Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?

[orlovsky]

Hornets should have worked on the Clems with fighter weights and were seriously considered.

Mc Donnell-Douglas F-18 (FN) Hornet [in french]

"Les experts et ingénieurs de la Marine et de la firme américaine constatent que seules quelques modifications mineures (le prix d'un F-18 à l'époque), notamment sur les déflecteurs de jets et les catapultes, sont nécessaires."

Catapult adjustment would probably be the nose tow for the Hornet.
Just odd that the site is talking about Northrop as the american firm...

Can't see a reason against A-7, only in overload condition probably too heavy for the cats.

 

[Archibald]

Hornets were marginal, barely two wingtip AAMs and a reduced fuel load to keep them at 19 tons or less. Same weight limit as A-7s. Clems catapults couldn't do much better than 19 tons at 110 kt (from memory)

 

[orlovsky]

F/A-18A, internal fuel, 1 drop tank, 2 AIM-7, 2 AIM-9 ~39.5k lbs ~ 18 metric t.
Should be~130 kt min end speed, with safety margin ~140-145 kts.
Catapult+engines ~115-120 kts.

 

[uk 75]

The North Atlantic, especially after 1966, drives the equipment of the Royal Navy towards a focus on anti-submarine warfare.
But its aircraft carriers do not contribute much to this effort once the Gannet/Seamew no longer serve in the ASW role.
The job of the four in service fleet carriers until 1966 is to provide at least one carrier at Singapore with a second in transit in the Med or Indian Ocean. CVA01 to 03 were intended to take on this role in the 70s.
I dont think any serious historians challenge the correctness of the UK decision to withdraw from its military commitments East of Suez and then in the Mediterranean to focus on the Soviet threat in the Atlantic.
From 1966 the need is for a platform for Seaking helos in the ASW role. This can be combined with the need to move Royal Marines to Norway and the UK Mobile Force to Denmark.
The doctrinaire anti carrier approach of Ministers and some Admirals from 1966 has to be seen against the need to get sufficient fleet nuclear submarined and high tech T42 and T22 escorts into service. The Escort later Command Cruiser with its gas turbines and all missile armament (Seadart and initially Exocet) fitted this vision more than the old carriers. It did not help that the Soviets managed without them too.
A Soviet carrier force would have made the UK pause. The emergence even of the Freehand and then the Kiev and its Forgers plays a part in getting Sea Harriers developed into being just than a few anti-snooper add ons.

 

[uk 75]

Now let us suppose the UK is in much better financial and industrial shape in 1966.
The continuing war in Vietnam is diverting US attention from other trouble spots. The Beira sanctions patrol against Rhodesia is one of many out of area commitments needing carriers.
CVA01 is still a headache. It is complicated and may take ages to build. The need for a permanent carrier at Singapore has receded with the end of the Confrontation. It is still planned to withdraw from the Gulf and Aden by the end of the decade.
Cabinet decides to retain two carriers into the 1970s but the Phantoms will go to the RAF. However the new Anglo French Variable Geometry Aircraft (AFVG) will replace RAF Lightnings and FAA Sea Vixens in the early 1970s.
Buccaneer S2s will continue to serve but following the cancellation of TSR2 (its costs cannot be brought under control) Buccaneer S3s will be bought for both the RN and RAF.

 

[zen]

If....AFVG goes ahead, it certainly is suggestive of the French desire for a Fighter, rather than a Strike machine. Aiming for 12tons, and likely a lot closer to AW.406 requirements than the F4K.
Which thus meshes with the concept of the S.3 Buccaneer funded...to the cost of MRCA participation.

This could also see the more limited MRI variant of AFVG funded instead of the Supersonic Trainer. Essentially ditching Jaguar to get the more potent AFVG.
Training being dealt with by something like Hawk or Alphajet.

Funding CVA-01 does potentially alter French decisions.
Above all it keeps astrong relationship between the MN AN and RN FAA.

 

[uk 75]

CVA01 I think is a bit like TSR2. It tried to introduce too many innovations into one project. I don't think it could have been built without delays and cost overruns even in this alt UK.
France and the UK could have worked together on carriers to replace Foch/Clem and Eagle/Hermes in the 80s in this alt world where the UK is not so rigidly tied to NATO.
Something still has to give. Fewer S class SSN get built and cooperation with the US on ASW is not as close.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The first sentence of Post 389.

I think the UK doing a better job of maintaining carrier based air power is closely related to the UK doing a better job of managing its aerospace industry.

Derek Wood's Scenario 1945​

Let us turn the clock back to 1945, and see what might have been done. Instead of the Ministry of Supply, a small compact ministry is set up to deal purely with aviation: it has strong and clearly defined ties with the operational requirements and planning branches of the Services and good links with the airlines. The fiat goes out that teams must be strengthened and the number of companies reduced – otherwise no contracts. Hawker Siddeley, in particular is told to stop internal competition among its teams and present one joint design to any particular specification. Firms are urged to specialise and stop trying their hands at everything from bombers to light aircraft. The Services are informed that they must consider the civil market and exports in any transport specification they issue.

Britain is far behind in high speed aerodynamics and there is a complete lack of understanding of what is transonic and what is supersonic. Pocketing its pride, the Government, calls for the assembly of one key high speed research/design team from Germany. It is brought to Britain with its facilities and put to work alongside a group of British companies and the Royal Aircraft Establishment with the intention of producing a transonic Derwent-powered prototype of a swept-wing aircraft on which to base future military types. The Miles M.52 straight wing Mach 1.5 research aircraft is well down the road and must be continued to the flight test stage. It is therefore, decreed that the programme be accelerated and the technical back-up reinforced. Arrangements are made for Miles to amalgamate its M.52 team with one of the larger companies, one condition being that it retains its identity as a division within that firm. M.52 contracts are guaranteed and the 5,000lb (2,268gk) thrust Rolls Royce Nene engine is specified.

Numerous technical problems are encountered and the first prototype is written-off in a heavy landing. All lessons learned are incorporated into the second M.52 which flies with a Nene incorporating aft-fan and burners in the exhaust duct. In the early summer of 1947, this aircraft successfully flies "through the barrier" in level flight, months ahead of the USA's rocket-powered Bell X-1. As a result of the German team's work RAE, three test-bed prototypes of a transonic aircraft are built to give vital aerodynamic knowledge. This is applied to a new generation of swept-wing fighters and bombers. The team is ultimately absorbed into one of the new unified industry groups.

Derek Wood's Scenario 1952​

How, does the scene look with a P.1081 type given top priority by the RAF and the Fleet Air Arm? The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming. Naval jet experience has been gained with three squadrons of Sea Vampires and the straight wing, tail wheel undercarriage Sea Attacker has been abandoned. An RAF Squadron is operating alongside F-86’s in the Korean War and the naval squadron is preparing to embark on HMS Eagle for service in Korean waters. The P.1081 proves itself a match for the Mig15 in dog fighting over the Yalu River and with rockets and bombs does useful work in the ground attack role. The Fleet Air Arm cross-operates with US Navy carriers and for a period flies from the land base alongside the RAF.

The results are far-reaching. There is a massive inflow into the Air Ministry of up-to-date data and many young pilots are rotated through the Korean squadron to gain combat experience. Eight RAF squadrons in Britain and Germany are equipped with P.1081s and the type forms the spearhead of Fighter Command until the full advent of the Hunter in 1955-56. The vital decision is to re-equip the Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons with P.1081s and, for export, Government finance is made available for the P.1081 to be re-engined with the up-rated Rolls Royce Tay engine with afterburner. Impressed with the P.1081’s performance, the first nation to order the type is Australia. Thereafter a total of 250 are sold abroad.

The P1081’s successor, the Hunter, is chosen as the basis for long-term development. After the introduction of the Avon Hunter into RAF service, a prototype of the P.1083 variant, with 50-degree sweep and fully variable afterburning, is flown in the autumn of 1953. It is ordered into production. The P.1083 Hunter enters service in late 1956, and the RAF has its first genuine supersonic aircraft at the same time that the US Air Force introduces the Convair F-102 delta. The P.1083 proves capable of 800mph at sea level and around 780mph at 36,000ft. Export sales boom and a further development is ordered, with a two per cent thinner wing and equipped with either air-to-air missiles or ground attack weapons. Production of single or two-seat Hunters continues into the 1970’s, mainly for export.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Link to Post 291 in which I proposed cancelling all aircraft carriers that hadn't been launched in January 1946 (amongst other things) and building six 1952 Aircraft Carriers 1950-61.

The first sentence of Post 389.

I think the UK doing a better job of maintaining carrier based air power is closely related to the UK doing a better job of managing its aerospace industry.

Link to Post 448 which contained Derek Wood's Scenarios 1945 and 1952.

I "went large" with aircraft carriers in Post 291 and I want to "go large" with the British aerospace industry too, because doing a better job of managing the British aerospace industry is closely related to the UK doing a better job of maintaining carrier based air power.

One of my maxims is "if you're going to do something, do it properly" and if @uk 75 to do a better job of maintaining carrier based air power, I want to do it properly for him. That's why I wrote Post 295 and that's why I will do a combination of Wood's Scenarios 1945 and 1952. However, to paraphrase Eric Morecambe my posts may not be in chronological order.

If anyone thinks it's a fantasy, all alternative history is a fantasy. They should think of it as an ideal plan and then consider how much of it could plausibly have been achieved. For what it's worth my opinion is that what I shall propose is plausible (or I wouldn't be proposing it) with the caveat that it's the high end of what is plausible.

 

[starviking]

Part of Post 335.

Some plausibility/feasibility checks before I write Part Two.

At present in my "Version of History" long-lead items for the first trio are ordered in 1948, the hulls are ordered in 1949 and they are laid down in 1950 with Argus & ALT-Eagle completed in 1955 to Standard B & ALT-Hermes completed in 1958 to Standard A. The second trio are ordered in 1951 as part of the 1951 Rearmament Programme, but they weren't laid down until 1954 and completed 1959-61 to Standard A.

The theory behind that is that the money spent after January 1946 on completing Ark Royal, Eagle, the Centaur class & the Tiger class and the 1950-58 "Great Rebuild" of Victorious & Centaur's 1956-58 refit would go a long way towards paying for 6 new & better ships on the theory that "steel is cheap & air is free". The first pair were completed in 1955 because that's when Ark Royal was completed. ALT-Hermes is laid down in 1950 & completed in 1958 because she takes the place of the 1950-58 "Great Rebuild" of Victorious. As I understand it the decision to complete the Tiger class was taken in 1951 but work on them didn't begin until 1954. That is why Courageous, Furious & Glorious are ordered in 1951 but not laid down until 1954 and they are completed 1959-61 because that's when the Tiger class were completed. The money spent on Real-Hermes 1951-59 is spent on building Courageous, Glorious & Furious 1951-59. The money spent on Real-Eagle's 1959-64 is either spent on the first major refits of Argus & ALT-Eagle (in which they were upgraded to Standard A) or the portion spent 1959-61 is instead spent on completing Furious & Glorious.

Just one point, and before I make it I have to say I’m very much enjoying your posts. The Great Rebuild was problematic because of the late discovery of the poor state of the boilers. It’s pretty inconceivable that ALT-Hermes will suffer any problem that will require stopping the build near completion, stripping, and restarting. Given Argus and ALT-Eagle have preceded her, she is likely to be completed faster than their 5-years.

 

[Hood]

Derek Wood's scenarios are intriguing but they have a lot of handwaving.

The time is summer 1952. The RAF has three squadrons of P.1081s in service and the Royal Navy one, with a further unit forming.

Sounds pukka but let's not forget in the real world that the first production Sea Hawk F.1 did not fly until 14 November 1951. That's over four years after the first prototype flew! By that metric a production P.1081 wasn't likely until 1953-54 (P.1067 Hunter took 3 years exactly).

I guess in a less-hand waving scenario a production swept-wing P.1052 Sea Hawk might have been possible in late 1952 (P.1052 sea trials went on until mid-1952). Even that would be 4 years after the prototype flight.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Just one point, and before I make it I have to say I’m very much enjoying your posts.

Thank you. I feel flattered.

The Great Rebuild was problematic because of the late discovery of the poor state of the boilers. It’s pretty inconceivable that ALT-Hermes will suffer any problem that will require stopping the build near completion, stripping, and restarting. Given Argus and ALT-Eagle have preceded her, she is likely to be completed faster than their 5-years.

FWIW (1) What delays the completion of ALT-Hermes is the decision to complete her to Standard A instead of Standard B. The difference between the two standards being the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT. I have written that in other posts, but not the one that you quoted. Those systems weren't available in 1955 in the "Real World" and I think they can't be made available 3 years sooner in this "Version of History". If I did Argus, ALT-Eagle & ALT-Hermes would have been completed in 1955 to Standard A in my "Version of History".

Edit: Yes I did say she was completed to Standard A instead of Standard B. Viz.

At present in my "Version of History" long-lead items for the first trio are ordered in 1948, the hulls are ordered in 1949 and they are laid down in 1950 with Argus & ALT-Eagle completed in 1955 to Standard B & ALT-Hermes completed in 1958 to Standard A. The second trio are ordered in 1951 as part of the 1951 Rearmament Programme, but they weren't laid down until 1954 and completed 1959-61 to Standard A.

FWIW (2) Argus, ALT-Eagle & ALT-Hermes are laid down in 1950 so Argus & ALT-Eagle don't precede her and therefore she can't be built in less than their 5 years.

FWIW (3) Something that I haven't written yet is that the first batch of 3 ships was completed one to four years late because when the hulls were ordered in 1949 the builders were put under contract to deliver the ships in 1954. This is because the "Great Rebuild" of Victorious was to have taken 4 years. And when the second batch of 3 ships was ordered in 1951 the builders were under contract to deliver them in 1957, but they were delivered 2 to 4 years late.

FWIW (4) On the subject of the "Great Rebuild" of Victorious, Marriott wrote.

Work on this was proceeding when it was retrospectively decided that new boilers would be installed to replace the old Admiralty pattern units, some of which had been damaged in an accidental fire.

Therefore, the real reason for the poor state of the boilers was the fire and therefore the delay wasn't due to lack of foresight by the Admiralty and was really inadequate fire precautions at Portsmouth Dockyard. If new boilers had been fitted from the start they (like the original boilers) would have been damaged by the fire and if the damage was severe enough would have required replacement by "new" new boilers.

I've also read that the refit took twice as long to complete than originally planned by the decision to fit a a fully-angled fight deck, a Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT. Therefore, the completion of Victorious would have been delayed until 1958 regardless of the decision to replace the boilers and regardless of why that decision was made, because as already written the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT couldn't be made ready any sooner.

 

[Archibald]

Victorious really was a red herring, if not a death trap - as far as modernization / rebuild was concerned. Much like the "extended Illustrious family" of carriers (let's call it that way: the six carriers).

The more I dig into all those carriers, the more I think only one was worth modernizing and rebuilding: HMS Eagle. The biggest of the lot (Audacious vs Illustriouses vs Centaur) - yet not in poor shape like Ark Royal. And since the third Audacious had been canned in infancy...

I know it would be impossible for many reasons (east of suez and countless others) , but sometimes I wonder whether RN should not had pulled out an Aéronavale and switched to a 2*carriers format ASAP afer 1945. Basically HMS Eagle + another carrier, rebuild and modernized (Hermes seems the best of them all). And that's it.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Derek Wood's scenarios are intriguing but they have a lot of handwaving.

In his defence he did refer to Scenario 1945 as glorious wishful thinking and according to Gardner in this history of BAC the Atlee Government wanted to rationalise the British aircraft industry, but its plans were overtaken by the Korean War.

Sounds pukka but let's not forget in the real world that the first production Sea Hawk F.1 did not fly until 14 November 1951. That's over four years after the first prototype flew! By that metric a production P.1081 wasn't likely until 1953-54 (P.1067 Hunter took 3 years exactly).

Why are people saying metric instead of measurement?

I guess in a less-hand waving scenario a production swept-wing P.1052 Sea Hawk might have been possible in late 1952 (P.1052 sea trials went on until mid-1952). Even that would be 4 years after the prototype flight.

At present I'm thinking of the Sea Hawk entering service at exactly the same time in my "Version of History". The difference is that instead of it being the P.1040 it's the P.1081. What makes that possible are the lessons learned from the Derwent-powered prototype built by the German engineers.

I'm also hoping that lessons learned from that aircraft and the non-cancelled Miles M.52 will avoid some of the development problems that the DH.110, Hunter, Javelin, Scimitar, Swift & V-bombers (which are still built in my "Version of History") had in the "Real World". I'm also hoping that the lessons learned help with the design of the Mach one-and-a-bit developments of DH.110, Javeln (Thin-Wing Javelin), Hunter (P.1083), Scimitar & Swift (Type 545) that succeed them, the Mach 2 heavy fighter (British Phantom) that I want developed instead of the Lightning & Sea Vixen and the complimentary Mach 2 light fighter developed from the P.1083 that is built instead of the Hunter FGA.9 & FR.10.

 

[uk 75]

May I take this opportunity to thank everyone who has contributed so much information to this thread,
Anyone sceptical about the value of asking what-if? should see how much "real world" data has been featured here.

 

[Hood]

Why are people saying metric instead of measurement?

It's metrification.

I'm also hoping that lessons learned from that aircraft and the non-cancelled Miles M.52 will avoid some of the development problems that the DH.110, Hunter, Javelin, Scimitar, Swift & V-bombers (which are still built in my "Version of History") had in the "Real World". I'm also hoping that the lessons learned help with the design of the Mach one-and-a-bit developments of DH.110, Javeln (Thin-Wing Javelin), Hunter (P.1083), Scimitar & Swift (Type 545) that succeed them, the Mach 2 heavy fighter (British Phantom) that I want developed instead of the Lightning & Sea Vixen and the complimentary Mach 2 light fighter developed from the P.1083 that is built instead of the Hunter FGA.9 & FR.10.

I will sit here grinding my teeth in (comparative) silence so I don't derail the thread (too much).
I'm increasingly sceptical that the Mach one-and-a-bit designs were feasible, not from a technological standpoint, but from an industrial point of view.
Elsewhere in these AH threads I have lambasted the slowness of the Attacker, Sea Hawk, Sea Vixen and Scimitar to get through development with all kinds of interim prototypes and swept-wing one-off derivatives cropping up and derailing the core developments.
For example - imagine if the P-84B Thunderjet had taken 4 years to develop and hadn't entered service until 1951...
The F9F Panther flew in 1947 and was carrier qualified and in service in 1949. Now I know that the US had tons of economic muscle and facilities and manpower and brains and the UK was broke, cold, short of materials, energy and drive, but there should have been some kind of happy medium ground.
The Mach one-and-a-bit designs were probably 3-5 years too late. If Sandys hadn't axed the last of them in 1957 they might have limped on until 1960, warmed-up late 40s designs just in service in time to be obsolete. Although I will say that Wood's idea of P.1081 leading to Hunter being the P.1083 instead of P.1067 is a good idea and I could get behind that dream.

Gardner in this history of BAC the Atlee Government wanted to rationalise the British aircraft industry, but its plans were overtaken by the Korean War.

Yes they were, or at least the Ministry of Supply was.
The rationalisation (such as it was) would have been aimed at maintaining thirteen companies as viable production units, kept in work by issuing only three or four operational requirements each year and the resulting development programmes would sustain nine or ten design teams. Manpower was to be about 150,000 workers in total.
We could have fun in another topic coming up with our Super Top Trumps thirteen companies and ten design teams.

 

[Pirate Pete]

Hornets should have worked on the Clems with fighter weights and were seriously considered.

Mc Donnell-Douglas F-18 (FN) Hornet [in french]

"Les experts et ingénieurs de la Marine et de la firme américaine constatent que seules quelques modifications mineures (le prix d'un F-18 à l'époque), notamment sur les déflecteurs de jets et les catapultes, sont nécessaires."

Catapult adjustment would probably be the nose tow for the Hornet.
Just odd that the site is talking about Northrop as the american firm...

Can't see a reason against A-7, only in overload condition probably too heavy for the cats.

Alight divergence from thread subject matter….

I haven’t had a chance to read a translation of the article as yet, but I think you will find that the reference to Northrop is because the Genesis of the F.18 was the Northrop YF.17 which was the competitor of the F.16 (then YF.16) for the U.S.A.F. lightweight fighter competition.

 

[uk 75]

As the originator of this thread I have no problem with contributors going off on tangents as long as they bring information as well as arguments and keep it good natured.

 

[orlovsky]

Alight divergence from thread subject matter….

I haven’t had a chance to read a translation of the article as yet, but I think you will find that the reference to Northrop is because the Genesis of the F.18 was the Northrop YF.17 which was the competitor of the F.16 (then YF.16) for the U.S.A.F. lightweight fighter competition.

These threads are drifting a lot, but it is closely related as the Clems used British catapults and arrestor gear (with modifications) and the F-8E(FN)/F-8J/speyed Crusader keeps popping up as an easy solution.
I think it was not. An F-8J with internal fuel and 4 sidewinders would require more WOD for catapulting than a longnoselegged F-4B with internal fuel and 4 sparrows.
Northrop, sure, but the time is 1988, Northrop was just the subcontractor, and the F-18/F-18L lawsuit had been settled in 1985.

 

[Archibald]

The article mentions YF-17 (with J101s, not F404s) because circa 1978 it was tested by french pilots... of the Armée de l'Air. Not the Aéronavale, and btw YF-17 wasn't a Hornet yet: not navalized. It was just a test, France had no use for YF-17.

 

[JFC Fuller]

Don't just blame the RN for studying the flexible deck. The trials on Warrior were in 1948/9. I recently came across these articles stating USN interest went on to at least 1953, when they built such a deck at Pax River.

https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/december/landing-aircraft-carrier-without-wheels

Aircraft Carriers With Rubber Decks Were A Bad Idea

The British and Americans toyed with the idea of flexible aircraft carrier decks from which to operate wheelless jet aircraft.

www.thedrive.com

Why were they studying this in 1953 when Britain had provided the solution to landing high performance jet aircraft on a carrier deck, and shared it with the USN in Aug/Sept 1951 and the USN had Antietam at sea with the first angled deck in Dec 1952?

The flexible deck and the angled deck offered different things, and were complimentary. The flexible deck offered an opportunity to reduce aircraft weight, or increase performance for a given weight (the RAF was interested in it for that reason), whilst providing a more benign landing. The angled deck was, at its core, a solution to congestion/deck space challenges caused by larger and faster jet aircraft.

The deck layouts @Hood referred to include one that combines the two approaches. However, by the time they were drawn (mid-1953) the mood was turning against the flexible deck concept. There were several challenges with it that had never been credibly overcome, specifically what to do with ASW and AEW types with propellers, limitations on where ordnance could be put on the aircraft, how to recover an aircraft at a shore facility without a flexible deck, catapulting challenges and the inability of the system to have more than one arrestor wire. In the meantime the RAE had been looking at the VTOL concept and this was latched onto as an alternative to the flexible deck. My own interpretation was that VTOL aircraft were a good excuse to drop a concept that was, by then, clearly becoming a dead-end. That said, VTOL became a bit of an obsession for the next 2-3 years with carrier concepts being shown with vertical landing zones and basic requirements being written for VTOL interceptors. Ultimately, the RN settled on STOL, jet deflection in NA.47 (P.177) and lift jets/trim engines in OR.346. For the latter, the objective was to get landing speeds down to 80 knots.

As an addendum, the earliest drawings of angled deck layouts, from mid-1951, show a ramp at the end of the deck that was intended to provide additional lift to aircraft that had missed the wires and needed to go round again. It feels like a foreshadowing of the ski jump.

 

[PMN1]

As an addendum, the earliest drawings of angled deck layouts, from mid-1951, show a ramp at the end of the deck that was intended to provide additional lift to aircraft that had missed the wires and needed to go round again. It feels like a foreshadowing of the ski jump.

Furious had a ramp to assist in launching Barracudas off Norway....at least she did in a photo which I can no longer find.

Edit; Found it, filed under a diffent name, interestingly this Barracuda appears to be already off the deck - 830 sqn for reference
under a

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It's metrification.

I'm being very blond today. Do you mean that it's short for metrification (like disconnect is short of disconnection) or because of the metric system?

“Why are they going to disappear him?"​

"I don't know."​

"It doesn't make sense. It isn't even good grammar."​

― Joseph Heller, Catch-22​

I will sit here grinding my teeth in (comparative) silence so I don't derail the thread (too much).

I'm increasingly sceptical that the Mach one-and-a-bit designs were feasible, not from a technological standpoint, but from an industrial point of view.
Elsewhere in these AH threads I have lambasted the slowness of the Attacker, Sea Hawk, Sea Vixen and Scimitar to get through development with all kinds of interim prototypes and swept-wing one-off derivatives cropping up and derailing the core developments.
For example - imagine if the P-84B Thunderjet had taken 4 years to develop and hadn't entered service until 1951...
The F9F Panther flew in 1947 and was carrier qualified and in service in 1949. Now I know that the US had tons of economic muscle and facilities and manpower and brains and the UK was broke, cold, short of materials, energy and drive, but there should have been some kind of happy medium ground.
The Mach one-and-a-bit designs were probably 3-5 years too late. If Sandys hadn't axed the last of them in 1957 they might have limped on until 1960, warmed-up late 40s designs just in service in time to be obsolete. Although I will say that Wood's idea of P.1081 leading to Hunter being the P.1083 instead of P.1067 is a good idea and I could get behind that dream.

Points taken. What's your opinion on the Spectre (British Phantom) that I want designed & built in place of the Lighting & Sea Vixen? That's at the top of the list of what I want done.

Yes they were, or at least the Ministry of Supply was.

The rationalisation (such as it was) would have been aimed at maintaining thirteen companies as viable production units, kept in work by issuing only three or four operational requirements each year and the resulting development programmes would sustain nine or ten design teams. Manpower was to be about 150,000 workers in total.
We could have fun in another topic coming up with our Super Top Trumps thirteen companies and ten design teams.

For what it's worth my plan is rather similar to what @Pirate Pete suggested in your "Super Top Trumps" thread because (for convenience) I'm keeping it close to the real reorganisation of 1960 too. However, I'm doing it between 1945 and 1948 so that the new firms are in being when the ALT-versions of B.35/46 Issue 2, F.3/48, F.4/48 and F.23/49 were issued.

 

[zen]

Must we digress?

metric - Wiktionary, the free dictionary

en.m.wiktionary.org

And in ironic outcome
Mete-ric could also be construed as 'measure-rule', which is quote appropriate.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Eagle (the original one from 1942) was only 26% complete when cancelled in Dec 1945. £1.95m spent. Cancellation was estimated to save £5.5m to complete to original design. Then add extra costs for completion to Eagle (ex Audacious) Standard, or more to Ark Royal standards. Where will money come from?

Although you were referring to the Eagle cancelled at the end of World War II it also applies to the ships that I've proposed to build.

Not modernising Victorious and not completing the whole of the Audacious, Centaur & Tiger classes would cover more than half the cost of six 1952 carriers built 1950-61 and not building the Invincible class 1973-85 covers more than half the cost of building three CVA.01s be they the Real version or the GT version proposed by yours truly. I also think that building a homogenous class of 6 ships in the 1950s rather than the real rag tag fugitive fleet we know and love will produce an economies of scale effect. I also think that building all 3 CVA.01s in one yard (on the Clyde or on the Tyne) will help. However, in spite of steel being cheap and air being free the money spent in the "Real World" plus the cost reductions I have suggested will not "get us over the financial line".

So we need a better performing British economy, a British Government that will spend more on defence, a British electorate that will accept the higher taxes or inferior social services, paying more interest on the National Debt because the Government paid the difference on the "never never" or spending less on something else.

Paying for them with more government borrowing is probably affordable because its tens of millions of Pounds added to a National Debt that was already in the tens of billions in the 1950s and hundreds of million of Pounds added to a National Debt that was already in the hundreds of billions in the 1980s. The 1952 Aircraft Carriers might cost less to run than the real ships, because we've established that they would have had similar crews to Ark Royal & Eagle and they'll be carrying similar size air groups and they might be spending less time in dockyard hands due to being better built and being built with a good measure of future proofing.

Spending less on something else is one reason why doing a better job of managing the British aerospace industry is closely related to the UK doing a better job of maintaining carrier based airpower.

Going backwards for Christmas.

• Not scrapping the strike carriers means AEW isn't taken over by the RAF so no No. 8 Squadron and no need for an aircraft to replace it's Shackletons and therefore in the region of a billion Pounds is saved from not having a Nimrod AEW programme 1977-86.
  • That would have paid for 4½ Invincibles (i.e. Ark Royal cost £220 million) and might have paid for 3 CVA.01s (or at least the thick end of them) on its own.
  • The RAF can still have an AEW capability because the RAF can still have its Boeing Sentries.
• The British contribution to the R&D and production costs of Concorde.
• £46.4 million on the F-111K 1965-68 when the estimated price of CVA.01 was £70 million in 1976 and that sum would also have paid for.
  • For a fifth Polaris submarine (I've not checked but if I remember correctly the average cost of the class was about £40 million.)
  • Two Valiant or Churchill class submarines (Valiant cost £25.3 million, Warspite cost £21.5 million and the average cost of the Churchill class was £26.3 million.)
  • The cost of Blake's conversion into a helicopter cruiser nine times. (It cost £5.5 million.)
  • Four sister ships for Fearless and Intrepid. (Fearless cost £11.25 million.)
  • Two Type 82 destroyers at late 1960s prices. (Estimated cost in 1969 was £20 million.)
  • Three County class Batch II destroyers. (Glamorgan & Fife cost about £14.75 million each and Antrim & Norfolk cost about £16.5 million each.)
  • The thick end three Type 42 destroyers. (Estimated cost in 1969 was £17 million.)
  • Six or 7 Type 21 frigates (Estimated in 1969 cost was £7-8 million)
• £21 million each for HS.681 and P.1154 between 1962 & 1965.
• £195 million TSR.2 £195 million 1959-65.
  • Allegedly Lord Mountbatten walked around with five photographs of a Buccaneer and one of a TSR.2 claiming that five of one could be purchased at the same cost of one of the other.
  • £70 million of that was said to be the cancellation costs which happens to be the estimated cost of CVA.01 in 1966.
• £73.5 million spent on the following projects that were cancelled in 1962.
  • £32.10 million Blue Water.
  • £27.00 million Skybolt.
  • £13.65 million Fairey Rototyne.
  • £730,000 High-resolution reconnaissance radar.
  • The sums spent on Skybolt and Blue water.
  • That's more than double the cost of the ongoing 1959-64 refit of Eagle.
  • It would have paid for 5½ County class Batch I destroyers.
  • It would have paid for 5 Tiger class cruisers.
• £84.0 million Blue Streak 1955-60
  • Then there's the money HMG spent keeping Blue Streak "ticking over" between the cancellation and the start of the Europa project. I think Hill wrote that it cost £2 million a quarter in "A Vertical Empire".
  • Then there's the British contribution to the Europa project itself.
  • That would have paid the thick end of the cost of 5 Hermes class or to modernise Illustrious, Implacable, Indefatigable & Indomitable to the same standard as Victorious in 1958.
• £22.3 million on Swift F.1 to F.4 and the Swift PR version which were cancelled in 1955.
  • That would have paid for the completion of the other Eagle in 1955 to the same standard as Ark Royal.
• £15.6 million on the Brabazon and Princess.
  • £6.5 million on the Brabazon cancelled 1952.
  • £9.1 million on the Princess cancelled 1954.

HS.681 to Brabazon came from a list of aviation projects cancelled 1951-67 which I think came from a 1967 edition of Flight International when the Flight Archive was still working. The total cost was £496.9 million, but about £240 million (or 48%) of that was spent on projects cancelled 1965-67.

 

[Hood]

What's your opinion on the Spectre (British Phantom) that I want designed & built in place of the Lighting & Sea Vixen? That's at the top of the list of what I want done.

I like the idea. Being Hawker Siddeley it would circumvent the VG obsession that BAC had. Who you have in mind to develop it, Brough or Kingston?
The only sticking point for me is what AAMs you intend toting on it as Red Top is big and draggy and you really need a radar-guided AAM capability to match Phantom. But otherwise I see no technical issues. If the RAF can piggy back off it for a Lightning replacement then even better.

 

[zen]

My suggestion is AWA P.58 in some developed form as I've described. Which fits into history fairly well.

However in terms of design houses that come close....
Hawkers themselves with the somewhat desperate P.1125 indicate that a twin engined P.1103 ought to offer one path earlier by 1955

Brough of course actually trotted out quite practical designs.

DeHaviland was quite practical.

Saro had much to commend and DH would essentially become involved.

Supermarine's efforts at the end showed indications of promise.

 

[Archibald]

I like the idea. Being Hawker Siddeley it would circumvent the VG obsession that BAC had. Who you have in mind to develop it, Brough or Kingston?
The only sticking point for me is what AAMs you intend toting on it as Red Top is big and draggy and you really need a radar-guided AAM capability to match Phantom. But otherwise I see no technical issues. If the RAF can piggy back off it for a Lightning replacement then even better.

I remember the P.141 and P.146, from my Tony Buttler readings. Good designs, could have sold very well.

 

[uk 75]

I still think that the answer is the AFVG for delivery in the early 70s replacing the Sea Vixen FAW2.
Anything started earlier is going to run into the problems that plagued TSR2 and P1154. The Lightning was the only supersonic military aircraft the Brits had built and as a weapons system it was pretty basic.

 

[zen]

AFVG or P.141 NGTA.
The latter reappears as P.1179X in '69 with RB.199s as the cheaper and lighter solution of HSA's P.1179 studies to MRCA.

Considering Dassault did the work on VG, arguably the UK should have flown a P.141 or 1179X to compare and contrast real performance and maintenance figures.

 

[Hood]

The P.1179X does look a better contender than P.141 to me, the extra power from the RB.199s would have been worth it. Of course 1969 is a bit late for what NOMISYRRUC wants, even P.141 dating from 1965 is a bit too late.

I think if we're looking at early 1960s then Kingston probably has the edge given its P.112x series studies. Although Blackburn did have the P.135 as a proposed Buccaneer successor in 1962 as an alternative to the P.123 to OR.346: two reheated Speys, VG wings (25-63 degrees), span 30-60ft, length 59ft, MTOW 60,000lb. This is pretty much right in the Phantom ballpark.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Musings on the cost of the Argus class
Part One​

My train of thought of is a follows

• The estimated cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier (built in my "Version of History" as the Argus class) was £26 million in 1953.​
• The estimated cost of the 1954 Medium Aircraft Carrier was £18 million in 1954.​
• The "Great Rebuild" of Victorious cost £20 million.​
  • As far as I'm concerned she was the contents of the 1954 Ship crammed into a smaller hull.​
  • Below the flight deck everything outside the machinery spaces was new.​
  • The hull above the flight deck was brand new and so was the superstructure and so was everything inside them.​
  • All that was left of the original Victorious 1950 was the hull plating and her turbines.​
• Therefore, the estimated cost of £18 million for the 1954 Medium Aircraft Carrier was accurate.​
• Therefore, the estimated cost of £26 million for the 1952 Aircraft Carrier was accurate.​

Therefore, I put the following to the forum

1. The 4 Argus class ships completed 1958-61 in my "Version of History" would have cost about £26 million each at 1958 prices.
2. The pair of ships laid down in 1950 and completed in 1955 would have cost less than £26 million each at 1958 prices, because they didn't have the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Musings on the cost of the Argus class
Part Two

The estimated cost of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier was £26 million in 1953
I want to build six of them.
Six times £26 million equals £156 million

In the "Real World" £148 million was spent as follows:

​

I've included the cost of the Daring class because the some of money spent on the aircraft carriers 1945-50 in the "Real World" will be spent on bringing their completion forward from 1952-54 to 1948-50. In turn the money that was spent on the destroyers after 1950 in the "Real World" will be spent on the Argus class in this "Version of History".

In Part One I postulated that the 1953 estimate of what I'm calling the Argus class was accurate and that the 4 ships completed 1958-61 would have cost £26 million each at 1958 prices. As I wrote in the other post the rebuilt Victorious was the contents of the 1954 Medium Aircraft Carrier crammed into a smaller hull and that a 1954 ship built in her place would have cost less. What I didn't explain was that the 1954 ship can be regarded as the contents of the 1952 ship in a larger hull with more powerful machinery and I think that accounts for most of the extra cost of the 1952 ship.

In this "Version of History".

• The £67.945 million spent on Albion, Ark Royal, Bulwark, Centaur & Eagle would be used to build Argus & Alt Eagle.
  • The pair of new ships would have cost less than £26 million at 1958 prices because they didn't have the Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT so the total cost would have been less than £52 million.
  • However, I'm going to be prudent and say that they did cost £52 million.
  • Which leaves £15.945 million that can be spent on something else.
• The £20 million spent on Victorious 1950-58 and £6 million of the £15.945 not required to built Argus & ALT-Eagles is used to build ALT-Hermes which was laid down in 1950 and completed in 1958.
• The £42.428 million on the Tiger class cruisers would be used to build Courageous, Glorious & Furious, which were ordered in 1951, laid down in 1954 and completed 1959-61.
  • Using the Bank of England Inflation Calculator.
    • £26.17 million cost of Courageous at 1959 prices.
    • £27.42 million cost of Furious at 1960 prices.
    • £28.36 million cost of Glorious at 1961 prices.
    • Total cost £81.95 million.
  • That leaves £39.352 million to be found.
    • £9.945 million of the £15.945 million not required to build Argus and ALT-Eagle is spent 1951-55 on long-lead items for the Courageous, Furious & Glorious.
    • Real-Hermes cost £18 million and was completed in 1959. The money spent on her would have been spent on Courageous.
    • The 1959-64 refit of Real-Eagle cost £31 million. The portion spent 1959-61 can be spent on completing Glorious and Furious.

However, we have to deduct what was spent on the ships 1941-45.

• In Post 246 @EwenS wrote that £1.95 million had been spent on the other Eagle by the end of 1945.
  • The construction of Ark Royal & Eagle was more advanced than their sister at the end of 1945.
  • However, in spite of that I'm going to say that £2 million had been spent on each those ships by the end of 1945.
• According to Brown the cost of Centaur was originally £2.8 million that due to the long delays and inflation increased the actual cost of Centaur to £10.53 million.
  • According to @EwenS in Post 246 £1.95 million had been spent on the other Eagle and was 26% complete when she was cancelled. He also wrote that she was laid down 7 months after Ark Royal which works out as December 1943. (Although Chesneau wrote that it was in April 1944.)
  • Albion was laid down in March 1944, Centaur was laid down in May 1944, Hermes was laid down in June 1944 and Bulwark was laid down in May 1945.
  • Therefore, they were likely to have been less advanced than the other Eagle at the end of 1945.
  • However, assuming that they were an average of 26% complete too and because one Centaur is effectively half an Audacious in terms of displacement, machinery and armament my guess is that an average of £1 million had been spent per ship for a total of £4 million.
• The Vote 8 cost of a Fiji class cruiser was £2.23 million so I'm deducting £6.69 million from the cost of the Tiger class.
  • That may be an overestimate of the money spent on them to January 1946 in the "Real World".
  • If it is an overestimate that will compensate for me underestimating the sums spent on the Audacious and Centaur classes to January 1946.
• Therefore, my estimate is that £15 million had been spent on the Audacious, Centaur and Tiger classes to the end of 1945, which reduces the sum available to £133 million.

There's also the money spent on the "Real World" ships between 1945 and 1950 when the Argus, ALT-Eagle and ALT-Hermes were laid down. I've no idea of how to estimate that sum. That's why I've used it to accelerate the completion of the Daring class destroyers and transferred the money spent on them after 1950 in the "Real World" to the Argus class.

We also have to deduct the money spent on completing Hercules & Leviathan in 1948. The mean Vote 8 cost of the Colossus (and I assume Majestic & Sydney) was £2.5 million and as the ships were at an advanced stage of construction the money required would have been trivial. However, if it was a trivial sum of money why weren't they completed?

Finally, the long-lead items for the first 3 Argus class ships were ordered in 1948, the hulls were ordered in 1949 and they were actually laid down in 1950. So it may be correct to say that the start date was 1948 rather than 1950. In any case the money spent 1948-50 on the long-lead items and other preparatory work before they were laid down comes from what was spent on the real ships 1948-50.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The P.1179X does look a better contender than P.141 to me, the extra power from the RB.199s would have been worth it. Of course 1969 is a bit late for what NOMISYRRUC wants, even P.141 dating from 1965 is a bit too late.

I think if we're looking at early 1960s then Kingston probably has the edge given its P.112x series studies. Although Blackburn did have the P.135 as a proposed Buccaneer successor in 1962 as an alternative to the P.123 to OR.346: two reheated Speys, VG wings (25-63 degrees), span 30-60ft, length 59ft, MTOW 60,000lb. This is pretty much right in the Phantom ballpark.

Unfortunately, they're a lot late.

In the RAF I want the first operational unit that receives Spectres to be No. 74 Squadron at Coltishall on 29.06.60 which in the "Real World" received the Lighting F.1s that arrived on that date. Meanwhile, the first operational RN unit (No. 892 Squadron) to be equipped with the Spectre embarked in Ark Royal in March 1960 instead of embarking in Ark Royal with Sea Vixens.

I suggest keeping as close to the "Real World" as possible. Therefore, have a more ambitious Specification F.23/49 and have the group that English Electric became part of be selected to build it, because that firm developed the only Mach 2 aircraft that came into service when I want the Spectre to enter service, namely the Lightning. It would cost more than the Lightning to develop and some of that money comes from what it cost to turn the DH.110 into the Sea Vixen.

I call the British Phantom the Spectre because the F-4C Phantom II was the F-110A Spectre before the tri-service aircraft designation system was introduced.

 

[zen]

1969 is a bit late for what NOMISYRRUC wants

In context, I mentioned the P.1179X after UK75 comment

I still think that the answer is the AFVG for delivery in the early 70s replacing the Sea Vixen FAW2.

While the answer I gave to NOMISYRRUC in post 395 was the 'time correct' option of the ministry to continue funding the AW.58 but switch to the twin engined option.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I like the idea. Being Hawker Siddeley it would circumvent the VG obsession that BAC had. Who you have in mind to develop it, Brough or Kingston?

As I wrote in Post 474 I want to stick as close to the "Real World" as possible (it's more convenient for one thing) and have the firm that English Electric becomes part of develop it. For convenience that firm is the real British Aircraft Corporation, but it's formed in 1948 instead of 1960.

The only sticking point for me is what AAMs you intend toting on it as Red Top is big and draggy and you really need a radar-guided AAM capability to match Phantom. But otherwise I see no technical issues. If the RAF can piggy back off it for a Lightning replacement then even better.

Can we develop a lighter and more streamlined Red Top? I want a British Phantom, may I have it armed with a British Sparrow?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Just one point, and before I make it I have to say I’m very much enjoying your posts. The Great Rebuild was problematic because of the late discovery of the poor state of the boilers. It’s pretty inconceivable that ALT-Hermes will suffer any problem that will require stopping the build near completion, stripping, and restarting. Given Argus and ALT-Eagle have preceded her, she is likely to be completed faster than their 5-years.

In addition to what I wrote about the time taken to rebuild Victorious (the fire damaging the boilers, decision to fit the angled flight-deck, Type 984 radar, CDS & DPT) Marriott wrote that another factor which added to the date of completion was a chronic shortage of skilled labour at Portsmouth dockyard in the mid-1950s.

 

[red admiral]

Can we develop a lighter and more streamlined Red Top? I want a British Phantom, may I have it armed with a British Sparrow?

I think the only realistic is "no". Licence produce Sparrow, potentially with UK seeker eventually is probably a much better bet.

Red Top / Firestreak were very large, but this also misses the masses of on-aircraft systems they needed. It's definitely not just bolt then on the outside.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

115ft to 115.5ft BWL is a figure to ensure drydocking at Gladstone drydock.

Davenport N.10 (a merger of two drydocks) allows for 815ft LWL and 118ft BWL, assuming the flight deck overhangs the dock's 855ft Length.

Edited in Additional:-
During the earlier Malta process, the then limitation of Davenport N.10 implied a carrier of
765ft LBP
820ft LWL
845ft LFD
The 114ft BWL version was 45,000tons deep load and had 190,000shp as per a number of Malta studies.

The later 1952 effort using the lines of Eagle came to LFD of 865ft, with a 815ft LWL hull. Again these studies worked on 190,000shp in the tropics.

The 118ft BWL option is from the 1970 sketch designs for CVA-01 at 50,000tons.

Yes and the question you asked was.

1. Slip availability. They must be appropriate size and dates?

According to Jane's 1940

Cammell Laird, Birkenhead​

6 slips, longest 1,000ft​

6 smaller slips​

John Brown, Clydebank, Glasgow​

5 slips 1000ft to 600ft​

3 slips 600ft to 450ft​

Denny, Dumbarton​

Building ways up to 400ft​

Thornycroft, Wooslton, Southampton​

Vessels up to 400ft.​

Fairfield, Govan, Glasgow​

6 slips to built ships up to 1,000ft.​

Harland & Wolff, Belfast​

19 slips, no other details.​

However, there must have been one slip longer than​

Hawthorn Leslie, Hebburn-on-Tyne​

9 slips up to 735ft.​

Scotts', Greenock​

Slips for 8 large vessels​

Stephen, Linthouse, Govan, Glasgow​

Builds cruisers, destroyers, & torpedo craft, no other details.​

Swan Hunter, Wallsend​

16 building berths up to 900ft.​

Vickers-Armstrong, Barrow, 13 building berths of.​

800ft​

750ft​

680ft​

2 x 620ft​

2 x 580ft​

2 x 550ft​

530ft​

500ft​

410ft​

380ft​

Vickers-Armstrong, High Walker, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 10 building berths of.​

1,000ft​

900ft​

800ft​

2 x 600ft​

5 from 450ft to 550ft.​

White, Cowes, Isle of Wight​

Vessels up to 400ft in length.​

Yarrow, Scotstoun, Glasgow​

6 building berths up to 400ft in length.​

The dimensions of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier were 815ft x 115ft which means that the following yards had at least one slipway long enough to build one on.

Cammell Laird​

John Brown, Clydebank​

Fairfield, Govan​

Harland & Wolff, Belfast​

Swan Hunter, Wallsend​

Vickers-Armstrong, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, which we know had two.​

However, as you've mentioned dry docks, in my initial reply I wrote.

According to Friedman the waterline dimensions of the 1952 Aircraft Carrier were 815ft x 115ft and the corresponding dimensions of Malta Design X1 were 850ft x 115½ft so the UK must have had at least 4 slipways that were long enough. Plus the Luftwaffe's "slum clearance" of 1940-41 may have allowed some of the shorter slipways to be extended between 1945 and 1950.

IIRC Plymouth and Portsmouth were heavily bombed during the war. There might be vacant land that the dry docks in at HM Dockyards Devonport and Portsmouth can be extended into. If labour's a problem maybe the British Government can keep some of its Axis prisoners for longer to do the work and say that it's war reparations.

 

[uk 75]

The Royal Navy were not the easiest customer for the British aircraft industry.
Although the P1127 Kestrel was tested on British warships as was the later Harrier the FAA stuck to the view that it needed Phantoms or nothing. Between 1966 and 1974 the answer came back: nothing.
Until the Phantom arrived on Ark Royal in the 1970s the only air to air missiles on FAA aircraft were Firestreak/Red Tops on Sea Vixens and early mark Sidewinders on Scimitars.
The RAF were in a similar position except they relied totally on Firestreak and Red Top Javelins and Lightnings until they got Phantoms in the late 60s.
BAC or HS could have built an airframe as good or better than the Phantom but radar and missiles in the 60s would have had to be American as was planned for AFVG.
The various paper aircraft that Zen refers to would have been far more expensive than Phantom or Sea Harrier. I see them hitting all the snags that hit TSR2- the only British supersonic aircraft system built in the early sixties.
AFVG and later MRCA/Tornado are not just bringing in European partners they also draw on US suppliers.