Avro Arrow killed in the cradle?

[Archibald]

Marcel would be much more interested to slide an Iroquois into Mirage III arguably particularly in conjunction with the plans to put Iroquois into Mirage IV. If it could be fitted it would be giving Mirage III 19,350 lbf on dry thrust as much as an early Mirage 2000 had on afterburner. And with a lower specific fuel consumption.

Although you are getting into Mirage F3 size territory to properly fit the engine I think, Iroquois is closer to size and weight to TF30 than ATAR it seems to me. Still...

The largest engine ever swallowed by a Mirage III airframe was a JTF-10 / TF106 : the 1964 Mirage III-T. The airframe, notably the air intakes, clearly had reached their limits. Despite the massive power upgrade the plane did not flew faster than Mach 1.4, with truly atrocious compress stalls. One of them even led to a dead stick landing a bit short of Istres runway - and a rather stressed test pilot...

 

[Apophenia]

Diefenbaker came to power in April 1957. The decisions to develop CF-105 were under the Liberals of St Laurent who were in power since 1948. And you'd better get whatever Avro designs working by April 1957. Which for a presumably simpler one engine aircraft should be feasible.

Too true. And - as described - every military procurement becomes inherently political.

However, I was querying MadRat's claim that, in demanding two engines, AIR-7-3 was both "fallacious" and politically-driven.

Had Dief not cancelled the Arrow programme, I'm sure that - as you say - St Laurent et al would have desired a cheaper option. So, maybe 'Arrowgate' brings down 'Uncle Louis' long before his TransCanada pipeline controversy does in OTL?

 

[Lascaris]

The largest engine ever swallowed by a Mirage III airframe was a JTF-10 / TF106 : the 1964 Mirage III-T. The airframe, notably the air intakes, clearly had reached their limits. Despite the massive power upgrade the plane did not flew faster than Mach 1.4, with truly atrocious compress stalls. One of them even led to a dead stick landing a bit short of Istres runway - and a rather stressed test pilot...

And that's why I suggested something closer to Mirage F3 in size. If Mirage F3 can take TF30 then it can also take Iroquois. If anything the latter is both slightly shorter and has a smaller diameter.

 

[MadRat]

In what sense was AIR-7-3 a "political decision"? If it had been at all politically driven, the Diefenbaker Cabinet would never have allowed the RCAF to write such a risky and obviously expensive requirement.

Because two engines is not statistically any more safe as one, when it came to accident rates, in the time period. One engine failing was devastating during the timeframe. Today's fighters would still struggle to recover in such an event with far more reserve power to work with. There are some exceptions when it came to airframes devoid of all the sensors and ordnance, like on some of the trainers in that period. But for a long range and high performance fighter you are riding a performance edge that is unfavorable to limping home on one engine. If you have a single larger engine during the period the engine could be built for longer times between failures. So the engineering choice is higher mtbf in a bigger engine or a higher mtbf in two. The engineer would not have written the specification but the politician that represented an interest certainly would have. And the campaign slogan of two legs good, I mean engines, is nonsense unchallenged because it sounded right... was purely political.

 

[Archibald]

Just for the record... the Iroquois wasn't for the Vigilante-size Mirage IVA, but the B-58 size Mirage IVB. Which only had a very brief life (the year 1959) before C-135FR killed it: aerial refueling of smaller Mirage IVA, way to go.

Late 1958 SNECMA was unable to get a turbojet twice as powerful as Atar 9 (6.5 mt thrust, so 13 mt) to power that Mirage IVB. So they went shopping in the anglophone aerospace world, and brought back four options, each interesting in itself
-Medway (hello, Spey and all the related projects: also SAAB Viggen)
-Olympus (4 years before the Concorde deal)
-Iroquois (there we are)
-Pratt J75 (the winner takes it all...)
SNECMA took a J75 licence from Pratt and did nothing with it but some years down the road it drove it to the JTF10 & TF30 extended family (TF104, TF106, TF306)

We can imagine a scenario where late 1958 SNECMA takes an Iroquois licence for the Mirage IVB, then nothing happens for a few years and then - 1963: VSTOL (Mirage III-V + RB lift jets) then STOL, swept wings (F2 / F3) then that VG Mirage F2 variant, called Mirage G...

Note that the Mirage IV moniker between 1957 and 1960 covers a whole lot of aircraft designs. If Mirage IIIC = F-104, then Mirage IV designs covered different size and weights...
- F-105 (early Mirage IVC, 1956-57)
- Phantom (Mirage IVC, 1958 variant)
- Vigilante (Mirage IV-01 as flown, also Mirage IVA and even a shrunk Mirage IVM naval heavy fighter / light bomber)
- B-58 (Mirage IVB)

So an Iroquois could led Dassault to a F-105 type aircraft - right between the Mirage IIIC and Mirage IVA. Not sure however the AdA would have the budget to add it to its massive Mirage III orders (it got a total of 473 airframes).
Or maybe the Mirage IVC Iroquois can sweep away all the Atar - Mirage IIIs... kind of trading a F-104G air force for a F-105 one. Still single engine type for nuclear strike, but F-105 was a league above the lawn dart...

 

[Apophenia]

Because two engines is not statistically any more safe as one, when it came to accident rates, in the time period. One engine failing was devastating during the timeframe. Today's fighters would still struggle to recover in such an event with far more reserve power to work with. There are some exceptions when it came to airframes devoid of all the sensors and ordnance, like on some of the trainers in that period. But for a long range and high performance fighter you are riding a performance edge that is unfavorable to limping home on one engine. If you have a single larger engine during the period the engine could be built for longer times between failures. So the engineering choice is higher mtbf in a bigger engine or a higher mtbf in two. The engineer would not have written the specification but the politician that represented an interest certainly would have. And the campaign slogan of two legs good, I mean engines, is nonsense unchallenged because it sounded right... was purely political.

Okay. We obviously have different ways of defining what constitutes a "political decision".

AIR-7-3 was prepared under the Deputy Air Member for Air Plans (Plans), reporting to the Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshall Slemon. Cabinet (on the advice of its Defence Committee) then accepted the requirements as laid out in the final draft AIR-7-3.

So, does responsibility for your "political decision" rest with A/M Slemon (who accepted D/AMAP/P's twin-engine requirement)?

Or does responsible for your "political decision" rest with D/AMAP/P for making a twin-engine recommendation in the first place?

I'm thinking that, normally, the "political decision" would be seen as Cabinet's choice to accept AIR-7-3 as it was presented to them for approval. If so, then yes - the Diefenbaker Cabinet is responsible for accepting the approval by the Cabinet Defence Committee of D/AMAP/P's AIR-7-3 recommendations. I'm just not sure how that conclusion is helpful in any way ...

Personally, I'd love it if my MP was familiar with engine-out conditions. On the other hand, Canada has experience with MNDs who think they know more about fighters than the CAS does. It didn't end well.

 

[nintender-dorfin]

I don't see any real way the Arrow enters production.

A smaller, single engine design doesn't meet the requirements, so doesn't seem likely to usurp the Arrow as the offering.

That said, something with a single engine that splits the difference between the F-106 and Draken might have come close enough to be considered for both AIR-7-3 and a tactical fighter.

I feel like all in all, the Arrow was too ambitious and too specialized. Also; for what it's worth the Arrow looks to have among the worst cockpits ever, in terms of outward visibility. With Falcon missiles, no gun and that cockpit, if you encounter another fighter you might as well just eject.

 

[Apophenia]

...That said, something with a single engine that splits the difference between the F-106 and Draken might have come close enough to be considered for both AIR-7-3 and a tactical fighter.

I feel like all in all, the Arrow was too ambitious and too specialized. Also; for what it's worth the Arrow looks to have among the worst cockpits ever, in terms of outward visibility. With Falcon missiles, no gun and that cockpit, if you encounter another fighter you might as well just eject.

By definition, satisfying AIR-7-3 meant twin engines, so unless you can conceive of an economical tactical twin in the late '50s ...

Cockpit/visibility: Part of the problem with the Arrow was too much reliance upon radar guidance. As for ejecting, if the CF-105 is encountering fighter opposition over the boreal forests or High Arctic, Canada is already in serious trouble.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth I thought of the following a long time ago and have recently posted it in the "RCAF '46?" thread.

Alternative Vickers V.1000

The ALT-OR.315 and Specification C.132 were for a British equivalent to the Lockheed Starlifter, except the cargo bay had a wider cross section. It was effectively the Short SC.5/45 designed to meet ASR.364 but with Conway engines instead of RB.178s and I call it the Jet-Belfast.

One prototype and an initial production run of 29 production Jet-Belfast C.1 aircraft were built for the RAF instead of the 7 V.1000s that were ordered in the "Real World" and the 23 Britannias (built by Short's) for the RAF. This was followed by a second production run of 24-29 Jet-Belfast C.2 aircraft with more powerful Conway engines. These aircraft were built in place of the 10 Belfasts, 14 VC.10 C.1s and possibly the 5 Comet C.4s built for the RAF. That made a total of 54-59 aircraft (including the prototype) and the 29 Mk 1 aircraft might have been converted to Mk 2s.

Maybe the RCAF could have bought 24 of them in place of the 12 Yukons purchased out of 24 planned. They would be build in the UK with a 100% offset package or built under licence in Canada.

Or even do it as an Anglo-Canadian joint project. Which is why I'm reposting it here.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

According to "The Rise and Fall of Canada's Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968" by Bertram C. Frandsen cost overruns on the Arrow led to the number of Argus and Yukon aircraft being cut. If the Arrow is "killed in the cradle" they'd have been built in the numbers planned.

 

[riggerrob]

For what it's worth I thought of the following a long time ago and have recently posted it in the "RCAF '46?" thread.

Alternative Vickers V.1000

The ALT-OR.315 and Specification C.132 were for a British equivalent to the Lockheed Starlifter, except the cargo bay had a wider cross section. It was effectively the Short SC.5/45 designed to meet ASR.364 but with Conway engines instead of RB.178s and I call it the Jet-Belfast.

One prototype and an initial production run of 29 production Jet-Belfast C.1 aircraft were built for the RAF instead of the 7 V.1000s that were ordered in the "Real World" and the 23 Britannias (built by Short's) for the RAF. This was followed by a second production run of 24-29 Jet-Belfast C.2 aircraft with more powerful Conway engines. These aircraft were built in place of the 10 Belfasts, 14 VC.10 C.1s and possibly the 5 Comet C.4s built for the RAF. That made a total of 54-59 aircraft (including the prototype) and the 29 Mk 1 aircraft might have been converted to Mk 2s.

Maybe the RCAF could have bought 24 of them in place of the 12 Yukons purchased out of 24 planned. They would be build in the UK with a 100% offset package or built under licence in Canada.

Or even do it as an Anglo-Canadian joint project. Which is why I'm reposting it here.

Remember that during the 1950s, the RCN traded butter for guns … er … food stuffs for ships and airplanes.
The UK economy had been bankrupted by two world wars and they struggled to feed their people. Meanwhile, the Canadian economy was booming with Canadian farms producing more food than Canadians could eat.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Remember that during the 1950s, the RCN traded butter for guns … er … food stuffs for shops and airplanes.
The UK economy had been bankrupted by two world wars and they struggled to feed their people. Meanwhile, the Canadian economy was booming with Canadian farms producing more food than Canadians could eat.

And you also gave us Shane Rimmer, Lois Maxwell, Bernard Braeden, Bob McKenzie, Hammy Hamster (made by Canadians on the Isle of Wight) and (temporarily) Donald Sutherland & Christopher Plummer. Plus 400-odd Canadair Sabres, although Uncle Sam may have paid for them.

And forgive me for being blond (again) I don't understand what that's got to do with the opportunity for Canada to obtain a better strategic transport aircraft than the Yukon. They did buy the Viscount & according to Charles Garnder it was TCA's advice that helped to turn it into one of the UK's few commercially successful airliners. TCA was one of the two airlines that bought the Vickers Vanguard and BEA was so impressed by TCA's that they had their own aircraft converted to TCA's standard and according to Wood were the only confirmed customer (apart from the RAF & BOAC) for the V.1000/VC.7.

 

[riggerrob]

And you also gave us Shane Rimmer, Lois Maxwell, Bernard Braeden, Bob McKenzie, Hammy Hamster (made by Canadians on the Isle of Wight) and (temporarily) Donald Sutherland & Christopher Plummer. Plus 400-odd Canadair Sabres, although Uncle Sam may have paid for them.

And forgive me for being blond (again) I don't understand what that's got to do with the opportunity for Canada to obtain a better strategic transport aircraft than the Yukon. They did buy the Viscount & according to Charles Garnder it was TCA's advice that helped to turn it into one of the UK's few commercially successful airliners. TCA was one of the two airlines that bought the Vickers Vanguard and BEA was so impressed by TCA's that they had their own aircraft converted to TCA's standard and according to Wood were the only confirmed customer (apart from the RAF & BOAC) for the V.1000/VC.7.

Yukon was great for moving troops and bulk cargo, but ill-suited to carrying bulky cargo (e.g. trucks and AFVs) or dropping paratroopers.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Yukon was great for moving troops and bulk cargo, but ill-suited to carrying bulky cargo (e.g. trucks and AFVs) or dropping paratroopers.

I'm aware of that. Which is why I suggested that the RCAF be allowed to buy the ALT-Vickers V.1000/Jet-Belfast in your "Version of History".

 

[Scott Kenny]

So, requirements:

Canada has a LOT of real estate to cover. More than the US. But with the advantage that there's little need to cover the southern border or the West Coast (US interceptors in Alaska will provide a lot of the coverage you need). So the interceptors need to cover the Arctic coast and the Atlantic coast. Up to 200nmi from those coasts, once the ADIZ gets going. Plus, most of the Canadian air bases are in the south of the country, which pushes the range from launch base to point of interception further.

• This means a very long range interceptor, which by definition means a big aircraft.
• It needs to be supersonic, so it can get from whichever base to in front of the intruding aircraft before the intruder can launch weapons. (thankfully this is before supersonic cruise missiles)
• Engines kinda suck in the 1950s, we don't have any real stand-out designs for either reliability or power. This means needing two engines, if not more. (I'm considering a B-58 sized interceptor here.)
• As an interceptor, it needs weapons to deal with bombers, not fighters. I personally question the effectiveness of the AIM-4 series on even 1950s bombers. However, Active Sparrow just isn't possible, you cannot pack the electronics necessary into a 7" tube in the 1950s. So this means either SARH Sparrow or one of the heavy Falcons that developed into Phoenix. Or, if the US is amenable, AIR2 Genies and/or AIM26s to swat the entire formation. There's less critical infrastructure over northern Canada so it's somewhat better to use nuclear AAMs there instead of over the US. Alternatively, Talos upper stage, if you can stuff a big enough radar into the plane.

Honestly, the ideal Canadian interceptor is looking like the YF-12 Blackbird! Or at least a plane that could cruise at about Mach 2.4 or wherever the max sustained temp of aluminum ends up being, since titanium might as well be unobtainium in the West. And cruise for at least 2000nmi at that speed.

See also XF-108 and A-5 Vigilante.

 

[Apophenia]

Or, instead of building an interceptor the size of a bomber, Treasury Board simply coughs up cash to building more (and more substantial) Forward Operating Location bases 'North of 60' and the 'Hardship Post' wage bonuses to go with them?

Take that option and you're building lasting Arctic infrastructure (and a tradition of non-suburban basing nowhere near to the 49th) instead of ginormous interceptors even more likely than the CF-105 to be technical failures.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Or, instead of building an interceptor the size of a bomber, Treasury Board simply coughs up cash to building more (and more substantial) Forward Operating Location bases 'North of 60' and the 'Hardship Post' wage bonuses to go with them?

Take that option and you're building lasting Arctic infrastructure (and a tradition of non-suburban basing nowhere near to the 49th) instead of ginormous interceptors even more likely than the CF-105 to be technical failures.

Yes, but good luck prying that money out of Treasury without a VERY detailed cost comparison between "whole new air bases" and "ginormous interceptors"

 

[zen]

CAP and Interception are different missions with different outcomes.

Arguably like the Red Barrel musings in the UK, the Canadians ought to have looked at slower patrol aircraft with very long range radar and missiles.

And that mates nicely with the USN concept of the Missileer using Eagles.

 

[Apophenia]

... the Canadians ought to have looked at slower patrol aircraft with very long range radar and missiles.

And that mates nicely with the USN concept of the Missileer using Eagles.

In the aftermath of the Sparrow II débâcle, I doubt that the RCAF would be in a hurry to put itself back in the mercy of the USN. That said, if the F6D Missileer was the American answer, perhaps Canada should just update the CF-100 airframe for a similar role?

TB: After the Arrow collapse, Treasury Board would probably find projects that involved paving and base housing VERY agreeable.

 

[Scott Kenny]

CAP and Interception are different missions with different outcomes.

Arguably like the Red Barrel musings in the UK, the Canadians ought to have looked at slower patrol aircraft with very long range radar and missiles.

And that mates nicely with the USN concept of the Missileer using Eagles.

In the aftermath of the Sparrow II débâcle, I doubt that the RCAF would be in a hurry to put itself back in the mercy of the USN. That said, if the F6D Missileer was the American answer, perhaps Canada should just update the CF-100 airframe for a similar role?

TB: After the Arrow collapse, Treasury Board would probably find projects that involved paving and base housing VERY agreeable.

I also can't see the RCAF wanting to trust the USN for Missileer+Eagles.

Plus, remember that the Fleet Air Defense mission quickly evolved into a supersonic, dogfight-capable requirement. Supersonic to get into position quickly, so physically having (lots) more aircraft on patrol at one time may be an option for the RCAF.

Frankly, had someone just said "You can't pack an active radar into that size missile, stick with SARH" we probably would have seen the CF-105 completed and armed with Sparrows. Or you build bigger missiles. Much bigger missiles, ~1000-1500lbs each. That may have been a better option, having Canada build and prove ARH big missiles.

 

[Apophenia]

And ironically, the USN's SARH AAM-N-6 Sparrow III FOC pretty much coincides with the cancellation of the Arrow. True that the AAM-N-6 wasn't USAF/NORAD compatible - but the planned AIM-101 (later becoming AIM-7D) was.

So, dump the RCA Astra-1 set in favour of the Hughes MA-1 FCS (for USAF compatability) and stick with SARH Sparrow III missiles exclusively?

But, I'm drifting well clear of 'killed in the cradle' here ...

 

[Scott Kenny]

And ironically, the USN's SARH AAM-N-6 Sparrow III FOC pretty much coincides with the cancellation of the Arrow. True that the AAM-N-6 wasn't USAF/NORAD compatible - but the planned AIM-101 (later becoming AIM-7D) was.

So, dump the RCA Astra-1 set in favour of the Hughes MA-1 FCS (for USAF compatability) and stick with SARH Sparrow III missiles exclusively?

But, I'm drifting well clear of 'killed in the cradle' here ...

I mean, the RCAF needs some kind of interceptor. If you can't stop people from pissing in your yard, do you own it?

The Canadian options are:
1) Build bases north of 60 and use CF-100s till the CF-101 Voodoos come from the US, or
2) Build Arrows/similar large craft and operate from existing bases.

Part of being able to afford Arrows is someone with half a brain saying "You can't stuff an active radar into an 8" missile!" and stopping work on Sparrow II. Optionally, allowing work to continue on much bigger ARH missiles like Eagle, but getting Arrows into service with Sparrow IIIs/AIM-7Ds, then refitting Arrows with the bigger ARH missiles, though that requires the Arrow being able to lift some10,000lbs (4x Eagle/Phoenix class, 2x Sparrow, 2x-4x Sidewinder). Assuming that the Arrow will have a sufficiently big radar to track aircraft at long enough range to make Eagle-equivalents worthwhile, of course.

 

[zen]

How do I put this nicely....?

You can have ARH in a 8" diameter missile, but you're going to need to get the launch aircraft as close as 5nm from your target to give it a decent chance.

And that folks is why the Arrow be so.

Now say you opt for Red Barrel, air launched Thunderbird II and you need only get within 50nm of your target.....
And ideally you get a 100nm range radar/missile combo.

 

[Archibald]

That said, if the F6D Missileer was the American answer, perhaps Canada should just update the CF-100 airframe for a similar role?

And the CF-100 Mk.8 was exactly that, by June 1959.

 

[Archibald]

How do I put this nicely....?

You can have ARH in a 8" diameter missile, but you're going to need to get the launch aircraft as close as 5nm from your target to give it a decent chance.

And that folks is why the Arrow be so.

Now say you opt for Red Barrel, air launched Thunderbird II and you need only get within 50nm of your target.....
And ideally you get a 100nm range radar/missile combo.

Bingo. This is the range I red for Sparrow II, think it was in a Friedman book, perhaps "Fighters over the fleet". And on top of that minuscule range, the electromagnetic band (can't remember which "letter" I have to browse this very forum and that Archibald fellow informed posts, ha ha) is allergical to water vapor.
At the end of the day, plain old AIM-9B Sidewinder also provide a fire-and-forget early weapon of equal range, except with a seeker that works (on paper at least !)

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/first-generation-active-radar-missiles.36504/#post-437552

Seems I had a thread on that topic. A rather interesting discussion.

K-band, that's the one that can't stand water vapor. Annoying when flying inside Earth atmosphere: even more over Vietnam...

My understanding is that, with 1950 ARH technology, only K-band can get the antenna small enough to fit inside a 8-inch diameter Sparrow missile. And then - as @zen said, range is pathetic. Plus that water vapor allergy.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

What Canada really needed both at home and in Europe was the F4 Phantom.
Twin engined and with Sidewinder/Sparrow.
Rather like the RAF the domestic alternative would be as Phantomlike as possible.

www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no3/stouffer-eng.asp

The Search for a Tactical Air Support Fighter​

The search for a conventional role fighter aircraft, and the subsequent decision to purchase the CF-5, need to be understood within the context of Liberal Party policy with respect to their commitment to the nuclear strike role in Europe, and to the creation of an integrated military command structure, which was to be established on 1 June 1965. Liberal policy on the future of combat air forces for Canada’s armed forces was detailed in the 1964 Defence White Paper. As stated earlier, the emphasis was placed upon the need for mobile, tactical fighters that could perform conventional ground attack and surveillance roles.14 The RCAF had been tasked to review its aircraft requirements during preparation for this new defence policy statement. Later, on 4 August 1964, Hellyer directed his military staff to carry out a cost effectiveness study of known tactical fighter aircraft, and to make recommendations for an aircraft that would best meet the Liberal government’s air power criteria. What ensued was a selection process that put Hellyer at odds with his CDS, the RCAF, and, to a lesser extent, with senior public servants in the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Defence Production community.

In a memorandum to the MND dated 14 September 1964, Air Chief Marshal Miller echoed the views of the RCAF by strongly recommending that DND select the McDonnell Douglas F4C Phantom II aircraft from the list of tactical fighter aircraft under consideration.15 Of interest, but perhaps not surprising, given Hellyer’s years as Associate Minister in DND during the late 1950s, Miller tried to persuade his boss, based upon economic as opposed to operational grounds. Quoting the views of the Minister of Defence Production, Bud Drury, Miller pointed out that selection of a fighter aircraft needed to maximize employment in the Canadian aircraft industry. He brazenly suggested that the government order 108 Phantom IIs, and added that costs could be mitigated by taking advantage of an offer by the British government for a joint British-Canadian program to build the F-4 under license in Canada with Rolls-Royce Spey engines.16 These aircraft, powered by the British engines, were highly sought after by the Royal Navy. Miller and the RCAF clearly favoured the F-4 as a replacement for the CF-104 Starfighter, and for the CF-101 Voodoo air defence interceptor, but the CDS knew he had to justify the choice based more upon national industrial benefits than upon operational needs. “Selection of a cheaper aircraft than the F-4 would ease our financial difficulties but would not seem to assist Mr Drury in solving his problem (that of maximizing national aircraft production and employment.)”17

As is implied in his biography, Hellyer initially accepted Miller’s recommendation with respect to the F-4 because it was a suitable replacement for both the CF-104 and the CF-101 fleets, in addition to being suitable for a conventional attack role.18 However, he later concluded that this aircraft was unacceptable for the same reason it had been earlier rejected in 1959 as a replacement fighter for the F-86 Sabres and CF-100 Canucks of the Air Division – namely its prohibitive cost.19 Even pressure from senior members of Defence Production, who were as supportive of the joint Anglo-Canadian F-4 program as the CDS and the RCAF’s senior leadership, could not convince Hellyer to buy the Phantom II. As will be explained later, the MND’s options were clearly somewhat limited, given the direction of the incumbent Finance Minister, Walter Gordon. But Hellyer’s own actions indicate that his rejection of the F-4 was based as much upon his views about the air power needs of the RCAF as they were upon financial grounds.

There were two issues in Miller’s memorandum that ran counter to Hellyer’s views on Canada’s air power needs. First, the CDS once again unequivocally endorsed the demands of his old service for an expensive, multi-role fighter aircraft, instead of a less sophisticated but less expensive option designed exclusively for the conventional ground attack role. Second, Miller’s recommendation of the F-4 was to come at the expense of purchasing the de Havilland Caribou II medium transport aircraft. These aircraft were considered highly suitable for support of UN missions, a role that had been placed at the top of the Pearson government’s defence priorities. Equally important for Hellyer was that the Caribou was built by a firm located near his political riding in Toronto. If Hellyer had any faith left in Miller’s competence and his ability to remain unbiased in his role as the senior uniformed member in an integrated armed forces following the C-119/C-130 incident earlier in the year, this remnant of trust ended with the Miller’s subsequent recommendation to buy a high-priced fighter at the expense of yet another transport aircraft.

Hellyer’s next challenge was to mitigate any political fallout generated from not endorsing the popular F-4 Phantom II. He told Cabinet that a better opportunity to purchase this fighter had been squandered by the previous Conservative Government in 1959, when they decided to buy the CF-104 as a replacement aircraft for the Air Division. A subsequent 10-year financial commitment to the Starfighter left the Liberals no defence funds for the Phantom. In addition to attributing the existing poor financial state of DND to the Conservative’s decision to buy the CF-104, the MND also had to overcome the aforementioned strong lobby by the RCAF and the aircraft industry, which he felt were one and the same, to acquire the Phantom II. Hellyer would overcome these pressures, exerted by both the RCAF and from those within his own Party, by presenting the options before Cabinet in such a manner that he knew the outcome would go his way.

Hellyer offered Cabinet two options. They could either approve $215 million for the acquisition of six to eight squadrons of ground support aircraft, or they could approve an annual increase in the DND estimates of four per cent for the five-year period 1965 to 1970 if they insisted upon the acquisition of the F-4 RN (Royal Navy) for industrial reasons.20 Hellyer knew perfectly well that the latter option was not an option for a department that was already struggling to find funds to meet existing capital programs. He also knew that the senior officers representing the army and navy would not approve an expensive air force project that would have jeopardized their
own acquisition priorities.21

Notwithstanding Hellyer’s aggressive stance, it is important to understand that the Liberal government’s deliberations over defence were not entirely driven by the personal wishes of the Minister of National Defence. An important factor in his search for a cost-effective fighter aircraft was the insistence by Finance Minister Walter Gordon that the annual defence budget was to be held at $1.5 billion annually for three years. This ceiling was to be maintained in spite of Cabinet’s 1964 decision to increase the defence budget to an annual $2 billion, as recommended by the Conservative administration in March 1960. At the time, the increase was deemed necessary to pay for Canada’s increased commitments in support of NATO’s nuclear strike capability, as articulated in the Military Committee’s policy document (MC 70).22

In a memorandum dated 20 October 1964, Hellyer gave the CDS and the RCAF a strong indication that the F-4 would likely not be a fighter aircraft contender. The air power priorities for the new fighter were to be limited to the following conventional roles: close air support, interdiction, and reconnaissance. Furthermore, the potential areas of operation for this fighter, as documented by the MND, were to be those supporting United Nations missions, not taskings with NATO or NORAD.23 By 8 December 1964, Cabinet had not reached a conclusion concerning the future aircraft needs of the RCAF, but they did agree that the F-4 did not fulfill aforementioned force requirements. The next day, Prime Minister Pearson informed his British counterpart, Harold Wilson, that a deal for the joint production of the F-4 was off. And with this action, the opportunity for the RCAF to buy what would turn out to be one of the most successful and versatile combat aircraft produced in the West during the Cold War era evaporated. It also opened the door for the eventual acquisition of the CF-5.

In another memorandum dated 7 January 1965, Hellyer informed Miller of the Cabinet decision not to buy the F-4, and, further, that Cabinet had agreed to pursue a less costly tactical fighter, limited to close support of ground forces and one of lower performance than the Phantom II. The MND confirmed the government’s allocation of $215 million for a light attack aircraft that would best meet the government’s policy of “more balanced forces for employment in limited conventional war situations.”24 Furthermore, tactical fighters were no longer to be considered as replacements for the Starfighter and Voodoo fleets. Other than the now-eliminated F-4 Phantom II, the remaining light attack aircraft contenders under consideration were all American-designed aircraft: the McDonnell Douglas A-4E Skyhawk, the Grumman A-6 Intruder, the Vought A-7A Corsair, and the Northrop F-5 Freedom Fighter. Since much of the preliminary evaluation of these aircraft had already been completed, the CDS was tasked to provide his final recommendation by 15 February 1965.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

What if instead of the CF-105 Arrow Canada uses the money to become a full partner in the aircraft that the UK develops to the ALT-Spec. F.23/49 in the "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?" thread? That is the Phantom clone that I want developed instead of the Lightning and Sea Vixen. It would be purchased for the RCAF instead of the Starfighter, Voodoo and Bomarc missile. As it's already in production more might be built instead of everyone's least favourite Canadian fighter the CF-116 Freedom Fighter despite it being more expensive.

 

[Archibald]

Paul Hellyer was really a major asshole and idiot. Only McNamara came close.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In the "Could the UK have done a better job of maintaining carrier based air power?" thread I've suggested that doing a better job of managing the British aerospace industry is closely related to the UK doing a better job of maintaining carrier based air power.

Would Canada have benefitted from a better managed British aerospace industry? My opinion is yes it would. For one thing some of the companies were subsidiaries of British aircraft companies. One of the likely results is a better CF-100 Canuck which I think would have benefitted from the lessons learned from the German designed research aircraft and the Miles M.52 in Derek Wood's Scenario 1945. Would the lessons from them have also helped with the development of the CF-105 Arrow?

 

[riggerrob]

In a more radical “what if” scenario. A bankrupt Miles sells the M.52 prototype to a Canadian company giving Canada a lead in supersonic flight.

 

[Archibald]

This would help the CF-100, for sure. Gone are the massive jet pods on the flanks...

 

[Scott Kenny]

How do I put this nicely....?

You can have ARH in a 8" diameter missile, but you're going to need to get the launch aircraft as close as 5nm from your target to give it a decent chance.

And that folks is why the Arrow be so.

Now say you opt for Red Barrel, air launched Thunderbird II and you need only get within 50nm of your target.....
And ideally you get a 100nm range radar/missile combo.

Okay, so you're technically correct. A K-band ARH seeker can physically fit into an 8" missile.

But operationally, you can't stick an ARH seeker into an 8" missile in the 1950s, it just doesn't work.

So either stick with 8" SARH missiles, or plan on huge hecking chonk missiles in the 10-12" and 1000-1500lb class to give you 50+nmi range.

I think in general, whatever interceptor Canada chooses, it needs a 100nmi radar even if it's armed with 5nmi range Sparrow IIs and Sidewinders (or Falcons, ugh). Not enough precision radar coverage over the Great White North, even if RCAF built fighter bases up around Yellowknife etc.

 

[zen]

Well yes, the only state that built the sort of aircraft Canada needed to defend against Soviet bombers was.....

The Soviet Union.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Well yes, the only state that built the sort of aircraft Canada needed to defend against Soviet bombers was.....

The Soviet Union.

Ironic, isn't it?

Had Canada built some big, long range interceptors in the 1950s, that might have been enough to get the US to buy the Canadian interceptors in exchange for supplying the Canadians with missiles and radars(?) to put in the planes.

The funny question then happens in the 1970s: Does Canada make a new aircraft analogous to a MiG-31, do they buy F-14s off the shelf, or do they modernize the heck out of their late 1950s interceptor like the Tu-128? (yes, knowing the Canadian government's usual behavior, my money is on modernize. The Tu-128s hung on until 1990, so it's not terrible.)

 

[Lascaris]

Ironic, isn't it?

Had Canada built some big, long range interceptors in the 1950s, that might have been enough to get the US to buy the Canadian interceptors in exchange for supplying the Canadians with missiles and radars(?) to put in the planes.

The funny question then happens in the 1970s: Does Canada make a new aircraft analogous to a MiG-31, do they buy F-14s off the shelf, or do they modernize the heck out of their late 1950s interceptor like the Tu-128? (yes, knowing the Canadian government's usual behavior, my money is on modernize. The Tu-128s hung on until 1990, so it's not terrible.)

If you have actually built CF-105 then arguably it makes sense to replace the electronics wholesale in the 1970s instead of building new planes. There is nothing wrong with the airframe performance wise and its big enough with enough power output to fit the new electronics. So why not a modernization or even newly built aircraft? Likely rather cheaper than new aircraft.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

In a more radical “what if” scenario. A bankrupt Miles sells the M.52 prototype to a Canadian company giving Canada a lead in supersonic flight.

Strictly speaking Miles couldn't have done it because the M.52 prototype was government property, so Air Ministry or Board of Trade would have had to sell it.

 

[Apophenia]

... Would Canada have benefitted from a better managed British aerospace industry? My opinion is yes it would. For one thing some of the companies were subsidiaries of British aircraft companies. One of the likely results is a better CF-100 Canuck which I think would have benefitted from the lessons learned from the German designed research aircraft and the Miles M.52 in Derek Wood's Scenario 1945. Would the lessons from them have also helped with the development of the CF-105 Arrow?

I'd say that in OTL, Canada benefited hugely from a badly-managed British aerospace industry. With a few notable exceptions, most of the movers and shakers in postwar Canadian aerospace were ex-pat Brits. On the CF-100, a nationalist might argue that the Canadians involved - chief engineer Edgar Atkin and aerodynamicist Jim Chamberlin - knew what they were about. It was Mancunian import Jim Floyd who oversaw the design of those manky wing-attachment points. Just sayin'

The initial design sketches show that the CF-100 could have had almost any configuration that the RCAF wanted. What they asked for was a long-range all-weather interceptor. With that in mind, I'd say that the Canuck compared quite favourably to its contemporaries. For the US Northrop F-89, the remit was the same - demanding a GIB on the radar scope; twin-engines for reliability (as assumed at the time); and good, gentle flight characteristics to cope with inclement conditions and poor visibility. (Much as I love the Miles M.52, I really don't see it contributing anything to the art of all-weather interceptor design in 1946.)

Archibald: Those "massive jet pods on the flanks" turned out to be very handy in the 'productionization' of the CF-100. The prototypes were flown with Avons, the production types had locally-produced Orendas. The accepted story now is that the RCAF preferred the Orendas all along. Well possibly. Then again, as Sinéad O'Connor crooned so memorably, "I Do Not Want What I Haven't Got".

Since I've wandered off onto engines, power and performance figures for contemporary all-weather interceptors may be of interest. The CF-100, on 14,600 lbf total power, could hit 552 mph and had a range of 2,000 miles (1,170 without tip tanks). By comparison, the F-89 was almost 100 mph faster on less power (10,900 lbf total) but the Northrop's range was only 1,370 miles. Then compare with much more aerodynamically ambitious Gloster Javelin. The 'Drag Master' produced 24,600 lbf in full reheat - almost twice the CF-100's power. But - perhaps as a result of that afterburning - the Gloster's range was a paltry 955 miles.

My argument here is that the RCAF got what it asked for - a beautifully-handling all-weather interceptor with a fairly impressive range for the size of airframe. And, other than those wing joints, the 'Clunk' was built like a tank ... eventually proving to have 10 times the planned airframe life. Not a bad result for a bunch of Colonials and ex-pats!

 

[Apophenia]

If you have actually built CF-105 then arguably it makes sense to replace the electronics wholesale in the 1970s instead of building new planes. There is nothing wrong with the airframe performance wise and its big enough with enough power output to fit the new electronics. So why not a modernization or even newly built aircraft? Likely rather cheaper than new aircraft.

Agreed. In OTL, DND's New Fighter Aircraft Project was a political nightmare. Had Avro Canada still been extant (or were CF-105 airframes available suitable for updating), another MLU would have been in the offing and the NFA Project would have devolved into a CF-104 (and, gawd-help-us, CF-5) replacement programme.

The RW Air Force looked at the F-14 but, for an avionics & sensors upgrade, the F-15's kit would have won out - for NORAD compatibility (and Hughes continuity for the F-15's AN/APG-63 radar).

 

[uk 75]

The Tu 160 Blackjack is the aircraft that Western countries feared was coming when it saw the single Myasichev Bounder flying over Tushino.
A supersonic bomber threat would have justified something like the F108 Rapier or F12A with huge Hughes missiles.

 

[riggerrob]

… Much as I love the Miles M.52, I really don't see it contributing anything to the art of all-weather interceptor design in 1946.) ….

Agreed!
Miles M.52 was purely a research airframe, but it would have given Canadian engineers and earlier understanding of supersonic aerodynamics.