British Army of the Rhine alternatives

uk 75

uk 75

ACCESS: Above Top Secret
Senior Member
Joined
27 September 2006
Messages
6,074
Reaction score
6,188
The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) based in Germany for the duration of the Cold War was a significant component of British defence spending and equipment in the postwar era.
It is a very complicated subject, and .
unlike the Royal Navy or the RAF has not been such a popular subject for books.
So I thought I would start a general thread about BAOR options over the period.
It was reorganised again and again. Units were pulled back to the UK. Its equipment varied in quality and quantity.
In his seminal World War 3 books General Hackett argued for the creation of a second UK Corps in Germany.
 
In particular there was tension,especially before 1967 between forces designed for service in W Germany and those needed for service further afield.
Unlike West Germany's lavishly equipped Bundeswehr with its newly built barracks, Rhine Army was dependent on the hostnation's WW2 infrastructure. Its equipment was often lacking
 
Strange how naval and air force threads get people going but not so much army ones.
I know there are individual threads on BAOR kit like Chieftain and the 25pounder replacement that never was.
Part of the problem is that in the 50s while the RAF were dreaming up atom bombers and the Navy its missile ships the Army had the chicken heated atomic mine.
In fact the BAOR did not have tracked troop carriers in setvice till the mid 60s unlike the US and W German forces.
Its artillery had to make do with the woeful Abbot 105m sp gun instead of decent quantities of M109s like everyone else in NATO.
The 80s brought the curious Saxon wheeled apc for units reinforcing BAOR.
The list is almost endless.
Its organisation charts are a miracle of fudge. The West Germans for example used the standard NATO three brigade division (2 Armoured and 1 Machanised in the case of a Panzer Dvision. In the 70s the Brits were so ashamed of having only 2 brigades in a division that they scrapped the Brigade altogether.
Unlike the RAF who continued to dine out on the Battle of Britain and the Navy with its impressive carriers and subs the Army in the Cold War was associated with obsolete images of national service recruits spud bashing in Carry on Sergeant or standing on street corners in Cyprus or Aden.
It is no wonder that despite our treaty commitment for the first time in peacetime to keep an army on the European mainland, BAOR was a political football. It nonetheless was our most expensive defence commitment.
No accident that as soon as possible after 1990 the legions came home. Of course BAOR was no longer necessary but units from it were soon in action in the Balkans. But the continental commitment had come to an end. For more than forty years ordinary British men and women, with their children got to live in a European country that had been our enemy in 2 terrible wars.
Anyone who did not live through it (and it came to an end pretty much twenty years ago now) cannot understand the impact BAOR had
 
The thing is BAOR is like most of NATO stationed in Germany for most of it's time. Nothing more than a speed bump in the path of Soviet Armour.

And that was ostensibly it's purpose. Buy time for everyone to find a way out of conflict before the nukes fly.

Once France got nukes, the fact is it didn't matter what Washington was willing to trade away. Paris wasn't going to have another foreign power doing a victory parade through the capital while.....

The good news was that transport infrastructure that had hampered Germany going east also hampered Russia going west. Once they overextend into western Europe, a few tactical nuclear strikes would cut off their logistic tail and they'd run out of everything pretty quickly. Becoming easy meat.

So in this context the BAOR was there to die with allies in sufficient numbers they felt we were doing our bit and would have a right to sit at the negotiations for ceasefire and peace. Or if worse came to it, justify the horrendous carnage a nuclear exchange would produce.

Brutal but true.

This being the redacted, nice and avoiding certain issues post.
 
I am reminded of the exchange in the first episode of Yes Prime Minister between Jim Hacker and the Chief Scientific Adviser about when the PM would press the button.
 
The whole episode is brilliant.
Sadly the exchange with the chief scientist is not online but his question to Hacker
Where do they (the Sovs) have to get to before you'd press the button? the Reform Club? came to mind in connection with Rhine Army
More chillingly I had sometimes in a job to explain to East Germans why Mrs Thatcher might use Polaris and part of the answer was the fate of 55.000 people in our forces in West Germany. The East Germans did not know there were so many Brits there and did not believe me when I answered the question "what would happen if the West Germans asked you to leave?" with " Well, we'd go home." I did not realise in 1988 that only a few years later that was to happen.
 
Post cessation of national service BAOR didn’t change that much?
I have, or rather had since I now cant find it, a book charting BAOR’s organisational changes. It always struck me as lots of reorganisation but relatively little change in fundamentals, +/- 10% units etc.

The speed bump is a common belief, but then we saw in 1991 what professional western armoured forces did to a Soviet supplied, trained and conops force comprising conscripts, plus we saw in Afghan how the Soviet Army actually performed and even as recently as Chechyna and arguably Georgia - they were never this steam roller and the sheer mass of NATO troops opposing them and Soviet’s general weakness logsitics wise makes me think it would have been a grinder but they could have been stopped.
A lot of the simulations and models of what were happen were quite flawed in assumptions, 1991 being a surprise to many.

On the comment the legions came home after 1990, for the Army that wasn’t the case as 1st Armoured Division with 2/3rds of the armour was still there until recently. Most of the 90s Army redctions were disbandments rather than relocations back to the UK?

I recall in 2004 Deputy CGS (or COS LAND, I forget) describing Saxon as “not a weapon of war”.

Somewhere on the internet was a clip of the music Dreamscape (trance type), to home movie footage taken by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. It was awesome - it showed these soldiers living, moving (no fighting) and just the reality of their time there. A telling moment was when I noticed inside their BTR (or whatever it was), was a poster of Bruce Lee.

There you have the shock troops of the Soviet Army, on ops on behalf of the Union, looking to a Western cultural icon. That isn’t an Army that will drive to the Atlantic crushing everything in it’s path.
 
A cynical friend of mine suggested that Soviet troops would have been so shocked by the lavishness of West German shopping centres that they would have degenerated into a hoard of looters, assuming they coped with the huge traffic jams on German roads.
He was in the TA for the big Lionheart exercise and met young German officers his age who reckoned they would saddle up and head East into the GDR (I think they were ironic.about the W German policy of Forward Defence (Vorneverteidigung).
I think it was the Polish Army who revealed that the Soviets planned to use nuclear strikes on a massive scale to punch through NATO lines.
The commitment of III US Corps to Northern Germany (a brigade was ststioned near Bremerhaven) would have been helpful, assuming it could arrive in time by air from the US and pick up its kit.
The biggest mismatch was in the air where Soviet airpower was much more rigid and less agile than NATO.
Fortunately the Soviet rulers were much more cautious than Western pundits claimed and did not put any of this to the test.
Legions coming home was figurative but thanks for the clarification.
The changes in composition including equipment types were fairly significant.
 
uk 75 said:
A cynical friend of mine suggested that Soviet troops would have been so shocked by the lavishness of West German shopping centres that they would have degenerated into a hoard of looters, assuming they coped with the huge traffic jams on German roads.
Click to expand...

Reminds me be a bit of Operation Red Lightning from Cold War Hot

The whole idea was designed to take advantage of the alcoholism problem in the Soviet Army.

Crates of alcohol would be prepositioned along the expected line of advance of Soviet units, the Soviet personnel would soon become more interested in the alcohol than moving forward to be shot at.

Alcohol submunitions were also developed for NATO aircraft and the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and Tactical Missile System (TACMS) batteries to drop once the war became more fluid and prepositioning was not feasible.

The priority targets for the Kinetic Controlled Air Scatterable Alcoholic Munitions (KICAS-AM) would be in the path of attacking Soviet units, assembly areas, river-crossing sites and headquarters. Each exploding rocket would scatter hundreds of fluorescent orange round plastic miniatures, each on its own parachute.

For Headquarters targets, a special sub-category of KICAS-AM was developed, the Delayed Effect Bomb Cluster, Alcoholic, Leadership (DEBOCALL), which used a higher quality of Vodka that most Soviets never saw as it was reserved for the elite and for export.
 
The Soviet army was a strange beast and for all its power on paper its manpower by the 1970s was the main problem, something that even Hackett put into his second volume.
Its conscripts were drawn from across the USSR, a hodge-podge of different people from different cultures, races, religions and languages. Few were probably very enthused by their time in the Army. Its unlikely that they would have fought well. Sure the Guards Divisions would have put up a big fight but you can't conquer Europe with just a handful of decent divisions. Then the WarPac allies also leave question marks, would the Poles have followed the Russians and East Germans? By 1980 Poland has internal strife to sort out, let alone worrying what NATO is up to. The Czechs and Hungarians might have had second thoughts too, 1956 and 1968 were not long ago and as was seen in 1989 - the iron curtain was weakest here. Romania and Bulgaria wouldn't even consider joining in.

But let's not forget that NATO forces were facing the same situation, although perhaps well bedded at the higher echelons with the Norweigians, Belgians, Dutch, German, Italians, Greeks, Turks and others were of varying quality and would have had their own national defence priorities had as mass attack taken place.
Also, its too easy to assume that US forces would have put up a first class effort, yet in the latter years of Vietnam its clear that the ranks of the US Army were disgruntled, widespread 'fragging' of officers and a desperate desire not to fight was hardly the sign of a disciplined and effective force. Units in Europe may have been less affected, but its clear that the average soldier in Vietnam or Afghanistan during this period was equally disenchanted and eager not to follow orders.

All conflicts since 1990 have shown the superiority of Western equipment over Soviet era systems - even allowing for lower-standard export kit to Moscow's allies and clients. A WarPac attack would probably have been the most hellish conflict Europe had ever experienced even without the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With chemical and biological warfare it would be indescribable even by First World War standards. Destruction and death would have been on a mass scale but there is no certainty which side would prevail. I feel the WarPac forces would be the first to crumble, they might have coped better with less logistical support but heavy losses would eat into morale and having KGB men with AK-47s behind the front waves would only take them so far. NATO though has to withstand the onslaught with what equipment it has, sure its going to get pushed back but it might just might hang on, though crowds of fleeing civilian populations will equally sap the ability to move and morale.

My Dad was part of BAOR during the 1970s. I have never gotten the sense from him that he worried too much about a threat of war - he felt any real threat would come from China in due course. In fact hostile Germans from the older generations seemed to be the main opponent! Proof that not even welcomed BAOR, it was still seen by some as much as an occupying force as it was a protective shield against Communist forces who might, for some never explained reason, might want to let its troops go for a paddle on the Channel beaches. The difference was probably all East Germans and Poles hated the Russians so they had less chance to enjoy themselves.
 
On the Speed Bump...

It's in the 1980's (which is telling) that the idea of technical superiority over numerical came to be possible.
This is when the idea of actually fighting and beating Soviet numbers raised it head.
But the popular cult of defeatism continued to exert it's baleful influence among the ordinary population until the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait.

This of course straddles the political will to confront and defeat Soviet power both tactically and strategically.
And should be no surprise it took the whole decade to turn around both deficiencies in the military and the political establishments.
That will was derided, denounced, and dismissed at the time as right wing populism, demagoguery and outright impossible.

What hit hardest was this military display of technical superiority and quickly followed by the political collapse of the USSR, exposing the sheer scale of the delusions about the Communist society and power.

We forget how much the West was riddled with those stating with utmost confidence that we would lose any war, that we were in decline, failing and that we were wrong to fight it at all but should just accept the 'inevitability of history'.
 
zen said:
On the Speed Bump...

It's in the 1980's (which is telling) that the idea of technical superiority over numerical came to be possible.
This is when the idea of actually fighting and beating Soviet numbers raised it head.
But the popular cult of defeatism continued to exert it's baleful influence among the ordinary population until the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait.

This of course straddles the political will to confront and defeat Soviet power both tactically and strategically.
And should be no surprise it took the whole decade to turn around both deficiencies in the military and the political establishments.
That will was derided, denounced, and dismissed at the time as right wing populism, demagoguery and outright impossible.

What hit hardest was this military display of technical superiority and quickly followed by the political collapse of the USSR, exposing the sheer scale of the delusions about the Communist society and power.

We forget how much the West was riddled with those stating with utmost confidence that we would lose any war, that we were in decline, failing and that we were wrong to fight it at all but should just accept the 'inevitability of history'.
Click to expand...
History as per a very specific perspective....
 
Er dont we all describe history from a very specific perspective or are we back at the no views allowed that dont fit the prescribed modern orthodoxy of a certain oh so caring and sensitive kind
 
kaiserd said:
zen said:
On the Speed Bump...

It's in the 1980's (which is telling) that the idea of technical superiority over numerical came to be possible.
This is when the idea of actually fighting and beating Soviet numbers raised it head.
But the popular cult of defeatism continued to exert it's baleful influence among the ordinary population until the Gulf War to liberate Kuwait.

This of course straddles the political will to confront and defeat Soviet power both tactically and strategically.
And should be no surprise it took the whole decade to turn around both deficiencies in the military and the political establishments.
That will was derided, denounced, and dismissed at the time as right wing populism, demagoguery and outright impossible.

What hit hardest was this military display of technical superiority and quickly followed by the political collapse of the USSR, exposing the sheer scale of the delusions about the Communist society and power.

We forget how much the West was riddled with those stating with utmost confidence that we would lose any war, that we were in decline, failing and that we were wrong to fight it at all but should just accept the 'inevitability of history'.
Click to expand...
History as per a very specific perspective....
Click to expand...
Yes a Western one and one centred on the UK and the USA.
 
I know the fear in my country wasn't so much losing that war, but being obliterated before victory - however you might define victory.
 
The end of the Cold War showed very clearly the Soviet Union was a house of cards. The rush with which ever bit abandoned Russia it puts paid to the idea of some unified fighting force.

For instance, how many of that mass of Soviet troops couldn’t actually leave their base areas as they were in effect, a deterrence force for independence.

Defeatism at higher and more political/cultural levels aside, I think in the UK military it was a mixture of not appreciating the Soviet’s weaknesses, and the usual bantar/“I’ve got a bad feeling about this” - something you see in everything we do, yet we then crack on and do it and nobody is massively shocked or surprised, it’s just a cultural thing.

As mentioned above, there is the perennial question of why the Soviet Union would want to conquer western Europe by force when it had seen the Germans fail at that and knew the cost of such a war better than the West arguably. Yes they had offensive doctrine based on their experience from ‘41 but is this no different to the French military culture post WW1 of fighting the war on someone else’s territory? The reality is both sides sat there entrenched with neither wanting an offensive war.
 
Looking back on this old thread about BAOR I rather let it go off on the big picture.
What I was hoping to do instead, and would like to do now is look at some of the equipment choices that were made.
It always seemed strange that in the early 60s when US and Germany adopted the 105mm tank gun for MBTs that served well up to the end of the Cold War Britain went off and built the slow moving heavy Chieftain with its 120mm gun. Could we have made do with Centurions like the Israelis did?
I think we were right to stick to infantry carriers than infantry fighting vehicles. Infantry are much better fighting dismounted. Leave the 30mm cannon and Swingfires in separate more mobile vehicles.
Instead of FV432 and Warrior I would have developed something like the French VAB or West German TPZ1..Better yet bought the VAB.
BAOR seemed all over the place with its artillery. Everything from towed 25pounders to the long rifle M107 was pressed into service. Why did it take so long to introduce Lance to replace Honest John? What was the point of using Abbott and FH70 when M109 existed. Then the whole sorry SP70saga.
The same was true of the standard British Army rifle. The US persuaded NATO to adopt 7.62 so killing the revolutionary EM2 rifle and leaving us with the Lee Enfield bolt action until the late 50s.
At least with the SLR a degree of commonality of ammo was achieved with the Belgian, Danish, Dutch and W German forces alongside us. But it was a long ungainly weapon for troops to carry in troop carriers.
So what should have been a simple resurrection of the old EM2 became instead the fragile unloved SA80.
A simple procurement of late model M16s might have been better?
So a lot to talk about in BAOR as we sorted all the political stuff above.
 
uk 75 said:
I think we were right to stick to infantry carriers than infantry fighting vehicles. Infantry are much better fighting dismounted. Leave the 30mm cannon and Swingfires in separate more mobile vehicles.
Instead of FV432 and Warrior I would have developed something like the French VAB or West German TPZ1..Better yet bought the VAB.
Click to expand...
Disagree. Infantry still fights dismounted even with IFVs, they can just dismount closer to actual combat and get better protection in the IFV than a regular APC, while having constant support thanks to the IFV's heavier armament. At a time when the concentration of tanks was much lower than in WW2, having some level of local support was important. The cost of an APC+fire support vehicle is no lower than that of the IFV itself.

As for FV 432, tracks still were too important to go wheeled yet for all APCs at the time it was designed. It should definitely have been made earlier however considering that it's not much different from a British M59 (steel armor, 200hp class gasoline engine at the start)
It always seemed strange that in the early 60s when US and Germany adopted the 105mm tank gun for MBTs that served well up to the end of the Cold War Britain went off and built the slow moving heavy Chieftain with its 120mm gun. Could we have made do with Centurions like the Israelis did?
Click to expand...
It makes sense when you consider that when the decision on the gun for Chieftain was made, L7 had been rejected for the new specification due to allegedly insufficient penetration with HESH and APDS (it had been considered for it initially but with a more lenient 120mm @ 60° at 2000 yards req). L7 was only considered a stopgap at best to rearm Centurions at the time. It is only later when the choice for Chieftain had already been made that the Americans and Germans selected the L7/M68. Why the US accepted this when they had been seeking even greater penetration remains a mystery,but probably because they did not like L11's two-part ammo (true) and didn't want to take the time to rework it (supposedly).

Standardization of the tank guns and ammo for this case was simply not a consideration at the time, and only happened by accident, so to speak.

And no, Chieftain being poorly designed OTL doesn't make keeping Centurion a good idea. Just don't fuck up the replacement.
BAOR seemed all over the place with its artillery. Everything from towed 25pounders to the long rifle M107 was pressed into service. Why did it take so long to introduce Lance to replace Honest John? What was the point of using Abbott and FH70 when M109 existed. Then the whole sorry SP70saga
Click to expand...
Click to expand...
Because FH70 is a towed weapon so not even the same category as M109, which the UK got anyway? Ditto for the M107. The only mistake was getting plain M109A2s instead of using the version with the FH70 that Germany and Italy used among others. Now that's standardization and with a better gun than the M109A2's to boot.

Abbott basically only existed because it had been initially designed for the Indians and the MOD bought it because the UK SPH program was in shambles. The definitely could have done better but HMG's gotta screw the British industry and procurement as usual even when there was potential if used correctly.
 
Thank you. Teasing info out is what this thread is all about.
Warrior with its 30mm Rarden certainly came into its own in the Gulf Wars and in Yugoslavia in the 90s.
A comparison of FV432 with alternatives probably exists here somewhere. The UK has certainly had its money's worth. Some will pobably even find their way to Ukraine.
I am not convinced that Chieftain/Challenger really got us anywhere for all the money spent on them. An improved Centurion could have been made as good as Leopard 1 and M60A1. Choosing between M1 and Leopard2 I would have joined the Dutch and bought Leopard 2 in the 80s.
My recollection is that only Italy fitted its M109 with FH70 barrels. Not bothering with FH70 and AS90 would have allowed us to have improved M109s across all BAOR and dispose of Abott.
The M107 and M110 were US gifts practically so dont matter much. MLRS did replace them eventually.
Something I left out of my first post was ground based air defence. BAOR had no Gepards unlike its Belgian, Dutch and W German colleagues. Starstreak on a tracked vehicle was the alternative but arrived too late. Tracked Rapier like Challenger was an Iranian vehicle shoehorned into Europe.
 
uk 75 said:
Something I left out of my first post was ground based air defence. BAOR had no Gepards unlike its Belgian, Dutch and W German colleagues. Starstreak on a tracked vehicle was the alternative but arrived too late. Tracked Rapier like Challenger was an Iranian vehicle shoehorned into Europe.
Click to expand...
Yep. Only so much can be done about it with the mismanaged British economy and military industry, and even in a poor 70's economy, a better managed MIC could still have worked better through better exports of more competitive equipment. The BAOR should have just got Tracked Rapier on a Stormer chassis back when the latter vehicle was prototyped by MVEE in 1976.
I am not convinced that Chieftain/Challenger really got us anywhere for all the money spent on them. An improved Centurion could have been made as good as Leopard 1 and M60A1. Choosing between M1 and Leopard2 I would have joined the Dutch and bought Leopard 2 in the 80s.
Click to expand...
Well, the UK could have done much better than it historically did with less mismanagement, but I agree that by the time they contemplated Challenger 1 they should have just acquired a M1 or Leo 2 license, which was offered (and was offered for the Chieftain replacement Challenger 2 had been designed for), and the British Army really wanted Leopard 2 instead of CR2. They were both more mature than CR1 and better than either CR1 or CR2, especially since they kept less from their predecessors than CR1 and 2 kept from Chieftain. And you get the bonus of commonality with your allies.

The British historically brought up the argument of "keeping local production and design capacity" or "they do not perfectly meet our reqs", but neither argument really works given that the US and Germany offered very favourable license agreements with the possibility to design British upgrades for them and the UK killed its tank industry anyway with no compensation OTL. And for the second argument, well the British could design upgrades for M1 and Leo 2 to meet said reqs (FCS and optics for M1, armor for both although Burlington really wasn't as efficient as US and German armor and the Challengers were barely adequate and competitive only because they were heavier) already but at least they wouldn't have to pay and wait for the "perfect I swear" British tank like MBT-80, and could design upgrades only for areas they really want to change while they don't need to pay for what is already mature.

I disagree about Centurion instead of Chieftain. The former can not truly match Leopard 1 and M60A1 without complete structural upgrades that would almost require new production, and if you produce something new you might as well go all the way to a new design like Chieftain. Upgrades without a complete rework will just leave you with a very weight-inefficient layout with some glaring deficiencies (not very ergonomic turret with the smallest turret ring of all 105mm NATO tanks, no optical rangefinder, slow for the armor it has), that is also worn out, and with some parts that are not as durable as new tanks.
Once again, the problem was not in making a proper replacement for Centurion, but in the UK deciding on technical solutions that were poor either in hindsight or already compared to contemporary tanks, or cheapening out on bad worksmanship and some parts. The same problems would have been found in a Centurion upgrade done by the same UK.

My recollection is that only Italy fitted its M109 with FH70 barrels. Not bothering with FH70 and AS90 would have allowed us to have improved M109s across all BAOR and dispose of Abott.
Click to expand...
No, the Germans also mounted the FH70 on their M109s, and Norway bought the German upgrade. AS90 might have been valuable but only if the UK had been more agressive with keeping it up to date and exporting it (like the Korean K9 or the German Pzh 2000). Otherwise it was just a hull that wasn't standard with anything in the British or foreign fleets. I disagree about FH70 as it was quite commercially successful and better than any foreign option of the time, and NATO really was bad enough at artillery that it needed a winner like FH70.
Warrior with its 30mm Rarden certainly came into its own in the Gulf Wars and in Yugoslavia in the 90s.
Click to expand...
The one thing I dislike about it is that it should have entered service in the 70s when an unstabilized Rarden and image intensifiers were not so outdated. By the late 80s more modern IFVs that could mount a properly automatic, stabilized and more powerful 30mm Bushmaster were just around the corner and the rationale for Rarden really no longer worked, and it barely did as is in the 70s.




Again, the gist of it is that you either want a UK that manages its own military industry better or at least you want it to be more efficient at buying foreign. I would point out however that foreign wasn't always financially better even if it in mass production outside of Britain, due to the recurrent lack of dollars in the British reserves.
 
Elen Vital thank you this is just the helpful detailed response my bald statements are aimed at getting.
I am already learning a lot from this thread.
I hope others will weigh in with info and opinions as BAOR was the most siginificant ground force we ever deployed in peacetime overseas.
 
"Lemming No. 1 report to the cliff! It's time to do your duty."

Building American & German tanks under licence instead of the Chieftain, Challenger 1 & Challenger 2 has been suggested. Would building M108 and M113 under licence instead of the FV430 family have improved BAOR's logistics? The M108s could have been upgraded to M109s at a later date.

I suspect that the answer will be no, but if one doesn't ask, one doesn't find out.
 
I would be happy to let Canada be included in this thread as 4CMBG had similar equipment needs and restraints to BAOR though I thnk we have threads on Canadian equipment.
 
uk 75 said:
I am reminded of the exchange in the first episode of Yes Prime Minister between Jim Hacker and the Chief Scientific Adviser about when the PM would press the button.
Click to expand...
For what it's worth, here it is.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o861Ka9TtT4


Part of Post 11
Hood said:
But let's not forget that NATO forces were facing the same situation, although perhaps well bedded at the higher echelons with the Norwegians, Belgians, Dutch, German, Italians, Greeks, Turks and others were of varying quality and would have had their own national defence priorities had as mass attack taken place.
Click to expand...
What you wrote reminded me about Bernard Woolley told Jim Hacker about the other NATO armies.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IKQlQlQ6_pk

Is has been said that many a true word is spoken in jest. How much of it was true?
 
Last edited:
Yes Minister, Yes Prime Minister were never entered by BBC for the Montreux TV Comedy Awards. As a Current Affairs Politics lecture it was avidly watched by PM Thatcher.
 
alertken said:
Yes Minister, Yes Prime Minister were never entered by BBC for the Montreux TV Comedy Awards. As a Current Affairs Politics lecture it was avidly watched by PM Thatcher.
Click to expand...
However, it did win an award from Mary Whitehouse's National Viewers and Listeners Association. She can be seen in the background of this clip.

There's a better quality version of the above on Facebook. "Margaret thatcher turns thespian with the cast of Yes Minister".
 
Elan Vital said:
uk 75 said:
Something I left out of my first post was ground based air defence. BAOR had no Gepards unlike its Belgian, Dutch and W German colleagues. Starstreak on a tracked vehicle was the alternative but arrived too late. Tracked Rapier like Challenger was an Iranian vehicle shoehorned into Europe.
Click to expand...
Yep. Only so much can be done about it with the mismanaged British economy and military industry, and even in a poor 70's economy, a better managed MIC could still have worked better through better exports of more competitive equipment. The BAOR should have just got Tracked Rapier on a Stormer chassis back when the latter vehicle was prototyped by MVEE in 1976.
I am not convinced that Chieftain/Challenger really got us anywhere for all the money spent on them. An improved Centurion could have been made as good as Leopard 1 and M60A1. Choosing between M1 and Leopard2 I would have joined the Dutch and bought Leopard 2 in the 80s.
Click to expand...
Well, the UK could have done much better than it historically did with less mismanagement, but I agree that by the time they contemplated Challenger 1 they should have just acquired a M1 or Leo 2 license, which was offered (and was offered for the Chieftain replacement Challenger 2 had been designed for), and the British Army really wanted Leopard 2 instead of CR2. They were both more mature than CR1 and better than either CR1 or CR2, especially since they kept less from their predecessors than CR1 and 2 kept from Chieftain. And you get the bonus of commonality with your allies.

The British historically brought up the argument of "keeping local production and design capacity" or "they do not perfectly meet our reqs", but neither argument really works given that the US and Germany offered very favourable license agreements with the possibility to design British upgrades for them and the UK killed its tank industry anyway with no compensation OTL. And for the second argument, well the British could design upgrades for M1 and Leo 2 to meet said reqs (FCS and optics for M1, armor for both although Burlington really wasn't as efficient as US and German armor and the Challengers were barely adequate and competitive only because they were heavier) already but at least they wouldn't have to pay and wait for the "perfect I swear" British tank like MBT-80, and could design upgrades only for areas they really want to change while they don't need to pay for what is already mature.

I disagree about Centurion instead of Chieftain. The former can not truly match Leopard 1 and M60A1 without complete structural upgrades that would almost require new production, and if you produce something new you might as well go all the way to a new design like Chieftain. Upgrades without a complete rework will just leave you with a very weight-inefficient layout with some glaring deficiencies (not very ergonomic turret with the smallest turret ring of all 105mm NATO tanks, no optical rangefinder, slow for the armor it has), that is also worn out, and with some parts that are not as durable as new tanks.
Once again, the problem was not in making a proper replacement for Centurion, but in the UK deciding on technical solutions that were poor either in hindsight or already compared to contemporary tanks, or cheapening out on bad worksmanship and some parts. The same problems would have been found in a Centurion upgrade done by the same UK.

My recollection is that only Italy fitted its M109 with FH70 barrels. Not bothering with FH70 and AS90 would have allowed us to have improved M109s across all BAOR and dispose of Abott.
Click to expand...
No, the Germans also mounted the FH70 on their M109s, and Norway bought the German upgrade. AS90 might have been valuable but only if the UK had been more agressive with keeping it up to date and exporting it (like the Korean K9 or the German Pzh 2000). Otherwise it was just a hull that wasn't standard with anything in the British or foreign fleets. I disagree about FH70 as it was quite commercially successful and better than any foreign option of the time, and NATO really was bad enough at artillery that it needed a winner like FH70.
Warrior with its 30mm Rarden certainly came into its own in the Gulf Wars and in Yugoslavia in the 90s.
Click to expand...
The one thing I dislike about it is that it should have entered service in the 70s when an unstabilized Rarden and image intensifiers were not so outdated. By the late 80s more modern IFVs that could mount a properly automatic, stabilized and more powerful 30mm Bushmaster were just around the corner and the rationale for Rarden really no longer worked, and it barely did as is in the 70s.




Again, the gist of it is that you either want a UK that manages its own military industry better or at least you want it to be more efficient at buying foreign. I would point out however that foreign wasn't always financially better even if it in mass production outside of Britain, due to the recurrent lack of dollars in the British reserves.
Click to expand...
Having served as a infantryman, FV432 driver and a Milan ATGW No 1 (so the firer) in BOAR from 1978 to 1982 I would not disagree with most of comments equipment wise above; although I will mildly below and come up with some of my own ideas.

I always was greatly concerned about the extremely thin armour of the FV432 APC we used, 1/2 inch on the front at most, so I remember when attached to a armour heavy Combat Team (CT) (1 platoon of infantry attached to a Chieftain Sqn - less the tank troop attached to the rest of our infantry Company as a Infantry heavy CT) we were always taught to tuck our FV432's in behind the assault troop of Chieftains in the assault - better them than us to be hit! Just not too close as if they decide to stop and reverse .................!

Interestingly by the early 80's the Chieftains seemed to have worked out most of their engine issues as it was rare to see one broken down, screaming along yes but mostly still going, and during a 'play with the other units toys day' the young infantrymen all wanted to transfer to the tanks!

The Warrior was/is a great vehicle, I was a qualified armoured infantry Platoon Commander later in my time, thicker than the FV432, a great gun (less the 7.62mm chain which was utter rubbish) and decent sights. However to have given it fully stabilised turret (and a better gun/ATGW as some countries did on their IFVs) would have have made the vehicle much more expensive and also mis-understands the role and manning of the Warrior. It was mostly commanded by young Corporals who, while mostly very good, had a lot on their plate; they had to command the vehicle, load the gun, and command their section while dismounted - a simple gun and a simple turreted system worked better than a all singing and dancing turret that would likely be more unreliable. The vehicle of course did get thermal sights later. The vehicle was at its best getting the troops to the dismount area, withdraw to a firing position or, if resistance was weak, provide fire support from the dismount area. We always withdrew and provided flank fire support if possible. Its still thinly armoured and is not a tank!

BTW for those wondering why no ATGM; it was preferred in the UK that dedicated ground based ATGM teams were better trained to ID the bad guys versus the young Corporal, and his Lance Corporal gunner, who already had enough jobs to do! AFV recognition was not every bodies favourite subject! And money of course!

To come to my point on this thread and what would I have preferred vehicle wise then its a far more thicker APC. A Chieftain based APC at the time would have been far better in many ways, I won't bore you with why in detail right now (unless you ask later), but I never understood why they put 4 guys behind the heavy armour of a Chieftain but 8-10 behind 1/2 inch on the FV432. Also while the Warrior was a great vehicle for peace support operations I was never convinced it would work in a peer on peer conventional conflict because of the thin armour (the Gulf wars were hardly peer on peer). The utility of the IFV in a general war scenario can be read about in the book below in more detail; the author thinks the IFV was not the right way to go about things and would likely suffer heavy causalities.

Battlegroup!: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War

So a tank based APC would be the ideal vehicle; at least one in every four (so one per platoon) could have a Marder type turret with a belt feed cannon but not all four; the rest could have a HMG/MG/GMG fired from within the vehicle. So get the Corporal and his section to the dismount area in one piece and let him do his job.

I was interested to read in the recent book Chobham Armour that the UK was planning to replace the Warrior in 2012 (yes really!) and one of the options was a Challenger Kangaroo (Kangaroo as in WW2 turretless Canadian built Ram tanks used as APCs); not clear if this was converted Challenger 1 or new builds.

Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development

Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development: Amazon.co.uk: William Suttie: 9781472855268: Books

Buy Chobham Armour: Cold War British Armoured Vehicle Development 1 by William Suttie (ISBN: 9781472855268) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.
www.amazon.co.uk

BTW wheeled APC's are great for light mechanised units and peace support operations but it has to be tracked and have heavy armour for conventional conflicts. Any thing else is barmy; I commanded a Saxon platoon as a SNCO so I know trust me!

Happy to discuss more of my thoughts if anybody is interested; but go easy on me please.

Regards, VikingTank.
 
Nice post VikingTank, I’m just about to read Battlegroup! and Chobham Armour myself and have started to think an APC with MBT level armour is a better option than a IFV with a fancy turret.

I’ve flicked through both books and believe the Chobham Armour book has a table in it that states the cost of the turret in a IFV is 33% of the total.

I think there is definitely an argument that IFV turret money would be better spent on MBT level armoured APCs which can carry a full section (12 soldiers?) and more Main Battle tanks in general! 30mm or bigger autocannons should have found a place on self propelled anti-aircraft tanks which of course can take out ground targets also.

My ideal BAOR frontline equipment list would be -
- considerably more Chieftain/Challenger/MBT80 level tanks.
- a self propelled anti-aircraft turret version of the MBT with heavy cannon and missiles. Cannon must have high elevation and low depression for fighting in built up areas or trench clearing. Maybe give it a secondary anti-tank missile capability too.
- an APC with MBT level armour able to carry a full 12 soldier section and kit. Armament could be anything from 7.62mm machine guns to remote weapons stations with missiles. The APC would have as much in common with the MBT hull and drivetrain as possible. Variants would include ambulance, command post, recovery, engineer, mortar, load carrier and bridging versions. Self-propelled artillery and MLRS versions too obviously.

Hopefully there would be great economies of scale to be had from the increase in vehicles with a common drivetrain. The savings would need to be spent improving the logistics abilities and war material reserve of the BAOR.
 
I highly recommend Never Ready by Kenton White to anyone with an interest in how the BAOR and UK armed forces would have faired if the Cold War had turned hot.

Never Ready | Europe@War | Helion & Company

Never Ready, Europe@War - just one of the military history books available from Helion & Company.
www.helion.co.uk www.helion.co.uk
"This is a fascinating if stark and very sobering analysis of Britain's Defence capability during the period and provides clear evidence of the failure to align higher level policy and plans with resources and budgets. I do not doubt that many who served, especially in more senior posts, during this period will find this a familiar if somewhat depressing summary of their Cold War service on the north German Plain and of life in staff appointments endlessly drafting "impact statements" in response to proposed cuts. There are many stark lessons here for today's Government Ministers and Defence Staff and it is highly recommended." Cliver Elderton, Military Historical Society, Autumn 2022
Click to expand...
 
This was proved when it took the whole of BAOR to send one Division to Kuwait in 1991 and even then we had to scrounge equipment off allies like Belgium.
The organisational acrobatics necessary to maintain the pretence that BAOR had enough Divisions to meet UK commitments under the WEU Treaty are well known and documented.
And yet it was the one postwar commitment that was so binding that the Royal Navy had to be gutted in 1981 to maintain it alongside the Nuclear Deterrent and the Air Defence of the UK.
 
uk 75 said:
This was proved when it took the whole of BAOR to send one Division to Kuwait in 1991 and even then we had to scrounge equipment off allies like Belgium.
The organisational acrobatics necessary to maintain the pretence that BAOR had enough Divisions to meet UK commitments under the WEU Treaty are well known and documented.
And yet it was the one postwar commitment that was so binding that the Royal Navy had to be gutted in 1981 to maintain it alongside the Nuclear Deterrent and the Air Defence of the UK.
Click to expand...
It's fairly ironic that Northern Germany had to be protected by the permanently cash-strapped and unbalanced British, BENELUX and Danish forces against the main Soviet push while the "well-funded" and heavy (depends on the exact timeframe) US forces were happily sitting further South near Fulda which was more easily defensible and where the Warsaw Pact didn't intend to push as heavily.
Meanwhile, you had the Canadians wasting a limited budget on an airmobile brigade that was anything but fast, and an understrength brigade, neither of which were really optimal for the intended theater. NATO in general was overcommitting to Norway when ironically the Soviets at best intended to probe the place by D+30 if the situation was favourable (that's hindsight obviously).

Perhaps, it might have been best to have at least most of the American forces in Germany set in the North where their strong cavalry, air cav and airforce could shine and blunt the Soviet armored offensive, covered by a smaller but more balanced and better equipped BAOR, a Canadian force consolidated into a single Division with an Air Component optimized for war in Europe rather than peacekeeping ops (LOOKING AT YOU CF-116) and the BENELUX and Danish forces (best if you can help the Dutch forward deploy part of their forces in Germany as was demanded). Meanwhile the Germans could then bring their center of gravity further South to cover Fulda. Bonus point is that the long term American sea-borne reinforcements would arrive even closer to where they are needed now.
 
Part of the Opening Post
uk 75 said:
In his seminal World War 3 books General Hackett argued for the creation of a second UK Corps in Germany.
Click to expand...
So far the thread has been about improving the equipment. Is a larger BAOR allowed? I.e. National Service isn't abolished and BAOR isn't cut from 85,000 to 55,000 men?

After completing their 2 years with the colours National Servicemen had to serve for a number of years in the reserves. I don't know the fine details but in the 1950s the plan was to reinforce BAOR with a number of TA divisions.

According to Watson & Rinaldi the TA was set up in 1947 with 2 armoured divisions (49th & 56th), 6 infantry divisions (42nd, 43rd, 44th, 50th, 51st/52nd & 53rd) and an airborne division (16th) along with a few independent brigades. However, they also say that by the end of 1955 only 2 were still tasked as NATO reinforcements and the others were organised for home defence. The airborne division was reduced to a brigade (44th) in 1956 and an extra infantry division (54th) was created from two of the independent infantry brigades. Further, reductions in 1961 saw the elimination of the remaining (independent) armoured brigades. There was also the Army Emergency Reserve (AER) that provided a pool of men to bring the Regular Army up to its War Establishment and provide a pool of men to replace casualties.

Then there were the massive cuts of April 1967 that saw the TA & AER merged into the Territorial Army & Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) and apart from the airborne brigade (disbanded in 1977) there were no tactical units above the battalion level. I don't know much about the 1970s other than a number of TAVR units did have a BAOR reinforcement role and I'm guessing that most of them became part of 2nd Infantry Division in the 1980s.

I appreciate that the extra expense of maintaining a larger active and reserve army after the 1957 Defence Review would mean a large increase in the percentage of GNP spent on defence and/or a better performing British economy. Therefore, I'm assuming in advance that a larger BAOR in peace and a larger TA & AER (and their successors) to reinforce it in war isn't allowed. However, if one doesn't ask one doesn't find out.
 
SteveO said:
Nice post VikingTank, I’m just about to read Battlegroup! and Chobham Armour myself and have started to think an APC with MBT level armour is a better option than a IFV with a fancy turret.

I’ve flicked through both books and believe the Chobham Armour book has a table in it that states the cost of the turret in a IFV is 33% of the total.

I think there is definitely an argument that IFV turret money would be better spent on MBT level armoured APCs which can carry a full section (12 soldiers?) and more Main Battle tanks in general! 30mm or bigger autocannons should have found a place on self propelled anti-aircraft tanks which of course can take out ground targets also.

My ideal BAOR frontline equipment list would be -
- considerably more Chieftain/Challenger/MBT80 level tanks.
- a self propelled anti-aircraft turret version of the MBT with heavy cannon and missiles. Cannon must have high elevation and low depression for fighting in built up areas or trench clearing. Maybe give it a secondary anti-tank missile capability too.
- an APC with MBT level armour able to carry a full 12 soldier section and kit. Armament could be anything from 7.62mm machine guns to remote weapons stations with missiles. The APC would have as much in common with the MBT hull and drivetrain as possible. Variants would include ambulance, command post, recovery, engineer, mortar, load carrier and bridging versions. Self-propelled artillery and MLRS versions too obviously.

Hopefully there would be great economies of scale to be had from the increase in vehicles with a common drivetrain. The savings would need to be spent improving the logistics abilities and war material reserve of the BAOR.
Click to expand...
Both books are a really good read; Battlegroup (if you want a spoiler) explains the authors angle on IFV's from page 122 onwards to about 128. Chobham Armour has some detail on the many failed armoured projects and options for the UK; as always in the UK army lots of great ideas either binned along the war or badly put into practise. My only critique of the book is it left me hankering for more detail (especially MBT80) and more images/drawings.

Good to see we agree on the heavy APC concept and, as is well known, the Israeli Army is a big fan; in fact they are now converting redundant Merkava 2 tanks into command/signals variants as they have found that a thin M113 type command vehicle is now under just as much threat as the tank/IFV in the front lines. If the 'front lines' is now still a relevant term with the current, and future, weapons about. And as you say all the supporting variants of the tanks based APC.

It is worth noting that I was 'in the weeds' at the time, I had no idea what Brigade I belonged to, what Division or what the Divisional task was (I did later); I just knew where to go and did a hole initially and was well trained to react to events as required!

To get us back on thread at the time in the infantry platoon we had 3 x 8-10 man sections (a GPMG MG group and a rifle/Carl Gustaf 84 mm RCL group) and a Platoon Commanders/Sergeants Group. So 4 vehicles with one for the Platoon Commander in the platoon. And 3 platoons to a company and 4, later, 3, infantry companies to a battalion (plus of course recce/ATGW/MMG/ mortar/admin support companies/platoons etc). With the MG and the RCL being in the sections, and with all the ammo for both, the sections did not move fast especially with a respirator (gas mask) on!

At one stage somebody came up with a 'rule of fours' concept so that there would be a minimum of 4 groupings at every level (4 sections/4 platoons/4 companies etc) and this seemed to be a valid concept which gave each level an extra reserve for unexpected events; like all good ideas it was talked about a lot but never enacted.

So what would I have wanted? The heavy tank based APC with a remote HMG/MG station with a dedicated gunner/vehicle commander (for when the infantry section and its commander dismounts) with 4 sections to a Platoon in 5 vehicles. The 4 section vehicles each with a dedicated 8 man infantryman section and also a dedicated anti-tank (AT) or light role MG team of 2 (so 2 teams of each in each platoon) and lastly the platoon commanders IFV vehicle with the Marder type auto cannon for HE support/anti-enemy IFV. The larger sized tank based APC would then have a crew of 8 infantryman including the section commander, a driver, a dedicated vehicle commander/gunner and a 2 man AT or MG team = 12. The Platoon Commanders vehicle could of course carry extra AT or light role MG teams. Simples!

There is much detail on this idea and others in a book called Mechanized Infantry - Hardcover – 1 Jun. 1980. An old book but a great read and still relevant.

Mechanized Infantry: Amazon.co.uk: Simpkin, Richard: 9780080270302: Books

Buy Mechanized Infantry by Simpkin, Richard (ISBN: 9780080270302) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.
www.amazon.co.uk

BAOR did badly need a tank based anti-aircraft gun system, as you say, but I would not agree (nor would the operator the Royal Artillery) with it having a secondary ground support role; keep it for its primary role and save its very expensive systems for the anti-air role. However the tank units could do with a tank support vehicle, similar to the Russian BMPT tank support vehicle, see below, with cannon and ATGW; 1 to a troop or 1 troop to a Sqn; all on the same tank/IFV/AA gun etc chassis.

1673176120076.jpeg

The next change that would have improved the 'in the weeds capability' is mixed units, the Israelis do this now, with a fully formed Battlegroup of a mixture of tanks and IFVs in the same unit; so this would give us 4 Combat Teams/Company/Sqn groups in the Battalion/Regt each with tanks and IFVs. They are then ready and waiting, with no regrouping of 2 separate tank/APC or IFV units each with different SOPs etc to carry out their tasks. Its simple actually its just the British regimental system would never allow this; its a Tank Regt or a an Infantry Battalion and the 2 must never meet unless really, really important!

There is much more I could say but I have blathered on enough I think for now. Regards Viking Tank.
 
Last edited:
SteveO said:
I highly recommend Never Ready by Kenton White to anyone with an interest in how the BAOR and UK armed forces would have faired if the Cold War had turned hot.

Never Ready | Europe@War | Helion & Company

Never Ready, Europe@War - just one of the military history books available from Helion & Company.
www.helion.co.uk www.helion.co.uk
"This is a fascinating if stark and very sobering analysis of Britain's Defence capability during the period and provides clear evidence of the failure to align higher level policy and plans with resources and budgets. I do not doubt that many who served, especially in more senior posts, during this period will find this a familiar if somewhat depressing summary of their Cold War service on the north German Plain and of life in staff appointments endlessly drafting "impact statements" in response to proposed cuts. There are many stark lessons here for today's Government Ministers and Defence Staff and it is highly recommended." Cliver Elderton, Military Historical Society, Autumn 2022
Click to expand...
Click to expand...
Hi SteveO,
Yes read this book last year, a rather dry read, but as you imply a very depressing read although full of interesting info. I found it so depressing, remember I was in BOAR, that I cannot bring myself to read it again; for ref only in future! Lets hope some of our current and future politicians read it!
Regards, VikingTank.
 
uk 75 said:
This was proved when it took the whole of BAOR to send one Division to Kuwait in 1991 and even then we had to scrounge equipment off allies like Belgium.
The organisational acrobatics necessary to maintain the pretence that BAOR had enough Divisions to meet UK commitments under the WEU Treaty are well known and documented.
And yet it was the one postwar commitment that was so binding that the Royal Navy had to be gutted in 1981 to maintain it alongside the Nuclear Deterrent and the Air Defence of the UK.
Click to expand...
Hi uk75,
Its a good job that the Russians did not decide to play silly buggers in 1990/1991 during Gulf War 1 as there was not much of a British Army left in northern Germany in the UK area. And as you say the 1981 RN cuts almost lost us, and may have caused, the Falklands war.
Regards, VikingTank.
 
NOMISYRRUC said:
Part of the Opening Post
uk 75 said:
In his seminal World War 3 books General Hackett argued for the creation of a second UK Corps in Germany.
Click to expand...
So far the thread has been about improving the equipment. Is a larger BAOR allowed? I.e. National Service isn't abolished and BAOR isn't cut from 85,000 to 55,000 men?

After completing their 2 years with the colours National Servicemen had to serve for a number of years in the reserves. I don't know the fine details but in the 1950s the plan was to reinforce BAOR with a number of TA divisions.

According to Watson & Rinaldi the TA was set up in 1947 with 2 armoured divisions (49th & 56th), 6 infantry divisions (42nd, 43rd, 44th, 50th, 51st/52nd & 53rd) and an airborne division (16th) along with a few independent brigades. However, they also say that by the end of 1955 only 2 were still tasked as NATO reinforcements and the others were organised for home defence. The airborne division was reduced to a brigade (44th) in 1956 and an extra infantry division (54th) was created from two of the independent infantry brigades. Further, reductions in 1961 saw the elimination of the remaining (independent) armoured brigades. There was also the Army Emergency Reserve (AER) that provided a pool of men to bring the Regular Army up to its War Establishment and provide a pool of men to replace casualties.

Then there were the massive cuts of April 1967 that saw the TA & AER merged into the Territorial Army & Volunteer Reserve (TAVR) and apart from the airborne brigade (disbanded in 1977) there were no tactical units above the battalion level. I don't know much about the 1970s other than a number of TAVR units did have a BAOR reinforcement role and I'm guessing that most of them became part of 2nd Infantry Division in the 1980s.

I appreciate that the extra expense of maintaining a larger active and reserve army after the 1957 Defence Review would mean a large increase in the percentage of GNP spent on defence and/or a better performing British economy. Therefore, I'm assuming in advance that a larger BAOR in peace and a larger TA & AER (and their successors) to reinforce it in war isn't allowed. However, if one doesn't ask one doesn't find out.
Click to expand...
Hi NOMISYRRUC,
Thanks some really interesting info there; I did not know most of that.

Personally I would have rather seen any extra money spent on better and more kit for the then (so my time in BAOR 1978-82 and as a re-enforcement later) 55,000 troops and their re-enforcing troops from the UK. If I could only explain to you the unbelievably poor kit we had at the time; from our boots, our uniforms, our load carrying gear to our vehicles etc it would make your hair stand on end! And the shortages of everything; on the more funny side I remember eating tinned rice pudding made in 1945 in 1982. I was happy as we were ordered not to eat it so I had loads from the other vehicles in the Platoon; tough stomach you see!

But yes I would love to hear your ideas on the higher level strength and formations; I was always concerned (mostly in hindsight) about the Spetsnaz threat to our HQ's/ammo depots etc which really needed dedicated protection units and hunter units to prevent the Spetsnaz attacks.
Regards, VikingTank.
 
Last edited:
Elan Vital said:
uk 75 said:
This was proved when it took the whole of BAOR to send one Division to Kuwait in 1991 and even then we had to scrounge equipment off allies like Belgium.
The organisational acrobatics necessary to maintain the pretence that BAOR had enough Divisions to meet UK commitments under the WEU Treaty are well known and documented.
And yet it was the one postwar commitment that was so binding that the Royal Navy had to be gutted in 1981 to maintain it alongside the Nuclear Deterrent and the Air Defence of the UK.
Click to expand...
It's fairly ironic that Northern Germany had to be protected by the permanently cash-strapped and unbalanced British, BENELUX and Danish forces against the main Soviet push while the "well-funded" and heavy (depends on the exact timeframe) US forces were happily sitting further South near Fulda which was more easily defensible and where the Warsaw Pact didn't intend to push as heavily.
Meanwhile, you had the Canadians wasting a limited budget on an airmobile brigade that was anything but fast, and an understrength brigade, neither of which were really optimal for the intended theater. NATO in general was overcommitting to Norway when ironically the Soviets at best intended to probe the place by D+30 if the situation was favourable (that's hindsight obviously).

Perhaps, it might have been best to have at least most of the American forces in Germany set in the North where their strong cavalry, air cav and airforce could shine and blunt the Soviet armored offensive, covered by a smaller but more balanced and better equipped BAOR, a Canadian force consolidated into a single Division with an Air Component optimized for war in Europe rather than peacekeeping ops (LOOKING AT YOU CF-116) and the BENELUX and Danish forces (best if you can help the Dutch forward deploy part of their forces in Germany as was demanded). Meanwhile the Germans could then bring their center of gravity further South to cover Fulda. Bonus point is that the long term American sea-borne reinforcements would arrive even closer to where they are needed now.
Click to expand...
Hi Elan Vital,
In full agreement here; I think historically its where the Allies ended up in 1945 in Germany and thats where they stayed. Unless more funding was available to the UK, as you say, a smaller better equipped BOAR covering the US forces is a better idea. Above my pay grade but very relevant.
Regards, VikingTank.
 
Last edited:

Similar threads

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom