Candidates for NATO standardisation in the Cold War

Seriously tempted.

However I'm duty bound to point out i
FAL was briefly adopted as NATO standard.
 
Siberia addresses the core issue here, which is not domestic politics of jobs, but is...who is the customer?
.... Economies of scale from its domestic orders give US massive advantage over other sources. Why did UK bother with 40-odd Nimrods when >700 Orions were to be built? Waste.
....

Equally silly was the RCAF's decision to build a much-modified Maritime Patrol Aircraft based upon the Bristol Britannia turbo-prop airliner. The greatest change was to Wright Turbo-Compound piston engines because they provided better fuel economy than early turbo-props.
The primary function of the Canadair CP-107 Argus MPA was to buy votes in Montreal (only 33 built for the RCAF). The RCAF also bought 39 Canadair-built Bristol Britannia transports (called CC-109 Yukon in RCAF service) which were almost stock.
Britannia's biggest problem was that it reached production about the same time Boeing introduced the 707.
After they wore out their Argus, RCAF bought Lockheed P-3 Orions during the early 1980s.
 
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After they wore out their Argus, RCAF bought Lockheed P-3 Orions during the early 1980s.

Which they then proceeded to make unique by using the electronics from the S-3 Viking instead of a the normal Orion electronics, probably another silly decision.
 
What about the Westland Lynx HAS.3
(naval variant) as a Standard NATO platform from 1982?
At the end of the day the naval Lynx capability for its size, weight and price was unpresident IMO.
At the end of the day Denmark, Britain, France, West Germany, Portugal, Netherlands, Norway ended up using the naval Lynx in real-world terms.....

Regards
Pioneer
 
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Standardizing on the French 155mm OE Mle.56 HE shell would have been super neat given that it appeared a few years before HE M107 entered service, was compatible with US guns yet offered greater range and HE capability for roughly the same weight.

The French shell is 800 grams heavier (for a 43kg round), but carries over 1.5kg extra explosive content and fired from the same French Mle.50 gun (similar to US M114 in barrel length), has 2700m extra range.

Since both France and the US were looking for new 155mm ammo at the same time, making it a NATO competition akin to the 5.56 competition in the 80's that led to the Belgian SS109 being chosen would be plausible and useful.
 
The real reason that the US went with 7.62 was that the US army and marines were (and in the case of the marines, still are) under what is called the 'cult of the rifleman' despite the fact that the data says otherwise and the StG44 was surprisingly well-liked by troops who used them (from captured stocks).

Problem is that stupid cult. Hell, in an alternate timeline that I've been cooking up, it took a world war where the cult got its knees cut out from under it (a lot of combat in that WW2 was in close-quarters terrains like jungles or cities).
 
Getting infantry to pull the trigger enough was always a big issue, hence full automatic being pushed into the carbine space. 1% of fighters were shooting 60% of the rounds at targets whereas many infantry were eradic and prone to lofting rounds blindly. It turned out many were simply handicapped with eyesight and could not see to effectively fight at anything but close range. The need for rapid consumption of rounds is more or less focused on machinegunners for good reason, as open sights of modern weapons combined with eyeware make effective fighting at 400 meters possible. And the current weapons are extending this out further.

Its interesting that 7.62 rounds were less effective due to recoil, not hitting power. Probably explains why lower caliber submachineguns were preferred over heavier models, more so than the fact they carried more rounds. Being able to get lead on heads accurately was likely a highly desirable trait at close quarters.

And think about pistols. Nazi autoloader pistols were highly prized for rapid but accurate shooting of small rounds, with many in dimunitive 7.63mm and .32 ACP. The larger versions tended to max out at 9mm. But 9mm is not probably the best round when protective vests can neutralize them. Today we could really progress this smaller-but-better concept further, using fully automatic versions and monster capacities. Sportsmen will also use pistol braces and accuracy aids (lasers, red dots, etc.) for pretty spectacular results. How long until full auto .177 braced pistols become standard?
 
Getting infantry to pull the trigger enough was always a big issue, hence full automatic being pushed into the carbine space. 1% of fighters were shooting 60% of the rounds at targets whereas many infantry were eradic and prone to lofting rounds blindly. It turned out many were simply handicapped with eyesight and could not see to effectively fight at anything but close range. The need for rapid consumption of rounds is more or less focused on machinegunners for good reason, as open sights of modern weapons combined with eyeware make effective fighting at 400 meters possible. And the current weapons are extending this out further.

Its interesting that 7.62 rounds were less effective due to recoil, not hitting power. Probably explains why lower caliber submachineguns were preferred over heavier models, more so than the fact they carried more rounds. Being able to get lead on heads accurately was likely a highly desirable trait at close quarters.

And think about pistols. Nazi autoloader pistols were highly prized for rapid but accurate shooting of small rounds, with many in dimunitive 7.63mm and .32 ACP. The larger versions tended to max out at 9mm. But 9mm is not probably the best round when protective vests can neutralize them. Today we could really progress this smaller-but-better concept further, using fully automatic versions and monster capacities. Sportsmen will also use pistol braces and accuracy aids (lasers, red dots, etc.) for pretty spectacular results. How long until full auto .177 braced pistols become standard?
I suspect that many of the vision problems were caused by fatigue. After a few days with no sleep, vision deteriorates.
 
The real reason that the US went with 7.62 was that the US army and marines were (and in the case of the marines, still are) under what is called the 'cult of the rifleman' despite the fact that the data says otherwise and the StG44 was surprisingly well-liked by troops who used them (from captured stocks).

Problem is that stupid cult. Hell, in an alternate timeline that I've been cooking up, it took a world war where the cult got its knees cut out from under it (a lot of combat in that WW2 was in close-quarters terrains like jungles or cities).
That "cult of the rifleman probably originated during the Boer War when farmers equipped with the latest Mauser rifles consistently out-shot British troops. After that, the professional, peace-time British Commonwealth Armies focused on producing superior riflemen.
See the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association and the way they supplied .303 ammo and Lee-Enfield rifles to civilian competitive shooters. (later 7.62 x 51mm).
 
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At minimum, a common single and twin barrel 20mm towed anti-aircraft gun to meet the requirements for low-level air defence (not to mention it's ground support capability)
In truth I've never understood Britain and the US dismissing of towed low-level cannons - regardless of the excuses of manning and technological advancements of missiles.
Because you need a radar for cueing, and the USAF was promising total air superiority. Very loudly swearing that no Red Air would fly.
 
Skysweeper was a pretty good unit for guided AA. Guided AA was not a one-size fits all solution because as aircraft velocities went up so did the need for cannon projectile velocity, hence NATO moving away from Skysweeper's 3-inch projectile to smaller sizes. But each partner had their own ideas what that meant, obviously. 20mm was in more than one size and then you had other odd sizes proposed from 27mm to 40mm. What NATO probably was needing more at the time was a competition of strategy rather than standardization around one form of equipment. The competition met the needs of each NATO member and the supporting technology for target search, early warning, IFF, effective shot patterns, directing the shot patterns to coordinate multiple systems, etc. became the more important secret sauce to collaborate on.
 
How high should NATO standardisation go?

Armies were commanded at the national Army/Corps level and Air Forces were commanded at the National Air Force/Group level (with no doubt numerous exceptions) and by about 1960 conventional WW3 would likely be short like the Arab-Israeli wars rather than prolonged like Vietnam or other insurgencies. So while I wouldn't be surprised that say a Dutch division might be chopped to a British Corps in NORTHAG it would still likely draw from Dutch logistics rather than from British logistics. Any chops at a lower level would likely be either rare or so limited in duration that the requirement to use the other country's supplies could be managed.
 
How high should NATO standardisation go?
Originally, it was supposed to be same equipment all across the board. US, UK, French, WGerman etc infantry all using the same rifle, same APC, same tank, etc ad nauseam.

Like how most WAllied armies in WW2 used US gear.
 
Originally, it was supposed to be same equipment all across the board. US, UK, French, WGerman etc infantry all using the same rifle, same APC, same tank, etc ad nauseam.

Like how most WAllied armies in WW2 used US gear.

I have no doubt some important people would have preferred that, my guess would be NATO procurement people and major defence exporter governments and companies. However there was far too much money and jobs at stake, not to mention national doctrinal differences, financial constraints, defence policies and interests and even national geographical positions for this to happen.

While I think it's easy to point out the advantages of standardisation of major items of kit I think there are advantages to what actually occurred as well. From the enemy's perspective it complicates planning and training for 2nd echelon units, which might be deployed to face 3 tanks types in NORTHAG. Or air units who might have to face any number of enemy aircraft types. From the NATO perspective non-producer nations can select the major items of kit that most suit their circumstances while producer nations can produce kit that also best suits their needs.
 
How high should NATO standardisation go?

Armies were commanded at the national Army/Corps level and Air Forces were commanded at the National Air Force/Group level (with no doubt numerous exceptions) and by about 1960 conventional WW3 would likely be short like the Arab-Israeli wars rather than prolonged like Vietnam or other insurgencies. So while I wouldn't be surprised that say a Dutch division might be chopped to a British Corps in NORTHAG it would still likely draw from Dutch logistics rather than from British logistics. Any chops at a lower level would likely be either rare or so limited in duration that the requirement to use the other country's supplies could be managed.
Going down the European Defence Community route would be interesting, if politically impossible. All units above division level organised by NATO, divisions provided by the member states but organised as dictated by the NATO General Staff.

Doctrine, of course, would also be set by the NATO General Staff.
 
Going down the European Defence Community route would be interesting, if politically impossible. All units above division level organised by NATO, divisions provided by the member states but organised as dictated by the NATO General Staff.

Doctrine, of course, would also be set by the NATO General Staff.

Something I'd imagine would be a problem, and likely impacted on standardisation even if the powers that be didn't consciously recognise it, is language. If you start combining units at lower and lower levels you need more and more people that speak 2 and even more languages. Not much point in a (theoretical) Belgian Regiment pulling up to a US division in NORTHAG with fully compatible US kit and almost nobody knowing what they're saying.
 
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I'm extremely surprised that the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk never became a more NATO Standard ground attack/battlefield interdiction aircraft, what with it's affordability, it's simplicity and its exceptional performance. Granted the G.91Y was itself affordable and simplistic, but it's weapons load and range never came close to the Skyhawk.

The FMC M113 came very close to being the NATO Standard APC.

For all the piss taken against the Soviet BTR-60 APC, NATO seemed both hesitant and chaotic when it cane to wheeled APC's.




Regards
Pioneer
 
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'NATO standard' sounds a lot like 'successful on the export market' rather than something a lot of members agree on, like the adoption of standard bullet sizes, artillery calibres or vehicle/aircraft fuels.

What are some high-end items of kit that were only used by 1 NATO member that might have been adopted by others? Chieftain tank and Buccaneer aircraft are two that might have sold to Netherlands and West German Navy and increased NATO capability and standardisation. But where does that leave the French AMX30, given France didn't leave NATO until 1966?
 
The main obstacle to NATO standardisation is the need to ensure industrial capacity in W Europe rather than force the US to supply everything Soviet style with only assembly in European countries.
M47, M48 and M60 tanks are a case in point. Would the US taxpayer have wanted to carry on supplying these virtually free to France and Germany once those economies were booming? The UK might have been willing to use "free" US M47 and M48 tanks instead of Centurions to focus on equipment like Saladins and Saracens for its colonial wars.
The choice between Leopard 1 and AMX30 would have been easier if Germany had paid for the tanks used by FR I Armee in Germany.
Once you have countries in NATO paying for and building their own equipment it is much harder to impose Soviet style (or WW2 Allied) commonality.
 
Once you have countries in NATO paying for and building their own equipment it is much harder to impose Soviet style (or WW2 Allied) commonality.
Which is why most NATO standards have settled on ammunition, not the entire weapon. Technically the 5.56mm magazine is also a NATO standard, but most of NATO hasn't adopted it. (France, Germany, Austria all use unique magazines in their assault rifles)

In all honesty, being able to use common fuel and ammunition is usually enough. Well, and communications systems able to talk to each other.
 
Communications was still evolving until the end of the Cold War. Not sure that wasn't to their benefit because the foes had to digest every design whereas NATO had much less work to do in response.
 
The main obstacle to NATO standardisation is the need to ensure industrial capacity in W Europe rather than force the US to supply everything Soviet style with only assembly in European countries.
M47, M48 and M60 tanks are a case in point. Would the US taxpayer have wanted to carry on supplying these virtually free to France and Germany once those economies were booming? The UK might have been willing to use "free" US M47 and M48 tanks instead of Centurions to focus on equipment like Saladins and Saracens for its colonial wars.
The choice between Leopard 1 and AMX30 would have been easier if Germany had paid for the tanks used by FR I Armee in Germany.
Once you have countries in NATO paying for and building their own equipment it is much harder to impose Soviet style (or WW2 Allied) commonality.
Re the Centurion

If I remember correctly the Centurion's biggest customer was the US DoD which paid for most of the tanks that were supplied to the NATO countries and I'm also fairly confident that it paid for the Hunters that were supplied to NATO countries. (I'm less confident in saying that many of the British Army's Centurions and the RAF's V-Bombers, Hunters & Javelins were paid for by the USA via the MDAP along with the Canadair Sabres & Lockheed Neptunes.) If I am right about the USA paying for the British Army's Centurions no money would have been saved by acquiring US-built M47s & M48s.

Re the AMX-30 and Leopard 1

Quote from Page 176 of "Jane's Main Battle Tanks - Second Edition" by Christopher F. Foss and published in 1986.
In 1956 Italy, France and West Germany drew up a requirement for a European MBT which would be well armed, lighter and more mobile than tanks then in service.
In the end France placed the AMX-30 in production, West Germany placed the Leopard 1 in production while Italy obtained a licence to manufacture the M60A1 from the United States. A total of 200 were built in Italy by OTO-Melara for the Italian Army with a further 100 being supplied direct rom the Untied States.
In the summer of 1964 Italy evaluated the Leopard 1 in Sardinia and after many delays in 1970 placed an order for 800 Leopard 1 MBTs, the first 200 of which were to by supplied by West Germany by Krauss-maffei and the remaining 600 to be built under licence by OTO-Melara. In addition 69 ARVs and 12 AEVs were ordered from Krupp MaK of West Germany that built all the specialised versions of the Leopard 1.
The first Italian-built Leopard 1 was completed in 1974 and the last of the original order for 600 in 1978. Since then a further order for was placed for 120 which were delivered in 1982.
OTO-Melara has recently built 160 specialised versions based on the hull of the Leopard 1 including 64bridgelayers, 68 ARVs and 28 AEVs. Co-producers to OTO-Melara are FIAT which supplies the engine, suspension and track, Lancia which supplies teh transmission and major sub-contractors include Fucine Breda which provides the forged steel gun barrel and the cast turret.
On Page 35 is says that in July 1963 the Defence Committee of the Federal German Parliament decided to go ahead with the production of Leopard 1, even though the main comparative trials had yet to take place.

And on Page 21 it says that in July 1963 the AMX-30 was adopted as a replacement for its American-supplied M47 tanks.

I don't know which of the two tanks was the best. Furthermore, I don't know how you get the French to accept Leopard 1 and the Germans to accept AMX-30. That is other than to say they make an agreement over the countries that French & German tanks are exported to.
 
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I think a greater level of standardisation might be useful for aircraft support services because of the finite number of airfields in Europe and the need for diversions in wartime. Nothing too serious, but enough to get say a Lightning that diverted to a civilian or non RAF military airfield, back in the air again and back to an RAF base. Or even better, turned around for another combat sortie that would finish at the aircraft's home base.
 
I think a greater level of standardisation might be useful for aircraft support services because of the finite number of airfields in Europe and the need for diversions in wartime. Nothing too serious, but enough to get say a Lightning that diverted to a civilian or non RAF military airfield, back in the air again and back to an RAF base. Or even better, turned around for another combat sortie that would finish at the aircraft's home base.
I think single-point fuel nozzles are standardized, and so are starter carts with either electrical or huffer air-starter connections.
 
Comments here (e.g SK #61: being able to use common fuel and ammunition is usually enough) query the conventional wisdom (inc mine), that Commonality is an evident Good Thing. It was known in NATO as RSI(Rationalization, Standardization & Interoperability) centred (6/5/54-16/5/66) on 49xNBMRs, then dropped as none led to...RSI. The point made about confusing the other side would be well understood in Ukraine today.

Maybe we just accept that each Requirement is studied unto boredom and the outcome is...what it is.
US during Korea funded Euro-straight overlaps with F-86s, C-119s, in part because it was easier for we locals to build to materials standards/processes that we knew and loved; partly because US factories were full up anyway.
 
Comments here (e.g SK #61: being able to use common fuel and ammunition is usually enough) query the conventional wisdom (inc mine), that Commonality is an evident Good Thing. It was known in NATO as RSI(Rationalization, Standardization & Interoperability) centred (6/5/54-16/5/66) on 49xNBMRs, then dropped as none led to...RSI. The point made about confusing the other side would be well understood in Ukraine today.

Maybe we just accept that each Requirement is studied unto boredom and the outcome is...what it is.
US during Korea funded Euro-straight overlaps with F-86s, C-119s, in part because it was easier for we locals to build to materials standards/processes that we knew and loved; partly because US factories were full up anyway.
Right. That's why you aim for the lowest, simplest things to standardize on first.

Ammunition, including magazines and belts (though IIRC Germany still uses the non-disintegrating belts from WW2 and everyone else uses US style disintegrating belts). Fuel types, and fuel nozzles. Aircraft starter connections and voltage/air volumes needed. Batteries for NVGs and radios.
 
... IIRC Germany still uses the non-disintegrating belts from WW2 and everyone else uses US style disintegrating belts)...

Not quite. Since the introduction of the MG1A2, Bundeswehr 7.62 mm GPMGs have been capable of using either Patronengurt DM1 non-disintegrating belts or DM6 (US M13) disintegrating links. IOW, the Germans adjusted to NATO standards but also managed to retain what they regard as a superior technology. Which raises a question about possible downsides to RSI ...

Could some rationalisations towards an established standard (US or otherwise) result in compromised kit for NATO? In the case of GPMG ammunition belts, the Germans claim that picking up spent DM1 belts in the field and then reloading them is much faster than collecting and reassembling spent DM6/M13 links. That claim seems intuitively true but I wonder if anyone in NATO has ever bothered to tested it against disintegrating belts?
 
Not quite. Since the introduction of the MG1A2, Bundeswehr 7.62 mm GPMGs have been capable of using either Patronengurt DM1 non-disintegrating belts or DM6 (US M13) disintegrating links. IOW, the Germans adjusted to NATO standards but also managed to retain what they regard as a superior technology. Which raises a question about possible downsides to RSI ...

Could some rationalisations towards an established standard (US or otherwise) result in compromised kit for NATO? In the case of GPMG ammunition belts, the Germans claim that picking up spent DM1 belts in the field and then reloading them is much faster than collecting and reassembling spent DM6/M13 links. That claim seems intuitively true but I wonder if anyone in NATO has ever bothered to tested it against disintegrating belts?
IIRC the US regards M13 links as purely disposable, so it's not really even a comparison.

Yes, they're totally able to be reused, if you busted out a big magnet to collect them. Never saw them reused in the military. Civilians, though, reuse them all the time.
 
IIRC the US regards M13 links as purely disposable, so it's not really even a comparison.

Yes, they're totally able to be reused, if you busted out a big magnet to collect them. Never saw them reused in the military. Civilians, though, reuse them all the time.

So ... when you're out of DM6/M13 (and/or magnets), you're out of action!

I get the 'perfect is the enemy of the good' concept. But this sounds more like the rest of NATO settled for disintegrating M13 when a more flexible, less throw-away option was already available.
 
So ... when you're out of DM6/M13 (and/or magnets), you're out of action!

I get the 'perfect is the enemy of the good' concept. But this sounds more like the rest of NATO settled for disintegrating M13 when a more flexible, less throw-away option was already available.
If you reuse the DM6 belt, you need to inspect it, clean any rust off, etc.

Plus, most 7.62 in US service is shipped already belted together at the factory and put into 200rd ammo cans.
 
If we get a "free and democratic Oceania" post WW2 scenario then I'd nominate Abe G's conceptual NATOtank: Chieftain with Leo 1 mobility and M60A1 FCS.
 
Equally silly was the RCAF's decision to build a much-modified Maritime Patrol Aircraft based upon the Bristol Britannia turbo-prop airliner. The greatest change was to Wright Turbo-Compound piston engines because they provided better fuel economy than early turbo-props.
The primary function of the Canadair CP-107 Argus MPA was to buy votes in Montreal (only 33 built for the RCAF). The RCAF also bought 39 Canadair-built Bristol Britannia transports (called CC-109 Yukon in RCAF service) which were almost stock.
Britannia's biggest problem was that it reached production about the same time Boeing introduced the 707.
After they wore out their Argus, RCAF bought Lockheed P-3 Orions during the early 1980s.
For what it's worth.
  • The RCAF had a requirement for 50 CP-107 Arguses to replace its Lancasters, but only got 33 and the 25 Neptunes (which were a stop-gap for the Argus) were kept in service for longer than intended.
  • A total of 39 Canadair CL-44s were built and the RCAF bought 12 of them. However, the RCAF wanted 24 to replace its North Stars on a one-for-one basis.
  • The Canadian Orions weren't P-3C standard aircraft because the 18 CP-140 Auroras had the S-3A Viking's ASW avionics (instead of the P-3Cs) and the 3 CP-140A Arcturuses didn't have any ASW equipment.
The Argus was several years ahead of the Orion. That's why I think it's unlikely that the RCAF would have bought the Orion instead of the Argus. Furthermore, it's likely that Canadair would have built it under licence. Maybe the RCAF should have bought another 33 Neptunes (for a total of 58) instead of the Arguses.

Or the Argus should have become NATO's standard LRMP aircraft. General Dynamics bought Canadair in 1952 and Convair in 1954. Maybe there would be two assembly lines (at Convair & Canadair) making the USN's and everyone else's aircraft respectively, but each "bit" was made by one firm in the interests of economies of scale.
 
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Economies of scale from its domestic orders give US massive advantage over other sources. Why did UK bother with 40-odd Nimrods when >700 Orions were to be built? Waste.
Because the RAF wanted an aircraft that could reach the patrol area sooner, the balance of payments, British jobs for British workers and maybe it didn't know that 700+ Orions were to be built. That being written the 1960s squadron patterns that I found in the National Archives include alternative LRMP forces with Orions instead of Nimrods & Shackletons.

Using that logic why did France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands buy 87 Atlantics in two batches (60 & 27) that were 4 years apart instead of the Orion? And why did production restart in the 1980s against a French requirement for 42 aircraft of which only 28 were built. I'm not being sarcastic. It would be interesting to know why they put the balance of payments and maintaining their domestic aerospace industries (domestic jobs for domestic workers et al) ahead of saving money, that is if the Orion was cheaper & did its job just as well as the Atlantic.

Similarly, why did France & Germany buy the Transall instead of C-130s? The Wikipedia entry says 214 were built, but I counted 213 consisting of 3 prototypes, 6 pre-production aircraft, 169 first production run and 35 second production run, including 15 aircraft that were exported. IOTL France bought 10 C-130Hs not long after production of the second batch of Transalls ended and by the late 1990s had increased the total to 14 C-130Hs. Again, I'm not being sarcastic. It would be interesting to know the pros and cons of each aircraft and why they decided that the Transall was the better aircraft.
 
Similarly, why did France & Germany buy the Transall instead of C-130s?
Again, I'm not being sarcastic. It would be interesting to know the pros and cons of each aircraft and why they decided that the Transall was the better aircraft.

Transall had a larger load area than the baseline C-130, lower weight and didn't have the minimum-fuel-in-wings restriction that affected C-130 short-field ops.

For Germany it made sense as they didn't need the oceanic range of the C-130 as they didn't plan to deploy overseas. Why carry more weight and power than needed.

For France the Transall was also better suited to North African austere airfields or soft surfaces where the C-130 would tend to dig in.

Look at how the SAAF used the two types as an example; Transall for tactical ops and C-130 mainly for line haul.
 
Transall pioneered the integrated pallet rollers that have permeated every transport and improved upon literally ever since its introduction. Transall high price made C-130 follow ons the better options.
 
Something I'd imagine would be a problem, and likely impacted on standardisation even if the powers that be didn't consciously recognise it, is language. If you start combining units at lower and lower levels you need more and more people that speak 2 and even more languages. Not much point in a (theoretical) Belgian Regiment pulling up to a US division in NORTHAG with fully compatible US kit and almost nobody knowing what they're saying.
May I point out that multi-lingualism is closer to the norm in Europe?

Belgium is officially a bi-lingual country (French and Dutch) with a German minority living along the border with Germany.

While serving with NATO, I routinely worked alongside European officers who spoke two or three languages.
As a Canadian I speak English and French. While serving in West Germany, I learned the basics of German and while jumping at the Bundeswehr Luftlande-Lufttransport Schule was assigned as course translator ... mainly because the Quebecouis were too arrogant to converse with the handful of French officers on the course. There was a lot of friction over the notion that France had withdrawn from NATO , but still participated in some military exercises.
Finally, while working in factories in Southern California, I learned the basic of Spanish.
 
I preferred to travel with Dutch and Swedish ladies. Guys from those countries seldom had the languages down as well.
 
Agreed. I preferred to travel with a Dutch lady who spoke three languages: Dutch, German and English. Her language skills nicely over-lapped with my skills at English, French and German.
 

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