Choosing One V Bomber

[NOMISYRRUC]

On the subject of the Canberra I came across this passage in Tony Butler's British Secret Projects 3: Jet Bombers Since 1949 on the Internet Archive whilst researching my next post.

It is worth taking a quick look at a proposed fighter Canberra. In June 1949, with just 12 hours of test flying completed, test pilot Wg Cdr R P Beamont had written that ‘with only minor modifications to the existing design a night fighter variant could be produced for Squadron Service...which would compare favourably in performance with the proposed interim types [de Havilland Vampire and Gloster Meteor], and would most probably exceed them in rate of climb, endurance, operational ceiling and firepower’.

He then describes the English Electric P.12 Canberra all-weather fighter project dated 05.03.56.

Air Britain's The British Aircraft Specifications File says that a modified Canberra B.8 was a contender to Specification F.44/46 (which the book said was won by the Meteor NF.11) but the specification was dated 24.01.47 and the Canberra B.8 didn't exist then, unless they mean the B.5 from which it was developed.

The Gloster Meteor Night Fighter

According to Chaz Bowyer in Postwar Combat Aircraft: 2 Gloster Meteor a total of 3,545 Metors were built by Gloster and Armstrong Whitworth between 1944 and 1955 of which 3,239 were allotted British Service serials. It also said that Fokker built 300 Meteor F.8s 1951-54 plus another 30 F.8s from components supplied by Avions Fairey of Belgium.

According to Puthams Gloster Aircraft and Puthams Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft 1,067 Meteors were built by Armstrong Whitworth including 45 F.4s, 430 F.8s and all 592 Meteor night fighters. The firm delivered the 1,067 aircraft 1949-55. The 589 production night fighters were delivered from November 1950 to May 1955. Armstrong Whitworth designed the night fighter version of the Meteor as well as building it.

The De Havilland Vampire and Venom Night Fighters

According to Postwar Military Aircraft: 5 De Havilland Vampire, Venom and Sea Vixen and Air Britain's Royal Air Force Aircraft WA100 to WZ999:

• 94 Vampire night fighters were built. This included the prototype, 78 production aircraft for the RAF which were delivered from March 1951 to June 1952 and 15 that were exported (14 to Italy and one to Switzerland).
• 283 Venom De Havilland fighters were built. That is:
  • 2 prototypes (one Mk 2 and one Mk 3);
  • 90 Mk 2 for the RAF delivered from September 1952 to April 1955;
  • 129 Mk 3 for the RAF delivered September 1953 to May 1956; and
  • 62 Mk 51 for Sweden that were delivered from 11.12.52 to 15.07.57.

The English Electric Canberra Night Fighter

I like the idea of 931 Canberra night fighters being built to replace the Mosquito night fighters in the RAF instead of the Meteor, Vampire and Venom night fighters because the aircraft would have replaced the Mosquito four out of four roles instead of "only" three out of four roles. The others being light bomber, interdictor and medium range photographic reconnaissance.

However, development would have to begin in 1948 at the latest and production contracts to be let in March 1949 at the latest for deliveries to begin in November 1950. Even that's optimistic. The first 90 production Canberra B.2s were ordered in March 1949 and deliveries commenced in February 1951.

The 4 Canberra B.1 prototypes were ordered on 07.01.46 and were followed by the orders for 4 B.2 & one PR.3 prototypes in 1948. Only the first pair of B.2 prototypes was built because the last pair was transferred to the first production contract with new serial numbers.

What if XV177 and XV181 were instead completed as prototype night fighters? I suspect that wouldn't be early enough to have deliveries of the Canberra night fighter begin in November 1950. I think the prototypes would have to be ordered at the same time as the B.1 prototypes, i.e. 07.01.46.

The Canberra looks to large to be navalised so we'd still have to have the Sea Venom or an equivalent aircraft for the RN, RAN and Aéronavale.

 

[Yellow Palace]

The Canberra looks to large to be navalised so we'd still have to have the Sea Venom or an equivalent aircraft for the RN, RAN and Aéronavale.

The Canberra was used as a reference aircraft for the 1952 Fleet Carrier studies. There was no expectation that a naval variant would be built, but it was thought to be representative of the size and weight required for a strategic strike aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Another reason why the Canberras and V-bombers were built in several factories instead of one may have been dispersal.

If all the aircraft were built in one factory and it was damaged or destroyed production ended until the factory could be repaired or rebuilt. However, if was spread among four factories (in the case of the Canberra) and three factories (in the case of the V-bombers) you've only lost a fraction of the production if one factory is damaged or destroyed.

This could have been an additional reason why Swifts were to have been built by Short & Harland as well as Supermarine, why Hunters were built by Armstrong-Whitworth and Hawker, Blackpool as well as Hawker, Kingston, and why the Javelin was built by Armstrong-Whitworth as well as Gloster.

It could also have been why the Valiant had Avons, Vulcan had the Olympus and the Victor Mk 1 had Sapphires. Also the first 150 Hunters built by Armstrong-Whitworth had Sapphires instead of Avons. All the Canberras had Avons, but not all of them were built by Rolls Royce. The source that I used for Post 35 said that Napier was one of the other firms that built the Avon. I can't remember where I read it but I do recall reading that Bristol built Avons in the 1950s too.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is a paragraph from Page 466 of "RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces" by Humphrey Wynn.

A note prepared for the Prime Minister early in the New Year on the Valiant said that R&D costs were difficult to identify because a good deal of its equipment and its engines were common with other aircraft; development of the airframe cost about £10 million, and 100 Valiants had been bought for the RAF at a cost of £57 million. At one time there were 72 Valiants in the RAF front line, but since 1959/60 their numbers had been: 24 assigned to Saceur as a TBF, equipped with 48 American nuclear weapons; 16 converted for use as tankers; and eight in the SR role. The total number of Valiants, including those used for training and research, was currently 61.

The Victor and Vulcan had a good deal of equipment that was common to other aircraft too. The Sapphire and Conway engines used by the Victor Mk 1 and 2 respectively were common to other aircraft. Of the three V-bombers only the Vulcan used an engine that wasn't common to other aircraft. (I'm not counting Concorde and the TSR.2 because their development wasn't begun until the 1960s and AIUI all their Olympus engines had in common with the Olympus engines in the Vulcan was the name. I'm not counting cancelled projects from the 1950s like the Thin-Wing Javelin either.)

Therefore, would developing one V-bomber instead of three have saved that much money? At least "in the scheme of things" as the UK spent £12,660 on defence between 1948 and 1957 according to this table from Appendix IV of "Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945" by Michael Carver.

​

Assuming that the R&D cost of the V-bombers airframes was £10 million each then £20 million would have been saved if one V-bomber had been developed instead of three. While, that's a lot in absolute terms and would have paid for more than a few Centurion tanks, Hawker Hunters or about 8 Daring class destroyers or about 8 Whitby class frigates, it's only 0.16% of the £12,660 million spent on defence between 1948 and 1957.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

That is a very good analysis of the production plans.

The common thread is the Korean War, whether it was Canberras, Hunters, Swifts or Balliols the panic buying meant spreading orders around to anyone who had capacity (space and manpower). In some cases, like the Hunter, it meant taking over factories from other companies and retooling (Squires Gate).
But the post-war cancellations do distort the picture, the companies had already retooled and begun production so all of them had to produce something. As you say the bulk of their output was between December 1952 and October 1955 which shows how long the preparation period was from the placement of the orders in November 1950 and April 1951.

It's increasingly looking like Korea induced such a panic that decisions across the board utterly messed up the longer term strategy.

Yes. Agree 110%.
I think this dislocation of MoS planning led to some of the debacles of the late-third of the 1950s.
It was unavoidable - but like rearmament in 1938, it takes time to get a juggernaut rolling again. Say what you like about the US MIC, they never stopped rolling post-1941.

This the table that I included in Post 44 with an extra column added.

​

British defence spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 7.1% in 1948 to 9.7% in 1953 and at Constant Prices it increased from 100% in 1948 to 160% in 1953.

Then the Korean War ended and it decreased to 7.9% of GDP in 1956 and but at Constant Prices it only decreased to 151%.

I'm not sure what that illustrates or proves, but I think it's interesting.

 

[red admiral]

Opportunity cost? Maybe Avro should have been helping dH fix the Comet?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Opportunity cost? Maybe Avro should have been helping dH fix the Comet?

Is that the opportunity cost of the Korean War mobilisation or the opportunity cost of developing and producing three medium bombers instead of one?

For what it's worth the Vulcan would have been the sole V-bomber had it been up to me.

However, that's because I know that all three V-bombers were successful. This was something that the people who made the decisions to develop and produce three V-bombers didn't.

In the "real world" the MoS ordered two prototypes & one static test article of each V-bomber and the initial contracts for 25 Valiants, 25 Victors & 25 Vulcans included 5 or 6 aircraft for the A&AEE.

In "this version of history" I want to use some of the money saved to order eight prototypes and one static test article from Avro and the initial production contract for 75 Vulcans to include 15-20 aircraft for the A&AEE.

The object of the exercise is to complete the development programme sooner and have the Vulcan enter service with the RAF earlier than 11th July 1957 which was when the type equipped No. 83 Squadron. I want No. 138 Squadron to form on Vulcans in January 1955 instead of Valiants, but I suspect that cutting 30 months off the development programme is too optimistic.

Something else that I suspect. Had only one V-bomber had been developed the MoS would have ordered the production aircraft from three factories. Therefore, instead of an initial contract 75 Vulcans being let with Avro the MoS would have ordered 25 from Avro, 25 from Handley Page and 25 from Vickers.

 

[starviking]

Opportunity cost? Maybe Avro should have been helping dH fix the Comet?

Is that the opportunity cost of the Korean War mobilisation or the opportunity cost of developing and producing three medium bombers instead of one?

<SNIP>

Something else that I suspect. Had only one V-bomber had been developed the MoS would have ordered the production aircraft from three factories. Therefore, instead of an initial contract 75 Vulcans being let with Avro the MoS would have ordered 25 from Avro, 25 from Handley Page and 25 from Vickers.

If not for the severe problems facing British airliner development in this period, it would have perhaps been better to have only two companies building the Vulcans, and the other working on Brittania, Comet, or dare I even say it, VC7?

 

[Lascaris]

I wonder if perhaps what you need, perhaps not for the V bombers but for the British aircraft industry in general isn't 1957 and forcing the companies to start merging about 5 years earlier, say at the end of the Korean war. Not certain how practical that is under Churchill. Alternatively how different the industrial policy of a Labour government in say 1951-56 would be?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Opportunity cost? Maybe Avro should have been helping dH fix the Comet?

Is that the opportunity cost of the Korean War mobilisation or the opportunity cost of developing and producing three medium bombers instead of one?

<SNIP>

Something else that I suspect. Had only one V-bomber had been developed the MoS would have ordered the production aircraft from three factories. Therefore, instead of an initial contract 75 Vulcans being let with Avro the MoS would have ordered 25 from Avro, 25 from Handley Page and 25 from Vickers.

If not for the severe problems facing British airliner development in this period, it would have perhaps been better to have only two companies building the Vulcans, and the other working on Britannia, Comet, or dare I even say it, VC7?

That sentence doesn't make sense. Did you mean?

Due to the severe problems facing British airliner development in this period, it would have perhaps been better to have only two companies building the Vulcans, and the other working on Britannia, Comet, or dare I even say it, VC7.

Or?

Due to the severe problems facing British airliner development in this period, would it have perhaps been better to have only two companies building the Vulcans, and the other working on Britannia, Comet, or dare I even say it, VC7?

I don't see how having two companies building the Vulcan instead of three so the third company could have produced airliners would have helped British airliner development as production and development aren't the same thing.

In the "real world" the first 25 Valiants were ordered in April 1951 while the first 25 Victors and first 25 Vulcans were ordered in June 1952. "In this version of history" I was going to have 75 Vulcans ordered in April 1951.

As I understand it development of the Comet and Britannia was progressing rather smoothly in 1951-52. According to Jane's 1953-54 the first Comet Series 1 was handed over to BOAC on 4th February 1951 (six months ahead of schedule) and the ninth Comet Series 1 was handed over to BOAC on 30th September 1952 (more than fifteen months ahead of schedule), the Comet 2 was due to enter service in 1954 and the Comet 3 was due to enter service in 1956. The first Britannia flew on 16th August 1952 and (as far as I know) was projected to enter service in 1954. The problems with the Britannia and Comet didn't emerge until well after the first production contracts for the V-bombers were let. For example the first Comet crash (caused by pilot error) wasn't until 3rd March 1953 and the crashes caused by structural problems weren't until May 1953, January 1953 & April 1954.

Even if it had been good for British airliner development, it would have been bad for the defence of the realm. The Governments of the day wanted as many V-bombers as possible as quickly as possible. This is why I suspect that the production contracts would have been spread amongst three factories even if only one V-bomber had been developed.

Please bear in mind that when the first production contracts were let (1951-52) the plan was for Bomber Command to have a front-line of 144 medium bombers (Lincolns and Washingtons) in 18 squadrons & 260 Canberra light bombers in 26 squadrons (total 404 aircraft in 44 squadrons) by March 1955 and 320 V-bombers in 40 squadrons (38 medium bomber & 2 long-range PR) & 100 Canberra light bombers in 10 squadrons (total 420 aircraft in 50 squadrons) by 1958.

For what it's worth (1) Bomber Command did have 260 Canberras in 26 squadrons at 31st March 1955, but only 58 medium bombers (8 Valiants in one squadron and 50 Lincolns in 5 squadrons) for a total of 318 aircraft in 32 squadrons. At 31st March 1958 Bomber Command actually had 80 V-bombers in 10 squadrons (8 with Valiants including one LRPR squadron and 2 with Vulcans) and 96 Canberras in 6 squadrons for a total of 176 aircraft in 16 squadrons. Note that neither of the totals includes the Canberra PR squadrons, the ECM squadron and in the case of March 1958 the Canberra squadrons supporting the nuclear test programme.

For what it's worth (2) the Valiant entered service 30 months before the Vulcan and 39 months before the Victor. Furthermore, the peak strength of 8 squadrons (7 medium bomber and one LRPR) was reached in January 1957 which was four months before the first Vulcan squadron formed (July 1957) and 15 months before the first Victor squadron formed (April 1958). I'm not counting the ECM squadron because I don't know when it converted from Lincolns to Valiants. Although according to Puntams book on Vickers Aircraft the last Valiant was delivered on 17th August 1957.

Having written that if the Valiant and Victor weren't developed the design departments of Handley Page and Vickers would have had a lot of spare capacity from the late 1940s. Both firms might have have produced proposals for airliners from their unsuccessful bids for Specs. B.35/46 and B.9/48 in 1948 or 1949 that might have attracted the attention of BOAC and the Ministry of Supply. So development of an airliner in the VC.7 class would have started two or three years before the VC.7 i.e. 1948 or 1949 instead of 1951. Whether either of them would have been a success is a different matter.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I wonder if perhaps what you need, perhaps not for the V bombers but for the British aircraft industry in general isn't 1957 and forcing the companies to start merging about 5 years earlier, say at the end of the Korean war. Not certain how practical that is under Churchill. Alternatively how different the industrial policy of a Labour government in say 1951-56 would be?

For what it's worth that's exactly what the Atlee Government wanted to do.

This is a quote from Page 15 of "British Aircraft Corporation - A history by Charles Gardner".

The Korean War of 1950 caused the plan instantly to be shelved, and a re-armament boom followed under what was seen as the likelihood of the outbreak of World War III.

The Korean War began on 25th June 1950 and the Conservatives returned to power on 25th October 1951. If the Korean War hadn't happened the Atlee Government might have implemented the plan before the Conservatives returned to power. Or it if had won the February 1950 General Election with a larger majority there wouldn't have been a General Election in 1951 and the Labour Party would have remained in power until at least 1954.

 

[zen]

Another 5 years of Atlee led Labour is a much bigger AH Scenario.
All sorts of consequences flow from that.......not all of them good.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Another 5 years of Atlee led Labour is a much bigger AH Scenario.
All sorts of consequences flow from that.......not all of them good.

For what it's worth I agree about it being a much bigger AH Scenario.

However, I don't know enough to say whether it would have been better or worse than the "real world's" Conservative Government.

One thing that won't change is the 1951 Rearmament Programme because it was introduced by the Atlee Government.

 

[alertken]

About to be pushed into the Pusan Sea, GA Macarthur very publically demanded PRC's Yalu R. safe haven be nuked. UK PM Attlee pronto met Pres.Truman, 6/12/50. On that day:
-SACEUR GA Ike had not yet organised NATO as a military Force, centralised Command and Control;
- Attlee had one fission Bomb and 3 potential delivery platforms in R&D, no prodn. commitment;
- USAF/SAC had many B-50s, few B-36s, no Bombs (Truman kept his stockpile in the civilian USAEC, precisely to command their use).

By Korean Armistice, 7/53: - Pres Ike had begun the process of passing AW curation to USAF/USN;
- PM Churchill had funded prodn of Blue Danube fission Bomb and Victor/Valiant/Vulcan B.1, and R&D of Red Beard fission Bomb;
- USAF/SAC was onway to receiving 2,032 B-47 and Bombs sufficient for dual carriage....because:

Much of US/UK/Canada/France's engineering resources had been assigned to SUPER PRIORITY military business for WW3, managed by revival of WW2 US/UK/Canada Combined Boards, assigning materials priorities. US was paying for much of its Allies' re-equipment (not solely pro bono, but to ensure we all shared the dying). These Boards determined who got what, when, such as from ALCAN, ALCOA's output of aluminium products. Great efforts were made to harmonise, say Avon engine deliveries with airframes' progress, to avoid gliders with weapons, radars, or engines in their packing cases near incomplete airframes.

UK and US funded second-sourcing in 2 senses: 1 product from 2 (or more) firms (Canberra: EE/Avro/HP/Shorts; Avon from RR/Bristol/ Napier/Standard Motors); or 2 products from 2 firms (Victor, Vulcan, all from the design parents). The reasons could be traced to 1915: "insurance" -v.R&D failure, or prodn. disruption, such as by enemy action; or to accelerate delivery beyond one Supplier's capacity; or to sustain a firm through a lull before a priority product - so to bridge Avro from Anson, Shackleton to Vulcan, HP from Hastings to Victor.

US elected to avoid the B-29+B-32 duplication and to bet on B-47, second-sourced at Douglas/Tulsa and Lockheed, DoD assigning the ex-Bell B-29 Marietta plant. UK chose to repeat Halifax+Lancaster and to hedge with sole-source Victor plus Vulcan...but:
Attlee and Churchill, tried hard to build neither Victor nor Vulcan, nor interim, insurance Valiant. Attlee nearly extracted B-47/Mark 5 Bomb from Truman, but was stuffed by the Fuchs et al spy scandals; Churchill thought he could revive that from Ike, but was thwarted by his Minister of Supply, responsible for sponsoring UK Aero industry: Sandys saw that as wounding a National asset.

Sandys was back to the same issue, 1/57, when dealing with Marks 2: he could have tossed a coin and chosen one of them, second- sourced at the loser. But the advice he received from MoS was that deliveries would be quicker, 2 types from 2 parents, than 1 type from a parent and his apprentice. (Ministers did not then Go Compare Price...because no-one had a clue: RR's Hives expected more than 33 Victor 2 to be built {1 crashed before delivery} and placed Conway by offering a fixed Unit Price).