British Army of the Rhine alternatives

Scott Kenny said:
Surprised that the UK didn't get any M51 Skysweepers or equivalent like the 3"/70 naval gun. Doesn't have the sheer rate of fire of the Bofors 40mm/L70, but the bigger shells allow proximity fuses.
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The 42mm guns were aimed at that role, no proximity fuses IIRC but significantly higher rate of fire and shorter time of flight than the Bofors.
 
Continuing from Posts 157 ...

This is BAOR's artillery order of battle in April 1961 according to Pages 51 to 56 of "The British Army in Germany (BAOR and after): An Organizational History" by Graham E. Watson and Richard A. Rinaldi.

1st Army Group Royal Artillery (Field).
27th Guided Weapons Regiment (Field) RA (6 &137 Batteries) with Corporal SSMs.​
47th Guided Weapons Regiment (Field) RA (3 & 4 Batteries) with Corporal SSMs.​
24th Missile Regiment RA (51 & 76 Missile and 2 & 34 Heavy Batteries).​
The missile batteries had Honest John SSMs.​
The heavy batteries had M115 towed 8” howitzers.​
39th Missile Regiment RA (19 & 36 Missile and 75 & 171 Heavy Batteries).​
The missile batteries had Honest John SSMs.​
The heavy batteries had M115 towed 8” howitzers.​
50th Missile Regiment RA (15 & 21 Missile and 33 & 78 Heavy Batteries).​
The missile batteries had Honest John SSMs.​
The heavy batteries had M115 towed 8” howitzers.​
12th LAA Regiment RA (T, 9 & 34 Batteries) with Bofors 40mm LAA guns.​
94th Locating Regiment RA (14, 73, 152 & 156 Batteries).​
1st Division (7th & 20th Armd Bde Gps).
7th Armoured Brigade Group.​
4th Field Regiment RHA (F, G & I Batteries) with M44 self-propelled 155mm howitzers.​
20th Armoured Brigade Group (from 4th Div to 1st Div March 1961).​
1st Field Regiment RA (A, B & E Batteries) with M44 self-propelled 155mm howitzers.​
2nd Division (6th, 11th & 12th Inf Bde Gps).
6th Infantry Brigade Group.​
40th Field Regiment RA (38, 78 & 137 Batteries) with towed 25pd gun/howitzers.​
11th Infantry Brigade Group.​
19th Field Regiment RA (25, 28 & 67 Batteries) with towed 25pd gun/howitzers.​
12th Infantry Brigade Group.​
6th Field Regiment RA (H, V & 132 Batteries) with towed 25pd gun/howitzers.​
4th Division (4th Gds & 5th Inf Bde Gps).
4th Guards Brigade Group.​
49th Field Regiment RA (55, 127 & 143 Batteries) with towed 25pd gun/howitzers.​
5th Infantry Brigade Group.​
45th Field Regiment RA (70, 116 & 176 Batteries) with towed 25pd gun/howitzers.​

That's a total of 44 batteries distributed amongst 14 Regimental Headquarters (RHQs).
  • 10 batteries of SSMs distributed amongst 5 RHQ.
    • 4 batteries of Corporal SSMs distributed amongst 2 RHQ.
    • 6 batteries of Honest John SSMs distributed amongst 3 RHQ. (which also had the 8in howitzer batteries).
  • 3 LAA batteries with Bofors 40mm guns distributed amongst 1 RHQ.
  • 27 batteries of tube heavy, medium and field artillery distributed amongst 7 RHQs.
    • 6 batteries of M115 towed 8” howitzers which distributed amongst the Honest John SSM regiments.
    • 6 batteries of M44 self-propelled 155mm howitzers distributed amongst 2 RHQs.
    • 15 batteries of towed 25pdr gun/howitzers distributed amongst 5 RHQs.
  • 4 Locating batteries distributed amongst a single RHQ.
The net increase since April 1958 was 8 batteries distributed amongst 2 RHQs.
  • The reductions (which totalled 11 batteries and 3 RHQs) were:
    • 7 medium batteries and 2 RHQs.
    • 3 LAA batteries and 1 RHQ.
    • 1 AA control battery.
  • The additions (which totalled 19 batteries and 5 RHQs) were:
    • 4 batteries and 2 RHQs of Corporal SSMs.
    • 6 batteries and 3 RHQs of Honest John SSMs.
    • 6 batteries of M115 towed 8” howitzers, which were distributed amongst the 3 Honest John regiments.
    • 3 locating batteries, which were added to the existing locating regiment.
Therefore:
  • The AA capability of BAOR had been reduced by half to 3 batteries & 1 RHQ of Bofors 40mm guns.
  • There had been no change to BAOR's field artillery, because there were still:
    • 6 batteries & 2 RHQs of M44 self-propelled 155mm howitzers - 3 batteries & 1 RHQ per armoured brigade.
      • And.
    • 15 batteries & 5 RHQs of towed 25pdr gun/howitzers - 3 batteries & 1 RHQ per infantry brigade.
  • The departure of the 7 batteries & 2 RHQ with 5.5in howitzers was offset by the arrival of the 6 batteries of towed 8in howitzers.
  • The SSM capability of BAOR had been increased from nothing in April 1958 to 10 batteries (4 Corporal & 6 Honest John).
 
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NOMISYRRUC said:
Part of Post 88.

This is a summary of the entry on the M109A2 in Terry Gander's "Encyclopaedia of the Modern British Army - 3rd Edition" which was published in October 1986.
  • The first paragraph says that the M109 entered service with the British Army in 1965 and that in 1978 these vehicles were fitted with longer barrels known as the M185 to give their self-propelled carriages a new designation of M109A1, later M109A2.
  • The next paragraph says that the M109A2 is the standard equipment of the Royal Artillery's medium self propelled batteries based in Germany. The first two vehicles were obtained for trials in 1975 and that the barrel retrofit programme was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1978.
  • The third paragraph is a description of the vehicle.
  • The fourth paragraph says that the M109A1s now in service have been updated to a new standard known as M109A2, that new vehicles have been purchased from the United States with all up-to-date modifications incorporated and finally that these "new" vehicles are sometimes referred to M109A3s.
  • The fifth (and final) paragraph says that there is little sign that the SP70 will enter service as scheduled and that in the meantime numerous changes can be made to the basic M109A2 to improve its range and all round performance. Several concerns are now promoting new and longer barrels for the M109A2 and revised turrets to go with them. Autoloaders are another option and some of these may be incorporated into future British Army M109A2s.
Therefore, based on that it looks like 40 vehicles were purchased in the 1960s, 2 were purchased in 1975 and 69 were purchased in the 1980s = 111. However, the designations are the opposite to what @OldBill17 wrote, i.e. the M109A1 vehicles purchased in the 1960s were updated to M109A2 standard and that the vehicles purchased in the 1980s were M109A3, while @OldBill17 says that the original vehicles were updated from M109A1 to M109A3 and the new vehicles were M109A2s.
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Though Terry Gander was "on the money" with alot of his information, other information in his books is mistaken. I have a plethora of documents (literally thousands of pages worth) from Kew and FOI requests. My numbers are exact. I am currently updating my document. The 111 will read 119 in the new version as I have the 1989/90 stock planning guidance and it shows 96 UE (unit entitlement), 5 WMR, 14 ITO, UR, RP, PDS, & 4 R&D.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
When I first read that statement I was completely nonplussed by it and at the time of writing this reply I am somewhat nonplussed by it.

The M107s and M110s weren't in the four divisions, they were part of 1st Artillery Brigade. Therefore, they weren't in the "Real World" and this "Version of History" divisional artillery orders of battle shown in Post 99.

For BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in the "Real World" please see the list in Post 97 which you "liked" at 21:17 on Thursday 5th October 2023.

This is BAOR's full "tube artillery" order of battle in this "Version of History". That is the "tube artillery" of its four divisions (already listed in Post 99) plus the "tube artillery" of 1st Artillery Brigade.

1st Artillery Brigade - 12 M110, 24 M107 and 48 M109 as follows:
General Support Group North​
12 M107 - 32 Heavy Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 27 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 2nd Infantry Division - see below)​
General Support Group South​
12 M107 - 5 Heavy Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 45 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 4th Armoured Division - see below)​
Corps Support Group​
12 M110 - 39 Heavy Regiment, RA​
1st Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 27 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 1st Artillery Brigade - see above)​
24 M109 - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 M109 - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 M109 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 72 M109 as follows:
24 M109 - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
24 M109 - 45 Field Regiment, RA (but also part of 1st Artillery Brigade - see above)​

Totals: 24 M107, 288 M109 and 12 M110 - Grand Total: 324 tube artillery pieces.
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1 BR Corps intended to fight with NO artillery in reserve, that is 1 & 4 Armd Div would have their three 155mm SP regts PLUS one Regt each from 3 Armd Div. The third Regt in 3 Armd Div was intended to support 33 Armd Bde which had a task of covering the Belgian sector until their deployment. The GSGs would each have one MLRS Regt and one FH70 Regt. Corps Reserve would be one MLRS Regt, however there was correspondence before Wall Fall about converting 50 Missile Regt into a fourth MLRS Regt if FOTL (follow on to Lance) was shelved by the U.S. The two TA Regts with LTG were intended to support any attacks against Soviet Airmobile/SPETNAZ/Para landings in the Corps rear. They also were intended to cover the Weser Bridges (all of which would have been wired for demo) and in a pinch they did have HESH rounds for the AT role (which if it got to that things would have been really bad)
 
OldBill17 said:
1 BR Corps intended to fight with NO artillery in reserve, that is 1 & 4 Armd Div would have their three 155mm SP regts PLUS one Regt each from 3 Armd Div. The third Regt in 3 Armd Div was intended to support 33 Armd Bde which had a task of covering the Belgian sector until their deployment. The GSGs would each have one MLRS Regt and one FH70 Regt. Corps Reserve would be one MLRS Regt, however there was correspondence before Wall Fall about converting 50 Missile Regt into a fourth MLRS Regt if FOTL (follow on to Lance) was shelved by the U.S. The two TA Regts with LTG were intended to support any attacks against Soviet Airmobile/SPETNAZ/Para landings in the Corps rear. They also were intended to cover the Weser Bridges (all of which would have been wired for demo) and in a pinch they did have HESH rounds for the AT role (which if it got to that things would have been really bad)
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So after the Abbot & M109 regiments had converted to AS90 and if 50 Missile Regiment had converted to the MLRS it would have looked like this:

Regimental titles are those in BAOR in July 1989.

1st Artillery Brigade - 72 MLRS and 36 FH70 as follows:
General Support Group North​
18 MLRS - 32 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
General Support Group South​
18 MLRS - 5 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​
Corps Support Group​
18 MLRS - 39 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 MLRS - 50 Heavy Regiment, RA​
1st Armoured Division - 96 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 AS90 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 48 L118 Light Guns as follows:
24 L118 - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 L118 - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 24 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 72 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 AS90 - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​

Totals: 192 AS.90, 36 FH70, 48 L118 Light Guns and 72 MLRS Grand Total: 348 artillery pieces.

Except I'm an AS90 regiment short for the 4th Armoured Division because in July 1989 it had 2 Abbot and one FH70 regiment with the latter to be part of General Support Group South.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
So after the Abbot & M109 regiments had converted to AS90 and if 50 Missile Regiment had converted to the MLRS it would have looked like this:

Regimental titles are those in BAOR in July 1989.

1st Artillery Brigade - 72 MLRS and 36 FH70 as follows:
General Support Group North​
18 MLRS - 32 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 27 Field Regiment, RA​
General Support Group South​
18 MLRS - 5 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 FH70 - 45 Field Regiment, RA​
Corps Support Group​
18 MLRS - 39 Heavy Regiment, RA​
18 MLRS - 50 Heavy Regiment, RA​
1st Armoured Division - 96 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 1 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 AS90 - 2 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 4 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 40 Field Regiment, RA​
2nd Infantry Division - 48 L118 Light Guns as follows:
24 L118 - 100 Field Regiment (V), RA​
24 L118 - 101 Field Regiment (V), RA​
3rd Armoured Division - 24 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 26 Field Regiment, RA​
4th Armoured Division - 72 AS90 as follows:
24 AS90 - 3 Field Regiment, RHA​
24 AS90 - 19 Field Regiment, RA​
24 AS90 - 49 Field Regiment, RA​

Totals: 192 AS.90, 36 FH70, 48 L118 Light Guns and 72 MLRS Grand Total: 348 artillery pieces.

Except I'm an AS90 regiment short for the 4th Armoured Division because in July 1989 it had 2 Abbot and one FH70 regiment with the latter to be part of General Support Group South.
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Yes, but if 33 AB didn’t have to cover the Belgians it would have went to 4 DAG (Division Artillery Group).
The lack of artillery was mentioned in many documents I have. There was a TA ORBAT Review in the 80’s. It was suggested that the TA form one or two FH70 Regts, presumably from guns transfered from the regulars. They would be replaced by M109s released upon entry of AS90 in service. Again Wall Fall overtook all this.
 
As I also mentioned, in a perfect world 1 BR Corps wanted an additional Inf Bde and Armd Bde.
The Armd Bde to fill out 4 AD releasing 19 IB to return to its role of defending the “Water Sandwich” (the land sandwiched between the canals south of Hannover and west of Hildesheim). The additional Inf Bde would replace 24 Airmobile Bde (which was going to the MN Airmobile Div) in the Corps Rear area.
 
As always, money was short, so the two Bdes that BAOR/1 BR Corps needed never materialized. But take note of the Parachute Regiment Group. PRG used the RHQ of the Parachute Regt to form an ad hoc Bde (it was called PRG to prevent the bean counters from getting excited) to control the three TA Para Bns holding Hildesheim. Hildesheim was key in the Corps plan as it was intended to pull back 7 AB after it covered 1 ADs deployment. 7 AB would refurbish in the Water Sandwich and then be prepared for counterstroke operations using Hildesheim as a pivot.
22 AB had four Battle Groups to make up for the loss of 19 IB defending the Water Sandwich. Elements of 6 AB (3 AD) would be detached to form defensive positions West Bank of the HILDESHEIMZWEIGKANAL until relieved by, possibly, the Dover based SAXON equipped Bn which initially had a TTW role of LOC duties from the Channel Ports to the Corps Rear. There was also plans to use use the SAXON equipped Bn in 24 Airmobile in that role also. 12 AB would hold the Div boundary in the South with 4 AD. 4 RGJ and 5 Queens (from 11 AB/ 4 AD) with extra MILAN Pls would most likely hold the Sibesse Gap. 1/51 HV (4 AD) had a role, also with extra MILN Pls holding the Finger Valleys leading to Alfeld. This of course could change and the TA ORBAT Review wanted to pull the TA Bns back for MHD and replace them with regular Bns in garrison in the UK.
Besides the extra Bdes 1 BR Corps also wanted the 13 AI/Mech (T) Bns to add a fourth rifle Coy & dedicated Aslt Pioneer Pl. Again this was more or less a wish list. DRAC thought he could have all BAOR Armd Regts strengthened to Type 57 (four Sqns) by the 1990’s, at least that was the aspiration.
When WARRIOR was fully deployed it was envisioned that each Div of Inf would always have two Bns in the AI role (the Queen’s Div with three Large Regts would have three Bns). This was supposedly to provide variance of roles in the Arms Plot and possibly move to each having four Coys (which would probably entail shorting home based Bns). However even with IRs and REDRUM personnel bringing units up to WE there was tens of thousands reservists with no roles. Again all before Wall Fall.
 
On the Artillery topic…
UK IRL
1989/90

105mm HE = 665493 (NATO SPG = 1440000; BAS/RARS = 865995)

155mm HE & Bomblet = 265710 (NATO SPG = 675000; BAS/RARS = 504330)

No NATO SPG listed and no BAS/RARS listed (203mm)

175mm (all natures) = 30340 (BAS/RARS = 86400)

203mm (all natures) = 5193

NATO Stock Planning Guidance …. What NATO thought you needed for a 30 day war


UK Battlefield Attrition Study/ Review of Ammunition Rates and Scales…. based on expenditures during the Yom Kippur War. What the UK thought you needed for 8 days of war at 100% strength and a further 2 days at 40 % strength

I don't know the exact methodology of the NATO SPG but it was to be for 30 days of combat. UK was based on 8 days of combat with everyone being at 100% strength each of those days (so it factored in losses and making good those losses) The last two days it was assumed that attrition would bring all formations to 40% of their authorized strength and there would be enough to sustain them at that strength for two days.......then there was nothing except sunshine.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
According to its Wikipedia Article the British Army purchased 1,057 Alvis Stalwart High Mobility Load Carriers (HMLC) which were delivered 1963-71. That is 125 Mk1 ordered 1962 (delivered 1963-65) and 932 Mk2 (delivered 1966-1971). Its Wikipedia article also says that the Stalwart was adopted and entered service with the British Army in 1964 as a general transport truck in preference to the FV431, the load carrier variant of the FV430 series.

With hindsight, was FV431 the better choice? As far as I know the Stalwart did what it was designed to do, but it did need a lot of maintenance and all the vehicles were withdrawn in 1993. Meanwhile, the FV432 APC and its derivatives remained in service with the British Army to this very day.

I know that the Stalwart was developed (via the Salamander) from the Saladin armoured car and Saladin APC, but how many components did they actually have in common with the Stalwart? I'm asking the question because 1,057 FV431s instead of 1,057 Stalwarts would increase the number of FV430 vehicles built from about 3,000 to about 4,000 and as I'm a believer in economies of scale 1,057 FV431s might have been cheaper to build and operate than 1,057 Stalwarts.

However, I've also suggested that the British Army purchased the M113 family of vehicles instead of the FV430 family, in which case 1,057 M548s might have been cheaper to build and operate than 1,057 Stalwarts.

The M548 did serve in the British Army in the "Real World" because the Tracked Rapier was mounted on M548s, the M677 launcher for the Lance missile was based on the M548 and according to the Wikipedia article on the M548 the British Army used it as a logistical vehicle during the 1991 Gulf War. Therefore, 3 families of vehicle might have been reduced to one, i.e. the M113 family instead of the FV430 family, M113 family and Stalwart.
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You're forgetting a couple of points.
Firstly, ignore anything you read on Wikipedia because the original entries are usually very wrong - with any attempts to correct them being deleted because the Wiki keyboard warriors would rather believe myths and incorrect articles on websites like Trucksplanet.com, Thinkdefence.co.uk - which they think are official sites.

With regards to FV430 series still being in service whilst Stalwart was sold off in 1993, remember that the FV430 series had the K60 multifuel engine fitted because of the fires, and then a true diesel for the upgrade to Bulldog.
The original FV430s had the Rolls-Royce 8 cylinder petrol engine, the same as the Saladin, Saracen, Salamander and Stalwart. The Rolls petrol engine was the British Army's engine of choice back in the 50s and 60s, hence why the early Army Land Rovers had RR B40 engines in them.
In 1993 the Army sold off a load of petrol engine vehicles, including the Saladin, Saracen, Humber pig, etc.

The Stalwart's swim gear was ordered to be removed in 1983 because of advances in Military Bridging, and the issue of Engineer support to find suitable places for trucks to enter and exit the river.

This video explains why the Stalwart was chosen over the FV421 and FV431
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YsGUozrbFOE
 
Apophenia said:
No, not instead of the CVR(T)s. One exception would be the FV103 Spartan which had dubious utility as an APC.
...
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You're aware that Spartan was a NBC proof CVR(T) reconnaissance vehicle, compared to the Ferret being a non NBC proof CVR(W) reconnaissance vehicle.
Spartan used in the Royal Engineers of BAOR for Field troop commanders, Staff Sergeants and Reccy Sergeants. FV432s used as section vehicles
 
Mark_Ellis said:
Firstly, ignore anything you read on Wikipedia because the original entries are usually very wrong - with any attempts to correct them being deleted because the Wiki keyboard warriors would rather believe myths and incorrect articles on websites like Trucksplanet.com, Thinkdefence.co.uk - which they think are official sites.
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The trouble with Wikipedia is that, as a matter of policy, they don't accept primary sources or 'original research' - which seems to include looking at actual evidence. There are generally good reasons for this, but they break down when it comes to subjects that aren't extensively covered by informed secondary sources.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
However, if standardisation had been taken to it's logical conclusion the British Army would have bought:
  • Leopard 1 or M60 instead of Chieftain.
  • M1 Abrams or Leopard 2 instead of Challenger 1 and Challenger 2.
  • Bradley instead of Warrior.
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If I may, the Bradley IFV was far from standardisation, given, until very resently, the Bradley was not adopted by any other NATO country, given that the Bradley was overly expensive to purchase and maintain, and complex. If they had already built and operated the M113 APC, then I would suggest they license build and operate AIFV/
YPR-765 [preferably a stretched six-wheel derivative].

I can't argue about the British Army using Leo2's instead of the Challenger 2. Again, until very recently, the M1 Abrams was far from standardisation, given that no other NATO country used the Abrams.

Regards
Pioneer
 
Chally 2 competed with Leo 2 & M1A1 to replace Chieftains. Internal RAC memos indicated that if they picked Leo 2 or M1A1 they would be able to bring either into service/equip Regts faster because they could piggy back off the Bundeswehr/U.S. Army training systems. The general consensus was that M1A1 was the most preferable out of the two because of the volume the U.S. could produce and supply replacements/mechanical items. However there was a worry of the amount of logistics that would be needed due to the thirsty-ness of the engine. The drawback of Leo 2 was the main factory was about 48 hours away from being overrun by a Soviet Front. Ultimately it was politics, did the country who invented the Tank want to go out of the MBT business and lose jobs and perhaps overseas sales (which didn’t materialize except for Oman).
From what I have read the Vickers Mk.7, KM chassis with a Vickers Valiant turret was an excellent MBT and would have been in the running but KM would not give Vickers the rights to be able to sell overseas and the MOD did not want to be beholden to the FRG with a MBT.
 
VIKINGTANK said:
Having served as a infantryman, FV432 driver and a Milan ATGW No 1 (so the firer) in BOAR from 1978 to 1982 I would not disagree with most of comments equipment wise above; although I will mildly below and come up with some of my own ideas.

I always was greatly concerned about the extremely thin armour of the FV432 APC we used, 1/2 inch on the front at most, so I remember when attached to a armour heavy Combat Team (CT) (1 platoon of infantry attached to a Chieftain Sqn - less the tank troop attached to the rest of our infantry Company as a Infantry heavy CT) we were always taught to tuck our FV432's in behind the assault troop of Chieftains in the assault - better them than us to be hit! Just not too close as if they decide to stop and reverse .................!

Interestingly by the early 80's the Chieftains seemed to have worked out most of their engine issues as it was rare to see one broken down, screaming along yes but mostly still going, and during a 'play with the other units toys day' the young infantrymen all wanted to transfer to the tanks!

The Warrior was/is a great vehicle, I was a qualified armoured infantry Platoon Commander later in my time, thicker than the FV432, a great gun (less the 7.62mm chain which was utter rubbish) and decent sights. However to have given it fully stabilised turret (and a better gun/ATGW as some countries did on their IFVs) would have have made the vehicle much more expensive and also mis-understands the role and manning of the Warrior. It was mostly commanded by young Corporals who, while mostly very good, had a lot on their plate; they had to command the vehicle, load the gun, and command their section while dismounted - a simple gun and a simple turreted system worked better than a all singing and dancing turret that would likely be more unreliable. The vehicle of course did get thermal sights later. The vehicle was at its best getting the troops to the dismount area, withdraw to a firing position or, if resistance was weak, provide fire support from the dismount area. We always withdrew and provided flank fire support if possible. Its still thinly armoured and is not a tank!

BTW for those wondering why no ATGM; it was preferred in the UK that dedicated ground based ATGM teams were better trained to ID the bad guys versus the young Corporal, and his Lance Corporal gunner, who already had enough jobs to do! AFV recognition was not every bodies favourite subject! And money of course!

To come to my point on this thread and what would I have preferred vehicle wise then its a far more thicker APC. A Chieftain based APC at the time would have been far better in many ways, I won't bore you with why in detail right now (unless you ask later), but I never understood why they put 4 guys behind the heavy armour of a Chieftain but 8-10 behind 1/2 inch on the FV432. Also while the Warrior was a great vehicle for peace support operations I was never convinced it would work in a peer on peer conventional conflict because of the thin armour (the Gulf wars were hardly peer on peer). The utility of the IFV in a general war scenario can be read about in the book below in more detail; the author thinks the IFV was not the right way to go about things and would likely suffer heavy causalities.

Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War

So a tank based APC would be the ideal vehicle; at least one in every four (so one per platoon) could have a Marder type turret with a belt feed cannon but not all four; the rest could have a HMG/MG/GMG fired from within the vehicle. So get the Corporal and his section to the dismount area in one piece and let him do his job.

I was interested to read in the recent book Chobham Armour that the UK was planning to replace the Warrior in 2012 (yes really!) and one of the options was a Challenger Kangaroo (Kangaroo as in WW2 turretless Canadian built Ram tanks used as APCs); not clear if this was converted Challenger 1 or new builds.

Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development

Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development: Amazon.co.uk: William Suttie: 9781472855268: Books

Buy Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development 1 by William Suttie (ISBN: 9781472855268) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.
www.amazon.co.uk

BTW wheeled APC's are great for light mechanised units and peace support operations but it has to be tracked and have heavy armour for conventional conflicts. Any thing else is barmy; I commanded a Saxon platoon as a SNCO so I know trust me!

Happy to discuss more of my thoughts if anybody is interested; but go easy on me please.

Regards, VikingTank.
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Hello all,

Hope nobody objects to be resurrecting this thread as I very much enjoyed it in the past. Much interesting, and knowledgeable, discussion was had over a couple of years by us all. I have added my first post above for reference from early 2023 and I did say much later I would comment on recce vehicles and ATGW we had in service; but never got around to it. As I said in the above post, and many others, I was in the weeds at Battalion (Bn) level so I can speak from experience at this level on BOAR and its equipment but as for other units/systems I can pass comment but perhaps others may wish to correct me. I am not really into 'fantasy fleets' so will avoid that if I can; apart from the tank based APC hobby horse of mine which I mention above.

I was a very small part of 1 Armoured Division, the covering Force Division (their task was to delay the Sovs to allow the rest of 1 BR Corps to deploy and dig in) and was also in Task Force Bravo/22 Armoured Bde (square unit/Bde of two tank and 2 Infantry Bn’s). But we were behind the 1 BR Corps Screening Force.

As a reminder in my unit, we had FV432 infantry carriers (2 per platoon with the Peak engineering L37 MG turret originally designed for the FV722 Vixen liaison armoured car), Company and Battalion Commander versions, the FV432 for Milan ATGW, the FV432 REME, the FV434 REME, FV432 ambulance and the FV432 81 mm mortar version. With the CVR(T) family we had the Scimitar recce vehicle, the Spartan APC for Mortar MFC, Sultan command and Samson recovery/repair. On top of that we had Ferrets for the ATGW section commanders and Stalwarts for resupply.

I think we basically agreed on a better Chieftain tank (engine, armour and fire control) and some agreed on my hobby horse of tank based APC (redundant Centurion hulls/purpose built Chieftain APC etc (but all with rear doors)?) and leave the FV432 for support roles; but what else? So some more areas for discussion if you wish.

So, to recce vehicles. In the Bn we had the Scimitar recce vehicle which was used in the classical recce role, find and report the enemy etc, but also much used for selecting and marking routes and guides for the Bn. Remember that they were not part of the 1 BR Corps Screening Force (Scimitars/Scorpion/Striker, the first to meet, report and delay the Sovs ahead of the Covering Force 1 Armoured Division) so did not have any covering Strikers etc. Scimitar was a good, fast, small vehicle with excellent X-country capability and a good (simple but very powerful) 30 mm Rarden cannon and reasonably maintenance trouble free. It, and its 3-man crew, were capable of observing, reporting and if need be, destroying the bad guys BRDM-2/BRM-1 recce vehicles.

However, it was very small (too small according to the crews) and very thin and had no rearwards driving position. All the crews I spoke too, mostly in later years, would have preferred a larger vehicle (not to the current Ajax recce size I might add!), more frontal armour (Scimitar did receive applique side armour much later) and a fourth, rearwards facing, crew member who could drive the vehicle rearwards on contact. On contact the driver and gunner were likely to be rather busy with the Commander trying to guide the driver backwards; all in rather a rush! Of course, thermal sights were mentioned but these were to come later. One thing nobody, apart from one person, mentioned was an elevating mast with a camera on it; not sure if this would have been available then, fit in the vehicle, and if it really works as a concept.

Milan ATGW. When I was in the ATGW Platoon we had, I think, 18 Milan launchers with 6 attached to each Rifle Company, with 2 x Milan firing posts mounted in each FV432 APC; note at this time (early 1980's) the Milan Compact Turret (MCT) on a Spartan hull did not exist which later increased the firing posts available to 24 in a Bn. A single launcher had a crew of 2 and then every pair of launchers had an additional commander. We never fired the Milan vehicle mounted from the mortar hatches on the rear of the FV432 but always ground mounted; from on the ground, from a shallow shell scrape or from a purpose built trench (see below for on more on the trench digging!). We did however have the MIRA thermal clip-on sight that added considerable weight including the gas cooling bottles.

So, what would I change? Firstly, all to be vehicle mounted and fired from the vehicle, either from a simple pintel mount or from a purpose built turret like the MCT above. The Spartan would be ideal; smaller than the FV432 and more mobile - especially for the 1 Armoured Division Covering Force who could expect to be more mobile in defence. Firing the Milan from the ground meant moving after every launch due to the back-blast that was easily detectable, it had to be hand carried along with all the spare missiles and the MIRA kit. Digging in a ground fired Milan was also a mammoth task, it took many hours to do and defence stores to make it artillery proof would have been limited, and again it would be located on firing. However, a vehicle mounted Milan could either shoot and quickly scoot or be dug into a vehicle scrape; I see no reason why a Spartan based Milan carrier could not be fitted with a front mounted blade for self-digging a vehicle scrape and alternate positions.

Secondly, and a fix that should have been done, was for the UK to buy the Milan-2 and 2T 115 mm missiles with extra penetration and duel (ERA defeating) warheads; we only purchased the single warhead Milan 1 103 mm missile. I was teaching the soldiers about the Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) fitted T-64BV by then; we would not have been able to defeat it from the front at all!

Lastly, more range and a range finder. We were always taught max range of 2000 m but that the missile could go to 2,250 m (I think) but we could have used more range; especially if now vehicle mounted - perhaps 3,000 m was possible in the design? We did get very good at range estimation but a simple handheld laser ranger finder would have been very useful; did they exist that small in the early 1980's?

Air Defence. My opinion, and the British Armies view, on this is only give this to specialist troops. Nobody needs random troops firing off MANPADS etc in all directions as our IFF and aircraft recognition was not great. Yes, BAOR did need more systems, Gepard turret on a Chieftain chassis etc, would have been ideal. Enough said (although our L37 GPMG turrets on the back of the FV432 could fire in high elevation!).

Bn engineering support. The job, quite rightly, of completing the majority of the various counter mobility tasks was the job of the Royal Engineers. But I never understood why, with digging in so heavily emphasised with the Sov artillery threat, why it was almost completely done by hand; the Bn had one single 1950's Light Mobile Digger (LMD) on a Bedford RL Chassis which should have been in a museum. It rarely worked and when it did it broke down soon after starting, plain rubbish.

Just fit every tracked vehicle, that was intended for anywhere near the front lines, with a dozer blade for digging its own scrape - simple. And give the Bn some JCB diggers; one per Company at least.

Lastly, as somebody else said in the thread, a smaller better equipped BAOR (vehicle wise) would have been better than such a large manpower intensive army.

Enough blabbering from me; any comments or have we already said them all? Vikingtank.
 
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