Rule of cool
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There have been several discussions about the British aircraft of the 60s since I started here a few weeks ago, apparently it's a never ending topic. They appear to start out technically and end financially and politically in a viscous circle of failure. In the process some interesting and profound stuff has been said.
What I'd like to explore is if a virtuous circle can be produced in the same circumstances. Starting in 1957-58, where support for British products can lead to a cycle of success in the 60s for British industry despite the new political, strategic and financial circumstances Britain found herself in
The decisions that immediately jump out at me are:
What could the output of British industry be in the 60s if these mistakes, and others like of or those that occurred because of them, were avoided? Could the TSR2 be developed a bit quicker and cheaper? Would the economic health of Britain's 2 big aviation companies lead to better export prospects? Would advances in the civil airliner sphere spill over into the military sphere?
What I'd like to explore is if a virtuous circle can be produced in the same circumstances. Starting in 1957-58, where support for British products can lead to a cycle of success in the 60s for British industry despite the new political, strategic and financial circumstances Britain found herself in
The decisions that immediately jump out at me are:
- Not declaring manned fighters obsolescent in the 1957 DWP, whereby the Lightning isn't seen as interim but rather as a 'take it or leave it' centrepiece of the RAFs tactical force.
- Not allowing BOAC and BEA to demand the shrinking of the Trident and VC10 airliners, so HSA and BAC build these airliners to the specs they thought would sell: Medway sized Trident and VC10 Super 200.
- Not getting back into the 'fighter' game via the NBMR3/P1154, rather than having a small fleet of P1127 to fill the VTOL niche.
What could the output of British industry be in the 60s if these mistakes, and others like of or those that occurred because of them, were avoided? Could the TSR2 be developed a bit quicker and cheaper? Would the economic health of Britain's 2 big aviation companies lead to better export prospects? Would advances in the civil airliner sphere spill over into the military sphere?
EE/BAC came up with a range of proposals for providing an attack capability in the Lightning, such as the proposal to Australia that included an extended ventral pack providing a weapons bay able to carry 1,000lb bombs, or a recce pack, and a doppler navigator. IOTL the AI.23 was given A2G modes and the Saudi's actually used the type in that role. RAF Lightnings performed low-level intercept missions in both Germany and the UK. The radar was effectively useless at low-level interception but it should have been possible to provide terrain clearance functionality - this was proposed to the Australians.
The multirole pack proposed, developed from 1959 onwards, allowed for carriage of 3 x 1,000lb bombs without using the over-wing or outer-wing pylons. There were porposals for Bullpup and large batteries of 2" rockets (I have seen one configuration proposed with 122 but higher should have been possible).
1959-65 proposals for the Lightning include terrain clearance functionality in AI.23, and a doppler navigator for altitude control. AI.23 would provide ranging and sighting information to feed into the pilots sight for weapons delivery. The INAS/NAVWASS configurations are a bit later but between the space available in the front of the proposed multi-role central pack and the standard Lightning weapons pack under the nose there was plenty of space that could have accommodated additional equipment like the LRMTS.
F4K/F4M at £1.2 million is part of the sales pitch. UK content, quick to service. Expected completion by 1968 and under terms of a US loan.
It all sounds amazing.
Such high performance, far better than any other F4.
McDD was talking up a future US purchase and possible joint exports (UK engines).
A dream come true for Wilson as intelligence was banging the drum on the dangers of Soviet Anti-ship Missiles displayed in '63. There seemed no time for delay....
Everything could work out....
But reality hits incrementally, and so the "frog is boiled", until it's £3.55 per plane, devaluation has eaten chunks of off the loan away and it's not that much of a performer compared to the new F4J, numbers shrink to keep in budget.....oh and Late....
Deliveries start when they were expected to have finished.
And while UK got licensed US gyros for domestic INS, got a deep dive into US radar and AAMs, it pushed off the domestic AI radar effort, killed the domestic AAM effort and achieved zero joint exports of F4K/F4M to anybody.
What a success!
F111K was chopped, with EoS, UK would confine themselves to Europe and the North Atlantic.
And the last hope for domestic capability and independence was whatever could be developed under the cover of international partnerships.
By cancelling F.155 and F.177, no matter the logic, it also cut the spreading of development efforts for new supersonic aircraft and avionics.
As it did Hunter and Javelin successors. Which ultimately still needed replacement.
Leaving only the new OR.339.
And everything had to be carried by this program.
This got worse because that effort still needed to happen and soon had to spread to cover NMBR.3 and OR.346. Only now the case for replacement was becoming more pressing.
In our alterative histories the reorganisation of the aircraft industry takes place 10 years earlier. Would that have resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of tribalism in BAC in the first half of the 1960s?