Testimony of the witness that took the famous video above from the roof of his business (white dot (plain) below):
- Engine(s) were sputtering in such loud bangs that it alerted the witness inside his restaurant
- Plane did a 180 in a tight turn (plane landed reciprocally from open rwy)
- aircraft was able to regain some altitude during the turn (an indication of the power available to the pilots)
- Blast heat reached him while on the roof (video shows how close the blast reached him with debris littered close to airport outter fence
- Fire trucks were unable to move closer (than end of the stopway(?)) and operated from 50m away.
I have asked a pilot who knows that model of aircraft and he does not believe that the impact of a single bird or that of a commercial drone on a wing can cause that type of accident, it is very strange that the pilot would attempt a forced landing without deploying the flaps or slats. According to the expert, that could only have happened with a massive simultaneous failure of several safety systems or with an unconscious crew at least three minutes before impact.
This Guardian piece seems to imply the passengers were fully aware of the situation, and that there may have been damage beyond the bird ingestion.
“A bird is stuck in the wing. We can’t land,” one passenger on board the ill-fated Jeju Air flight 7C2216 sent out in a panicked text just before 9am on Sunday morning. “Should I write my final words?”
It sounds like more than one bird struck the aircraft. That text from one of the passengers saying “a bird is stuck in the wing” and the mention of a flock of birds is chilling.
I have asked a pilot who knows that model of aircraft and he does not believe that the impact of a single bird ……..According to the expert, that could only have happened with a massive simultaneous failure of several safety systems or with an unconscious crew at least three minutes before impact.
I suggest you consider the circumstances of BD092 of the 8 Jan 1989 where the same claim could be made except there was human error while dealing with a failure.
I wonder if it was the opposite--pilot starts to slide---sees the berm --and guns it thinking "If I can just get up ten more feet--the wall will knock off nacelles and wings and I'll slide past the fireball." (but forgot about the thrust reversers---which may have dug in.)
Can you open just one thrust reverser in hopes of sloughing off more speed by sliding sideways?
What ultimately doomed the occupants of the 737 is that massive concrete wall at the end of the runway, my understanding is that wall should never, ever have been placed there (Someone is going to catch it hot over that concrete wall).
That wall is to house the Instrument Landing System antennas. Which are required to be in that location for correct operation. It is some 500m away from the runway overrun.
The problem was the plane getting caught in ground effect for 10sec and impacting the runway roughly 2/3rds of the way down at high speed due to no flaps or slats (or gear).
Not every pilot has Sully's ice-water (for blood.)
CEO culture is to blame...
"Who needs flight engineers or more than two engines?
If I were king of the world--each cockpit has analog gauges on one side, glass cockpit on the other --and the manual release for landing gear at the flight engineers station so the two up front can fight the stick debug or whatever.
Any businessmen who suggests otherwise capped in the back of the head. I always liked how the cockpit of the big Antonovs looked like the bridge of the Enterprise--you fly human lives--they deserve the best. Redundancy, three up front at the least, etc.
@Scott Kenny : From a quick search on safety parameters for 737 thrust reverser:
The 737 thrust reversers are electrically/mechanically locked and hydraulically isolated during flight; the system can only deploy when the aircraft is <10ft rad alt or the air/ground safety sensor detects that the aeroplane is on the ground
The problem is that it is better to have one large run of wires in a single large hole in ribs or spars than it is to have multiple smaller runs of wires in multiple smaller holes.
It's physically stronger for those ribs and spars, and it's easier to install a single wire run. (Maintenance may or may not be easier, since tracing wires is easier but replacing them is a PITA)
FAA doesn't like wireless, unless you're using fly-by-light and therefore fiber optics instead of mechanical cables or electrical wires. Solid connections only, no wifi/bluetooth crap that by law has to accept any and all interference in operations.
An informative discussion, particularly regarding the potential smoke in cabin as exemplified that the late bulletin with the lack of checkvalve rerouting engine smoke to the cabin. .
Flightdata.com has track data through 0657. (excerpt below). Interestingly, no data seems to have been received post 0657, yet we have reasonably reliable accounts that the aircraft subsequently maneuvered to land in the opposite direction. What I can find in news account is the pilot reported a bird strike at 0658, and the aircraft touched down at 0703.
Not personally a pilot, but have flown enough to have some idea what normal looks like on a 737, and fairly easy to compare to the previous day's flight. I don't have the experience to say what normal speed/decent rate looks like for this airport/aircraft, but comparison to a similar flight seems reasonable. What jumps out to me though is the magnitude and variability of the decent rate just before the cutoff. The last point seems to correspond with the engine loss, so a high rate there is reasonable, but 0655-0656 is well prior. Comparing to the previous day, this is significantly high, and confirmed by this page - "Maintain a constant rate of descent (sink rate) between ~600-800 ft/min;.... Not have a descent rate greater than 1000 ft/min"
It also seems like the airspeed is too high throughout; for instance, 177 vs 156 kts @3000 ft and 144 vs 129 kts @1375 ft.
Admittedly, I'm assuming the data is correct, but this seems reasonable. It is also not my intent to jump to pilot error - there are undoubtedly possible valid reasons for this.
However, it does suggest there was something possibly going on prior to the bird strike or potentially pilot performance shortfalls; notably the flight was apparently late, and maintaining speed until the last minute could be a decision made in an attempt to regain schedule (though I'm unsure how much room there would be for pilot aggressiveness within ATC directions). This could also correlate with keeping flaps at minimum extension.
The time between bird strike and landing is of some interest. Single engine takeoff capability is a standard design requirement for any commercial twinjet, and further the design criteria is likely more stringent that the actual condition of JJA2216 (certification required at maximum takeoff/landing weight, and likely at higher temperature/elevation). Consequently, there is every reason to believe the aircraft should have been able to fly reasonable well even with an engine out; this is demonstrated by the fact that it did continue well enough to pass the airport, reverse and line up for the reciprocal landing. This fact also indicates the control system was working reasonably well; the aircraft is clearly well aligned and on runway heading.
Also, again from the 737-800 link above, normal altitude to lower landing gear is 2000-2400 ft, with 15* flaps simultaneously, and landing flaps >1500 ft elevation. Consequently, the aircraft arguably should have been fully configured for landing at the time of the bird strike, and landing gear should have been lowered well prior.
I have some difficulty coming up with a scenario in which a technical problem would result in this series of events. Procedural or technical problems could certainly result of both engines or a loss or aircraft control, but the post incident maneuvering and quite accurate alignment with the runway for landing indicate that power and control were both maintained to a significant degree. Conversely, failing to lower the landing gear, lack of flaps/slats, landing at overly high speed and most of the way down the runway and lack of speed brakes are difficult to ascribe to a mechanical issue. In all likelihood there was a complex error chain, but I suspect a large share will come down poor pilot performance.
Also as a general note, air travel is, and remains incredibly safe. While there is undoubtedly things to be learned from every incident, there is also considerable complexity in these systems, and some level of unavoidable (apt very very low) residual risk. There's a real risk of reduced overall system safety as a result of configuration changes to address a specific one off failure. For instance, the proposal to use either wireless or embedded conductors to replace legacy control circuits would induced many new failure modes and potential complex interactions which highly likely make the likelihood or consequences of failure more likely then just accepting the risk that a 'golden bb' act of god will cause an accident.
Likewise with the hype about the block wall - a reliable and functional ILS system is of some importance for safe operation in bad weather, and a location other than the standard one would reduce reliability/add potential problems. Below grade has risk of it's own - what happens when the ILS (which is most critical during bad weather) is covered in snow because it's in a pit?
Wanking about the block wall also misses a more significant point - aircraft going places at high speed outside of a runway/taxiway is almost invariably ending poorly, and in many cases rather fatally so. A rather fragile aluminum tube at 100+ kts is going to have a really bad day pretty much regardless of what it hits. This was a rather spectacular one admittedly, but the outcome is unlikely to have been much better had it hit the perimeter fence, trees, roadway, etc. etc. Yes, aircraft have gone off the runway with minimal issue in the past, but they generally aren't going 100+ kts when they did so. This is the key concern here - the aircraft departed the runway at considerable speed, and this would have almost invariably have caused similar end result. So choosing to focus on the block wall as a proximal issue completely misses the larger picture.
A proper risk evaluation would need to consider all aspects of the incident, and evaluate both the probability of reoccurrence and the consequences of proposed mitigations. Much clearly went wrong here that resulted in the aircraft being in a situation where the wall was relevant. One must consider how likely that is to happen again. Conversely, one must also consider the impact of changes - i.e. changes to the ILS array are likely to impact reliability of ILS, which likely increases risk of different accidents. If the later is more likely than the former, change would be rather unwise. Adding to this is the question of it would even matter. For instance, a pit for ILS antennas is only marginally less likely to cause catastrophic destruction of a wayward 150 kt 737 than a brick wall.
I have some difficulty coming up with a scenario in which a technical problem would result in this series of events. Procedural or technical problems could certainly result of both engines or a loss or aircraft control, but the post incident maneuvering and quite accurate alignment with the runway for landing indicate that power and control were both maintained to a significant degree. Conversely, failing to lower the landing gear, lack of flaps/slats, landing at overly high speed and most of the way down the runway and lack of speed brakes are difficult to ascribe to a mechanical issue. In all likelihood there was a complex error chain, but I suspect a large share will come down poor pilot performance.
I dunno, the Boise Idaho airport has a "bridge to nowhere" extending over the road outside the airport perimeter that carries the ILS antennas. The runways are very close to the airport perimeter at the west end of the airport, so those antennas had to go outside the fence. But even the ILS antennas at the other end of the runway are still pretty significantly elevated above the ground. 20-40ft just to get to the base of the antenna system.
Again, the problem is that not only did this accident involve a runway excursion, but a runway excursion at high speed. Plane was doomed as soon as they got caught in ground effect and floated down the runway for 10 seconds.
Had the gear been down--might the fuselage have slipped over the berm--lower baggage area shaved off?
Also--might hearing the chirping of "don't sink" have spooked the pilot into being less aggressive in putting down?
If some supernatural entity were to take me back in time and put me in the pilot's body at the start of the slide...I might have tried to angle in--maybe break up earlier. In NASCAR, the more spectacular the accident--the less fatal. Hit a wall and just STOP? That's the worst.
I forgot the flight number, but there was a passenger plane that put down behind some buildings blocking the videographer--then emerging in a gap. That plane was gradually cartwheeling and coming apart in a spectacular way, but a number of folks survived.
Assuming a mechanical-only failure, this might be the one in a trillion crash where you want to break up sooner.
Apparently Monday another Jeju aircraft returned to its origin, Gimpo Airport, because it couldn't raise its landing gear. (The airline uses exclusively 737-800 and 737-8 MAX)
Jeju until this week had a perfect safety record, its not like its an airline known for cutting corners on aircraft maintenance.
I don't think anyone suggested that mass is literally gone, but more that the visible bulk of the aircraft can seem to "disappear." A seemingly solid airframe will shred itself into small fragments on high-speed impact with a hard structure.
9/11 conspiracy theorists are fond of dismissing the Pentagon impact by asking "where did the plane go?" Answer is it's all still there, just pulverized and compacted.
I'll leave it up to any interested parties to take an empty aluminium/aluminum (alcoholic or nonalcoholic, doesn't really matter) beverage can and crush it, especially *after* submitting said empty can to an extreme short sharp shock heat wave, and report back to the forum with their findings.
I suggest you consider the circumstances of BD092 of the 8 Jan 1989 where the same claim could be made except there was human error while dealing with a failure.
I know I may well be pushing a nuclear discussion button here, but national cultural norms in terms of deference to authority figures vs. independent critical thinking just *might* have played a role as well. Let the voice recorder tell its story in this respect as well.
The problem is that it is better to have one large run of wires in a single large hole in ribs or spars than it is to have multiple smaller runs of wires in multiple smaller holes.
It's physically stronger for those ribs and spars, and it's easier to install a single wire run. (Maintenance may or may not be easier, since tracing wires is easier but replacing them is a PITA)
There is literally strength in numbers, so routing cable bundles trough a single orifice than having multiple individual structure punctures for every single wire is a sound engineering principle for maintenance, mass, and design simplicity reasons.
I know I may well be pushing a nuclear discussion button here, but national cultural norms in terms of deference to authority figures vs. independent critical thinking just *might* have played a role as well. Let the voice recorder tell its story in this respect as well.
There is literally strength in numbers, so routing cable bundles trough a single orifice than having multiple individual structure punctures for every single wire is a sound engineering principle for maintenance, mass, and design simplicity reasons.
Any wireless control system offers a point of intrusion for malicious actors never mind possibility of intentional or accidental jamming. Look at the recent Russian shoot down, what likely magnified the likelihood of the accident beyond it simply being in an active warzone during an attack was the airplanes navigation and communications were both being jammed.
And look at the US for example of possible future issues where the FAA had to direct aircraft modifications because aircraft altimeters were using the same 5G band C as the US mobile phone network, mobile networks have agreed not to install 5G near US airports until 2028, several hundred US based aircraft missed the June 30th 2023 FAA deadline to make sure their altimeters were compatible and as of the moment Instrumented Landings are still banned in the US despite widespread use in the rest of the world.
Wireless internal controls is opening a whole can of worms that should just not be touched. Yes an external ability to take command remotely in an emergency would probably be ok in the case of pilot incapacitation, but aircraft should never be relying on a wireless network for systems communication inside the aircraft.
The possibility of hacker-hijack could be eliminated due to the very short length of time it takes a line of sight transmitter from the cockpit to reach the tail say.
A hacker a distance away isn't going to make as quick a handshake back and forth.
Just a WAG, but was this one of those airports where the ILS only operates in one direction along the runway ? My thought is that the original, planned approach was to be to the non-ILS end of the runway, then the pilot, for whatever reason, decided they needed to make use of the ILS, hence the reversal of landing direction . . .
Just a WAG, but was this one of those airports where the ILS only operates in one direction along the runway ? My thought is that the original, planned approach was to be to the non-ILS end of the runway, then the pilot, for whatever reason, decided they needed to make use of the ILS, hence the reversal of landing direction . . .
Or it was just much less distance to get to the ground? Pilot aborted landing and instead of a full circle around the airport following traffic pattern went for an immediate 180 to land.
GA folks call that "the impossible turn" when you're talking about engine failure on takeoff, mostly because it's the only engine and you don't have enough speed/altitude/energy to safely do a 180 and line back up on the runway.
In this case, Pilot had one mostly-working engine but unknown levels of damage to flaps and gear (or hydraulics), so staying in the air wasn't impossible but you sure as hell do NOT want to spend any more time in the air than you have to.
I think I'd end up doing the same, opting for an immediate 180 instead of following traffic pattern.
One thing many are flagging is airspeed, without flaps and landing gear you get about 50 knots more ground speed with the same thrust and you really should be throttling right down to a lower level than you would normally expect. Some pilots were talking about on Airbus aircraft training they make a point of stressing to students how surprisingly low the thrust setting should be to achieve the same approach speed for a belly landing vs gear down but that by contrast its not stressed in Boeing training.
One thing many are flagging is airspeed, without flaps and landing gear you get about 50 knots more ground speed with the same thrust and you really should be throttling right down.
The aircraft had enough power as the 180 turn tells us (climb, bank, pull).
The choice of the reverse rwy direction for landing has in effect not much consequences as the winds were null. So, one way or another is logical.
Regarding wireless flight controls, I took great care of adding backup emergency, cockpit activated and directional in my choice of language
If you have a directional antenna from the cockpit to the tail, there is no chance a bad boy inside the fuselage would jam or interfere with the signal.
However, a fighter jet flying in formation might be able to overpower it (see it as an end to hijacking).
A microwave directional antenna only transmits 50% of its strength in the chosen beam shape, a lot of the signal leaks to the side and 10% of the signal strength is transmitted in the complete opposite direction to the antenna orientation. You would have to have a say 1m wide cavity from one end of the aircraft to the other wrapped in anechoic tiles for nose to tail backup communications, then how do you communicate with the wings, have another set of directional antennas pointing outwards from the centre of the aircraft?.
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