Carrier attack on airbases 1982

[TomS]

As well he should have, because his office is the one that screwed up.


Why should an elected official that had no input to the decisions resign?

It was a good deal more complicated than that. Especially as the crisis neared its head on South Georgia, Lord Carrington was preparing to send a message to the Argentines that laid out clearly (in diplomatic terms) that Britain was not willing to discuss the future of the islands as long as Argentina was threatening them. But they needed some actual substance behind that and wanted the MoD to commit to leaving Endurance on station and taking other concrete measures to show the British commitment. But no one at MoD or #10 were willing to move quickly enough to back up that statement. Then South Georgia happened and the avalanche began.

I recommend Signals of War by Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It was a good deal more complicated than that. Especially as the crisis neared its head on South Georgia, Lord Carrington was preparing to send a message to the Argentines that laid out clearly (in diplomatic terms) that Britain was not willing to discuss the future of the islands as long as Argentina was threatening them. But they needed some actual substance behind that and wanted the MoD to commit to leaving Endurance on station and taking other concrete measures to show the British commitment. But no one at MoD or #10 were willing to move quickly enough to back up that statement. Then South Georgia happened and the avalanche began.

I recommend Signals of War by Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse.

I'll add that to the list, thanks!

 

[Rule of cool]

See discussion here.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/raf-with-tsr2-etc-but-what-fighters.10445/

I've started looking at this thread and came across what appears to be a useful term.

'A program of record'

This is a good threshold, because all sorts of things get 'considered' in discussions for the purposes of establishing left and right of arc, or putting a wish list or whatever. I have no doubt someone suggested F4Ds, but was a team established to look into acquiring them or was it a thought bubble?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I've started looking at this thread and came across what appears to be a useful term.

'A program of record'

This is a good threshold, because all sorts of things get 'considered' in discussions for the purposes of establishing left and right of arc, or putting a wish list or whatever. I have no doubt someone suggested F4Ds, but was a team established to look into acquiring them or was it a thought bubble?

Some things can still get built without a program of record, but for an entire fleet of aircraft you'd definitely need a PoR.

 

[Rule of cool]

Its a handy guide (although not definitivel) because so many documents can be found with stuff on them that makes people think that this or that item of kit was on the menu. One of my favourites is Australia getting a CVA01, sure enquiries were made but it was almost instantly dismissed as was getting a used Essex, although that got kicked around a bit longer.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Its a handy guide (although not definitivel) because so many documents can be found with stuff on them that makes people think that this or that item of kit was on the menu. One of my favourites is Australia getting a CVA01, sure enquiries were made but it was almost instantly dismissed as was getting a used Essex, although that got kicked around a bit longer.

For planes and stuff of that rough cost scale, about all you can get without a Program of Record is a "Dale Brown Special", something kinda thrown together as a one-off.
For small arms, though, things can get more interesting.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Its a handy guide (although not definitivel) because so many documents can be found with stuff on them that makes people think that this or that item of kit was on the menu. One of my favourites is Australia getting a CVA01, sure enquiries were made but it was almost instantly dismissed as was getting a used Essex, although that got kicked around a bit longer.

Oh, right. Sometimes people get creative with their accounting, and combine the end results of multiple programs of record.

Say you have a PoR to test some new engines, or maybe just a set of vectoring turkey feathers like the Su37 has. These engines are in an instrumented F-15D for testing. And you also have a PoR for some radar upgrades to the Eagle, so you stick that in an instrumented F-15D. Once the new engines are tested and people are satisfied with their reliability, there's no reason you can't stick that upgraded radar into the Eagle with the fancy engines. Repeat until all the goodies are installed.

 

[zen]

The obvious point of running the Falklands War in this AH section must be to examine the effects of different systems than was deployed.
In context that includes things like CVA-01, or Ark Royal and different aircraft such as the various options of P.1154, or OR.346 or F4K or F8 or whatever.

Similarly with say NIGS or ASWRE C-band 3D radar etc...

It might just be acceptable to minimally diverge with things like the Blue Eric Jammer (SkyShadow in a ADEN gun pod), or alternative weaponry like AS.30. Though that's getting controversial I think unless in comparison with other unrealised systems.

Politically the Falklands hits the ultimate problem of success.
Competance preempts such conflicts, neatly dissuading the other before shots are fired.
But Competance results in complacency and the rise of Incompetence .......

Incompetence kills

 

[Arjen]

But again, should Maggie Thatcher have resigned and called for new parliament elections because of this?

Yes. Because:

It was a good deal more complicated than that. Especially as the crisis neared its head on South Georgia, Lord Carrington was preparing to send a message to the Argentines that laid out clearly (in diplomatic terms) that Britain was not willing to discuss the future of the islands as long as Argentina was threatening them. But they needed some actual substance behind that and wanted the MoD to commit to leaving Endurance on station and taking other concrete measures to show the British commitment. But no one at MoD or #10 were willing to move quickly enough to back up that statement. Then South Georgia happened and the avalanche began.

MoD and #10 were involved in a series of ill-advised decisions. New elections would have had to wait until the end of the war, the Conservatives might even have won them, but in my view, Lord Carrington was the only Cabinet member who did the right thing.

 

[Hood]

Had Corporate failed then there would have been no option but to call a vote of no confidence and force an election.
There is no certainty that Labour would win that election ('the longest suicide note in history'), but it would have altered a lot of British history after that point if Thatcher had been toppled by her Party (again, uncertain given the lack of contenders at that time and her ideology was propelling the Tories forward at that time).

The whole Falklands issue to me is a sad affair, it need never have turned out the way it did. Britain has a tendency to dig its heels in when it comes to certain "colonial" matters - like the return of the Chagos islanders which seems again to be off the table, Britain will never negotiate now given the blood and treasure invested in the islands. It's a shame that two nations who were very close allies and trading partners for a long time ended up at loggerheads over a few scrappy bits of rock (yes there may be juicy oil down there but nobody has got to it yet and when anyone does it will probably be an American or Chinese corporation that does).

 

[Yellow Palace]

Its a handy guide (although not definitivel) because so many documents can be found with stuff on them that makes people think that this or that item of kit was on the menu. One of my favourites is Australia getting a CVA01, sure enquiries were made but it was almost instantly dismissed as was getting a used Essex, although that got kicked around a bit longer.

The really obnoxious one, for me, is 'The Shah of Iran was going to buy....'

A statement which can be seen attached to virtually anything that was being produced in the late 1970s, usually with very little evidence and often in ways that are obviously contradictory.

 

[uk 75]

I was told way back in the 70s that the Shah had all the major magazines like Aviation Week and brochures from companies as bedside reading. But like much in those days it was probably a myth.
The UK did try to get Saudi Arabia to finance and buy the BAe P110 fighter.

 

[Archibald]

Had Corporate failed then there would have been no option but to call a vote of no confidence and force an election.
There is no certainty that Labour would win that election ('the longest suicide note in history'), but it would have altered a lot of British history after that point if Thatcher had been toppled by her Party (again, uncertain given the lack of contenders at that time and her ideology was propelling the Tories forward at that time).

The whole Falklands issue to me is a sad affair, it need never have turned out the way it did. Britain has a tendency to dig its heels in when it comes to certain "colonial" matters - like the return of the Chagos islanders which seems again to be off the table, Britain will never negotiate now given the blood and treasure invested in the islands. It's a shame that two nations who were very close allies and trading partners for a long time ended up at loggerheads over a few scrappy bits of rock (yes there may be juicy oil down there but nobody has got to it yet and when anyone does it will probably be an American or Chinese corporation that does).

I have a French comics about the Falklands were one of the british soldiers send to the Falklands tersely notes that "Argentina provides the horses we use to play polo". No idea if it is true story, but it clearly shows how absurd this war was.

Also the Type 42 destroyers and Canberra bombers on both sides, plus that talk about selling Vulcans to Argentina, also 25 de Mayo was a Colossus / Majestic... thus a BRITISH carrier !

Then again, the Argentina junta successive iterations after 1976, including the 1981 with Ayana, were corrupt and murderous morons. At least the Falklands defeat led to the downfall of the Junta the next year - good riddance.

I blame the junta for the Falklands bloodfest, even if I have little affect for Thatcher. To her credit, it was a pretty balsy decision to make. She had some big ovaries there.

 

[uk 75]

I am not sure that any of the 1960s cancelled projects would have been much help in dealing with an Argentine invasion.

TSR2 lacked the range of the Vulcan and had no airfield denial weapons developed for it.

P1154RAF was not able to match the real Harrier (P1127RAF) for simplicity or rough field performance.

CVA01 and Ark Royal had identical airgroups unless you go for the Vickers Fighter Attacker instead of Phantoms and Buccs. Carriers don't like going too close to enemy shorelines so the Buccs/VG jobs would have to go a long way. Their main planned weapons were either nukes or anti-ship/radar ASMs.

The Phantoms on a single carrier (it is highly unlikely that CVA 01 and 02 would both have been in commission in 1982) would bring Sparrow/Skyflash to the party but small Argentine A4 and Daggers might not be as easy to hit as Russian bombers

 

[Rule of cool]

The really obnoxious one, for me, is 'The Shah of Iran was going to buy....'

A statement which can be seen attached to virtually anything that was being produced in the late 1970s, usually with very little evidence and often in ways that are obviously contradictory.

This is what I mean, trolling through records can find references to all manner references to this and that, and because these are official documents or Hansard or whatever the impression is that its in the official plan. However until a project team team is formed and a budget allocated such references are just thought bubbles amongst the general vortex of ideas that exist at any one time.

 

[H_K]

The obvious point of running the Falklands War in this AH section must be to examine the effects of different systems than was deployed.
In context that includes things like CVA-01, or Ark Royal and different aircraft such as the various options of P.1154, or OR.346 or F4K or F8 or whatever.

Similarly with say NIGS or ASWRE C-band 3D radar etc...

It might just be acceptable to minimally diverge with things like the Blue Eric Jammer (SkyShadow in a ADEN gun pod), or alternative weaponry like AS.30

I personally would start with minimum divergence from history and go from there.

From a technical perspective the 3 basic pre-requisites I have identified in this thread are 1) Buddy refueling, 2) Anti-runway bombs, and 3) Self-protection jammers.

Take those 3 and you have the ingredients to successfully destroy the Argentinian Air Force on the ground. It almost doesn’t matter what platform you pick - if you take the Israeli example they used whatever they had on hand (Mirages, Super Mysteres, Mysteres and Ouragans) and all did the job.

What it does require is some forethought by the navy in question to have considered anti-airfield ops as part of its potential carrier missions (clearly not the case of the RN at the time, unlike say the USN or Marine Nationale).

Then it becomes a question of planning, technical execution, and of course luck. CTOL vs. VSTOL arguments seem to be quite secondary, while the quality of a carrier force’s fighters and defensive systems is somewhat more relevant as it determines the level of risk that must be accepted if the strike fails.

A big open question in my mind is how many aircraft are needed in the initial strike, how many aircraft can the carrier(s) muster, and how many bases need to be attacked simultaneously. To some extent that depends on the quality of your intelligence… for example the Israelis were going against larger air bases with ~50 aircraft each and long runways and allocated ~20 aircraft per base in their 1st wave, but often most of the damage was done by the first 8 aircraft.

P.S. Posting some relevant information on Israel’s Operation Moked below… target assignments and airfield bomb damage assessments.

 

[Rule of cool]

I am not sure that any of the 1960s cancelled projects would have been much help in dealing with an Argentine invasion.

TSR2 lacked the range of the Vulcan and had no airfield denial weapons developed for it.

P1154RAF was not able to match the real Harrier (P1127RAF) for simplicity or rough field performance.

CVA01 and Ark Royal had identical airgroups unless you go for the Vickers Fighter Attacker instead of Phantoms and Buccs. Carriers don't like going too close to enemy shorelines so the Buccs/VG jobs would have to go a long way. Their main planned weapons were either nukes or anti-ship/radar ASMs.

The Phantoms on a single carrier (it is highly unlikely that CVA 01 and 02 would both have been in commission in 1982) would bring Sparrow/Skyflash to the party but small Argentine A4 and Daggers might not be as easy to hit as Russian bombers

I'd disagree. The TSR2 might have been able to land at Port Stanley in the days leading up to the invasion as a deterrent, although once the invasion has started it's only contribution would be like the Canberras that operated from Chile on intelligence missions.

The P1154RAF could certainly have operated from Port Stanley and would have provided a great deterrent, although I don't know if it would have flown from Sids Strip.

CVA01 or 02 or Eagle would have bought far more to the party with her ~36 +heavy hitters backed by AEW than even the real TF which peaked at 31 Shars and GR3s. These aircraft could do far more than the Harriers with their greater flight endurance, more powerful radars, greater weapons loads which would allow the TF Commander to consider things that in real life couldn't be, such as putting a Sea Dart ship or 'Type 64 combo'to the west of the islands covered by a Phantom CAP.

If the RN had CVA01 & 02 or Eagle as a second carrier both would likely see action even if one wasn't in commission. Hermes was 2 weeks into a 6 week refit and sailed in 5 days and Intrepid was de-stored awaiting disposal and sailed in 3 weeks. I think it's highly unlikely that a carrier would be so deep in refit that she couldn't be bought into service in 3-4 weeks in an emergency.

 

[uk 75]

TSR2 was a bit of a brute so I am not sure if Port Stanley airport could have taken it but the 4,000 ft tarmac runway could take a P1154 using its vectored thrust to STOL.

Port Stanley Airport - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

On CVA01, assuming she had entered service in about 1974 as planned I am not sure whether CVA 02 would have survived.the post 1973 global economic crisis. Eagle might have lasted until about 1980 but probably not.

But as you say, CVA01 or even a hanging-on Ark Royal would have had Phantoms able to work with Gannet AEW to increase the air defence zone considerably.

The Bucs were optimised for strikes against Kiev and co with Martels or WE177. The RAF might have been using Bucs too in some scenarios so they might provide suitable ordinance.

 

[Rule of cool]

Sandy Woodward worked in an information vacuum that drove so much of what he did. The SSNs off the Argentine coast could provide a reasonable idea if any ships had left port and could pick up radio chatter of planes taking off and forming up and/or rendezvousing with tankers, however there were only 3 of them so it was hardly comprehensive surveillance. Similarly a lack of good low level radar coverage meant the carriers had to operate about 200 miles east of the islands for fear of the Exocet-SE threat, which meant SHars with a flight endurance of 75 minutes could only spend 15 minutes on station over San Carlos.

A CVA or Eagle could launch a Buccaneer every morning to conduct large scale radar recce clearance searches west of the islands, which will give the commander confidence that there are no surface ships with Exocets are lurking nearby. Similarly even Gannet AEW will prove low level radar coverage out to about 80 miles over water, so the carriers could operate only 100 miles east of the islands. Coupled with the ~150 minutes of flight endurance for the Phantom means that the Type 64 picket/missile trap from near Pebble Island to maybe 100 further west, which gives much better radar early warning and puts the Fighters and SAMs in a great position to disrupt attacks.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I personally would start with minimum divergence from history and go from there.

From a technical perspective the 3 basic pre-requisites I have identified in this thread are 1) Buddy refueling, 2) Anti-runway bombs, and 3) Self-protection jammers.

1) I don't know if the RN had any buddy pods in service, but it wouldn't be hard to "borrow" a few from the USN when the RN stops to pick up the AIM-9Ls. The major issue with buddy refueling is that it takes half your strike force after accounting for fleet CAP. So now you're down to 12 total Harriers(!) in the attack group using the historical forces.

My operation plan: 2 SHARs for fighter escort of the strike and one plane for post-strike recon makes 9 birds in the strike so I'd do vics of 3s (assuming that the weapons split works out right). Good news is that the Argie hardened aircraft shelters didn't have blast closures across the front, so a 1000lb bomb in front of the HAS would wreck everything inside. And you don't even need to be all that close to the front of the shelters, so a tossed dumb bomb is probably adequate. One vic with 2x 1000lb bombs each for the HASs. One vic with 6x cluster bombs each to wreck everything in the open on the ground. And the last vic with 6x Durandals each for the runway. Single pass over the airfield and gone, then the post-strike recon bird blasts overhead maybe 10 minutes later to let the dust settle.​

2) We've pummeled the deceased equine of antirunway bombs enough. Mission requires them, unguided 1000lb bombs would take far too many aircraft, guided bombs weren't available, end of discussion.

3) Which brings us to the Jammer. Why didn't Harriers have a jammer pod? GR3s would be doing all their work within range of mobile radar guided AAA and SAMs. SHARs would be dealing with different radars when they roll in for Sea Eagle attacks on surface ships, but still within radar guided SAMs and even automatic 100mm naval cannons.

Assuming that the Blue Eric pod was available, I'd need 12 of them for the entire historical forces, one for every plane to have a jammer. Absolute minimum requirement is 6: one for each escort SHAR, one for the recon bird, and one for each flight lead, but I'd really rather have every bird in the strike package with a jammer pod.​

 

[Rule of cool]

don't know if the RN had any buddy pods in service,.....

RN Buccaneers had buddy packs. 2 aircraft in the old 809 sqn were set up as maxi tankers, with a fuel tank in the bomb bay.

However i don't know if its possible for Harriers to be a buddy tanker aircraft offload aircraft. In 1982 SHars and GR3s carried a 100gal tank under each wing, GR3s also could use 330gal ferry tanks. Because of the centre of gravity sensitivity there was severe restrictions on their use, the fuel sloshing back and forth would make the Harrier crash if the nozzles are down.

During the war 220gal Hunter tanks were trialled for SHars but rejected for these CoG issues, so a section was cut out making them 190gal and OK for CoG.

Maybe if the 190gal tanks were in service before the war maybe buddy refuelling might be possible.

 

[Dilandu]

From a technical perspective the 3 basic pre-requisites I have identified in this thread are 1) Buddy refueling, 2) Anti-runway bombs, and 3) Self-protection jammers.

You overestimate the self-protection jammers capability pretty seriously. They aren't some magic charms that would make radars useless. They merely make radar work more complicated.

As far as I knew, the Harriers and other tactical aircraft used a Sky Shadow ECM pod. The Buckaneers and Vulcans carried Dash 10 (AN/ALQ-101-10) ECM pod, but it seems to be pre-set to counter Soviet radar systems with as little response time as possible, and may not be efficient against Argentinean Western-provided electronics.

So let's stuck with Sky Shadow. As far as I knew, it's dual-channel (i.e. it could work on two radars simultaneously) G/J jammer (one band 5.0 - 9.4 GHz , other 9.15 -16.4 GHz). It's main advantage is, that it's programmable, which means it could be set on specific frequences of Argentinean radars.


The problem is, that Skyduard (early model) aquisition radar works in K-band, 18 to 27 GHz. Which means OUTSIDE of Sky Shadow frequency range. So your self-protection jammers would not be able to block the warning/aquisition for Skyguard.

With the tracking radar of Skyguard (I/G frequiences) it could work. But as we know, Skyguard have tracking cameras capable of both manual and automatic targect tracking. So as long as target could be aquired - and you can't prevent this, since your jammer did not work on required frequences - it could also be tracked and engaged.

The result? Your jammers would complicate Skyguard fire, but would not make it inefficient. So each attack on airfields would cost you several planes at least damaged (and maybe downed). What rate of attrition your carrier force could sustain?

 

[Rule of cool]

What effect would a Sky Shadow/Blue Eric have on the TPS43s and 44s used for search/early warning?

When 9 SHars attacked Port Stanley airfield on 1 May the only battle damage was a single 20mm through the tail of a SHar tasked with direct attack on the airfield. How this equates to an attack on a mainland airfield is anyone's guess, but its hardly a bloodbath.

 

[Hood]

The Argentines were prepared for anti-radar missiles but they had prepared for Martel rather than Shrike - which is what the Vulcan's had to use (Martel doesn't like getting chilly).
It's worth noting that Martel has different seekers for different bands, so you'd have to fit the correct seeker before the mission.

ECM pods were there mostly for the attack pop-up phase when they were more vulnerable to SAMs.

Provision of ECM pre-Falklands in the RAF was pretty patchy really (even things like chaff/flare dispensers were rare at that stage). Arguably they never really got it sussed until the 1990s with Sky Guardian or Zeus, Sky Shadow and ALARM as a package.
Now of course - in any CTOL flattop AH you have to consider whether the RN would have funded ECM to the same extent or better - I suspect that given the RN was very clued into EW that they would have upgraded the F-4 and Buccaneer with newer systems. Certainly the RAF was looking at a whole host of US EW kit in 1979-80 and some interesting stuff could have been brought.

 

[EwenS]

Unless I've missed mention of it, the Argentinian missile system that was most feared was the French made Roland. One was deployed to the Falklands to protect the runway at Stanley and was credited with shooting down a SHAR. It also drove the Vulcans to medium altitudes. Argentina had another 3 Roland units on the mainland.

 

[Hood]

CVA01 and Ark Royal had identical airgroups unless you go for the Vickers Fighter Attacker instead of Phantoms and Buccs. Carriers don't like going too close to enemy shorelines so the Buccs/VG jobs would have to go a long way. Their main planned weapons were either nukes or anti-ship/radar ASMs.

CVA might bring a 'Broomstick' if that capability was funded - its possible that Bristol would have had hers too. That would have been very helpful for air defence.
Gannet AEW wouldn't have been the world's best AEW system, but it would have provided adequate cover.

Saying that, the foggy conditions would have hampered air operations just the same as historical.

 

[EwenS]

Saying that, the foggy conditions would have hampered air operations just the same as historical.

Possibly more so in a conventional carrier. The RN developed the ability to bring VSTOL SHARS back to the deck using a trail of flares dropped astern of the carriers. Made possible by their slow approach speed.

And would the heavy seas encountered have had more or less effect on air operations in a conventional carrier?

 

[Dilandu]

What effect would a Sky Shadow/Blue Eric have on the TPS43s and 44s used for search/early warning?

Zero. It's a S-band radar, 2.9 to 3.1 GHz. Far outside Sky Shadow capabilities.

 

[Dilandu]

Now of course - in any CTOL flattop AH you have to consider whether the RN would have funded ECM to the same extent or better - I suspect that given the RN was very clued into EW that they would have upgraded the F-4 and Buccaneer with newer systems. Certainly the RAF was looking at a whole host of US EW kit in 1979-80 and some interesting stuff could have been brought.

Erm. There is one problem big - any systems that RN may develope, would be mainly adapted against Eastern Block radars, not the Western Block ones. So we essentially to the square one; RN planes would be forced to fly with ECM's, not exactly optimal for the job.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You overestimate the self-protection jammers capability pretty seriously. They aren't some magic charms that would make radars useless. They merely make radar work more complicated.

As far as I knew, the Harriers and other tactical aircraft used a Sky Shadow ECM pod. The Buckaneers and Vulcans carried Dash 10 (AN/ALQ-101-10) ECM pod, but it seems to be pre-set to counter Soviet radar systems with as little response time as possible, and may not be efficient against Argentinean Western-provided electronics.

So let's stuck with Sky Shadow. As far as I knew, it's dual-channel (i.e. it could work on two radars simultaneously) G/J jammer (one band 5.0 - 9.4 GHz , other 9.15 -16.4 GHz). It's main advantage is, that it's programmable, which means it could be set on specific frequences of Argentinean radars.

View attachment 720981
The problem is, that Skyduard (early model) aquisition radar works in K-band, 18 to 27 GHz. Which means OUTSIDE of Sky Shadow frequency range. So your self-protection jammers would not be able to block the warning/aquisition for Skyguard.

With the tracking radar of Skyguard (I/G frequiences) it could work. But as we know, Skyguard have tracking cameras capable of both manual and automatic targect tracking. So as long as target could be aquired - and you can't prevent this, since your jammer did not work on required frequences - it could also be tracked and engaged.

The result? Your jammers would complicate Skyguard fire, but would not make it inefficient. So each attack on airfields would cost you several planes at least damaged (and maybe downed). What rate of attrition your carrier force could sustain?

Well, that's significantly less useful than I expected...

Request for lots of Sky Shadow/ Blue Eric pods withdrawn.

Need to swipe some jammer pods from the USN that work in K band, and then stuff the guts into an Aden cannon pod so it doesn't use one of the bomb pylons.

 

[Hood]

The ARI.18223 RWR would definitely show indications for the Roland missile radar in the J-Band and Skyguard in the I-Band. The Argentine Type 42 Sea Darts would also be indicated in I and J-Bands. Mirage Cyrano II radars would also be indicated in the I-Band.

AN/ALQ-101(V)10 operated in 3 bands - 2.6-5.5, 4.85-9.7 and 8.9-16.5GHz (the older (V)8 previously used by the Buccs, and probably still available in 1982, did not have the low band).
It had 7 modes of operation, 1 silent, 1 linked to RWR, 2 manual and 3 automatic. I know for Jaguar only the automatic modes were used: Mode 1 XMIT1, Mode 3 XMIT2 and Mode 7 BOTH. XMIT1 was optimised for low-level use and for Firecan, Flapwheel, Gundish and SA-6; XMIT2 was optmised for use above 300ft for Firecan, Gundish (high scan rate), Jaybird, SA-2C & E, SA-3 and SA-6. It could also jam one channel of SA-N-3 to degrade that system.
BOTH was optimised for the Baltic for SA-N-1, SA-N-3, Muff Cob, Owl Screech 2, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B.

For Desert Storm they devised two composite settings: 77 for use against Fansong C & E and Headlights, 78 was optimised for Flapwheel, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B. Worryingly there was no discussion of Western system jamming but BOTH could apparently jam the RTN-10X radar.
Given that there are few Roland systems - really the main threat is from Skyguard and the EL M-2106 radars. It may have been possible to create specific settings for these, at least to degrade the radars' performance (but obviously not the K-Band Skyguard acquisition set).


For airfield attacks, against runways (in the absence of dedicated Durandal/JP.233 type weapons) 1,000lb GP freefall bombs worked best, but penetration of concrete runways was likely only from 65 degree dives. Freefall or retarded worked ok against grass strips. BL.755 was useless for anything except causing rubble but unexploded bomblets would hamper the repair teams. Either weapon was effective against parked aircraft, 30mm ADEN only being advised for aircraft parked in the open.
One other interesting vulnerability noted was manpower - aircrews were less easily replaced if their quarters/airfield buildings could be targeted, and ground crew would be near the aircraft out on the airfield.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The ARI.18223 RWR would definitely show indications for the Roland missile radar in the J-Band and Skyguard in the I-Band. The Argentine Type 42 Sea Darts would also be indicated in I and J-Bands. Mirage Cyrano II radars would also be indicated in the I-Band.

AN/ALQ-101(V)10 operated in 3 bands - 2.6-5.5, 4.85-9.7 and 8.9-16.5GHz (the older (V)8 previously used by the Buccs, and probably still available in 1982, did not have the low band).
It had 7 modes of operation, 1 silent, 1 linked to RWR, 2 manual and 3 automatic. I know for Jaguar only the automatic modes were used: Mode 1 XMIT1, Mode 3 XMIT2 and Mode 7 BOTH. XMIT1 was optimised for low-level use and for Firecan, Flapwheel, Gundish and SA-6; XMIT2 was optmised for use above 300ft for Firecan, Gundish (high scan rate), Jaybird, SA-2C & E, SA-3 and SA-6. It could also jam one channel of SA-N-3 to degrade that system.
BOTH was optimised for the Baltic for SA-N-1, SA-N-3, Muff Cob, Owl Screech 2, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B.

For Desert Storm they devised two composite settings: 77 for use against Fansong C & E and Headlights, 78 was optimised for Flapwheel, Hawk Screech and Sun Visor B. Worryingly there was no discussion of Western system jamming but BOTH could apparently jam the RTN-10X radar.
Given that there are few Roland systems - really the main threat is from Skyguard and the EL M-2106 radars. It may have been possible to create specific settings for these, at least to degrade the radars' performance (but obviously not the K-Band Skyguard acquisition set).

Well, crap. No good options for jammer pods, it looks like.

For airfield attacks, against runways (in the absence of dedicated Durandal/JP.233 type weapons) 1,000lb GP freefall bombs worked best, but penetration of concrete runways was likely only from 65 degree dives. Freefall or retarded worked ok against grass strips. BL.755 was useless for anything except causing rubble but unexploded bomblets would hamper the repair teams. Either weapon was effective against parked aircraft, 30mm ADEN only being advised for aircraft parked in the open.

So what I'm seeing for the attack run with 1000lb bombs is a low approach to give the guns minimum warning, pull up into a 10kft split-S for dive bombing the runways and HAS, and leave. (it'd be a fun mission in Ace Combat)

One other interesting vulnerability noted was manpower - aircrews were less easily replaced if their quarters/airfield buildings could be targeted, and ground crew would be near the aircraft out on the airfield.

While true, at least the historical forces don't have enough slack to assign any aircraft to barracks or other airfield buildings.

 

[Dilandu]

Well, crap. No good options for jammer pods, it looks like.

Well, most of NATO jammers were designed to operate against Eastern Block radars. And since the majority of them were still rooted in pre-digital era, the concept of "quickly identify Soviet radar and jam its specific frequency" was viewed as more important than "ability to be reprogrammed to jam Swiss export radars."

 

[Rule of cool]

Even without specific runway crating bombs, ECM and the ability to make follow up attacks or target more than 1 airbase I think an attack on Rio Gallegos or San Julian where the most aircraft were with all the 21 Harriers on Hermes on or about 18-20 May would be a worthwhile risk.

It would provide cover for the extremely risky at-sea transfer of 2 battalions off Canberra to Fearless and Intrepid. It would destroy and damage many aircraft as both these airfields only had 8 open front HAS but had 20-30 aircraft so plenty would be parked out in the open. Even without significant damage to the runways themselves there would likely be damage to things like repair shops, hangars, fuel farm that would require cleanup and repair by inexperienced personnel on the very day maximum effort was needed to attack the landings.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Even without specific runway crating bombs, ECM and the ability to make follow up attacks or target more than 1 airbase I think an attack on Rio Gallegos or San Julian where the most aircraft were with all the 21 Harriers on Hermes on or about 18-20 May would be a worthwhile risk.

It would provide cover for the extremely risky at-sea transfer of 2 battalions off Canberra to Fearless and Intrepid. It would destroy and damage many aircraft as both these airfields only had 8 open front HAS but had 20-30 aircraft so plenty would be parked out in the open. Even without significant damage to the runways themselves there would likely be damage to things like repair shops, hangars, fuel farm that would require cleanup and repair by inexperienced personnel on the very day maximum effort was needed to attack the landings.

Agreed here. But you'd have to push Hermes within about 200nmi of the coast to do it. Or buddy-store and lose 11 birds from the attackers.

 

[Rule of cool]

Agreed here. But you'd have to push Hermes within about 200nmi of the coast to do it. Or buddy-store and lose 11 birds from the attackers.

I'm pretty sure Harriers can't offload fuel as buddy tankers at all, let alone get it set up in a month.

A fast overnight approach to ~200mn from the target airbase, dawn strike, flank speed withdrawal would be the way to go. I think Rio Grande would be the easiest to get away from but not juicy enough. Rio Gallegos would be the most rewarding but the TF but the withdrawal would be within range of bases SJ in the north and RG in the south. San Julian is pretty juicy and really only on range of Rio Gallegos during the withdrawal, so probably would be the pick of the litter.

 

[Rule of cool]

This thread, as hypothetical and unlikely as it is, really shows what Britain lost when they gave up fleet carriers from 1966. Any mainland attack by the real TF sounds so feeble compared to what a pair of CVAs could do.

 

[uk 75]

Though it's not an airfield this incident did show the limits of conventional bombing.

A further Exmouth link to the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster

Following our recent ‘Framed In Time’ feature on the Torrey Canyon disaster, another local man has come forward to shed more light on the events…

www.exmouthjournal.co.uk

 

[uk 75]

Apart from the incident above RN bombers were rarely used in anger between Suez and the Falklands. Shows of force in Kuwait, Malaysia and Tanzania do count.

A controversial what-if that was the closest thing to a war in the 1960s was the possible military response to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). This was quickly rejected but RAF Javelins were detached to Zambia to reassure the government there.

It is telling that in dealing with one of the most serious disputes of the withdrawal from Empire in the 60s the UK preferred negotiation and UN sanctions to military force. This and the decision to withdraw from Aden and then the Gulf and Singapore left little need for carrier force projection.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Though it's not an airfield this incident did show the limits of conventional bombing.

A further Exmouth link to the 1967 Torrey Canyon disaster

Following our recent ‘Framed In Time’ feature on the Torrey Canyon disaster, another local man has come forward to shed more light on the events…

www.exmouthjournal.co.uk

That's a very good example of the limits of basic HE when you need to do a specialized job. That job called for napalm or even incendiary flares, not 1000lb HE.