Continuing relevance of the A-10 Warthog today and tomorrow?

[marauder2048]

The US Army has spent a enormous sum developing and deploying tube and rocket launched PGMs.
Many of these PGMs can fly significant off-axis trajectories, non-ballistic trajectories and are pretty tolerant of gun laying errors.

What this means in practice is that more batteries are available to engage with greater accuracy and potentially a higher rate of fire against targets close-in to friendly forces.

Deconflicting this very complex airspace to accommodate a fast-moving gunslinger which typically has to fly below the artillery ceiling to do CAS is going to be a major challenge. And I don't see the Army spending much if any money on addressing this challenge from a technical, doctrinal or training standpoint. As always, there are multiple sides involved in solving the Close Support challenge.

 

[jsport]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

 

[bobbymike]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

IMHO, I think the US military and Army are missing out by not having more robust ground and naval based offensive missile systems up to 1000km ranges (and longer if you abrogate the INF Treaty at least for convention missiles). With short flight times, GPS accuracy and possible loitering submunitions.

 

[jsport]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

IMHO, I think the US military and Army are missing out by not having more robust ground and naval based offensive missile systems up to 1000km ranges (and longer if you abrogate the INF Treaty at least for convention missiles). With short flight times, GPS accuracy and possible loitering submunitions.

sure would be all for that...down to the Fire Tm level USMC and USA sure and when...

 

[yasotay]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

IMHO, I think the US military and Army are missing out by not having more robust ground and naval based offensive missile systems up to 1000km ranges (and longer if you abrogate the INF Treaty at least for convention missiles). With short flight times, GPS accuracy and possible loitering submunitions.

LOL, USAF Inc., tried to take control of ATACM at one point (because it could do interdiction). They also tried to take control of Patriot (because it shot down airplanes).

 

[sferrin]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

IMHO, I think the US military and Army are missing out by not having more robust ground and naval based offensive missile systems up to 1000km ranges (and longer if you abrogate the INF Treaty at least for convention missiles). With short flight times, GPS accuracy and possible loitering submunitions.

LOL, USAF Inc., tried to take control of ATACM at one point (because it could do interdiction). They also tried to take control of Patriot (because it shot down airplanes).

Given that the US Army had everything from Little John to Pershing II over the years, not to mention Nike Ajax/Hercules, Safeguard, Hawk, etc. why would they bother?

 

[marauder2048]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

How does the Army intend to prosecute operations on a greatly dispersed battlefield without longer range artillery? Air mobile operations!?

I buy the CAS argument for the USMC since their expeditionary nature precludes embarking large amounts of land-based artillery. Still, naval gunfire support is an integral part of USMC doctrine which is why the USN spent colossal sums on ERGM, BTERM and now AGS/LRLAP.

 

[jsport]

Army Artillery, no matter how precise can not be counted on to replace CAS especially on the increasingly dispersed battlespace which is projected. USMC distributed ops depends on CAS, thus the well accepted argument that there would be no Marines if they did not have their own air.

How does the Army intend to prosecute operations on a greatly dispersed battlefield without longer range artillery? Air mobile operations!?

I buy the CAS argument for the USMC since their expeditionary nature precludes embarking large amounts of land-based artillery. Still, naval gunfire support is an integral part of USMC doctrine which is why the USN spent colossal sums on ERGM, BTERM and now AGS/LRLAP.

The Army has an Air Assault Div. and all divs execute versions of Air Mob Ops often w/o support. Every Army ever wants enhanced Air Mob capability depending on the air threat (again requires air.) Artillery is always subject to counter battery and many ops on Afgh were consistently out of Mortar/arty range..

 

[marauder2048]

The Army has an Air Assault Div. and all divs execute versions of Air Mob Ops often w/o support. Every Army ever wants enhanced Air Mob capability depending on the air threat (again requires air.) Artillery is always subject to counter battery and many ops on Afgh were consistently out of Mortar/arty range..

Devil's Advocate Time:

The Army has been infected by the mobility bug and wants to conduct "deep" operations far out of range of supporting organic assets.
The Army can't sanitize the deep operational areas adequately with Army aviation alone so it wants/needs/demands USAF "CAS" and often in a specific form. In other words, CAS as a crutch.

I'll leave discussion on the impact of C-RAM on CB fire for later.

 

[sferrin]

I'll leave discussion on the impact of C-RAM on CB fire for later.

Something to think about for "later", if your C-RAM can deal with CB fire it can certainly eat an A-10 for lunch.

 

[jsport]

The Army has an Air Assault Div. and all divs execute versions of Air Mob Ops often w/o support. Every Army ever wants enhanced Air Mob capability depending on the air threat (again requires air.) Artillery is always subject to counter battery and many ops on Afgh were consistently out of Mortar/arty range..

Devil's Advocate Time:

The Army has been infected by the mobility bug and wants to conduct "deep" operations far out of range of supporting organic assets.
The Army can't sanitize the deep operational areas adequately with Army aviation alone so it wants/needs/demands USAF "CAS" and often in a specific form. In other words, CAS as a crutch.

I'll leave discussion on the impact of C-RAM on CB fire for later.

This now in the realm of the bizarre. Of course any Army wants to "sanitize", regardless of Arty disposition, as deep as opportunity provides, so calling CAS a "crutch" sounds like Service rivalry or a strange statement.

 

[jsport]

I'll leave discussion on the impact of C-RAM on CB fire for later.

Something to think about for "later", if your C-RAM can deal with CB fire it can certainly eat an A-10 for lunch.

until there is a real strategy and budget..CRAM is terminal to close only.. and that is if even that happens.

 

[marauder2048]

I'll leave discussion on the impact of C-RAM on CB fire for later.

Something to think about for "later", if your C-RAM can deal with CB fire it can certainly eat an A-10 for lunch.

I was going to argue that attached C-RAM would reduce the need for friendly arty to displace due to CB fire.
Off-axis trajectories for friendly out-going would also make it much more challenging for hostile fire finder radars to back project
point of origin.

Also, if you are taking CB shouldn't your CAS assets be tasked to silencing those batteries?

 

[marauder2048]

This now in the realm of the bizarre. Of course any Army wants to "sanitize", regardless of Arty disposition, as deep as opportunity provides, so calling CAS a "crutch" sounds like Service rivalry or a strange statement.

More a reflection of the doctrinal and budgetary consequences the (IMHO massive) overemphasis on Army aviation and mobility forces has
had on the rest of the Army portfolio, particularly indirect fire which is really the key enabler and sustainer of mobility/maneuver.

The A-10 plugs a gap in the Army's capabilities that emerged as a result of the Army's own doctrinal and budgetary choices which is why the debate about its retirement is so impassioned often for all the wrong reasons.

 

[jsport]

This now in the realm of the bizarre. Of course any Army wants to "sanitize", regardless of Arty disposition, as deep as opportunity provides, so calling CAS a "crutch" sounds like Service rivalry or a strange statement.

More a reflection of the doctrinal and budgetary consequences the (IMHO massive) overemphasis on Army aviation and mobility forces has
had on the rest of the Army portfolio, particularly indirect fire which is really the key enabler and sustainer of mobility/maneuver.

The A-10 plugs a gap in the Army's capabilities that emerged as a result of the Army's own doctrinal and budgetary choices which is why the debate about its retirement is so impassioned often for all the wrong reasons.

If one doesn't have effective Army aviation and mobility one will be quick victim of it. One will only need direct fire as one attempts to prevent one from being overrun from one's rear flank. Airland battle is as far as I know, still main Army doctrine and includes the word "Air" not for Army Helicopters, so am not sure what "Army's own doctrinal and budgetary choices" is being refered to here.

 

[marauder2048]

If one doesn't have effective Army aviation and mobility one will be quick victim of it. One will only need direct fire as one attempts to prevent one from being overrun from one's rear flank. Airland battle is as far as I know, still main Army doctrine and includes the word "Air" not for Army Helicopters, so am not sure what "Army's own doctrinal and budgetary choices" is being refered to here.

I'm not quite sure why there needs to be a symmetrical counter to enemy Army aviation and mobility...

AirLand Battle *was* a great doctrine; CAS was to be conducted within the range of corp tube artillery...it got slightly fuzzier when MLRS came along. But in any event it was about conducting the close battle with a combination of weapons systems and platforms.

The main point is that the Army was careful to ensure that its reach did not exceed its grasp; their prior emphasis on air mobility did not which is where the requirements for A-X (A-10) originated.

 

[yasotay]

As I mentioned war is the supreme Darwinian endeavor. Smart contestants realize playing the American way of war, as has been demonstrated repeatedly over the last seventy years, is an expensive loosing proposition. Patience and fuzzy warfare where combatant and noncombatant are hard to distinguish has repeatedly demonstrated better results and it is much cheaper. They prey on the western distaste for collateral damage. The morality debate over "drone strikes" is purely a western philosophical construct. They go to great pains to point out when a JDAM gets a wedding party. It is thought that given that cities are the economic, technical and human centers for most countries, the radical state, non-state and global criminal elements are moving out of the hinterlands and into the "urban jungle". Conversely many of the major nation states that have the economics to field tank armies and integrated air defenses are so intertwined that major warfare could bankrupt everyone. Few believe that the probability of major industrial power committing to the potential of economic suicide is small.
My point is not that there is not still a need to be prepared for that sort of war, it is that preparing for that and thinking lesser forms of war are less challenging have been repeatedly proven wrong. Certainly if you going to have to deal with an integrated air defense then by all means air power should be the order of the day (although I would note that it was AH64s that fired the first shots in Desert Storm to begin the reduction of the Iraqi air defenses). I would also note that the United States Army committed the 101st division to a division level air assault deep into Iraq against a still organized Republican Guard mechanized Corps. My point is that you can do these sort of things against an enemy that warrant the risk.
Airland Battle is long gone. AirSea battle is now in vogue for folks worried about the Pacific Rim were ground maneuver is logistically problematic. The Army now talks about Integrated Distributed Operations, recognizing smaller more distributed organizations will deal with multifaceted enemies over larger areas.
For Air Sea Battle the multifunctional aircraft make perfect sense. For Integrated Distributed Operations aircraft like A-10 make perfect sense. Or leave it to precision fires from rotorcraft.

 

[jsport]

If one doesn't have effective Army aviation and mobility one will be quick victim of it. One will only need direct fire as one attempts to prevent one from being overrun from one's rear flank. Airland battle is as far as I know, still main Army doctrine and includes the word "Air" not for Army Helicopters, so am not sure what "Army's own doctrinal and budgetary choices" is being refered to here.

I'm not quite sure why there needs to be a symmetrical counter to enemy Army aviation and mobility...

AirLand Battle *was* a great doctrine; CAS was to be conducted within the range of corp tube artillery...it got slightly fuzzier when MLRS came along. But in any event it was about conducting the close battle with a combination of weapons systems and platforms.

The main point is that the Army was careful to ensure that its reach did not exceed its grasp; their prior emphasis on air mobility did not which is where the requirements for A-X (A-10) originated.

anyone not ready to "go deep", as it will certainly be done to them, ought to 'go home".

Certainly this is why the USMC Distributed Ops focused V-22 is so pivotal "AirSea Battle" the latest derivative of "Air Land'.

As Yasotay states the US Army does reach. Given the number and capability of helicopters available to High Intensity/Hybrid adversaries, the bad lessons of bad planning in a certain conflict which gave rise to these grasp vs reach arguments will lead to a bad strategy unable to match adversaries. Likewise, the future JVL capability enables more depth not less. Logistics for ground maneuver is only a problem for deeper Integrated Distributed Ops when their supporting CAS isn't "dense" enough ie numerous w/ many maximum effect munitions, and available for the longest loiter.

 

[kcran567]

Has anyone researched what the Army thinks of no longer having the A-10? Are they satisfied that the A-10 will no longer support them in favor of something newer or whatever? What is the problem with allowing the Army to have the A-10 since CAS is such a limited mission anyway, the Air Force can pursue more glamorous missions mainly Air and Strike missions against fixed targets. Having an A-10 option seems something the Army would like to have. The exaggerations of the A-10 being expensive to maintain really is a convenient excuse for the Air Force getting rid of it.

 

[Jeb]

Has anyone researched what the Army thinks of no longer having the A-10? Are they satisfied that the A-10 will no longer support them in favor of something newer or whatever? What is the problem with allowing the Army to have the A-10 since CAS is such a limited mission anyway, the Air Force can pursue more glamorous missions mainly Air and Strike missions against fixed targets. Having an A-10 option seems something the Army would like to have. The exaggerations of the A-10 being expensive to maintain really is a convenient excuse for the Air Force getting rid of it.

You don't have to research far to know that the Army is flipping out about it.

 

[yasotay]

As mentioned above the Army cannot afford to keep OH-58D any more. Certainly cannot afford A-10, without the funding line for it from the USAF; which is what the USAF wants to use for other more important programs.

 

[Triton]

As mentioned above the Army cannot afford to keep OH-58D any more. Certainly cannot afford A-10, without the funding line for it from the USAF; which is what the USAF wants to use for other more important programs.

Is the Army also retiring the Bell TH-67 Creek?

 

[GTX]

Has anyone researched what the Army thinks of no longer having the A-10? Are they satisfied that the A-10 will no longer support them in favor of something newer or whatever? What is the problem with allowing the Army to have the A-10 since CAS is such a limited mission anyway, the Air Force can pursue more glamorous missions mainly Air and Strike missions against fixed targets. Having an A-10 option seems something the Army would like to have. The exaggerations of the A-10 being expensive to maintain really is a convenient excuse for the Air Force getting rid of it.

Maybe this is part of a response:

Curiously, the Army has not formally objected to the Air Force’s divestment plan; nor have they asked Congress for funding to take over the A-10 system. Might this reflect an acknowledgment that, as the Air Force claims, the fire power has in fact been there when they needed it in Afghanistan and Iraq—either from an A-10 or from something else they perhaps did not even see?

Source: http://www.defenseone.com/management/2014/05/why-no-one-buying-air-forces-argument-ditch-10/84949/


Surely if the A-10 is only aircraft that can do CAS, why on earth would allied air forces send any aircraft? Why would the US Navy have any squadrons involved what so ever? Why would F-16s, B-1s, F-15Es be sent at all? Why would the Marines utilize their air wing? If the A-10 is the only aircraft that can provide CAS in an environment that is almost exclusively Battlefield air interdiction, CAS, and Recon, why would Afghanistan not be the worlds largest concentration of A-10s on the planet?

The answer to the question is the US Army recognizes and understands that A-10s have not been the only aircraft providing CAS the last 13 years. And with their funding being cut, they understand the USAF's plight. They also don't feel its worth giving anything they have up to get the A-10s. The Chief of Staff of the Army has said he understands and supports the USAFs decision to retire the A-10. A-10s have advantages in CAS over other aircraft but other aircraft have advantages over the A-10 in CAS. For some reason in this great debate only the A-10s advantages get mentioned.

Lastly, The idea that the USAF "hates" the A-10 needs to go. The A-10 has been in service for 40 years now, its not the young upstart upsetting the old guard, it is the old guard. It is the establishment. Even the Chief of Staff of the USAF is a former A-10 pilot. "The brass" is the A-10. Moreover, you would be hard pressed to find many people in the entire US and allied Militaries that served before the A-10 and actually remember a time when it wasn't around. The old guard who allegedly "hate it" retired a long time ago, and not many of them would actually speak ill of it today anyway. If the USAF could it would hang onto the A-10, its more planes and more pilots and the USAF has always loved more planes and more pilots way more than it ever "hated" the A-10. Post cold war the USAF retired A-7s, F-111s, F-4s, MH-53s and a lot of other things it "loved" while keeping the A-10 it "hates"?? That doesn't make much sense.

The USAF has learned that the only way to really "save" funding is not to reduce numbers but an "all or none" approach. They can't get rid of all the thousands of multi mission work horse F-16s, so its better to get rid of hundreds of less useful aircraft like the A-10. Do you decommission all the KC-10s? or KC-135s? KC-10s are smaller in number so those are on the chopping block. Funding cuts mean cutting. Hard choices mean hard choices.

 

[kcran567]

Thanks for the responses.


Are the A-10s going into desert storage, or is there a chance they could be sold and used by a foreign buyer who might want them? that seems like a good choice with all the focus on funding and money.

 

[GTX]

Whilst there is always a chance someone may buy them, given no-one but the USA has shown any interest in them in 40 odd years, how serious do you think the chances are of someone else wanting them now?

 

[yasotay]

With their agility and warload, I suspect the "fire bomber" idea may get more than a passing look. So maybe they will go to the US Forestry Service...

 

[bobbymike]

Firstly - GTX thanks for the great and informative commentary above.

These should help
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-u-s-air-forces-new-ac-130-gunships-are-really-bomb-1584518199

 

[Jemiba]

... how serious do you think the chances are of someone else wanting them now?

Judging the kind of operations, the A-10 was built for and the political and military situation,
wouldn't the armed forces of the ROK be one of the most logical customers ?

 

[TomS]

Judging the kind of operations, the A-10 was built for and the political and military situation,
wouldn't the armed forces of the ROK be one of the most logical customers ?

The ROKAF don't seem to think so. They have ordered CBU-105 Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispensers with BLU-108 Sensor Fuzed Weapon submunitions. I think this is a pretty clear sign of how they plan to deal with advancing armored forces.

 

[F-14D]

With their agility and warload, I suspect the "fire bomber" idea may get more than a passing look. So maybe they will go to the US Forestry Service...

This was proposed back in the '90s and early 2000s when USAF was dumping A-10s in the desert (no, I don't mean "preserving"). The various proposals all came under the general name of "Firehog". It didn't go anywhere because it was said that it would be too expensive to pull the gun (which would create a big cg problem), that the armor was too integrated, etc. Plus a big factor was that although USAF didn't have plans to use them again, they responded to all inquiries by stating that surplus A-10s were "unavailable".

 

[Triton]

"House Bucks Appropriators; Forbids A-10 Retirement"
by Colin Clark on June 20, 2014 at 3:30 PM

Source:
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/house-bucks-appropriators-forbids-a-10-retirement/

WASHINGTON: Election fears ruled the day on Capitol Hill when the full House of Representatives voted to stop the Air Force from retiring the venerable and venerated A-10 aircraft in the chamber’s version of the defense appropriations bill.

While we heard little of the backroom chatter and didn’t see the emails that doubtless flew as the bill’s sponsors urged their colleagues to vote against the Air Force’s attempt to save $3.7 billion by retiring the A-10 fleet, it didn’t take a rocket scientist to ascertain why members voted as they did.

While the bill’s principal sponsor Rep. Candice Miller spoke warmly of the A-10 as the best Close Air Support plane on earth, all you had to do to find ground truth was look at the district she represents in Michigan. Miller didn’t exactly vote on the merits of the Air Force’s argument. Instead, as a statement on her website made clear, she’d done this before for what most of her colleague’s would regard as one of the most fundamental reasons to vote for anything — jobs in your district and protection of the role of the National Guard:

“In 2012, Rep. Miller successfully defeated the Administration’s attempt to eliminate and/or reduce the Air National Guard personnel and assets, including the A-10 Thunderbolt aircraft, based at Selfridge Air National Guard Base.”

Now there are actually very few jobs at stake across the country should the A-10 be retired, as we’ve reported. But a vote for retirement would give any canny opponent considerable ammunition during a campaign. You know: “Candice Miller voted to kill the A-10, the best close air support aircraft in the world and one that means X jobs here.” But this vote was all about the November elections and the Guard.

A-10 retirement chart

It’s also a very interesting fact that the House overrode its own appropriators, who voted to retire the plane. That may not bode well for the chairman’s authority — or it may just be another indicator that no one wants to hurt a colleague’s chances for reelection.

So, now we’ve got both authorization committees voting against retirement as well as the whole House. It looks like our prediction that retirement won’t happen til next year is on track. The question that remains, as Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James noted at a Defense Writers Group breakfast earlier this week, where is Congress going to find the money the Air Force must now replace.

As Rep. Pete Visclosky, the top Democrat on the House Appropriations defense subcommittee put it simply during the HAC-D markup of the defense spending bill: “We’ve got to pay for stuff… Staying the course and hoping for some fiscal relief next year is wishful thinking.”

 

[Triton]

"Is the A-10 Right for Iraq?"
Aaron Mehta / 2 days ago

Source:
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/06/is-the-a-10-about-to-have-its-moment/

The fight over the A-10 may have been thrown a screwball this week, thanks to the sudden, dramatic surge from ISIL forces as they have overwhelmed whole chunks of Iraqi territory.

The battle over the future of the A-10 has largely centered around the Air Force’s argument that the plane doesn’t match future needs in a contested air environment. Proponents of the “Warthog” dispute that, and point to the types of mission the plane still performs to protect troops on the ground today – missions they say perfectly fit with battling ISIL forces if President Obama gives the ok for airstrikes.

Many say the Warthog’s finest moment came during the first Gulf War when the plane efficiently ripped Saddam Hussein’s fleet of tanks to shreds. With groups of pickup trucks tearing across the desert and photos showing armored vehicles captured from fleeing Iraqi army forces, supporters of the plane are saying the situation is ideal for the A-10.

“You want to keep in mind [that] this is not exactly a purely military confrontation,” said Pierre Sprey, considered the father of the A-10. “If you want to stop an outfit like these [ISIL] guys with pickup trucks and machine guns, there’s no other airplane anywhere that’s really useful.”

Sprey raises concerns about potential civilian casualties if high-level fast jets come by and cannot distinguish between ISIL forces and innocent locals. In contrast, he argues, the A-10 can go low and slow to scope things out before engaging.

“You can’t tell the farmers’ pickup trucks form the ones with machine guns,” Sprey said. “There aren’t that many targets. You’re not dealing with huge forces, so you really need an airplane that can get down there and tell a watermelon truck from the machine gun truck.”

“Absolutely the only thing we have that can really exert notable, useful power against 800 or 1,000 of these [ISIL] fanatics is the A-10,” he added. “Nothing else will do much but exacerbate the situation.”

While other pilot communities would likely disagree that the A-10 is the only option, no one, even those in favor of its retirement, has said it won’t fit the mission in Iraq.

“I’m sure they can go out and do an effective job,” Rebecca Grant, president of IRIS Research, said, before warning about reading too much into how the plane performs in Iraq when making future force decisions.

“This is still a very permissive airspace,” she said. “They may go out and do an excellent job and we can sing their praises, but what the A-10 does in Iraq right now is not relevant for what it could or could not do in other scenarios down the road. It still doesn’t mean this is the right platform for the future.”

Logistically, turning to the A-10 – a platform already in theater – would make sense for a potential mission.

“We have a variety of assets already over there in the regular order and of course we have others that could be moved within a matter of a fairly short period of time should that be asked of us,” Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said this week, noting the A-10 was one of those assets<< http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014306180032>>.

Would an anti-ISIL campaign in Iraq constitute a last hurrah for the plane? That’s up to Congress, which seems inclined to protect the machine for at least another year. Keep an eye on CongressWatch and DefenseNews.com in the coming weeks for more.

 

[bobbymike]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l73IyO1Qdqo#t=242

 

[kcran567]

"Is the A-10 Right for Iraq?"
Aaron Mehta / 2 days ago

Source:
http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2014/06/is-the-a-10-about-to-have-its-moment/

The fight over the A-10 may have been thrown a screwball this week, thanks to the sudden, dramatic surge from ISIL forces as they have overwhelmed whole chunks of Iraqi territory.

The battle over the future of the A-10 has largely centered around the Air Force’s argument that the plane doesn’t match future needs in a contested air environment. Proponents of the “Warthog” dispute that, and point to the types of mission the plane still performs to protect troops on the ground today – missions they say perfectly fit with battling ISIL forces if President Obama gives the ok for airstrikes.

Many say the Warthog’s finest moment came during the first Gulf War when the plane efficiently ripped Saddam Hussein’s fleet of tanks to shreds. With groups of pickup trucks tearing across the desert and photos showing armored vehicles captured from fleeing Iraqi army forces, supporters of the plane are saying the situation is ideal for the A-10.

“You want to keep in mind [that] this is not exactly a purely military confrontation,” said Pierre Sprey, considered the father of the A-10. “If you want to stop an outfit like these [ISIL] guys with pickup trucks and machine guns, there’s no other airplane anywhere that’s really useful.”

Sprey raises concerns about potential civilian casualties if high-level fast jets come by and cannot distinguish between ISIL forces and innocent locals. In contrast, he argues, the A-10 can go low and slow to scope things out before engaging.

“You can’t tell the farmers’ pickup trucks form the ones with machine guns,” Sprey said. “There aren’t that many targets. You’re not dealing with huge forces, so you really need an airplane that can get down there and tell a watermelon truck from the machine gun truck.”

“Absolutely the only thing we have that can really exert notable, useful power against 800 or 1,000 of these [ISIL] fanatics is the A-10,” he added. “Nothing else will do much but exacerbate the situation.”

While other pilot communities would likely disagree that the A-10 is the only option, no one, even those in favor of its retirement, has said it won’t fit the mission in Iraq.

“I’m sure they can go out and do an effective job,” Rebecca Grant, president of IRIS Research, said, before warning about reading too much into how the plane performs in Iraq when making future force decisions.

“This is still a very permissive airspace,” she said. “They may go out and do an excellent job and we can sing their praises, but what the A-10 does in Iraq right now is not relevant for what it could or could not do in other scenarios down the road. It still doesn’t mean this is the right platform for the future.”

Logistically, turning to the A-10 – a platform already in theater – would make sense for a potential mission.

“We have a variety of assets already over there in the regular order and of course we have others that could be moved within a matter of a fairly short period of time should that be asked of us,” Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said this week, noting the A-10 was one of those assets<< http://www.defensenews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2014306180032>>.

Would an anti-ISIL campaign in Iraq constitute a last hurrah for the plane? That’s up to Congress, which seems inclined to protect the machine for at least another year. Keep an eye on CongressWatch and DefenseNews.com in the coming weeks for more.

That article really exposes those that want to axe the A-10 and it's still relevant capability. The A-10 would eat Isis alive. The Russians don't seem to be in a hurry to scrap the Frogfoot.

 

[Triton]

"Air Force stands by A-10 retirement"
By Kristina Wong - 07/30/14 04:52 PM ED
"Air Force stands by A-10 retirement"
By Kristina Wong - 07/30/14 04:52 PM EDT

The Secretary of the Air Force on Wednesday stood by her department’s proposal to retire the A-10 fleet, arguing the United States has plenty of replacements available should the nation land in an armed conflict.

"It's possible we could get into something else where we would need higher levels of close air support in the next year or two or three," Deborah James told Pentagon reporters.

"And if that is the case, we've got it. We've got the F-16. We've got the F-15E," she said, referring to other aircraft that could perform the mission. "So the close air support mission is a sacred mission. And we got it."

Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-N.H.), the Senate's top A-10 supporter, issued a statement after the briefing Wednesday that noted the Iraqi government was currently using a similar aircraft to battle terrorist forces in Iraq.

"It is worth noting that the SU-25 'Frogfoot' — the inferior Russian version of the A-10 — was recently sent to Iraq to battle ISIL forces there," she said.

"Evidently, the Iraqis believe such a [close air support]-focused aircraft can operate effectively against the ISIL forces that are operating in Syria and Iraq," said Ayotte, whose husband was an A-10 pilot.

The Air Force recommended earlier this year that Congress retire the A-10 fleet in 2015 in order to save $4 billion dollars. So far, the House, and both the Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations Committees have rejected that plan.

Ayotte argued that in close air support missions where a close air support aircraft must fly slow and low above troops in danger, "there is no aircraft currently in America's arsenal that is more survivable than the A-10."

"I appreciate the difficult budget environment the Air Force confronts, but it's important that the debate going forward be based on facts rather than arguments that do not hold water," she said.

Gen. Mark Welsh, the Air Force's chief of staff and a former A-10 pilot, said the decision was "not about the A-10."

"It's about balancing an Air Force to provide the spectrum of missions we provide to a combatant commander," he said. "I now have a list of 15 things they'd prefer us to spend the money on."

Welsh added that $20 billion in cuts to the Air Force under sequestration was to blame.

"So if anyone else has got a solution that balances Air Force capabilities across the mission areas we are responsible to the combatant commanders for, we'd love to hear it," he said.

— This story was updated at 6:15 p.m. to clarify the remarks from Sen. Ayotte.

 

[donnage99]

2 years ago the USAF said that the f-35B cannot replace the A-10 because it doesn't generate enough sorties even though the B variant has the highest sorties rate of all 3 variants.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Via MilitaryPhotos.net: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/11/07/sen-john-mccain-vows-to-save-a10-from-retirement.html

It will be interesting to see if this will translate to action.

 

[Moose]

Via MilitaryPhotos.net: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/11/07/sen-john-mccain-vows-to-save-a10-from-retirement.html

It will be interesting to see if this will translate to action.

Since he's not going to add to the Air Froce's topline to afford keeping the A-10, the question becomes what will be force them to cut?

 

[sferrin]

Via MilitaryPhotos.net: http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/11/07/sen-john-mccain-vows-to-save-a10-from-retirement.html

It will be interesting to see if this will translate to action.

Since he's not going to add to the Air Froce's topline to afford keeping the A-10, the question becomes what will be force them to cut?

If I were the USAF I'd tell him I'd fund the A-10 by shutting down Luke AFB and moving their functions elsewhere. Then see how serious he is about wanting to keep the A-10. ;D

 

[Triton]

"Air Force begs for F-35 to be top priority over A-10 jet"
Thursday , November 20, 2014 - 10:40 AM

Source:
http://www.standard.net/Military/2014/11/19/Air-Force-Keeping-Warthogs-would-delay-Joint-Strike-Fighter.html

WASHINGTON — The Warthog is not dead yet.

Despite attempts by the Air Force to retire the A-10 Thunderbolt II, nicknamed for its toughness and one of the military’s most beloved airplanes, a scrappy band of lawmakers has put up a fight that has started to yield some results.

But if the A-10 survives, the Air Force warns, the already delayed introduction of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter could face another setback.

For months, the Air Force has said it can no longer afford its fleet of A-10s, a decision that came to symbolize the effects of the across-the-board budget cuts known as sequestration. But recently it has been forced to soften its stance and is now suggesting compromises that would slow down the aircraft’s retirement.

But it has also warned that if Congress does not allow it to retire the fleet, the Air Force won’t be able to transfer hundreds of maintenance workers from the A-10 to the F-35, as originally planned, which could further delay the program just as manufacturer Lockheed Martin is ramping up production.

“We’re really in a crunch now,” Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said in an interview over the weekend at the Reagan National Defense Forum. “We’re looking at, are we going to delay the Joint Strike Fighter? That would be awful. Are we going to underman the very aircraft that are most needed in this latest fight against” the Islamic State?

Hill Air Force Base now conducts maintenance for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the F-22, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 unmanned aerial vehicles and the C-130. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s proposed five-year Pentagon budget calls for the retirement of the A-10 attack aircraft, which Hill has relied on for years to help broaden its maintenance workload.

The A-10 is a slow-flying aircraft designed to stay close enough to the ground so that pilots can distinguish friend from foe, even with their own eyes. Often called the military’s ugliest aircraft, it is armed with a 30mm cannon that can destroy a tank, and a “titanium bathtub” belly designed to absorb ground fire.

It is beloved by soldiers and airmen alike, who say that it saved countless lives in Iraq and Afghanistan and that its ability to take out the enemy at close range is unparalleled.

A group of former service members who served as joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), who advise ground commanders on how best to deploy air power in combat, recently wrote in a letter to senior Pentagon leaders that the elimination of the A-10 “will cost American lives.”

“When under enemy fire and about to be overrun, JTACs look over their shoulders and pray an A-10 is there — knowing that nothing reassures and protects friendly forces and scatters and destroys enemy forces like an A-10,” they wrote.

But the Warthog is aged and has only one mission, Air Force officials say: providing close-air support to troops on the ground. Other aircraft can perform that mission — in addition to an variety of others, Air Force officials say. And with the budget cuts, James said the Air Force has no other choice. Retiring the A-10 fleet would save $4.2 billion over five years, she said.

“If you can’t have everything — and we can’t because realistically speaking the budgets won’t allow it — you have to make tough choices,” she said. “We’ve looked at 11 different ways to possibly do this, and there are no good solutions. So we went back to Congress and said, ‘Look, we’re between a rock and a hard place, is there no compromise that we can develop together?‘ “

So far, the reaction from some powerful members of Congress has been a steadfast no.

Both the House and Senate have moved to prevent the Air Force from retiring the A-10 this fiscal year. And the aircraft has received strong support from Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who is poised to become chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

In a news conference last week, he vowed to fight the Air Force’s plan to retire the fleet, saying: “This fight is far from over. We all know it’s the best platform. There’s no doubt about that.”

Sen. Kelly Ayotte, R-N.H., rebutted the Air Force’s assertion that not being able to divest the A-10 would delay the F-35 program, which is scheduled to achieve what’s called initial operating capability in late 2016. Congressional aides have said that the Air Force could use contractors as mechanics or transfer members from the Reserve forces to do the work — but Air Force officials said that was not tenable.

“So now we’re trying to pit the F-35 against the A-10,” Ayotte said. “It’s a false choice. There are other ways we can ensure the F-35 continues and the A-10” as well.

But Air Force officials say it’s simple math. Each F-35 requires a crew of 20 who check the aircraft before and after flights, perform scheduled inspections and maintenance, and make repairs.

The Air Force had expected to be able to transfer experienced aircraft mechanics from the A-10 fleet to the F-35, which is still in the development stages, and other aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16. When Congress would not allow it, the Air Force planned to raid the staffs of other aircraft even though they were already short. But with the air campaign against the Islamic State, the Air Force has been unable to do that, officials said.

As a result, the F-35, the next generation darling of the Air Force that is expected to replace several airframes, is getting short shrift, delaying their use. Last fiscal year, there were 748 maintenance workers assigned to the F-35, or about 70 percent of the needed total. This fiscal year, the figure would be 55 percent, and next year 47 percent if the Air Force is not allowed to retire the Warthog.

“Something’s got to give,” said one senior Air Force official.