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If the Axis had known of all the gargantua being developed by the Allies in 1943/44, just as the Bombing Campaigns were disrupting their own output, they might have decided to pack up and go home. Saro Princess did not become metalwork until 1946, but was consuming "draughtsmen's" efforts. T.167 was authorised for prototype construction in 11/44, 57 sleepers or 94 seats. UK did both because we perceived 2 things: Transatlantic has a Blue Riband, luxury market; and "Empire" has a steady business market, tied to the Motherland. Nobody in UK worried in their minds about economy, or competition. Picture the picture-promenades of pre-War flying boats, cruising gently with night stops, all passengers on expenses.
US 1940/41 embarked on Very Heavy Bombers, Very Heavy Transports, which were actually Very Long Range: US enemies were far away. So to reach Japan, Germany, from Alaska, Maine, Big was needed. US made no distinction between Transatlantic and Empire routes: everywhere was far away. So they started B-29, B-32 (deploying both), B-33, B-35, B-36, JRM Mars; and troop/cargo transports: L-89, CV104, C-74, C-97, C-99.
So, what went wrong? Only B-29 and C-97 were significant; B-36 was not deployed until technology had overtaken it. Yes, hostilities ended with benefit of smaller types, but why did so few Giants see production? Because those Wright and Pratt radials, on structure well-pressurised, with invisible, dull, efficient mechanical components ("rotables")...worked fabulously (after some teething!), economically, reliably. DC-6 and L-749 were simply unbeatable.
Biggest Brabazon Committee mistake during its rundown in 1946 was to be less than supportive of Bristol/Lockheed Centaurus/L-849.
US 1940/41 embarked on Very Heavy Bombers, Very Heavy Transports, which were actually Very Long Range: US enemies were far away. So to reach Japan, Germany, from Alaska, Maine, Big was needed. US made no distinction between Transatlantic and Empire routes: everywhere was far away. So they started B-29, B-32 (deploying both), B-33, B-35, B-36, JRM Mars; and troop/cargo transports: L-89, CV104, C-74, C-97, C-99.
So, what went wrong? Only B-29 and C-97 were significant; B-36 was not deployed until technology had overtaken it. Yes, hostilities ended with benefit of smaller types, but why did so few Giants see production? Because those Wright and Pratt radials, on structure well-pressurised, with invisible, dull, efficient mechanical components ("rotables")...worked fabulously (after some teething!), economically, reliably. DC-6 and L-749 were simply unbeatable.
Biggest Brabazon Committee mistake during its rundown in 1946 was to be less than supportive of Bristol/Lockheed Centaurus/L-849.