles make it past. That's why Russia and China are upset, they have to spend money to make sure their nuclear deterrence is still viable, meanwhile we are spending tons of more money to make sure it doesn't. Lots of money being spent on a futile effort, since short of some major technological breakthrough, the attacker will always have the advantage.
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Videos of GBI tests already show clutter and debris accompany the warhead and MDA is already noting that decoys are being added to test discrimination capability. If Russia and China thought the US was wasting money on GBI, they would be best served by having the US proceed full speed. Their propaganda machine must be working backwards because my impression is the opposite.

Once you have MKV and more advanced technologies (DE, railguns, whatever) operational, you can begin to shift your strategy away from MAD to just deterrence keeping enough nukes to inflict unacceptable damage but not necessarily total destruction. Even if the US were to obtain a science fiction force field, it wouldn't want a real nuke fired at it just like an Aegis destroyer wouldn't want real missiles coming at it. The ABM provides the real assurance that lets you actually contemplate reductions to offensive nukes without relying on good behavior from other countries.
 

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